J. Philip Johnson

In Fuson v. Schaible, the ex-wife sought a money judgment for child support arrearages accrued between 1977 and 1981 under a 1976 divorce decree, after the children were adopted by her new spouse in 1981, which terminated further support obligations. The district court awarded $8,450 plus interest via a motion procedure and rejected the ex-husband's statute of limitations defense because it was not raised in his written response. The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that a motion is a proper procedure to reduce pre-1987 arrearages to judgment under the court's continuing jurisdiction, but the statute of limitations under N.D.C.C. § 28-01-15 applies to the original divorce judgment with the period beginning when payments were due and unpaid, subject to tolling provisions for minority that do not extend the claim here.

family lawprocedure

This case was a divorce proceeding in which Joseph Catlin appealed a North Dakota district court judgment that awarded permanent custody of the couple's son to Shannon Catlin (now Klein). The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed, concluding that North Dakota had subject matter and personal jurisdiction because it was the child's home state, that denial of Joseph's requested stay under the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act did not prejudice the final custody determination, and that the trial court's custody findings based on psychological evidence were not clearly erroneous. The court rejected Joseph's challenges to jurisdiction and visitation rulings, holding that service and the interim custody orders were valid.

family lawprocedure

The case involved Loren Otto challenging the probate of his father Walter Otto's will on grounds including undue influence by his sister Carol Lashman, who had moved in to care for their terminally ill father and received the bulk of the estate under the will. The trial court granted summary judgment to Carol, dismissing the challenge after finding that the will's attestation created a presumption of due execution that could only be overcome by clear and convincing evidence. The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed, holding that Loren's evidence—including medical records, an attorney's affidavit, and his own statements—raised genuine issues of material fact about undue influence and that the trial court had applied an unduly heavy burden of proof at the summary judgment stage instead of viewing evidence favorably to the non-movant.

family lawpropertyprocedure

This case involved Mildred Sellie, who was injured when struck by a luggage cart operated by a bus driver employed by Senior Citizens Recreation, Inc. (SCR), during a group tour. SCR's insurer had become insolvent, so the North Dakota Insurance Guaranty Association (NDIGA) assumed responsibility but denied coverage under a policy exclusion for bodily injury from a mechanical device (other than a hand truck) not attached to the covered auto. Sellie settled with SCR for $128,000 via a stipulated judgment to be satisfied only from insurance proceeds, then sued NDIGA for a declaration that the policy provided coverage and that the judgment was enforceable. The trial court dismissed the action, finding no coverage because the device was not a hand truck. The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed, holding that the stipulated judgment was valid and enforceable against NDIGA because there was no evidence of fraud or collusion and the settlement amount was reasonable under the analysis from Miller v. Shugart.

torts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory

The case concerned the scope of coverage under a commercial liability insurance policy issued by Hartford to Columbia Paint Company for claims arising from an explosion that severely injured two painters using Columbia's product in North Dakota. The painters and their families brought a declaratory judgment action to determine whether the policy's per-occurrence limit of $1 million applied separately to each injured party or whether a single $1 million aggregate limit covered all claims. The district court applied North Dakota law and ruled there were multiple occurrences, but the North Dakota Supreme Court reversed, determining that Washington law governed the policy interpretation because of the stronger contacts with the formation and administration of the insurance contract. Applying Washington precedent, the court held that the explosion constituted a single occurrence stemming from one proximate cause, so the aggregate limit controlled regardless of the number of claimants or theories of liability.

business & regulatorytorts & liability

The case involved a commercial dispute where Cooperative Power Association (CPA) purchased a large step-up transformer from Westinghouse for use in an electrical generating station. After a bushing component failed and damaged the transformer, CPA sought recovery in federal court under negligence and strict product liability theories for the resulting economic losses, which were limited to damage to the product itself. The North Dakota Supreme Court, answering a certified question from the federal district court, held that a manufacturer in a commercial transaction cannot be held liable in negligence or strict products liability for economic loss caused by a component failure that damages only the machine. The court's reasoning followed the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., concluding that contract and warranty law, rather than tort law, governs such claims when a defective product injures only itself in a commercial setting.

