William A. Neumann

In State v. Nelson, law enforcement officers entered Dawn Nelson's home to transport her to the hospital under an emergency treatment order and conducted a warrantless search for her inhaler during an asthma attack, discovering a foil bindle that was used to obtain a search warrant leading to her arrest for drug possession. Nelson moved to suppress the evidence, arguing the initial search violated the Fourth Amendment, but the trial court denied the motion, leading to her conditional guilty plea. The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court failed to properly analyze whether the emergency exception to the warrant requirement applied and misinterpreted the doctrine by focusing solely on the officers' lawful presence in the home. The court remanded for a determination of whether an actual emergency justified the search of the bedroom and whether probable cause supported the warrant, while upholding the presence of certain third parties during the warrant execution.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Stephen and Sheri Simpson filing a new lawsuit against Chicago Pneumatic Tool Company and its attorneys, alleging fraud, concealment of evidence, obstruction of justice, and other tort claims based on the alleged failure to produce all surveillance videotapes during discovery in a prior 1996 product liability action where a jury found in favor of the defendants. The district court granted summary judgment dismissing the claims, denied the motion to compel production of additional videotapes, and imposed Rule 11 sanctions for filing a frivolous action. On appeal, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal, holding that res judicata and collateral estoppel barred relitigation of issues already decided in the prior case and post-trial motions, and that the new claims lacked legal basis or evidentiary support. The court also upheld the finding that the lawsuit was frivolous and the imposition of sanctions against the attorneys but reversed the portion holding the Simpsons jointly and severally liable with their counsel for monetary sanctions under N.D.R.Civ.P. 11(c)(2)(a).

proceduretorts & liability

In this case, Mitchell Thomas appealed a district court judgment upholding a Workforce Safety and Insurance (WSI) order that denied him further disability and vocational rehabilitation benefits after he injured his back in 1995 while working as a truck driver. WSI had determined that Thomas was noncompliant with vocational rehabilitation requirements under N.D.C.C. § 65-05.1-04(6) because he knowingly manipulated the results of a functional capacity assessment (FCA) conducted by an occupational therapist, which was his second instance of noncompliance without good cause. An administrative law judge (ALJ) recommended affirming the denial after an evidentiary hearing, finding that the greater weight of the evidence supported the conclusion of manipulation based on inconsistencies in the assessment, and WSI adopted this recommendation. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the agency's findings were supported by a preponderance of the evidence and its conclusions aligned with the statute, which allows termination of benefits for such noncompliance, while adequately addressing contrary medical opinions.

labor & employment

The case involved Helen Roberts' appeal of the North Dakota Department of Human Services' denial of her Medicaid benefits application. The court affirmed the denial, holding that Roberts failed to establish her eligibility because she did not prove that payments had been made under a 1979 mortgage deed for land sold to her son, and a 2001 satisfaction of mortgage executed by the son under power of attorney was presumed invalid due to a fiduciary relationship. The core reasoning was that Roberts retained legal rights to the asset—either by setting aside the satisfaction or enforcing payment—making it countable for eligibility purposes, and she bore the burden of showing otherwise under agency rules and evidence standards.

healthcareproperty

The case involved divorced parents Lyle Frieze and Suzanne Roll, where Roll sought court permission to relocate the parties' three children from Wyoming to California with her new husband, and Frieze responded by requesting a change of custody to himself. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district court's order granting the relocation and denying the custody modification. The court reasoned that Frieze failed to show persistent and willful interference with visitation under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.6(5), so no grounds existed to modify custody within two years of the original order, and the trial court's analysis of relocation factors under Stout v. Stout supported allowing the move as consistent with the children's best interests.

family law

Michael Gamboa appealed the district court's denial of his motion for default summary judgment and dismissal of his application for post-conviction relief without a hearing. The case concerned Gamboa's 1996 guilty plea to delivery of marijuana, which he sought to withdraw years later on grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel and an alleged conflict of interest by his attorney. The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed, holding that the statutory 30-day deadline for the state's response is discretionary rather than mandatory and that Gamboa had not shown prejudice from the delay caused by a clerk's office error. The court further determined that transcripts from the original proceedings demonstrated Gamboa's plea was knowing and voluntary, providing no basis for post-conviction relief.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Stephan Larsen appealing a two-year driver's license suspension imposed by the North Dakota Department of Transportation after his 2003 arrest for driving under the influence with a blood alcohol content of .19 percent, following a prior juvenile suspension in 2000 for a lower blood alcohol level. The district court had affirmed the two-year suspension under N.D.C.C. § 39-20-04.1(1)(d), but the Supreme Court reversed and remanded, directing that the suspension be limited to 365 days under subsection (c). The court reasoned that the statute's plain language authorizes the longer suspension only when the prior offense, not the current one, involved a blood alcohol concentration of at least .18, and that the court could not rewrite the statute to reach a different result.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Sharon Vogel's appeal of a Workforce Safety and Insurance (WSI) order denying her disability benefits after a work-related injury. While working as a detention supervisor, Vogel contracted hepatitis C from a needle stick and was reassigned to modified duties with no initial pay loss; she later voluntarily accepted a lower-paying Public Service Technician III position. The court affirmed the denial, holding that under N.D.C.C. § 65-05-08(7), an employee who voluntarily limits income is not entitled to benefits unless the limitation is justified, and Vogel failed to prove her actions were not voluntary or were justified. The decision rested on findings that Vogel knew of the pay reduction by February 2002, did not seek to reclaim her prior modified role or raise concerns with human resources, and remained in the lower-paying job despite the employer's willingness to retain her in the modified position.

