James Garfield Stewart

This case concerned whether the Cincinnati Civil Service Commission could impose a two-year time-in-grade requirement for police lieutenants seeking promotion to captain under R.C. 124.44. The statute states that no police officer may be promoted without serving at least twelve months in the next lower rank and expressly permits municipal commissions to require more than twelve months only for promotion to the rank immediately above patrol officer. Johnstone, a lieutenant who met the two-year requirement, challenged the commission's waiver of that requirement for other candidates and sought a writ of mandamus to compel his own promotion. The Ohio Supreme Court held that R.C. 124.44 does not authorize commissions to set time-in-grade requirements exceeding twelve months for any rank other than the one above patrol officer, so the commission lacked authority to enforce the two-year rule and Johnstone had no clear legal right to the relief requested. The Court therefore reversed the court of appeals and dismissed the mandamus petition.

labor & employment

The case concerned an appeal by the cities of Reading and Blue Ash and a citizens' group challenging the Ohio Power Siting Board's grant of a certificate of environmental compatibility and public need to Duke Energy Ohio for constructing, operating, and maintaining a natural-gas pipeline in Hamilton County. The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the board's order, concluding that the approval was lawful, reasonable, and supported by the weight of the evidence. The court rejected arguments that the board misapplied the criteria in R.C. 4906.10(A), relied on incomplete information, improperly weighed evidence, or restricted meaningful participation by the parties, noting that the alternate route was selected after supplemental reviews and hearings to minimize adverse effects.

environmentbusiness & regulatory

In State v. Williams, the Ohio Supreme Court considered whether a trial court has an affirmative duty under the Sixth Amendment to inquire into possible conflicts of interest when one attorney represents multiple codefendants in a criminal case. The defendant and his wife were jointly represented by the same attorney during plea and sentencing hearings on drug possession and trafficking charges, and the defendant later argued that his convictions should be vacated due to the court's failure to inquire about the joint representation. The court held that absent any factor that would alert the trial court to a possible conflict, there is no such affirmative duty, and it affirmed the court of appeals' judgment upholding the convictions. The core reasoning was that the record showed no objection to the representation, no indication the court knew or should have known of a conflict, and a beneficial plea deal for both defendants.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a challenge by Franklin County property owner John S. O’Keeffe to the continuing property-tax exemption for a 325-acre parcel owned by the state and operated as the Ohio State University Airport. The tax commissioner denied the complaint, and the Board of Tax Appeals affirmed that decision. The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the BTA, holding that the entire parcel qualifies for exemption under R.C. 3345.17 because it is used by the university to operate the airport as part of the College of Engineering’s academic programs. The court rejected arguments that the airport’s commercial activities or non-educational areas required taxation of the whole parcel or split-listing of portions.

taxesproperty

This case involved a licensed physician charged with misdemeanor sexual imposition based on patient complaints, who sought to suppress incriminating statements made during a state medical board investigation on the ground that the threat of losing his medical license coerced him into waiving his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The Ohio Supreme Court held that a medical license qualifies as a property right and that the potential loss of the license can constitute coercion, but suppression is warranted only if the defendant subjectively believed that invoking the privilege would result in license revocation and that belief was objectively reasonable under the circumstances. The court concluded that the doctor's belief was not objectively reasonable here, so the statements were admissible, and it reversed the court of appeals' suppression ruling while also clarifying that a sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge cannot be deemed moot by a remand on other grounds. The matter was remanded for further proceedings.

criminal lawprocedurehealthcareproperty

The case involved Dr. James Gideon, who was charged with sexual imposition after patients accused him of inappropriate conduct; during a state medical board investigation, he made incriminating statements to an investigator, which were later shared with police and used in his criminal trial. Gideon moved to suppress those statements, arguing they were coerced in violation of the Fifth Amendment because he faced a statutory duty to answer truthfully or risk losing his medical license. The Ohio Supreme Court held that a medical license is a property right and its threatened loss can constitute coercion under Garrity v. New Jersey, but suppression is warranted only if the defendant's belief that non-cooperation would result in license loss is both subjectively held and objectively reasonable. The trial court's factual finding that Gideon's belief was not objectively reasonable was supported by competent evidence, so the statements were admissible; the court of appeals therefore erred in reversing the convictions on that ground and in treating a sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim as moot. The judgment was reversed and the case remanded in part.

