Vernon R. Pederson

The case involved doctors who sued attorney Bayard Lewis for malpractice, alleging that his negligent preparation of trust agreements between 1969 and 1971 caused them to incur personal tax liability on partnership income. The district court struck Lewis's statute of limitations defense and denied his discovery motion, but the North Dakota Supreme Court reversed, holding that the clients suffered actual injury no later than the IRS's 1977 deficiency notices and that the two-year limitations period under NDCC § 28-01-18(3) began running once they knew or should have known of the injury, its cause, and the attorney's possible negligence. The court remanded for a trial on when the doctors should have discovered the claim and for reconsideration of the discovery motion relating to damages and discovery timing.

torts & liabilitytaxesprocedure

The case involved Advanced Irrigation and related parties suing First National Bank for deceit and bad faith in refusing to continue financing an irrigation equipment venture, while the bank counterclaimed for unpaid balances on promissory notes, foreclosure of collateral, and personal guaranties. A jury awarded Advanced $96,000 in actual damages for willful deceit but rejected punitive damages; the trial court then severed and decided the bank's counterclaim in its favor, offsetting the jury award and entering judgment for the bank on the notes after finding the collateral liquidation commercially reasonable. On appeal, the court affirmed, holding that the jury verdict was supported by the evidence, that Advanced failed to show any errors in jury instructions or bifurcation of issues, and that the trial court's factual finding on commercial reasonableness of the collateral sale was not clearly erroneous. Advanced raised no challenge to the unchallenged findings of fact on the notes themselves.

business & regulatorytorts & liabilityprocedure

This case involved an appeal from a final judgment canceling a contract for deed for campground property and foreclosing a security agreement after defaults on payments and taxes. The original buyer assigned his interest to Hillside Trust via quitclaim deed, prompting foreclosure actions against both the buyer and the trust, interspersed with bankruptcy filings that were dismissed by the bankruptcy court. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district court's judgment nunc pro tunc, holding that the automatic bankruptcy stay did not apply because the debtor had disclaimed any interest in the property, that summary judgment was proper on the undisputed defaults without needing to address counterclaims at that stage, that statutory cancellation under Chapter 32-18 was not an exclusive remedy, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in setting the redemption periods.

propertyprocedure

This case involved a dispute between Russell Walch, operator of a trucking business, and Gerald Jacobson, his former driver, arising from an oral agreement under which Jacobson would acquire and operate a truck leased by Walch, with Walch arranging hauls, deducting trailer rent and expenses, and remitting the balance. Walch sued to recover over $7,000 allegedly owed after Jacobson stopped driving the truck, and the trial court entered judgment for Walch in the amount of $6,171.17 after determining that Walch had improperly raised the trailer rent but that the overall accounting supported recovery. Jacobson appealed, challenging the trial court's factual findings on gross income, expenses, payments, and overcharges as clearly erroneous under N.D.R.Civ.P. 52. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that the evidence in the record, including summaries of checks, income notations, and expense computations, amply supported the findings and did not leave a definite and firm conviction of mistake.

business & regulatoryprocedure

In State v. Manke, the defendant appealed the district court's dismissal of his application for post-conviction relief following his conviction for gross sexual imposition, which had previously been affirmed on direct appeal. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal, concluding that the five issues raised concerning the admission of a laboratory report into evidence had already been finally adjudicated on direct appeal and were therefore barred from relitigation under the state's codification of the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act. The court reasoned that Section 29-32-08 prevents raising grounds that were finally adjudicated or not raised in prior proceedings, consistent with decisions from other states adopting the uniform act, and that post-conviction relief is not intended to provide repeated opportunities to challenge the same matters. A supplemental claim about the defendant's absence from an in-chambers conference was rejected because it was raised for the first time on appeal.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a dispute over an oral contract in which Almont Lumber agreed to erect a pole barn for Hatzenbuehler for $36,871.82, with disagreements arising over construction defects, a possible settlement reducing the price, and whether sales tax was due. Almont sued for the unpaid balance plus interest; at trial, a jury found the contract substantially performed, rejected the claimed settlement, and awarded Almont $6,800 in damages after accounting for defects. The trial court awarded prejudgment interest on that amount under NDCC § 32-03-04, and the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. The court reasoned that the statute allows interest on damages that are certain or capable of being made certain by calculation from a particular day, and a mere dispute over the sum owed does not render the claim uncertain or unliquidated.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The State brought a declaratory judgment action in Burleigh County district court seeking a ruling that J.P. Lamb Land Company violated the North Dakota Corporate Farming Law by owning and leasing more than 5600 acres of farm and ranch land in Nelson County and that the company must divest the land. The district court entered summary judgment dismissing the action with prejudice. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal but held that it was for lack of jurisdiction rather than on the merits, because the corporate farming statute requires any enforcement action to be commenced in the district court of the county where the substantial portion of the land is situated, and declaratory judgment statutes do not create or extend jurisdiction where it does not otherwise exist.

