Robert Vogel

The case Arneson v. Olson concerned the constitutionality of North Dakota's Chapter 26-40.1, enacted to limit professional liability for qualifying physicians in medical malpractice cases, create a patient trust fund for compensation, restrict claims procedures such as informed consent and expert testimony requirements, and limit joinder of actions. The North Dakota Supreme Court held the chapter unconstitutional in its entirety. The core reasoning was that key provisions, including the damage limitation in Section 26-40.1-11 and related restrictions on remedies and claims, violated due process and equal protection by arbitrarily capping recoveries and altering traditional tort rules without sufficient justification, rendering the interconnected statute invalid as a whole.

healthcaretorts & liabilityprocedure

This case involved three of eight children of a former ward suing the corporate conservator for allegedly breaching a pre-appointment oral agreement to lease the ward's real property only through public bidding procedures, in exchange for the plaintiffs withdrawing their objections to the appointment. After the conservatorship ended with court approval of the final account and no objections raised, the plaintiffs sued for breach of contract. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendant on res judicata grounds. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed but on the ground that any such contract would be unenforceable as against public policy, since it would restrict the conservator's statutory discretionary powers without notice to the court or other interested parties.

propertyfamily lawprocedure

The case involved a dispute between Everson, the former general agent and organizer of an insurance company later merged with the defendant, and the successor company over unpaid overriding commissions on insurance policies, including whether the company could deduct sub-agents' debts from Everson's account. Everson sued for approximately $380,000 in commissions plus other relief, and a jury awarded him $160,460.62 after rejecting punitive damages and an abandoned IRS-related claim, while also granting the defendants' full counterclaim. On appeal, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the account was a mutual account involving ongoing debits and credits, so the six-year statute of limitations did not bar older items as long as the latest was timely; it also found the contract ambiguous on the one-year objection deadline for statements and on charge-backs for sub-agents not under Everson's supervision, allowing the jury to resolve the intent of the parties based on the contract language and circumstances.

business & regulatory

The case involved Mr. and Mrs. Sande suing the City of Grand Forks and its Urban Renewal Agency for over $500,000 in damages after the Agency allegedly gave incorrect advice based on outdated federal regulations, denying them relocation funds to alter a new site for their bus depot business following the Agency's purchase of their original property in an urban renewal district. The Sandes had moved in 1975, lost their Greyhound contract after being told alterations could not be reimbursed, had their later claim rejected by the Agency and HUD, and sued in tort for abuse of discretion. The district court dismissed the suit, and the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal as a summary judgment. The court held that the Urban Renewal Agency is a municipal corporation whose actions fell within the discretionary function exception to liability, so the Sandes could not recover even if the advice was negligent.

propertyproceduretorts & liability

This case involved an appeal by the mother from a juvenile court determination that her child was deprived under North Dakota law, resulting in legal custody being placed with the county social service center and physical custody with the father following the parents' divorce. The Supreme Court of North Dakota reversed the deprivation finding and remanded the matter. The core reasoning was that the deprivation hearing had been improperly combined with a divorce-related custody modification proceeding, contrary to statutes requiring separate hearings and limiting juvenile court jurisdiction. The court also noted that the petition failed to allege specific facts as required by statute, providing inadequate notice, and that procedural rules for conducting adjudicatory and dispositional phases were not followed.

family lawprocedure

The case involved disputes over the interpretation and constitutionality of the federal Highway Beautification Act of 1965 and North Dakota's corresponding statute regulating outdoor advertising signs along interstate and primary highways. Newman Signs challenged the state's restrictions on billboards, while the Highway Commissioner sought enforcement to maintain federal funding eligibility. The court determined that the state law became effective on January 1, 1968, rather than later dates tied to federal agreements, and upheld the statute as a valid time, place, and manner regulation of commercial speech justified by interests in traffic safety and aesthetics that left open alternative channels for communication. It reversed the district court's judgment in part on the effective date and related issues and remanded for further proceedings.

free speechbusiness & regulatoryenvironmentfederal power

In Helbling v. Helbling, plaintiff Wayne Helbling, who occasionally worked for his father, was injured lifting a furnace while loading it onto a truck and sued the defendant for negligence in failing to provide sufficient assistance. The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendant, determining that the plaintiff was an independent contractor and, alternatively, that there was no negligence as a matter of law based on the plaintiff's deposition testimony. The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed, holding that summary judgment is rarely appropriate in negligence cases where reasonable differences of opinion may exist as to inferences from the facts, and that a plaintiff's lay statements about responsibility do not conclusively establish legal liability. The case was remanded for further proceedings.