criminal lawhealthcarepropertyprocedure

The case concerned a challenge by the Office of the Ohio Consumers’ Counsel to orders of the Public Utilities Commission finding that Ohio Edison Company’s 2017 earnings under its electric security plan were not significantly excessive. The commission had excluded revenue from the company’s Distribution Modernization Rider when applying the statutory earnings test under R.C. 4928.143(F). The Ohio Supreme Court held that this exclusion was not reasonable because the rider was approved as part of the electric security plan, and the statute requires the commission to consider whether provisions of the plan resulted in significantly excessive earnings compared to similar companies. The court therefore reversed the commission’s orders and remanded the matter for further proceedings.

business & regulatory

This case involved media organizations seeking school records of a deceased adult former student through public-records requests under Ohio law after the student was involved in a mass shooting. The school district denied the requests, citing exemptions under the Ohio Student Privacy Act (R.C. 3319.321(B)) and FERPA. The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the lower court's denial of a writ of mandamus, holding that the OSPA prohibits disclosure of public-school records pertaining to an adult former student without that student's written consent. The court reasoned that the statute's language is unambiguous and contains no exception for the former student's death.

free speechprocedure

This case involved whether inconsistencies in the language of a cognovit promissory note prevented its enforcement after the borrowers defaulted on a $500,000 loan from Sutton Bank. The borrowers argued that the statutory warning required by R.C. 2323.13(D) was defective because it used the defined term 'you' (referring to the lender) and therefore failed to adequately notify them of the rights they were waiving. The trial court entered a cognovit judgment in the bank's favor, but the court of appeals reversed, finding the note invalid. The Ohio Supreme Court reversed the appellate decision and reinstated the judgment, holding that courts must give effect to the parties' clear intent when interpreting the note and that the warning provision, read in context with the rest of the document and the signature lines, sufficiently notified the borrowers of the consequences of default.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involved two parents who had entered into a court-approved shared-parenting plan for their child after their relationship ended. Both parents later filed motions seeking to terminate the plan and obtain sole residential and legal custody. The trial court terminated the shared-parenting plan and designated the mother as the sole residential parent and legal custodian, finding the decision served the child's best interest. The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed, holding that under R.C. 3109.04 a trial court need only consider the best interest of the child when terminating a shared-parenting plan and designating a residential parent, without first requiring a finding of changed circumstances.

family law

The case involved the Village of Put-in-Bay filing criminal complaints against business owners Mark Mathys and Islander Inn for failing to pay an annual license fee on their rental golf carts under Section 858.01 of the village ordinances. The defendants challenged the fee as an unconstitutional excise tax under Article XII, Section 5a of the Ohio Constitution, which restricts how revenue from taxes relating to vehicle operation on public highways may be spent. The Ohio Supreme Court held that the ordinance does not impose an unconstitutional tax, as the fee relates to vehicle use on roads and the collected revenue is used solely for street repairs, a purpose permitted by the constitutional provision. The court affirmed the Sixth District Court of Appeals' judgment reversing the trial court's dismissal of the charges.

taxescriminal lawbusiness & regulatory

This case arose from a contract dispute in which Crown Services and Zurich Insurance sought to recover over $1.9 million in Kentucky workers' compensation benefits paid after an employee injury at Miami Valley's Kentucky facility; the suit was filed in Ohio's Cuyahoga County court despite a forum-selection clause and Miami Valley's motion to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds favoring a Kentucky court. The trial court dismissed the action without prejudice, and the question on appeal was whether that order qualified as final and appealable under R.C. 2505.02. The Ohio Supreme Court held that it did not, affirming the court of appeals, because a without-prejudice dismissal on forum non conveniens does not prevent refiling, affect a substantial right, or determine the action and thus falls outside the statutory criteria for immediate appellate review. The core reasoning emphasized that such orders leave the parties free to pursue the same claims elsewhere and do not carry the finality required for appeal, distinguishing them from dismissals that bar relitigation.

procedure

The case involved a driver convicted of speeding in Brook Park, Ohio, based on results from a laser speed-measuring device, where the trial court admitted the evidence without expert testimony or judicial notice of the device's scientific reliability. The Ohio Supreme Court held that results from speed-measuring devices using radar or laser technology are admissible without expert testimony establishing or the court taking judicial notice of the underlying scientific principles. The court reasoned that these devices operate on established principles, consistent with its prior precedent on radar devices, but required the factfinder to separately determine whether evidence of the particular device's accuracy and the operator's qualifications suffices to support a conviction. The Eighth District Court of Appeals' judgment affirming the conviction was upheld.

