William A. Berry

In this eminent domain case, Arkansas Louisiana Gas Company sought an 80-foot-wide right-of-way easement across the defendants' land for a high-pressure gas pipeline and disputed the compensation owed after a jury awarded the landowners $9,000. The Oklahoma Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, holding that the landowners' expert testimony properly established the property's best use as residential subdivision and calculated diminution in fair market value by comparing before-and-after values. The court ruled admissible the experts' reliance on local market perceptions of pipeline risks, as this evidence showed prevailing conditions rather than proving the truth of hearsay reports. Challenges to the valuation method and other issues were either unsupported by the record or not properly preserved for appeal.

propertyprocedure

The case involved Louis George Lowery's application for a retail liquor store license in Bartlesville, Oklahoma, which the Oklahoma Alcoholic Beverage Control Board denied based on a statute prohibiting such licenses on any city block where a church is located, interpreting "block" as a large area bounded by four streets encompassing about 400 acres. The district court reversed the Board's decision, finding it arbitrary, and the Supreme Court of Oklahoma affirmed, holding that "block" should be interpreted as the segment of one side of a street between two cross streets, so that an intersecting street between the proposed location and the church divided them into different blocks. The court reasoned that the statute's other provisions use linear distances like 300 feet, suggesting "block" was meant as a measure of distance rather than a large enclosed area, and rejected the Attorney General's opinion defining it otherwise.

business & regulatory

This case involved lessors seeking to cancel three oil and gas leases after lessees failed to pay shut-in royalties during a period from 1972 to 1975 when a producing well was shut in due to low pressure and the need to secure a new sales contract. The leases' primary terms had expired, and their habendum clauses extended them only so long as gas was produced, with separate clauses allowing $1 per acre annual shut-in payments to maintain the leases. The trial court ruled for the lessees, but the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the leases terminated for lack of actual or constructive production. The Oklahoma Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeals opinion and affirmed the trial court, reasoning that the shut-in clauses were not special limitations causing automatic termination, that marketing was not required under the leases' "produced" language, and that diligent efforts by lessees to find a market sufficed to keep the leases in force.

propertybusiness & regulatory

In Puckett v. Cook, the petitioner sought a writ of prohibition to prevent a trial judge from consolidating his personal injury lawsuit, arising from a bus accident, with a similar suit filed by his wife against the same defendant. The Oklahoma Supreme Court assumed original jurisdiction and upheld the consolidation order. The court held that 12 O.S. 1971 § 559, which requires unanimous party consent before consolidating cases for trial by one jury, was an unconstitutional legislative encroachment on the judiciary's inherent power to control its docket and procedures, in violation of the separation of powers under Article IV § 1 of the Oklahoma Constitution. Instead, the court applied 12 O.S. 1971 § 79, which permits consolidation in the exercise of sound judicial discretion, and found no abuse of that discretion here given the shared counsel, witnesses, and facts between the cases.

proceduretorts & liability

This case involved a stepfather's petition to adopt his wife's children from a prior marriage without the consent of their natural father, based on the claim that the father had willfully failed to provide support for the preceding twelve months under Oklahoma law. The trial court ruled that the children were eligible for adoption without the father's consent, and the Oklahoma Supreme Court reviewed that interlocutory order via certiorari. The Court held that mere inquiries about support do not constitute offers of support, and that the trial court's finding of willful non-support was not against the clear weight of the evidence, even though the mother had contributed to communication barriers. It therefore affirmed the order allowing the adoption to proceed without consent and clarified that such orders are now final and appealable directly rather than by certiorari. The Court overruled prior precedent to the extent it was inconsistent with this procedural holding.

family law

This case concerned a mother's appeal from an order terminating her parental rights to two young children who had previously been adjudicated dependent and neglected in juvenile proceedings. The Court of Appeals had reversed the termination on jurisdictional grounds, holding that the unverified motion used to initiate termination was improper because it was not a verified juvenile petition under the relevant statutes. The Oklahoma Supreme Court reversed that decision and affirmed the termination order, reasoning that the termination statutes do not require a verified petition when termination proceedings are commenced by subsequent pleading after the children have already been adjudicated within the juvenile court's purview, that the mother received adequate notice and opportunity to be heard consistent with due process, and that she showed no prejudice from the lack of verification. The Court further noted that statutory protections for the initial adjudication do not automatically extend to later termination motions in the same action.

family lawprocedure

This case involved a mother's appeal of a trial court order terminating her parental rights to four children who had previously been adjudicated dependent and neglected and made wards of the court. The mother challenged the admission of expert evaluation reports as hearsay and argued that the termination proceeding required a verified petition under 10 O.S. 1971 § 1103 rather than an unverified motion. The Oklahoma Supreme Court affirmed the termination, holding that a parental rights termination hearing is a dispositional proceeding rather than an adjudicatory one, so hearsay evidence was admissible, and that precedent established no verified petition was needed. The court further found the evidence of neglect and lack of support sufficient to uphold the ruling under the clear weight of the evidence standard.