business & regulatorypropertyprocedure

This case arose from a 1981 motorcycle-automobile accident in which plaintiff Bradley Keyes sought damages for his injuries. A jury apportioned negligence at 40% to Keyes, 40% to defendant Susan Amundson, and 20% to defendant Craig Stoner, leading the trial court to dismiss the action under North Dakota’s comparative negligence statute, NDCC 9-10-07. After an earlier remand for a new trial due to jury exposure to extraneous information, the district court certified two questions about whether a plaintiff whose negligence equals or exceeds that of any single defendant but is less than the total defendants’ negligence can recover, and whether recovery from a less-negligent defendant can exceed that defendant’s percentage share. The North Dakota Supreme Court declined to answer the certified questions, holding that Chapter 32-24 NDCC does not authorize advisory opinions and that a retrial would first require a fresh determination of liability that might render the questions irrelevant. The court remanded the case for further proceedings and directed the district court to award costs to Keyes.

torts & liabilityprocedure

Prosper Energy Corporation and other operators appealed from orders of the North Dakota Industrial Commission that terminated the unitization of certain oil and gas properties in Burke, Divide, and Williams counties and renewed earlier spacing orders. The district court in Burleigh County dismissed the appeals for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal, holding that a specific statute governing appeals from Commission orders on unitized properties requires filing in the district court of the county where the land lies, which irreconcilably conflicts with and prevails over a general statute permitting appeals in Burleigh County. Because none of the affected land is located in Burleigh County, that court lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeals.

business & regulatoryprocedure

In Delorey v. Delorey, a divorce case, Conchita Delorey appealed a trial court judgment granting the divorce and awarding her $300 monthly support for twelve months, seeking instead permanent alimony of $400 per month. The North Dakota Supreme Court denied the husband's motion to dismiss the appeal and reversed the property division and support award, remanding for retrial. The core reasoning was that the trial court's distribution was induced by an erroneous view of the law—that an unvested military pension could not be considered in dividing the marital estate under N.D.C.C. § 14-05-24—and that the payments were treated as property distribution rather than modifiable spousal support. The court emphasized that equitable distribution requires considering all marital assets, including the pension, even without specific valuation evidence presented at trial.

family lawproperty

The case concerned a dispute over ownership of one-half of the mineral rights in certain North Dakota property. In 1970, Mary Stuss conveyed the surface and reserved one-half of the minerals to herself via warranty deed to the Kubas defendants, even though the State already owned the other half; in 1974 she conveyed her claimed half-interest in the minerals to the Sibert plaintiffs. The court held that the 1970 deed unambiguously conveyed one-half of the minerals to Kubas under the Duhig doctrine, which estops a grantor (and successors) from asserting a reservation that contradicts a warranty of title when the grantor did not own enough to satisfy both the conveyance and the reservation. The court affirmed the judgment quieting title to the surface and one-half of the minerals in Kubas, relying on the deed's language and prior precedent rather than extrinsic evidence of intent.

property

In State v. O'Boyle, the State appealed a district court order dismissing a Class C felony escape charge against the defendant, who had been arrested for DUI and allegedly fled after exiting a police vehicle, struggling with the officer, and breaking free. The Supreme Court of North Dakota first denied the defendant's motion to dismiss the appeal, ruling that the memorandum opinion was effectively appealable as it quashed the information. The court then reversed the dismissal, holding that the issue of whether the defendant's conduct met the elements of felony escape (including use of force) was not capable of pretrial determination under Rule 12(b) of the North Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure because it involved factual questions that required a trial on the general issue. The case was remanded for further proceedings, with the court noting that lesser included offenses might be relevant at trial.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Ronngren, the defendants were convicted of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver after a search of their home yielded cash and other items; the trial court later ordered the return of $1,835 in seized cash without a further evidentiary hearing. The State appealed, arguing that the money was forfeitable as proceeds from drug sales. The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed, holding that the appeal was properly taken under N.D.C.C. § 29-28-07(4) and that the State had established a prima facie case linking the cash to drug offenses under the controlled substances forfeiture provisions, shifting the burden to the defendants to prove any non-drug portion, which they failed to meet. The court adopted standards from Illinois cases requiring the State to prove its forfeiture claim by a preponderance of the evidence and remanded with directions to order forfeiture of the full amount to the State.

