John B. Doolin

In McCoy v. Oklahoma Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co., a homeowner sued his insurer for breach of contract and bad faith after the insurer denied his fire loss claim for the home and personal property, asserting defenses including arson, material misrepresentations, and increased hazard. Following a bifurcated trial, the jury awarded contractual damages plus actual and punitive damages on the bad faith claim; the Court of Appeals affirmed the contract verdict with a credit for payments to the mortgagee but reversed the bad faith verdict and attorney fees award. The Oklahoma Supreme Court reinstated the jury verdict on bad faith, finding competent evidence that the insurer lacked a reasonable good faith belief for withholding payment, affirmed the contract award as modified by the credit, and reduced the attorney fees to a reasonable sum.

business & regulatorypropertytorts & liability

The case concerned whether a 1984 amendment to the John T. Griffin Revocable Trust should be reformed to remove language that prevented Trust A from qualifying for the federal estate tax marital deduction under IRC Section 2056(b)(7). After the grantor's death in 1985, the IRS determined that the surviving spouse's income interest was contingent on the executor's election and thus ineligible for the deduction, leading to a proposed tax deficiency. The trial court granted reformation by deleting the problematic language ab initio, and the Oklahoma Supreme Court affirmed, finding that undisputed testimony from the drafting attorneys and the estate's tax filings established the grantor's intent to maximize the marital deduction and that the language resulted from a scrivener's error. The court held that the evidence satisfied the requirements for reforming the trust to reflect that intent.

taxesproperty

In Lacy v. Schlumberger Well Service, a workers' compensation claimant alleged lung and respiratory injuries from prolonged chemical exposure during employment, which the employer contested with medical evidence including a doctor's testimony attributing the issues to asthma unrelated to the job. The trial court denied the claim after admitting the employer's evidence over an objection limited to its probative value. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed, finding the medical testimony lacked sufficient probative value to support the denial. The Oklahoma Supreme Court granted certiorari to address whether the appellate court could review the evidence's probative value despite the narrow objection at trial, clarifying the distinction between objections to evidentiary admissibility (competency) and legal sufficiency (probative value) under the any-competent-evidence standard of review from Parks v. Norman Municipal Hospital and related workers' compensation rules.

labor & employmentprocedure

The case involved a plaintiff suing a Catholic priest and two dioceses for alleged sexual abuse during counseling sessions from 1967 to 1970, claiming her multiple personality disorder from prior childhood abuse had repressed her memories of the incidents until they surfaced in therapy in 1987. The Oklahoma Supreme Court answered certified questions from the Tenth Circuit by holding that neither the plaintiff's multiple personality disorder nor the discovery rule tolled Oklahoma's two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims. The court reasoned that state law did not recognize the disorder as a legal disability extending the filing deadline and that the discovery rule did not apply to this clerical negligence action where the plaintiff lacked conscious knowledge of the abuse until years later, rendering the 1988 complaint time-barred.

torts & liabilityprocedure

In this workers' compensation case, claimant Albert Bond, who had been awarded permanent disability benefits after losing both legs, sought an order requiring his former employer and insurer to replace rather than repair his prosthetic legs due to wear and changes in his condition. The trial court granted the replacement request after a hearing where the employer presented evidence favoring repair, but then denied Bond's subsequent application for attorney fees based on an alleged unreasonable denial. The Oklahoma Supreme Court affirmed the denial of fees, holding that the employer had a statutory right under 85 O.S. § 15 to a hearing on the necessity of replacement, presented competent evidence supporting its position, and did not act without reasonable grounds under 85 O.S. § 30 or in bad faith under the American Rule, so no abuse of discretion occurred in denying fees.

labor & employmentprocedure

The case involved a minor student who sued a school district for negligence after being injured by a truck while crossing a highway during a supervised school activity; the district was not sued alongside the truck driver and defended in part by attempting to show the driver's negligence. At trial the district called the driver as a witness and, over objection, elicited testimony about his conviction for speeding from the same incident, after which the jury found for the district. The Oklahoma Supreme Court reversed and remanded, ruling that evidence of a non-party witness's criminal conviction arising from the same facts is inadmissible in a subsequent civil action when timely objected to. The court applied long-standing precedent that bars such evidence because of the fundamental differences between criminal and civil proceedings in parties, burdens, and issues, finding no applicable exception on these facts.

proceduretorts & liabilitycriminal law

This case concerned applications by oil companies to the Oklahoma Corporation Commission for authority to inject enhanced recovery fluids, including fresh water, into wells in the Postle field to increase oil production from the Morrow formation. The Commission granted the applications after published notice under its rules, rejecting arguments that personal notice was required for all Ogallala Aquifer water rights owners and that a prior water permit from the Oklahoma Water Resources Board was needed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that due process required personal notice to affected property owners and a prior OWRB permit. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and upheld the Commission orders, reasoning that the published notice was constitutionally adequate because not all water rights owners would be affected, the term "enhanced recovery fluids" sufficiently described the proceedings, and the Commission could authorize injection operations without a prior OWRB permit.

business & regulatoryenvironmentpropertyprocedure

This case involved a personal injury claim by Donna Price against Southwestern Bell Telephone Company and Bobby Carmon arising from a car accident in which both defendants were found negligent. Prior to trial, Price settled with Carmon for $8,000 and released him, after which a jury awarded Price $5,000 in damages against both defendants jointly and severally. The district court applied 12 O.S. § 832(H) to reduce the verdict by the full settlement amount and entered judgment of zero for Price; the Court of Appeals reversed, but the Oklahoma Supreme Court vacated that decision and reinstated the district court's judgment. The court reasoned that the statute expressly reduces a non-settling tortfeasor's liability by the amount of any good-faith settlement with another joint tortfeasor and discharges the settling party's contribution obligations, without regard to the parties' stipulated percentages of fault.