family lawprocedurecivil rights

In Matter of J.L., the Oklahoma Supreme Court reviewed a trial court's order terminating a mother's parental rights after her child was declared dependent and neglected, following a petition filed by the state alleging failure to provide care and lack of changed conditions. The Court of Appeals had reversed on procedural grounds related to the timing of the termination request, but the Supreme Court vacated that opinion and reversed the trial court on the merits. The core reasoning was that the evidence showed the mother had made sincere and substantial efforts to remedy the conditions leading to the adjudication, including improved housing and income, while the state's evidence of issues like developmental delays and strained visits was insufficient and inconsistent to justify termination.

family lawprocedure

In this case, the stepfather and mother petitioned for adoption of the mother's daughter from a prior marriage and sought an order allowing the adoption to proceed without the natural father's consent, alleging his willful failure to pay court-ordered child support for the one-year period preceding the petition. The trial court found the nonsupport willful based on evidence that the father had received income from a prison work-release program and later had funds available but made no payments, and it ruled the child eligible for adoption without his consent under 10 O.S.Supp. 1975 § 60.6. On appeal, the Oklahoma Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the question of willfulness is factual and that the trial court's finding was not against the weight of the evidence, as the father had both means and opportunity to pay yet took no action to fulfill the support obligation or modify the decree. The court rejected the father's claim that the mother's refusal of visitation excused his nonpayment, noting he pursued no legal remedies for visitation or support adjustment.

family law

The case involved an appellant seeking judicial review in district court of a Board of Review decision that denied her claim for benefits under the Oklahoma Employment Security Act after she was terminated by her former employer, Siegfried Insurance Agency. She named only the Oklahoma Employment Security Commission and the employer as defendants, omitting the Board of Review. The district court sustained a demurrer and dismissed the petition, and the Oklahoma Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The court reasoned that the governing statute makes the Commission, the Board of Review, and other parties to the administrative proceeding necessary defendants in any judicial review action, that compliance with these mandatory procedural requirements is jurisdictional, and that the absence of a necessary party such as the Board left the court without authority to proceed or obtain the record for review.

labor & employmentprocedure

This case concerned whether a plaintiff in a replevin action could dismiss the suit under 12 O.S.1971 § 684 before the court ruled on a prejudgment delivery application, and whether the trial court could later reopen the case to award attorney fees as costs under 12 O.S.Supp.1977 § 1580. The Oklahoma Supreme Court assumed original jurisdiction and held that the dismissal was effective once costs were paid, that attorney fees under § 1580 attach only to a party prevailing on the merits, and that the defendant had not prevailed when the dismissal occurred. The court reasoned that no jurisdiction remained after a proper § 684 dismissal, so the trial judge lacked authority to reopen the matter or assess fees. It therefore vacated the lower court's order and prohibited enforcement of the fee award.

procedure

This case involved a dispute over a 1964 lease granting Cities Service the right to store natural gas in subsurface formations beneath the Storck family’s land for 50 years, which included restrictions on drilling without approval; in 1973 the Storcks granted mineral leases to Min-Tex for oil and gas production, leading to a conflict when permission to drill was denied. The Storcks and Min-Tex sued to void the storage lease and seek damages, while Cities Service sought an injunction against drilling above the Mississippi Lime formation; the trial court denied relief to both sides. On appeal, the Oklahoma Supreme Court affirmed the denial of cancellation, holding that the lease was negotiated in contemplation of statutory condemnation proceedings under 52 O.S.1971 § 36.1 et seq., which limit condemnation of producing or capable strata and incorporate police-power protections into contracts, and that no inequity justified voiding the lease. Evidentiary rulings excluding certain testimony and exhibits were deemed harmless because they would not have changed the outcome.

propertybusiness & regulatory

The case addressed whether the 1971 amendment to Article II § 18 of the Oklahoma Constitution repealed the authority of a grand jury to initiate an accusation for removal against a county official under 22 O.S.1971 § 1182. The court held that the amendment did not repeal this power, either expressly or by implication, and that a duly empaneled grand jury could still bring such a proceeding. The core reasoning was that the amended constitutional language limited grand jury powers to investigating and indicting crimes without conflicting with the removal statute, repeals by implication are disfavored, and the legislature's authority to define crimes (including removal from office) remained intact. The trial court's dismissal of the accusation against the county superintendent was therefore reversed, and the matter was remanded for further proceedings.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a mother's appeal from a district court order terminating her parental rights over a seven-year-old child previously adjudged dependent and neglected under Oklahoma's juvenile code. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma affirmed the termination order and rejected the claim that the parent was entitled to a jury trial on the termination issue. The court held that the Oklahoma Constitution's jury trial guarantee extends only to proceedings recognized at common law or in federal courts before statehood, which does not include parental rights termination, and that the juvenile code statute providing for jury trials applies solely to initial hearings determining whether a child falls within the code's scope rather than to termination proceedings. The court also found no federal constitutional requirement for jury trials in such cases.