labor & employment

This case involved Troy Beckler's appeal from a district court judgment affirming Workforce Safety and Insurance's denial of his reapplication for workers' compensation disability benefits after a 1983 work-related wrist injury. Beckler had received benefits initially but returned to work after vocational training; he later quit a telemarketing job in 2002 due to arm pain and sought to reopen disability benefits, claiming a significant change in his medical condition. The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the denial, holding that although evidence showed Beckler had experienced increased pain and new conditions like ulnar neuropathy and carpal tunnel syndrome since leaving work, he failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that this change caused an actual wage loss by rendering him unable to continue his then-current employment. The court applied North Dakota statutes requiring both a significant medical change and resulting wage loss tied to inability to work at the job held at the time, noting medical opinions of total disability arose after Beckler had already quit. A dissent argued that wage loss could be shown through later evidence of total disability preventing any employment.

labor & employment

In State v. Buchholz, the State appealed a district court order discharging the defendant from a charge of being a felon in possession of a firearm after law enforcement found a rifle in his residence. Buchholz had previously pled guilty to a class C felony for issuing a check without sufficient funds and received a sixty-day suspended sentence, which under N.D.C.C. § 12.1-32-02(9) reduced the conviction to a misdemeanor. The district court found no probable cause because the sentence length meant he was not a convicted felon for purposes of N.D.C.C. § 62.1-02-01(2). The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed, holding that the firearm statute's definition of conviction explicitly includes cases where the felony has been reduced to a misdemeanor under § 12.1-32-02(9), so the original felony conviction still triggers the prohibition. The court reasoned that the statutory language is unambiguous and that the timing of the reduction does not eliminate the initial felony conviction for this purpose.

criminal lawguns

In State v. Jackson, a police officer initially suspected Grady Jackson's vehicle was stolen based on its license plates but quickly determined it was not; the officer then followed the vehicle for about twelve city blocks before stopping it upon observing what appeared to be erratic driving, leading to a charge of driving while under suspension. Jackson moved to suppress the evidence from the stop, and the district court granted the motion on grounds that continuing to follow the vehicle after ruling out the theft suspicion was improper. The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed and remanded, reasoning that prior precedent permits an officer to follow a vehicle for a reasonable distance before initiating a stop and that no bright-line distance limit exists to invalidate an otherwise justified stop based on observed driving conduct.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a dispute over modifying a child support order originally from Montana and registered in North Dakota. The father, who had quit his job and started his own business, sought a reduction in his $679 monthly obligation, and the trial court ordered $526 based on imputed income. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court improperly calculated imputed income by extrapolating from nine months of earnings rather than using the obligor's actual highest earnings in any twelve consecutive months under the guidelines. On remand, if the father does not provide adequate evidence of his income, the original support amount will remain in effect.

