Andrew Douglas

This case consolidated challenges by Ohio inmates to the Adult Parole Authority's (APA) use of 1998 parole guidelines in determining eligibility for release under indeterminate sentences. The inmates argued that the APA improperly assigned offense category scores based on alleged conduct beyond their actual convictions, such as dismissed or uncharged offenses. The Ohio Supreme Court held that the APA must assign an offense category score corresponding solely to the offense or offenses of conviction. The core reasoning was that the guidelines require the score to reflect the conviction itself to promote consistency and fairness, while still allowing the APA discretion to consider surrounding circumstances and other factors when making the ultimate parole decision.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a minor struck by an uninsured driver in 1996, resulting in permanent injuries; his parents sued the driver and their insurer, State Automobile, under a policy providing up to $300,000 in uninsured motorist coverage. After the driver declared bankruptcy, the case proceeded against the insurer and was submitted to arbitration, which awarded $275,000 in damages plus 10% prejudgment interest from the accident date. The trial court confirmed the damages but vacated the interest award, ruling that arbitration panels lack authority over prejudgment interest under R.C. 1343.03 and that interest was unavailable when damages did not exceed policy limits. The court of appeals reversed in part, holding that the panel could not reconsider its initial award. The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed that prejudgment interest may cause total recovery to exceed policy limits, that arbitration panels have authority to award such interest, and that panels lack power to reconsider an entered award.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved Tazwell Lomax, indicted on multiple counts including aggravated murder with specifications that could support the death penalty, who was convicted by a three-judge panel of aggravated murder during an aggravated robbery and aggravated robbery but acquitted of other charges and specifications. Prior to the penalty phase, the trial court granted Lomax's motion to impose a life sentence under R.C. 2929.03(A) because Count Three of the indictment omitted required elements from R.C. 2929.04(A)(7) such as principal-offender status or prior calculation and design, and denied the state's motion to amend the indictment. The Ohio Supreme Court held that the court of appeals lacked subject-matter jurisdiction under R.C. 2945.67(A) to review the trial court's judgment entry on the state's appeal.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned a challenge by Ohio business owners to a regulation adopted by the Lucas County Board of Health that banned smoking in nearly all indoor public places, including bars, restaurants, and workplaces, with criminal penalties for violations. The Ohio Supreme Court addressed certified questions from a federal district court regarding the board's authority under state law. The court held that R.C. 3709.21 is merely a rules-enabling statute that allows local health boards to implement policies already established by the General Assembly, not to create new substantive regulations on public health matters. It reasoned that the legislature had not expressed intent to grant boards unlimited power to address all health concerns through regulation, and administrative bodies cannot independently set public policy.

business & regulatory

In State v. LaSalle, the defendant was convicted of domestic violence in 1998 and filed an application in November 1999 under R.C. 2953.32 to seal the record of that conviction. A statutory amendment effective March 2000 (R.C. 2953.36(C)) barred sealing records for such offenses, and after the trial court initially granted then vacated the sealing order, the court of appeals held the amendment inapplicable. The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed, holding that absent clear legislative intent for retroactive application, statutes operate prospectively only per R.C. 1.48, and the law in effect at the time an R.C. 2953.32 application is filed controls. The core reasoning focused on the civil, post-conviction nature of sealing remedies and the filing date as the relevant temporal marker for determining applicable law.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Parker, the defendant was charged with aggravated murder carrying a death-penalty specification along with other offenses, waived his right to a jury trial, and entered a guilty plea after the state agreed not to seek the death penalty but without removing the specification from the indictment; a single trial judge accepted the plea and imposed sentence. The Ohio Supreme Court held that a single judge lacked authority to proceed and that the case must instead be heard by a three-judge panel. The core reasoning was that R.C. 2945.06 and Crim.R. 11(C)(3) expressly require a three-judge court whenever a defendant charged with an offense punishable by death waives a jury trial, and that requirement is triggered by the charges in the indictment rather than by whether the state ultimately seeks capital punishment.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned a medical malpractice lawsuit filed by the Gerig family against Dr. Kahn and St. Vincent Mercy Medical Center, along with related declaratory judgment actions by the Ohio Insurance Guaranty Association (OIGA) and others seeking to interpret an affiliation agreement between Kahn and St. Vincent regarding malpractice insurance coverage after Kahn's insurer became insolvent. The central issue was whether St. Vincent could compel arbitration of the coverage dispute under the agreement's arbitration clause against the nonsignatory plaintiffs and OIGA. The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's order compelling arbitration, holding that signatories to a contract may enforce an arbitration provision against a nonsignatory who seeks a declaration of the signatories’ rights and obligations under the contract. The court further held that related questions under state insurance guaranty statutes should be stayed pending the arbitration outcome to promote judicial economy.

