Zueger v. North Dakota Workers Compensation Bureau
North Dakota Supreme Court · 1998-09-29 · cited 23×
In this case, Maynard Zueger appealed the North Dakota Workers Compensation Bureau's termination of his disability benefits and order to repay $7,808 after the Bureau determined his self-limited performance on a functional capacity evaluation (FCE) was a false statement under N.D.C.C. § 65-05-33, based on videotape evidence of him performing physical work. The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the administrative record and held that nonverbal conduct during the FCE did not constitute a "false statement" under the pre-1997 version of the statute, whose definition of "statement" covered testimony, records, test results, and similar evidence but not physical actions or omissions. The court reversed the Bureau's order and remanded, reasoning that the statutory language and legislative history did not support treating the claimant's test performance as a willful false statement warranting forfeiture of all benefits.
labor & employmentcriminal lawprocedure
McCarty v. North Dakota Workers Compensation Bureau
North Dakota Supreme Court · 1998-09-25 · cited 20×
The case involved Jeff McCarty's appeal from a North Dakota Workers Compensation Bureau order that dismissed his claim for benefits based on alleged false statements about a 1995 back injury at work. After an administrative law judge recommended awarding benefits, the Bureau initially accepted that recommendation but then issued a separate false-statements order denying the claim. The court held that the Bureau's false-statements order was barred by res judicata because it raised issues that were or could have been addressed in the prior adjudicative proceeding, which became final after the parties stipulated to dismiss McCarty's appeal. The court reversed the district court's affirmance and remanded for entry of judgment directing the Bureau to award benefits in accordance with the earlier order adopting the ALJ's recommendation.
labor & employmentprocedure
Circle B Enterprises, Inc. v. Steinke
North Dakota Supreme Court · 1998-09-15 · cited 10×
In Circle B Enterprises, Inc. v. Steinke, the dispute concerned an oral and written contract under which Steinke agreed to restore a 1961 Corvette for Circle B by April 21, 1995, with a daily $100 penalty for delay and provisions allowing Circle B to hire a third party at Steinke's expense if he failed to complete the work. The Supreme Court of North Dakota held that Steinke breached the contract by failing to substantially perform, as he completed less than one-third of the remaining work after the written agreement, and therefore could not recover for any post-agreement services. The court modified the trial court's judgment—which had awarded loss-of-use damages rather than enforcing the liquidated damages clause—to award Circle B $17,078.72, consisting of $14,917.71 in liquidated damages (including the $100-per-day assessment reducing the contract balance to zero plus third-party completion costs) and $2,161.01 for return of a credit balance, and affirmed the judgment as modified. The core reasoning applied the plain language of the time-is-of-the-essence and liquidated damages provisions, along with the rule that a contractor who fails to substantially perform may not recover under the contract.
business & regulatoryproperty
Kouba v. Febco, Inc.
North Dakota Supreme Court · 1998-09-15 · cited 15×
Albert Kouba sued his former employer Febeo, Inc. and its officer for wrongful discharge and interference with employment after a guest dispute led to his termination from a motel job; the defendants counterclaimed for attempted extortion. The trial court granted summary judgment dismissing Kouba's claims with prejudice but left the counterclaim unresolved and entered no final judgment covering all claims. The North Dakota Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, concluding that without a Rule 54(b) certification or disposition of every claim the judgment was neither final nor appealable under state civil procedure rules. The court remanded with instructions for the parties to promptly resolve the counterclaim so that a complete final judgment could be entered if desired.
procedurelabor & employmenttorts & liability
Kadlec v. Greendale Township Board of Township Supervisors
North Dakota Supreme Court · 1998-09-15 · cited 22×
The case involved a dispute over drainage from a slough on Ray Kadlec's land in South Dakota, which overflowed during wet years and was blocked by a Greendale Township road in North Dakota, leading to flooding and road damage. Kadlec petitioned the Richland County Water Resource District multiple times for permission to install a culvert under the road but received deferrals or denials tied to unrelated drainage improvements. He then obtained a writ of mandamus from the trial court compelling the Township to install the culvert under N.D.C.C. § 24-03-06, which prohibits roadways from acting as dams and requires water to follow its natural course. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Kadlec had a clear legal right to the culvert, no other plain speedy and adequate remedy existed, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in issuing the writ despite arguments about exhaustion of administrative remedies.
propertyenvironmentprocedure
Ali v. North Dakota Workers Compensation Bureau
North Dakota Supreme Court · 1998-08-18 · cited 8×
The case involved Nadira Ali, who received workers' compensation disability benefits from the North Dakota Workers Compensation Bureau for work-related upper extremity pain and tendinitis sustained while assembling electronic wire harnesses at Fargo Assembly Company. The Bureau suspended her benefits after she was unable to fully complete multiple functional capacity evaluations (FCEs) due to pain complaints, determining she had refused to reasonably participate under NDCC 65-05-28(4). The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed the district court's affirmance of the suspension and remanded for reinstatement of benefits. The court reasoned that the statute permits suspension only for intentional obstruction of an examination or unreasonable refusal to participate in treatment, that an FCE qualifies as an examination rather than treatment, and that Ali's pain-limited performance—despite her cooperation—did not constitute the required refusal or obstruction, particularly given repeated medical recommendations for a pain management program that the Bureau had not authorized.
labor & employment