Harvey B. Knudson

The case involved a dispute between John Deere Company and its former dealer Nygard Equipment over termination of a franchise agreement, defaults on payments under a security agreement, and Deere's seizure and sale of equipment. Deere sought immediate possession of collateral valued at over $90,000 after alleging default, while Nygard counterclaimed for conversion, interference with business, and damages, asserting offsets, improper levy on excess property, and rights under North Dakota's farm machinery dealer statute. The court reviewed the dealership and security agreements, the Uniform Commercial Code remedies, a stipulation on indebtedness and credits, and the state statute requiring manufacturers to repurchase inventory at specified percentages upon franchise cancellation, determining the applicability of these provisions to the seizure and sale conducted by Deere.

business & regulatorypropertyproceduretorts & liability

This case involved wrongful death claims against American Motors Corporation (AMC) by the families of two women who died when their Rambler station wagon was rear-ended by another vehicle, causing the gas tank to rupture and the car to burst into flames. The plaintiffs alleged that AMC's negligent design of the vehicle caused the deaths. The trial court granted summary judgment to AMC on the grounds that a manufacturer has no duty to make an automobile accident-proof and that participation in collisions is not part of a vehicle's intended purpose. The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed, concluding that differing reasonable inferences could be drawn from the undisputed facts regarding whether the design created an unreasonable risk of harm, creating a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment, and it adopted strict products liability under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved an appeal by the State Highway Commissioner from a district court order that reversed the revocation of James Lund's driver's license. Lund was arrested for driving under the influence after a car accident, initially agreed to but then refused a chemical blood test at the hospital, later changed his mind after phone calls and sought to take the test about an hour later while still in custody, but the officer declined; Lund obtained his own tests later that evening. The Commissioner had revoked the license for six months based on the refusal under the implied consent law, and the district court had found no refusal occurred because Lund retracted it within a reasonable time. The Supreme Court of North Dakota reversed, holding that an initial refusal cannot be cured by subsequent consent within a reasonable time, as the statute contemplates prompt testing without unreasonable delay to ensure reliability and avoid administrative burdens on law enforcement.

criminal law

The case concerned the Commissioner of Insurance's revocation of Richard E. Evanson's resident insurance agent licenses after a complaint alleging violations of state insurance law, where Evanson requested but did not attend the hearing and the Commissioner issued the revocation based only on the complaint and notices without additional evidence or substantive findings. The district court voided the revocation order and remanded the matter for a hearing on the merits. The appellate court affirmed that decision, holding that the Commissioner's findings of fact were inadequate because they recited only procedural facts about service and nonappearance rather than establishing that Evanson had committed any of the wrongful acts listed in N.D.C.C. § 26-17-01.12 that would justify revocation, and that the statute and Administrative Agencies Practice Act both require explicit findings of fact and conclusions of law supported by evidence.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

The case concerned an appeal from a conviction for driving under the influence after the defendant was found asleep in the driver's seat of a parked but running vehicle on a public highway, with a breathalyzer test showing 0.22% blood alcohol and a blood test showing 0.23%. The defendant argued insufficient evidence of driving and improper admission of breathalyzer evidence due to lack of foundation regarding approval by the state toxicologist. The court decided that circumstantial evidence supported the finding that the defendant had operated the vehicle and that while the breathalyzer testimony and checklist lacked proper foundation, their admission was harmless error given the independent blood test results, leading to affirmation of the verdict.

criminal lawprocedure

This case arose from a 1971 rear-end automobile collision in which plaintiff King suffered a herniated disc requiring surgery, leading to ongoing leg numbness and activity limitations. King sued the Montzes in 1973; after their insurer failed to file a timely answer, a default judgment for over $27,000 was entered. The trial court denied the Montzes' motion under N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(b) to vacate the judgment. On appeal, the North Dakota Supreme Court reversed, holding that the insurer's misplacement of the summons constituted excusable neglect not imputable to the defendants and that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to set aside the default where a meritorious defense was presented and no substantial prejudice resulted to the plaintiff.

proceduretorts & liability

This case concerns the insolvency of R. F. Gunkelman & Sons, Inc., a public grain warehouseman in North Dakota, after which the Public Service Commission was appointed trustee of its assets under Chapter 60-04, N.D.C.C., to manage distribution to warehouse receipt holders. Secured creditors and the successor bankruptcy trustee appealed the district court's adoption of a referee's report, raising issues including the validity of warehouse receipts held by Agway and David despite no actual grain delivery, the classification of certain assets as grain for the trust fund, the secured parties' grain sales during possession, and the application of offsets. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district court's judgment in full, finding the receipts valid under the circumstances, upholding the asset classifications and sales treatment as reasonable under the statute's purpose to benefit receipt holders, and determining the offsets issue was either waived or properly resolved per statutory requirements.