family lawprocedure

The case concerned the suppression of evidence obtained from a nighttime search of Christopher Fields' home pursuant to a warrant. The State appealed after the trial court suppressed the evidence, ruling that the warrant lacked probable cause once tainted evidence from a prior illegal vehicle search was excluded. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed, holding that while garbage search evidence provided probable cause for a daytime warrant, it did not establish the separate probable cause required under N.D.R.Crim.P. 41(c)(1) for a nighttime search, as there were no specific facts showing a need for execution at night. The court therefore concluded the nighttime search was unreasonable and the resulting evidence must be suppressed.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Thill, Maurice Thill was charged with gross sexual imposition after a child under fifteen accused him of inappropriate touching at a 1999 party; he fled the jurisdiction before trial, leading to a delay until 2003. The trial court denied his motion to dismiss based on the police's destruction of videotapes and other evidence in 2002, as well as his motion for a mistrial after a juror may have overheard an inadmissible statement about his past conduct. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that the evidence destruction did not violate due process because there was no showing of bad faith by the State under Arizona v. Youngblood and related precedents, and that the potential juror exposure did not warrant a mistrial since the juror denied hearing the statement and jurors are presumed to follow instructions. The court applied a deferential standard of review to the trial court's factual findings on these preliminary matters.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Jaster, Charles Jaster was convicted by a jury of class C felony reckless endangerment after an incident in which he allegedly pointed a loaded handgun at police officers responding to a domestic altercation at his home. On appeal, Jaster challenged the district court's denial of his motion to excuse two jurors for cause due to their ongoing attorney-client relationship with the prosecutor, certain evidentiary rulings, and the jury instructions on reckless endangerment. The North Dakota Supreme Court held that the district court abused its discretion by failing to excuse the two jurors for implied bias under state law, but the error was not reversible because Jaster did not exhaust his peremptory challenges and the affected juror served only as an alternate who did not participate in deliberations. The court also concluded that the evidentiary rulings were proper and that, although one portion of the jury instructions was erroneous, the instructions as a whole adequately informed the jury of the applicable law, leading to affirmance of the criminal judgment.

criminal lawprocedure

Tracy Hayek was convicted by a jury of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, possession of marijuana paraphernalia, and possession of marijuana following a probation search of her home that uncovered methamphetamine in a purse and marijuana paraphernalia. On direct appeal, she claimed ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to stipulate to her prior conviction before trial or object to certain evidence, that the trial court erred by allowing testimony identifying her attorney as her boyfriend living in the home, and prosecutorial misconduct. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, reasoning that the ineffective assistance claim could not be evaluated on the existing record without evidence of deficient performance and was more appropriate for post-conviction relief, the evidentiary objection was waived by failure to raise it timely at trial, and the misconduct issue was not properly preserved or briefed.

criminal lawprocedure

The Rotts filed an action under N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(iv) seeking to void a 1983 foreclosure judgment and subsequent sale of land by Connecticut General Life Insurance Company, claiming the judgment was invalid because it occurred during bankruptcy proceedings. The trial court denied the Rotts' motion for default judgment and dismissed the proceeding on grounds including laches, res judicata, collateral estoppel, and statutes of limitations. On appeal, the Rotts disclosed that they had executed a quitclaim deed transferring any interest in the land to the Pembina Nation Little Shell Band of North America, an entity that had not been substituted as a party. The North Dakota Supreme Court dismissed the appeal because the Rotts no longer held any interest in the property and the proper party had not been substituted under the appellate rules.

propertyprocedure

The case involved the Bismarck Regional Child Support Enforcement Unit's appeal of a trial court's second amended judgment setting Christian Kuleck's monthly child support obligation at $330 based on an estimated annual income of $25,000. The Unit had sought a higher amount using Kuleck's 2001 tax return after he failed to provide requested financial information following his shift to self-employment, but the trial court declined to impute income under the guidelines and instead selected an arbitrary figure despite evidence of lower recent earnings. The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the determination violated the child support guidelines under N.D. Admin. Code § 75-02-04.1, which require documented income or proper imputation methods, and that the court erred as a matter of law by not complying with those requirements.

family lawprocedure

This case involved a wrongful death lawsuit brought by David Long against Dr. Adducci, Dr. Jaszczak, and Mercy Medical Center after his wife Jane Long died from complications following an intravenous pyelogram procedure, with claims centered on failure to obtain informed consent. The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed the dismissal of the claim against Dr. Adducci, holding that physicians owe a duty to obtain informed consent and that issues of risk materiality and causation are for the fact-finder, but affirmed the dismissal of claims against Dr. Jaszczak because the action was barred by the two-year statute of limitations and against the hospital because it owed no legal duty to ensure informed consent. The court reasoned that the statute of limitations began running when the plaintiff had notice of potential malpractice on the day of the procedure, and that hospitals do not have an independent duty to obtain informed consent as that responsibility lies with physicians, even if they have internal policies.

healthcaretorts & liabilityprocedure

This case involved Esther Baity's appeal regarding the start date of her supplementary workers' compensation benefits after being declared permanently and totally disabled. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the decision of Workforce Safety and Insurance (WSI), holding that Baity's supplementary benefits began on September 11, 2002, the date WSI's review committee determined she was permanently and totally disabled. The court reasoned that under N.D.C.C. § 65-05.2-01, eligibility for supplementary benefits requires the claimant to be receiving permanent total disability benefits, which commences upon WSI's declaration rather than an earlier date when medical evidence might have supported such a finding. The majority rejected arguments that WSI's delay or the benefit rate falling below a threshold entitled her to an earlier start date of July 1, 2001.

labor & employment