family lawprocedure

The case involved a plaintiff suing the operator of a nail salon, a domesticated corporate chair distributor, and a non-domesticated foreign chair manufacturer after she allegedly fell and was injured when her slacks caught on a chair at the salon in Tulsa County. The plaintiff filed suit in both Tulsa and Creek Counties, serving the foreign corporation via the Secretary of State, and the salon operator petitioned to challenge venue in Creek County. The court resolved conflicts among venue statutes, determining that 12 O.S.Supp.1976 § 187 controlled because resident defendants were present, making venue proper only in Tulsa County where the incident occurred and the residents were located, rather than in the plaintiff's home county under the statute applicable solely to the non-resident corporation. Because § 143 did not apply when venue was authorized in only one county, the court issued a writ of prohibition barring the Creek County court from exercising jurisdiction over the petitioner.

proceduretorts & liability

In Clark v. First Baptist Church, the claimant, a tithing church member, sought workers' compensation benefits under Oklahoma's Workmen’s Compensation Act after injuring himself while voluntarily trimming a tree on church property at the pastor's request, using his own tools. The State Industrial Court denied the claim for lack of jurisdiction, finding the claimant was not an employee, and the en banc appeal affirmed this order. The Oklahoma Supreme Court sustained the denial, holding that no master-servant relationship existed because there was no definite agreement on payment for the work, the claimant was not carried on the church payroll, and evidence of the church's right to control the work was insufficient as a matter of law. Credits to the claimant's tithing account or a later $15 check did not qualify as wages establishing employment under the Act.

labor & employment

This case concerns a dispute over an oil well drilled by defendants on their tract that bottomed under plaintiffs' adjacent Graham tract, producing hydrocarbons from it, and the proper measure of any benefit conferred on plaintiffs by that trespassing well for purposes of crediting against a damages judgment. After an initial remand, the trial court awarded defendants credit only for drilling costs from the Dornick Hills to the Springer formation based on the benefit of production from that deeper zone prior to defendants' knowledge of the trespass, while denying credit for other portions of the well. The Court of Appeals reversed that credit determination, but the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the trial court's benefit calculation was supported by the evidence and equity principles from the prior opinion, and further held that defendants' 1974 tender of the judgment balance was effective from the date of tender to stop further interest accrual, modifying the judgment accordingly.

propertytorts & liabilityprocedure

This case involved a dispute over construction liens on an apartment complex where Shankle Equipment, a materialman with a perfected lien, cross-petitioned against the mortgage lender Liberty National Bank after the bank foreclosed its superior mortgage. Shankle alleged that Liberty breached a fiduciary duty under Oklahoma trust statutes (42 O.S.1971 §§ 152 and 153) by allowing the borrower to divert construction loan proceeds away from paying lienable claims. The trial court sustained Liberty's general demurrer to this claim and dismissed it, and the Oklahoma Supreme Court affirmed. The court held that the pleadings alleged no facts establishing any special duty on the lender's part beyond providing the funds, and Oklahoma law does not impose trustee-like responsibility on mortgage lenders for the borrower's use of proceeds, unlike more expansive schemes in other states. The decision rested on the absence of supporting authority or pleaded facts creating such an obligation.

propertybusiness & regulatory

The case concerned whether a constructive trust could be placed on life insurance proceeds when a portion of the premiums had been paid with embezzled funds. An accountant embezzled over $78,000 from G & M Motor Company, using some of the money for life insurance premiums, and upon his death the company sought recovery from the proceeds paid to his surviving wife and child. The trial court imposed a constructive trust on part of the proceeds, the Court of Appeals modified it, and the Oklahoma Supreme Court granted certiorari to affirm the trial court's approach. The court decided that a pro rata share of the proceeds could be subject to a constructive trust to the extent of the wrongfully used premiums, but recovery could not exceed the total embezzled amount plus interest and costs. It reasoned that equity allows the owner of misappropriated funds to reach property acquired with those funds, citing Restatement of Restitution principles that prevent the wrongdoer from retaining profits and permit proportionate recovery when funds are commingled.

criminal lawproperty

The case involved a workers' compensation claim by an employee who sustained multiple injuries from a fall while operating a truck during covered employment. The employer challenged the award of compensation for 75% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole, arguing that the claimant's medical report was incompetent because it evaluated disability before the treating physician released the claimant from temporary total disability. The court upheld the award, finding the claimant's physician's report competent evidence on the end of temporary disability and the extent of permanent impairment, as the conflict with the treating doctor's report presented a credibility issue for the trial court to resolve. The matter was remanded only for recalculation to credit the employer for overpaid temporary total compensation.

labor & employmentprocedure