business & regulatoryproperty

This case arose from a 1969 motor vehicle accident in which plaintiff Ray Wock alleged that defendant John Kuhn's negligence caused Wock neck injuries. After Wock signed a release at a repair garage and received checks for truck repairs and $300, Kuhn moved for summary judgment based on the release; the district court granted it and dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the North Dakota Supreme Court reversed, ruling that Wock could pursue rescission of the personal-injury portion of the release under N.D.C.C. § 9-09-04 within the six-year statute of limitations, because the release was severable, Wock raised triable issues of fraud in its procurement, and no restoration of consideration for personal injury was required.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved Curtis Hansen's attempt to appeal a small claims court judgment that had been affirmed by the district court; he tendered a notice of appeal to the supreme court within the deadline, but the district court clerk refused to file it based on the Small Claims Court Act's bar on further appeals under N.D.C.C. § 27-08.1-06. Hansen petitioned the North Dakota Supreme Court for a supervisory writ compelling the clerk to accept the filing. The court held that exercise of its constitutional superintending control over inferior courts was not appropriate here. It reasoned that an adequate alternative remedy existed via mandamus proceedings in district court and that no emergency or other exigency justified direct intervention, consistent with precedents requiring such conditions for superintending control.

procedure

Erling Haugland appealed the denial of his request to be reclassified from Interviewer II to Information Specialist II with retroactive pay by the North Dakota Employment Security Bureau and the Merit System Council. The district court affirmed the Council's decision, and the North Dakota Supreme Court upheld that judgment. The court reasoned that the Bureau properly reassigned Haugland duties matching his classification when a discrepancy was found, that job classification determines pay under the merit system, and that the Council's findings supported its conclusions that he was not entitled to reclassification. The Council acted within its delegated authority under the merit system laws.

labor & employmentprocedure

This case involved a dispute between the majority stockholder of a close corporation and a former minority stockholder over the legal effect of an agreement for the sale of 147 shares of stock. The plaintiff sold the shares to the defendant, who financed the purchase with a bank loan guaranteed by the plaintiff and secured by a pledge of the stock; the agreement provided that if the plaintiff honored the guarantee, the stock would be returned to him. After the defendant defaulted and the plaintiff paid the bank, the plaintiff sought to foreclose on the security interest, but the trial court dismissed the complaint. The appellate court affirmed, holding that the trial court's findings of fact regarding the parties' understanding and conduct were not clearly erroneous under Rule 52(a), even though prepared by counsel, and were supported by substantial evidence.

business & regulatoryproperty

This case involved a state highway commissioner's condemnation of 24.11 acres from an 80-acre tract owned by the Sauvageau brothers for Interstate 29 right-of-way, with an initial offer of $8,764. The landowners appealed the offer as inadequate, seeking compensation for the taken land plus severance and consequential damages to their remaining parcels, which were farmed together as a unit despite lacking full contiguity or single ownership. A jury awarded $39,677.75 in damages (including $12,657.75 for the land taken, $10,100 in severance damages, and $16,920 in consequential damages), and the trial court added costs, interest, and $10,304.78 in attorney fees for a total judgment of $51,654.98. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the statute permitted severance damages based on unity of use among the parcels and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney fees after finding the initial appraisal insufficient. The core reasoning centered on interpreting eminent domain statutes to allow consideration of the overall farm unit and on evidence showing the owners' counsel contributed to increased valuations.

property

Jack Luithle sued Jack Taverna, Jarold Frazer, Minot Livestock Auction, and Swift & Company for damages after his cattle herd contracted leptospirosis allegedly from 31 infected animals purchased to fulfill a feeding contract. The trial court granted summary judgment to all defendants, dismissing the complaint, but the North Dakota Supreme Court reversed. The court held that Rule 54(b) certification was unnecessary because the cross-claim became moot once the main claim was dismissed and all claims against all parties were resolved. On the merits, the court found that the defendants' supporting affidavits, depositions, and interrogatory answers failed to show the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, while the plaintiff's responses sufficiently indicated triable issues, requiring remand for trial.

proceduretorts & liability

The case involved defendant Larry Julson, who was charged and convicted by a jury in Cass County of unlawfully selling LSD to two individuals in violation of North Dakota's Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, after a change of venue from Ward County. Julson appealed his conviction, the denial of a new trial, and the denial of post-conviction relief, raising multiple claims including improper jury separation during deliberations, insufficient admonitions to the jury, prejudicial evidence, changes to cross-examination rules, and constitutional challenges to the statute's delegation of authority to federal regulations for defining prohibited drugs. The court affirmed the conviction, holding that LSD had been properly designated as a hallucinogenic drug under federal regulations incorporated into state law prior to the offense, that the statutory scheme did not constitute an unlawful delegation of legislative power, and that no prejudice resulted from the alleged procedural errors at trial. The decision rested on the finding that the relevant federal designations were effective when the state act was enacted and that the trial record showed compliance with procedural requirements without improper influences on the jury.