procedurehealthcarebusiness & regulatory

The case concerned a union's challenge to the Ohio Bureau of Workers' Compensation administrator's announcement of a one-time 75-percent premium dividend credit for employers, issued without prior formal rulemaking. The Ohio Supreme Court held that the administrator lacked statutory authority to refund or reduce premiums under R.C. 4123.32(A) absent a rule adopted through the procedures of R.C. Chapter 119. The court's reasoning centered on the statute's explicit requirement for rulemaking and the fact that the credit applied to already-accrued premiums rather than future ones, rendering the action unlawful.

labor & employmentbusiness & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved a motorcyclist who was injured when his vehicle collided with a train at a railroad crossing and subsequently sued the railway company for negligence, including claims that the passive warning signs at the crossing were inadequate. The railway moved for partial summary judgment, arguing that the inadequate-warning-device claim was preempted by federal law because federal funds had paid for the installation of the signs. The trial court denied the motion and a jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, but the court of appeals reversed on the preemption issue. The Ohio Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and reinstated the trial court's judgment and the jury verdict, holding that an affidavit established federal funding for the signs and therefore federal preemption applied under 49 U.S.C. 20106.

proceduretorts & liabilityfederal powerbusiness & regulatory

This case arose from the death of employee Mike Gibson, who suffered fatal burns when hot molten plastic exploded from a manufacturing extruder line at Drainage Products, Inc. The administrator sued the employer for intentional tort under Ohio law, claiming the company knew injury was substantially certain to occur. Applying the Fyffe test, the Ohio Supreme Court held that evidence of the employer's policy requiring employees to seek new assignments, combined with failures to follow lockout/tagout procedures, was sufficient to survive a directed verdict on the third Fyffe element. The court reversed the appellate judgment upholding the directed verdict and remanded for further proceedings on the first two elements.

labor & employmenttorts & liability

The case involved the 1992 murder of Richard Franks, whose dismembered body was discovered in a Jefferson County pond; Raymond Twyford was arrested after police linked him to the victim through surveillance and recovered evidence including shell casings and knives. Twyford confessed after receiving Miranda warnings, admitting he and an accomplice lured Franks to a rural area under the pretext of hunting, shot him in the back, and mutilated the body. The Ohio Supreme Court upheld Twyford's aggravated murder conviction and death sentence on direct appeal, rejecting multiple propositions of law that challenged the voluntariness of his confession, the admission of prior bad acts, jury instructions, the replacement of a juror, ineffective assistance of counsel, and the constitutionality of Ohio's death penalty scheme.

criminal law

The case involved a wrongful death claim arising from an incident in which an armed security guard employed by an independent contractor, Youngstown Security Patrol, shot and killed Derrell Pusey while guarding property owned by Greif Brothers Corporation. Greif Brothers had contracted with the security company to deter theft and vandalism but did not specify whether guards should be armed. The Ohio Supreme Court held that Greif Brothers could be held vicariously liable for the guard's negligence under the inherently dangerous work exception to the general rule shielding employers from liability for the acts of independent contractors. The core reasoning was that hiring armed guards to protect property creates a peculiar risk of harm from weapons, making the employer responsible when injury results from the guard's failure to take reasonable precautions against that risk.

torts & liability

The case involved a workers' compensation claimant who prevailed in an appeal under R.C. 4123.512 after the Industrial Commission denied an additional condition in her claim; the dispute centered on whether the trial court properly awarded her the costs of videotaped expert depositions used at trial. The Ohio Supreme Court held that reasonable videotaped deposition expenses qualify as taxable costs under R.C. 4123.512(F) and may be awarded to a successful claimant, even though R.C. 4123.512(D) separately requires payment for stenographic transcription of the same depositions. The court reasoned that the statutes address distinct expenses, that videotape costs are allowable under the broader "cost of any legal proceeding" language in subsection (F) when the depositions are used at trial, and that only the material cost of the videotape itself should be excluded. The judgment was affirmed in part and reversed in part, with remand for adjustment of the award.

labor & employmentprocedure

The case arose from a fatal motorcycle accident caused by an underinsured driver, leading the decedent's family members to sue for wrongful death and personal injury while seeking recovery under eight separate underinsured motorist policies issued by State Farm to various family members living in the same household. The policies each had per-person limits of $25,000 or $50,000, and the family sought to combine them for a total recovery exceeding the per-accident limits. The Ohio Supreme Court held that valid antistacking provisions in the policies, authorized by former R.C. 3937.18(G)(2), prevented intrafamily stacking of the coverages, so that the family's total recovery under the policies could not exceed the highest single policy limit. The court further determined that claims were subject to per-person rather than per-accident limits because only one person suffered bodily injury, and similar single-claim limits applied to the tortfeasor's liability policy under R.C. 3937.44.