criminal lawpropertyprocedure

This case involved United Bank of Bismarck foreclosing on chattel and real property mortgages securing loans made to Gary L. Patten and his then-wife Valery Patten between 1979 and 1982. After judgments were entered in the foreclosure actions, Patten moved under Rule 60(b) of the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure to set them aside, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel, denial of due process, and fraud by the bank. The district court denied the motion on the grounds that Patten lacked interest in some property, offered no viable defense, and was represented throughout. The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed, concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion because Patten and his counsel received proper notice and service, the Sixth Amendment claim does not apply in civil cases, and no evidence supported the fraud allegations.

propertyprocedurebusiness & regulatory

This case was an appeal by a mother from a district court order terminating her parental rights to her minor daughter under North Dakota Century Code § 27-20-44(1)(b). The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the termination after reviewing a long history of prior proceedings that had found the child to be deprived. The court held that the state had proven by clear and convincing evidence that the child was deprived, that the conditions causing deprivation were likely to continue because of the mother's extended lack of contact and inadequate parenting skills, and that the child would probably suffer serious harm if returned to the mother's custody. The decision relied on cumulative evidence from multiple hearings showing the mother's failure to improve her situation despite opportunities and evaluations.

family law

In State v. Gronlund, the State appealed an order suppressing controlled substances and drug paraphernalia found in a green pail in the trunk of Gronlund's impounded car during execution of a search warrant for a walking cane allegedly used in an assault. The trial court had ruled that opening the pail exceeded the warrant's scope because it could not contain an intact cane and that the further search of its contents was an improper general search for drugs. The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed, holding that the initial opening of the pail was reasonable under the circumstances given the possibility the cane was broken, but that the subsequent warrantless search of additional closed containers inside required either a warrant or an exception such as exigent circumstances, which were not present here since the vehicle was already impounded. The case was remanded for a hearing to determine which, if any, items were properly suppressed. The court distinguished this from cases involving the automobile exception or plain view because a warrant had been issued and the containers were sealed.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Gloria Welch, who was charged with two counts of theft of property and entered a guilty plea that the court deferred accepting until sentencing. Before the plea was accepted, Welch moved to withdraw it, but the district court denied the motion, accepted the plea, and sentenced her. On appeal, the North Dakota Supreme Court reversed the convictions, ruling that under Rule 32(d) of the North Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure, a defendant has the right to withdraw a guilty plea before the court accepts it, as the rule's language distinguishes between pre- and post-acceptance withdrawals.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Hilda Ganske's appeal from a district court judgment that upheld the North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau's denial of her claim for benefits after she suffered a heart attack while working as a school kitchen helper. The court affirmed the denial, holding that Ganske failed to meet her burden under NDCC § 65-01-02(7) to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that her heart attack was precipitated by unusual stress causally related to her employment. The opinion noted that her duties on the day in question followed the ordinary routine, her physician lacked knowledge of her typical job duties, and coworker testimony confirmed no additional stress from preparing chicken; the court applied a deferential standard of review to the agency's factual findings and drew parallels to its prior decision in Nelson v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau.

labor & employment

This case involves an expedited appeal from a continuing treatment order that required Riedel to remain hospitalized and treated for mental illness at the North Dakota State Hospital for an indefinite period. The trial court granted the order after a hearing based on testimony from a psychiatrist and Riedel's own statements, using a preprinted form to conclude that she was mentally ill and needed hospitalization without preparing specific findings of fact. The North Dakota Supreme Court remanded the matter for the preparation of findings, holding that Rule 52(a) of the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure and section 25-03.1-20 of the North Dakota Century Code require trial courts to make and enter specific factual findings in involuntary commitment cases to support conclusions reached under the clear and convincing evidence standard and to permit meaningful appellate review under section 25-03.1-29. The court rejected arguments that the absence of findings was harmless or that review could proceed without them, even when most evidence was undisputed.

procedurehealthcare

The case concerned Otter Tail Power Company's application to the North Dakota Public Service Commission for a certificate of public convenience and necessity to extend electric service approximately 100 feet to a new Bureau of Indian Affairs school building on the Turtle Mountain Indian Reservation. After initially granting temporary authority and then permanent authority, the PSC reversed itself on rehearing and denied the certificate to Otter Tail, citing greater reliability and economic benefit from Baker Electric Cooperative's service and the need to avoid checkerboarding, without granting authority to Baker. The district court held that the PSC lacked jurisdiction under Article XIII of the North Dakota Constitution because the service point lay within Indian reservation boundaries subject to federal plenary control. On appeal by Baker Electric, the North Dakota Supreme Court addressed whether the jurisdictional challenge based on federal preemption and the supremacy clause could be raised for the first time at the district court level under the Administrative Agencies Practice Act, and began analyzing the interplay between state utility regulation and federal authority over Indian lands.

business & regulatoryfederal powerprocedure