criminal lawprocedure

This case concerned whether a barn on residential land in Litchfield Township, used for weddings and events, qualified for an exemption from township zoning rules under R.C. 519.21(A) because it was also used for vinting and selling wine from grapes grown on the property. The township trustees sought an injunction to stop the events, but the trial court found the exemption applied after the owner planted grapevines, produced wine stored in the barn, and required renters to buy the wine. The Ninth District affirmed, and the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed that judgment, holding that whether a building is used primarily for vinting and selling wine is a factual question decided by a preponderance of the evidence, that primary use is not determined solely by the percentage of space devoted to it, and that conditioning event rentals on wine purchases supported the trial court's finding of primary use.

propertybusiness & regulatory

This case concerned a juvenile designated as a serious youthful offender (SYO) who admitted to conduct that would constitute rape and was placed in the custody of the Department of Youth Services until his 21st birthday, with a stayed adult prison sentence imposed. After the juvenile failed to complete court-ordered sex-offender treatment, the state moved to invoke the adult portion of the sentence; the juvenile court held a hearing the day before his birthday, found non-compliance, and terminated the juvenile disposition in favor of a reduced adult term. The Ohio Supreme Court determined that the juvenile court lost subject-matter jurisdiction once the individual attained age 21, and because the invocation order was not journalized until the day he turned 21, the order was void. The court therefore reversed the court of appeals and vacated the adult portion of the sentence.

criminal lawprocedurefamily law

This case involved a jury verdict awarding compensatory and punitive damages to Phoenix Lighting Group against Genlyte Thomas Group in a business dispute over lighting product sales. Because punitive damages were awarded, the trial court had discretion to grant attorney fees to the prevailing party, calculating a lodestar amount of roughly $1.99 million based on reasonable hourly rates and hours worked, then doubling it due to case complexity and success. The Ohio Supreme Court held that the lodestar is presumptively the reasonable fee award, with enhancements permitted only rarely and only upon objective evidence showing a factor not already accounted for in the lodestar calculation, following U.S. Supreme Court precedent in Perdue v. Kenny A. The court therefore reversed the enhancement and remanded for an award limited to the lodestar amount.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved a disciplinary complaint by the Columbus Bar Association against attorney Natalie Bahan, who visited an incarcerated murder suspect uninvited to discuss legal representation and rights. The court found that Bahan violated Prof.Cond.R. 7.3(a) by engaging in in-person solicitation of professional employment when a significant motive was pecuniary gain, but dismissed charges under rules 8.4(d) and (h) for lack of evidence. It rejected the board's recommendation of a stayed six-month suspension in favor of a public reprimand, reasoning that this was an isolated incident with a single prospective client, Bahan had no prior discipline, and she had cooperated fully in the proceedings.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved the Ohio State Bar Association charging Mario Watkins and his company Watkins Global Network with the unauthorized practice of law for representing small businesses in debt-settlement negotiations with creditors from 2008 to 2013. The court reviewed the board's recommendation of 31 violations and found that debt negotiation on behalf of another does not by itself constitute the practice of law unless it includes rendering legal services such as giving advice, drafting documents, or raising defenses. The court concluded that only one of the 31 instances met this standard, leading to an injunction against future unauthorized practice and a $1,000 civil penalty.

business & regulatory

The case concerned whether Joseph Jones could be prosecuted under Ohio's dangerous-dog laws (R.C. 955.22) for failing to confine his dog after it allegedly bit a person, even though the dog had never been formally designated as dangerous through the process in R.C. 955.222. The Ohio Supreme Court held that a prior official designation is not required, as the state may prove the dog's dangerousness as an element of the offense at trial based on the dog's prior behavior. However, the Court found that the prosecution presented insufficient evidence to establish that Jones's dog met the statutory definition of dangerous, and therefore affirmed the court of appeals' judgment vacating the conviction on that ground. The decision resolved a conflict between appellate districts on the interpretation of the statute.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Gwynne, the defendant pleaded guilty to multiple counts of burglary, theft, and receiving stolen property arising from thefts of jewelry and memorabilia from residents of nursing homes and assisted-living facilities over several years, and the trial court imposed an aggregate 65-year prison sentence by running multiple felony terms consecutively. The state appealed from the Fifth District Court of Appeals' decision that had reviewed the sentence under R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 and reduced it to 15 years. The Ohio Supreme Court held that the state forfeits any argument that a defendant's appeal waiver bars appellate review if the waiver is not timely invoked, and that R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) alone governs appellate review of consecutive sentences without reference to the general felony-sentencing principles in R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 or the court's prior decision in State v. Marcum. The court therefore reversed the judgment and remanded for the court of appeals to apply the correct statutory standard to the consecutive-sentencing findings.

criminal lawprocedure