torts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory

In State v. Nodland, the defendant was convicted by a jury of driving with a blood alcohol concentration of .10 percent or greater after a blood sample was analyzed and reported at .18 percent. The trial court admitted the analytical report only after the State introduced a mid-trial certified copy of Form 104 detailing the approved blood-testing procedure, which had not been disclosed in advance despite the defendant's discovery request. The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed the conviction and remanded for a new trial, holding that the trial court abused its discretion by denying the defendant's motion for a continuance. The court reasoned that the surprise introduction of the new exhibit created an unforeseen need for the defense to cross-examine the testing chemist, and the lack of prior notice left the defendant without a fair opportunity to prepare or subpoena the witness.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Meyer, the State appealed a county court's order dismissing DUI charges against the defendant after the trial court excluded Intoxilyzer breath test results for lacking foundation to prove blood alcohol concentration as required by statute, then granted a judgment of acquittal when the State rested without additional evidence. The North Dakota Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the order was an acquittal based on insufficient evidence of a factual element of the offense rather than a purely legal ruling like quashing an information. Under N.D.C.C. § 29-28-07, the State may appeal only specified orders, and an acquittal resolving factual elements is not appealable, consistent with double jeopardy protections. The court declined to address the admissibility of the test record under N.D.C.C. § 39-20-07 due to the jurisdictional bar.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a wrongful death lawsuit brought by the father of Jason Dale against John Cronquist after Dale died in a 1988 rollover accident while driving a utility truck leased from Cronquist to his sons' farming partnership. The jury returned a verdict for Cronquist, and the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district court's judgment. The court held that the jury instructions correctly stated the law on an owner's liability for vehicle defects under a lease, which generally ends after the owner relinquishes control unless the owner agreed to maintain the vehicle or had actual knowledge of the defect at the time of the accident. The court further found that any error in instructing the jury on speed as a potential cause was harmless because the jury determined the steering defect did not exist at the time of the lease, Cronquist had no knowledge of it, and it was not the proximate cause of the death.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved Mary Jane Delorme, who had custody of her grandson under a tribal court order and had been receiving AFDC benefits and child care reimbursement until her income made her ineligible for AFDC. The North Dakota Department of Human Services terminated the child care benefits under federal regulations requiring eligibility as an AFDC family member, a decision initially reversed by the district court but appealed by the Department. The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the agency's decision directly and upheld the termination. It reasoned that the federal statute (42 U.S.C. § 602(g)(1)(A)(i)) and implementing regulation (45 C.F.R. § 255.2(a)) limit child care guarantees to AFDC-eligible family members, and courts must defer to the federal agency's reasonable interpretation of the statute when Congress has not spoken directly to the issue.

family lawfederal power

Brendan Kuklok appealed a district court judgment affirming a North Dakota Workers’ Compensation Bureau order that awarded him temporary total disability benefits, permanent partial impairment payments, and medical expenses for back injuries from two 1981 work accidents but denied benefits for psychiatric treatment. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that the Bureau’s finding of no causal link between Kuklok’s psychiatric problems and the accidents was supported by a preponderance of the evidence, primarily the opinions of Drs. Berg and McNairy attributing the issues to a pre-existing personality disorder rather than the work injuries. The court also rejected Kuklok’s due process claim, finding no substantial evidence of bias or unfair process by the Bureau.

labor & employmentprocedure

The case involved two defendants who appealed their DUI convictions in Fargo after conditional guilty pleas, challenging North Dakota statutes that criminalize having a blood-alcohol concentration of 0.10% or higher within two hours of driving. The defendants argued the laws were unconstitutionally overbroad and violated substantive due process by potentially punishing drivers whose BAC was below the limit at the time of driving but rose by the time of testing. The court affirmed the judgments, ruling that the statutes did not infringe on any fundamental right to travel and that there is no constitutional right to drink and drive. It held the two-hour testing window to be a reasonable means of identifying impaired drivers, noting that any inaccuracies from the delay affect both convictions and acquittals equally.

criminal lawcivil rights

The case involved a constitutional challenge to North Dakota statutes requiring overload fees for vehicles exceeding road weight limits to be deposited in the state highway fund rather than the common school fund. William Mills, owner of an overweight crane, stipulated to paying reduced charges but argued that the fees constituted fines that must go to schools under Article IX, Section 2 of the state constitution. The district court rejected the claim, treating the charges as civil penalties, and also denied Mills' request for an order compelling the Attorney General to investigate the Army Corps of Engineers' operation of Garrison Dam. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the constitutional reference to "fines for violation of state laws" does not include civil overweight charges, based on the ordinary meaning of "fine" as a criminal punishment and the statutes' language. The court further found no abuse of discretion in denying the investigation request due to insufficient evidence.