torts & liabilitylabor & employmentprocedure

This case involved a contractor, Gary Haugen, who sued the City of Berthold after his low bid on a wastewater treatment project was rejected. The parties stipulated that the city would have awarded him the contract but for his failure to hold a current contractor's license at least 10 days before the March 15, 1978 bid opening, as required by N.D.C.C. § 43-07-12; he had renewed his license the day after bids were opened. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the judgment against Haugen, holding that license renewals are not retroactive and that the statutory language plainly requires a current calendar-year license to be held by the bid date. The court rejected arguments for a contrary interpretation based on renewal deadlines or administrative burdens, noting that policy concerns are for the legislature and that the attorney general's consistent opinions supported non-retroactivity.

business & regulatory

In State v. Hass, the defendant was charged with terrorizing after a post-bar melee on a rural road where he fired a .22 rifle into the air during a confrontation involving stolen beer and a chase; he was convicted by jury of the lesser offense of menacing. On appeal, the North Dakota Supreme Court addressed multiple claims including whether a prior probation-revocation hearing based on the same facts violated his Fifth Amendment rights, challenges to self-defense jury instructions, evidentiary rulings on witness statements and physical evidence, and whether the defendant's statement constituted a threat. The court rejected these challenges to the conviction, relying on a prior related decision and finding no reversible errors in the trial proceedings, but it remanded for resentencing because the trial judge had improperly considered the defendant's exercise of his right to trial and failure to plead guilty or express remorse. The core reasoning emphasized that such factors are impermissible under state sentencing statutes and precedents, while affirming that concurrent proceedings did not compel self-incrimination in this instance.

criminal lawprocedure

This case concerns the interpretation of North Dakota’s wrongful death statute (Chapter 32-21) after Pamela Garland died in a car accident. Her estranged husband, from whom she had separated but not divorced, settled a claim with the insurer for $11,000, while her parents had notified the insurer of their own potential claim. The parents then sued the other driver’s estate, but the trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the statute gives the surviving spouse priority to bring or compromise a wrongful death action, with any such compromise binding on others, and that the husband had not disqualified himself by separation or unfiled divorce proceedings. The court also noted that the parents failed to wait the required 30 days after demanding action from the husband before filing suit themselves.

torts & liabilityfamily lawprocedure

In State v. Wells, the defendant appealed a life sentence for murder after pleading guilty, challenging the application of North Dakota's dangerous special offender statute that allowed a sentence beyond the standard 20-year maximum. The Supreme Court of North Dakota upheld the statute's constitutionality against claims that it violated rights to jury trial, confrontation of witnesses, and rules of evidence, and that it was unconstitutionally vague. The court reasoned that sentencing proceedings, unlike trials, do not require full constitutional trial protections such as jury findings or exclusion of hearsay, and that the statute provided sufficient standards. However, it remanded for resentencing because the prosecutor's notice failed to set out with particularity the reasons for invoking the statute as required by its terms.

criminal law

The case involved an appeal from a jury conviction on charges of kidnapping, a Class A felony, and aggravated assault, a Class C felony, stemming from an incident in which the defendant struck and dragged a young woman after she accepted a ride from him following their meeting at a bar. The defendant raised over twenty claims of error on appeal, including ineffective assistance of trial counsel, defects in the charging information, improper jury instructions, erroneous admission of evidence such as a metal pipe, and insufficiency of the evidence. The court affirmed both convictions, holding that trial counsel's decisions were within the bounds of reasonable judgment, the information adequately charged the offenses, the instructions properly defined the elements and distinguished the counts, the evidence was sufficient to support the verdicts, and the two crimes each required proof of distinct elements so separate sentencing was permissible.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a minor plaintiff who suffered an eye injury after being struck by a golf ball hit by a minor defendant while boating on a river that ran through a golf course owned by the defendant club. The jury found the plaintiff 30 percent negligent, the golf club 70 percent negligent, and the golfer not negligent, leading the club to appeal the denial of its motion for a new trial on grounds including the standard of care for minors and the sufficiency of evidence. The court affirmed the verdict, holding that the trial court properly instructed the jury using the standard of care applicable to minors based on their age, intelligence, experience, and capacity, and that substantial evidence supported the jury's findings on negligence and comparative fault. The court declined to address whether golfing constitutes an adult activity requiring an adult standard of care because the issue was not properly raised at trial.