criminal lawprocedurefederal power

In Armstrong v. Miller, the plaintiff sought damages for her own personal injuries from a 1969 car accident, relying on a prior jury verdict that had found the defendants negligent and liable for her husband's wrongful death in the same collision. The trial court granted summary judgment on liability for the plaintiff based on collateral estoppel or res judicata. The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed, holding that the doctrines did not apply because the plaintiff had sued in a representative capacity under the wrongful death statute in the first action and was now proceeding in her individual capacity for her separate injuries, so she was neither a party nor in privity with a party to the prior judgment under the mutuality rule. The court reasoned that a judgment binds only parties or their privies and cannot be used offensively by a non-privy to preclude relitigation of negligence.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case involved eminent domain actions by the Municipal Airport Authority of Fargo against several members of the Stockman family to acquire their land, with disputes over the amount of compensation awarded by juries exceeding the authority's initial offers. The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the trial court's awards of attorney fees to the defendants, which were based on contingent fee contracts providing one-third of the recovery above the offers. The court affirmed the awards, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion under N.D.C.C. § 32-15-32, which permits reasonable attorney fees in eminent domain proceedings. The decision rested on the trial court's proper consideration of multiple factors—including the character of services, results obtained, customary fees, and the attorney's skill and ability—rather than relying solely on the contingent fee agreements, with evidence showing substantial verdict increases due to effective presentation of land development potential.

property

This case involved Leo Lumber Company's claim against First Federal Savings and Loan Association for an alleged promise by the lender to pay Leo Lumber for building materials supplied to a construction project from mortgage loan proceeds. First Federal had previously foreclosed on the mortgage in an action that included Leo Lumber as a defendant, where Leo Lumber asserted the priority of its mechanic's lien but did not raise the payment promise as a counterclaim. The trial court dismissed the current action on summary judgment, and the appellate court affirmed, holding that the claim was a compulsory counterclaim under North Dakota Rule of Civil Procedure 13(a) because it arose out of the same transaction or occurrence as the foreclosure. The court reasoned that the construction financing, material supply, and loan administration formed interconnected parts of a single transaction, making the failure to counterclaim in the prior action a bar to the present suit.

procedureproperty

This case involved a personal injury claim arising from a 1967 automobile accident in which plaintiff Andrew Lacy was struck while unloading equipment from a parked station wagon, due to brake failure on a car driven by defendant Henry Grinsteinner and owned by defendant Don Moe Dodge, Inc. The trial court, sitting without a jury, found both defendants negligent—Grinsteinner for operating the vehicle with inadequate brakes or failing to avoid the collision, and Don Moe Dodge for lending a high-mileage car without proper brake inspection or repair—and awarded Lacy damages. On appeal demanding trial de novo, the North Dakota Supreme Court reversed the judgment. It held that the evidence did not establish Don Moe Dodge knew or should have known of any brake defect at the time of delivery, as the foot brakes had functioned during prior use and any failure occurred suddenly afterward, and noted that a bailor is not liable for defects arising after delivery.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved the Fargo Public Library suing the City of Fargo Urban Renewal Agency for breach of contract after purchasing land for a library building where demolished structures had left rubble and debris in basements that required costly removal and proper backfilling before construction could proceed. The trial court dismissed the action, finding it controlled by a prior decision interpreting identical contract language as requiring only demolition to grade level. On appeal, the North Dakota Supreme Court reversed the dismissal, holding that the contract's terms obligated the Agency to remove all resulting debris and prepare the site for redevelopment under the urban renewal program. The court interpreted specific contract provisions on demolition, debris removal, and site grading as creating this duty and remanded for the Agency to present rebuttal evidence after the Library established a prima facie case.

propertyprocedurebusiness & regulatory

This case involved a claim for malicious prosecution brought by Anthony J. Schmidt against a supermarket and its manager after Schmidt was arrested on a warrant for issuing a no-account check signed by 'A. J. Schmidt.' The manager had reported a bad $20 check to prosecutors and signed a complaint based on a telephone directory search, leading law enforcement to mistakenly identify and arrest the plaintiff, who was later cleared after signature comparisons showed he was not the signer. The trial court awarded the plaintiff actual and punitive damages, but the Supreme Court of North Dakota reversed, holding that the defendants acted on an honest mistake in identity without participating in the arrest and that the plaintiff failed to prove lack of probable cause or malice. The court emphasized that the proceedings were handled solely by law enforcement officers and that reporting a crime with an erroneous but good-faith identification does not support liability.

torts & liabilitycriminal law