criminal law

The case concerned R.N., who had been under a continuing mental health treatment order since 1991 and was appealing two court orders modifying her care: one committing her to inpatient treatment at St. Alexius Medical Center after she stopped complying with medication monitoring and made threats, and a second transferring her from there to the North Dakota State Hospital. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed both orders. It held that clear and convincing evidence supported the hospitalization because R.N. had failed to follow the terms of her alternative outpatient treatment plan. For the transfer, a preponderance of the evidence showed it aligned with her medical needs, given her deteriorating condition at St. Alexius and the State Hospital's prior success in treating her.

civil rightshealthcareprocedure

In State v. Zeno, the defendant appealed the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief after pleading guilty to theft by deception for issuing insufficient funds checks and having his probation revoked for additional bad checks and a simple assault conviction. The district court had found a factual basis for the plea, competent representation by counsel, and no constitutional violations from the state's practices regarding NSF checks or selective enforcement. On appeal, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Zeno failed to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, an unconstitutional agency relationship or wealth-based classification in enforcement, or any other grounds for withdrawing the plea under Rule 32(d). The court reasoned that conclusory allegations were insufficient to overcome the presumption of reasonable professional assistance and that Zeno did not meet his burden to show manifest injustice or improper enforcement of the theft statutes.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Mary Wiedmeier's appeal of a North Dakota Department of Human Services decision finding her ineligible for AFDC benefits from November 1990 through July 1991 after she received a $2,964.58 lump-sum payment from the National Guard for an injury-related incapacity. The court affirmed the Department's ruling that Wiedmeier's caseworker had no duty to advise her of options to avoid the federal lump-sum proration rules. The core reasoning was that the vague and ambiguous information Wiedmeier provided about the expected payment did not constitute the specific facts that would trigger an affirmative duty under 45 C.F.R. § 206.10(a)(2)(i) to inform her of eligibility conditions or avoidance methods, distinguishing it from cases with clear "red flag" situations.

federal power

The case involved Patrick Woytassek's appeal of his conviction for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or with a blood-alcohol content of at least .10%. A deputy stopped Woytassek after observing erratic driving, conducted field sobriety tests and an Alco-Sensor screening test that Woytassek failed, arrested him, and obtained an intoxilyzer result over .10%; the trial court denied motions to suppress the test results and dismiss for lack of probable cause. The appellate court affirmed, holding that the stop was supported by reasonable and articulable suspicion based on the observed driving behavior, that probable cause for arrest existed from the officer's observations and tests even without the screening result, and that the relevant statutes on chemical testing and on-site screening did not conflict because the screening test serves only to establish probable cause for arrest and need not follow an arrest.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Purdy, three defendants were convicted by a jury of criminal trespass and physical obstruction of a government function after entering an abortion clinic with others, chaining themselves together with bicycle locks around their necks, and refusing police orders to leave, which took three hours to resolve with locksmith assistance. The defendants appealed their convictions, claiming error in the denial of motions to sever their joint trial, for a change of venue, and regarding a mistake-of-law defense based on efforts to enforce a state abortion statute previously held unconstitutional. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed, reasoning that joint trials were appropriate under court rules because the defendants' defenses were not mutually antagonistic or prejudicial, no actual bias from pretrial publicity was shown to require venue change, and the jury was properly instructed on the affirmative defense which it rejected.

criminal lawabortionprocedure

This case involved parents Aaron and Cindy Lapp, who sought boarding care payments from the Southwest Multi-District Special Education Unit to support their hearing-impaired daughter Lisa's attendance at the North Dakota School for the Deaf in Devils Lake while the family maintained ties to the Reeder district. The Department of Public Instruction and district court denied the request, finding that Lisa and her sister had established residency in Devils Lake based on the mother's relocation there during the school year. The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed, holding that the child's educational residency followed the father's legal residence in the Southwest district and that natural parents providing boarding care are not required to obtain family boarding home certification under state law. The court based its decision on statutory residency rules for school purposes, the constitutional guarantee of equal educational opportunity for handicapped children, and the federal Individuals with Disabilities Education Act requirements for free appropriate public education.

civil rightsfamily law

The case involved Western Gas Resources appealing a North Dakota Tax Commissioner assessment of the Oil Extraction Tax on field condensate recovered from natural gas in its gathering system and compressor stations before reaching the inlet receiver at its processing plant. The company argued that the condensate was not 'oil' under the statutory definition because it was not recovered 'on the lease' as required by N.D.C.C. § 57-51.1-01(3). The court affirmed the assessment, interpreting the statute to include such liquid hydrocarbons recovered in the gathering system before the plant inlet as subject to the tax, based on legislative intent and the distinction from later-recovered plant condensate.

taxesbusiness & regulatory