torts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory

This case involved an insured driver, Catherine Fulmer, who was injured in a car accident caused by an underinsured tortfeasor with $50,000 liability limits; Fulmer's policy with Insura provided $100,000 in underinsured motorist coverage and included exhaustion and subrogation clauses. Fulmer accepted a $37,500 settlement offer after notifying Insura, which refused consent or to advance the funds, and she sought to recover the excess from Insura. The Ohio Supreme Court held that when an insured provides timely notice of a tentative settlement and the insurer declines to protect its subrogation rights by paying the offer amount, a release of the tortfeasor does not bar underinsured motorist benefits. The court further ruled that the exhaustion requirement is met by a settlement that allows the insured to pursue only amounts exceeding the tortfeasor's policy limits from the underinsurer. The decision extended prior precedent on notice and subrogation while clarifying the exhaustion standard in insurance policies.

torts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory

The case involved an employee, Larry Pytlinski, who was terminated the day after delivering a memorandum to his employer complaining about workplace health and safety violations he believed breached OSHA regulations. He sued for wrongful discharge in violation of Ohio public policy. Lower courts dismissed the suit as time-barred under the 180-day limitations period in the Ohio Whistleblower Act, R.C. 4113.52. The Ohio Supreme Court reversed, ruling that Ohio public policy favoring workplace safety provides an independent basis for a common-law wrongful-discharge claim under Greeley and Painter, which is governed by the four-year statute of limitations in R.C. 2305.09(D) rather than the whistleblower statute.

labor & employmenttorts & liability

In State v. Jones, the defendant was charged with multiple counts of rape, attempted rape, and gross sexual imposition involving his young nieces, each count including a sexually violent predator specification. After a bench trial, he was acquitted of the specifications but convicted on two counts of gross sexual imposition. The Ohio Supreme Court held that R.C. 2950.09 bars a trial court from classifying a defendant as a sexual predator following acquittal on a sexually violent predator specification, even though the defendant was convicted of sexually oriented offenses. The court vacated the sentence imposed by the court of appeals and remanded the case to the trial court for resentencing, interpreting the statute to preclude the civil classification in these circumstances.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved the aggravated murder conviction of Ahmad Fawzi Issa for the 1997 shooting deaths of brothers Maher and Ziad Khriss in a Cincinnati supermarket parking lot. The state presented evidence that Issa hired Andre Miles to commit the killings at the request of Maher's wife Linda, including witness accounts of Issa possessing a rifle matching the murder weapon, Miles's statements to others about being paid to kill someone, and Issa's post-crime instructions to witnesses. The trial court sentenced Issa to death, and on direct appeal the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence after reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence and rejecting multiple constitutional challenges to the trial process, jury selection, and application of Ohio's death penalty statutes.

criminal law

The case concerned whether Franklin County was required under R.C. 2744.07(A)(1) to defend its employee, Deputy Sheriff Pat Whaley, in a civil suit brought by Kim Tignor. Tignor alleged that Whaley had maliciously caused her arrest and prosecution after a personal dispute, and she also sued the county for failing to train and supervise him. Whaley sought a declaratory judgment compelling the county to provide his defense after it refused. The Ohio Supreme Court held that the statute requires a political subdivision to defend an employee whenever the underlying complaint alleges or reasonably implies that the employee was not acting manifestly outside the scope of employment or official responsibilities. The Court focused on the allegations in the complaint rather than the plaintiff's characterizations, concluding that the duty to defend was triggered here.

torts & liabilityprocedurecriminal law

This case involved a dispute over ownership of three motor vehicles among Saturn of Kings Automall, Cronin Motor Company, and Mike Albert Leasing. Gallatin Auto Sales took possession of the vehicles from Saturn and Cronin without paying or receiving titles, then sold them to Albert Leasing, which paid but never obtained titles. Saturn and Cronin sued for replevin, claiming they retained ownership. The trial court ruled in their favor under Ohio's motor vehicle title statute, but the court of appeals applied UCC provisions on entrustment and buyer-in-ordinary-course status. The Ohio Supreme Court held that R.C. 4505.04(A) controls over the UCC in resolving competing ownership claims to motor vehicles, meaning the dealers who retained the certificates of title prevailed.

propertybusiness & regulatory