torts & liability

This consolidated appeal from two North Dakota district court actions concerned disputes over title, possession, and damages related to three parcels of real estate in Bismarck, including claims of fraudulent misrepresentations, demands for monetary damages, punitive damages, and a determination of title against certain defendants. The sole issue on appeal was the district court's denial of a jury trial, which it had ordered after consolidating the cases and characterizing them as primarily equitable actions for specific performance triable to the court. The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed, holding that the denial was error because the state constitution preserves the right to a jury trial on legal issues such as damages claims, which must be tried first when mixed with equitable claims like title determinations, and remanded for further proceedings with the jury issues resolved before any remaining equitable ones. The court distinguished precedents like CIT Corporation v. Hetland and directed that the forcible detainer action also be reconsidered after resolution of the jury-eligible issues in the related case.

propertyprocedure

This case involved Dale Johnson's application to the North Dakota Public Service Commission (PSC) for a special certificate authorizing him to operate as a house mover in Richland County. The PSC denied the application after a hearing, finding that public convenience and necessity did not require the service and that Johnson was not financially able to provide it. Johnson appealed to the district court, which reversed the PSC and held that the governing statute, as applied under 1973 amendments, violated Johnson's rights under the North Dakota Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment. On appeal, the North Dakota Supreme Court reversed the district court, holding that the statute is constitutional and that a constitutional challenge could be raised for the first time at the district court level on an administrative appeal. The court remanded the case for reinstatement of the PSC's denial of the certificate.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved the conviction of the North Dakota Education Association for violating a state statute that required political advertisements to include the names of sponsors and those paying for the ads, after the association's newsletter urged a 'no' vote on an initiated measure limiting state expenditures without the required disclosure. The trial court convicted the association following a jury trial, deferring sentencing on the condition of no further violations. On appeal, the North Dakota Supreme Court reversed the conviction, holding that the statute violated the free speech protections of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Section 9 of the North Dakota Constitution. The court's reasoning centered on the historical importance of anonymous political speech and the statute's impermissible burden on expression in the context of ballot measures.

free speechelections

The case concerned whether signers could withdraw their names from a petition filed with the New Salem School Board under N.D.C.C. § 15-53.1-27 to reopen the closed Judson Elementary School. After a first petition with sufficient signatures (45 of 67 electors) was submitted on May 9, 1977, seven signers filed a withdrawal petition; the Board treated both together as insufficient and refused to act. The Judson PTO sought a writ of mandamus to compel verification of the original petition. The North Dakota Supreme Court held that the PTO’s standing issue was waived and that, under the statute’s lack of any notice-and-hearing requirement, the Board acquired jurisdiction upon filing, making post-filing withdrawals ineffective. Because the original petition met the two-thirds threshold when filed, the Court reversed and ordered the school reopened at the start of the 1978-79 term.

electionsprocedure

This case concerned an oral contract between Tower City Grain Co. and the Richmans for the sale of 10,000 bushels of wheat, with delivery to occur when elevator storage space or railroad transportation became available. After the Richmans repeatedly offered delivery starting in January 1973 and Tower City refused while accepting grain from later contracts and continuing seed operations, the trial court found that Tower City had breached the agreement by unreasonable delay. On appeal, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the lack of space was not beyond Tower City's control and that the delay excused the Richmans from performance, so no damages were owed to Tower City. The court noted that what constitutes a reasonable time for performance is a question of fact reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard.

business & regulatory

This case concerns whether contractors performing non-highway construction work for the federal government are entitled to refunds of special fuel taxes paid on diesel fuel. The contractors claimed they were exempt from the seven-cent-per-gallon tax under the Special Fuels Tax Act for industrial use and sought reimbursement. The court interpreted the statutes to hold that the tax must be paid initially but refunds are prohibited by a provision barring refunds when work is compensated from public funds; only taxes collected after the lawsuit was filed qualified for refund because earlier payments were deemed voluntary. The trial court's rulings on these issues, including retention of a two-percent tax under a related chapter, were affirmed.

taxesbusiness & regulatoryfederal power

This case involved a dispute between Rugby Milling Company, a grain elevator operator, and farmer Sam Logosz over a promissory note for $6,657.79 that Logosz signed after Rugby had sold his stored wheat to cover a prior debt. Logosz had previously sued Rugby for wrongful conversion of the grain, but that action was dismissed with prejudice and on the merits pursuant to a stipulation by the parties. Rugby then sued on the note, and Logosz answered by admitting partial liability while claiming a setoff equal to his prior conversion damages and suggesting the note amount was excessive. The trial court granted summary judgment to Rugby, and the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the prior dismissal was res judicata as to the setoff claim because it necessarily decided the underlying issues and that failure of consideration had not been affirmatively pleaded as a defense.

procedurebusiness & regulatory