torts & liability

The case involved a dispute over whether a Comprehensive General Liability Insurance policy issued by St. Paul Insurance Company covered damages awarded against Dodson Construction Company for a subcontractor's defective roofing work on a school building, which caused leaks and interior damage. Dodson had been held liable in arbitration for $45,997 to repair the roof and interior, then sued the insurer for failure to defend and bad faith denial of coverage. The district court granted summary judgment to Dodson on coverage, leading to a jury award of actual and punitive damages plus attorney fees. The Oklahoma Supreme Court reversed, holding that policy exclusions (m) and (n) unambiguously barred coverage for property damage to the insured's own work or products arising from faulty workmanship or materials, and that exclusion (a) did not create ambiguity or override those exclusions.

business & regulatorypropertytorts & liability

The case concerned a class action by out-of-state motor carriers challenging Oklahoma statutes that imposed retaliatory or mirror taxes and fees on vehicles registered in other states, matching any third-tier taxes those states levied on Oklahoma carriers. The Oklahoma Supreme Court ruled the statutes unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause because they discriminated on their face against interstate commerce by imposing unapportioned burdens based solely on state of registration. The core reasoning was that such taxes are neither fairly related to services provided nor compensatory, as they target nonresidents without equivalent treatment for in-state carriers and disrupt the market for interstate transportation. The opinion also addressed remedies, including refunds and attorneys' fees, with references to prospective application in light of U.S. Supreme Court precedent.

taxesbusiness & regulatoryfederal power

The case concerned the Dearings' attempt to quiet title to mineral interests beneath a railroad right-of-way strip in Roger Mills County, Oklahoma, following two prior lawsuits over the same property. In Dearing I (1982), the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the Dearings' claimed interests had been extinguished by 1930 resale tax deeds issued to the State. After a separate action by the railroads resulted in a ruling that those tax deeds were void, the Dearings filed this third suit against the State and other defendants; the trial court dismissed it as barred by res judicata. The Supreme Court examined whether the elements of res judicata—identity of parties, subject matter, capacity, and cause of action—were met and whether exceptions applied due to the later invalidation of the tax deeds.

propertyproceduretaxes

In this case, Capitol Federal Savings Bank obtained a foreclosure judgment and later a deficiency judgment against borrower Norman Bewley after he defaulted on a loan secured by real estate; Bewley received no notice of the deficiency motion because it was mailed to the wrong address and lacked hearing details. The trial court and Court of Appeals denied Bewley's motion to vacate the deficiency judgment, treating it as merely voidable and requiring him to show a defense under state statute. The Oklahoma Supreme Court reversed, holding that the complete absence of notice violated due process under the state and federal constitutions, rendering the deficiency judgment void rather than voidable. The court distinguished precedents involving defective but actual notice, emphasizing that a party must receive notification sufficient to decide whether to appear or default.

procedureproperty

The case involved Duane Blanton suing the Housing Authority of the City of Norman for wrongful discharge after the Board terminated his employment as executive director in 1985. Blanton claimed he had a protected property interest in continued employment based on assurances that his job would continue as long as his performance was satisfactory, entitling him to due process before termination, and that the firing breached an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Following a jury verdict, the trial court awarded Blanton actual damages and attorney fees. On appeal, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that Blanton was an at-will employee with no such property interest. The court reasoned that property rights in employment arise only from independent sources like statutes or contracts creating substantive restrictions on discharge, which were absent here as no statute granted the executive director just-cause protection and the evidence of hiring discussions did not establish an enforceable limit on the Authority's termination power.

labor & employmentcivil rightsprocedure

The case concerned a dispute over title to mineral interests under land conveyed by a 1940 warranty deed that included language requiring the grantee to pay the grantors one-half of proceeds from future oil and gas leases, while stating that such payments were personal property and that the grantors did not intend to reserve any interest in the land. The district court held the deed unambiguous and quieted title in the grantee's successor without any reserved royalty interest. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding ambiguity and a reservation of a one-half non-participating royalty. The Oklahoma Supreme Court vacated the appellate decision, reinstated the district court's judgment, and ruled that the deed lacked apt words of reservation, expressly disclaimed any retained interest, and contained no facial ambiguity that would permit extrinsic evidence to alter its terms.

property

The case concerned orders by the Oklahoma Corporation Commission that pooled leasehold interests in a 640-acre drilling and spacing unit for oil and gas development. After the initial well was completed, non-participating owners who had accepted bonuses sought to join later increased-density wells within the same unit; the Commission allowed this by construing its earlier pooling orders as applying only to the original wellbore. SKZ appealed, arguing the orders had pooled the entire unit. The Oklahoma Supreme Court reversed, holding that the pooling statutes and the language of the orders required unit-wide pooling rather than wellbore-only pooling, consistent with prior precedent. The court therefore ruled that the Commission exceeded its authority in permitting the non-participating owners to elect into the additional wells.

business & regulatoryproperty

This case involved attorneys who held an unrecorded mortgage on property from Garol Ray Leitner to secure payment for legal services; Leitner later conveyed interests in the property via recorded instruments to his mother, Dorothy James. The attorneys sued Leitner and Dorothy to foreclose the mortgage and quiet title, alleging Dorothy had actual knowledge of their prior lien when she received her deeds. The trial court granted partial summary judgment to Dorothy, finding no competent evidence of her knowledge and declaring her title superior under the recording statute, 16 O.S.1981 § 15; the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Oklahoma Supreme Court reversed, holding that a letter from a potential witness attached to the attorneys' response to the summary judgment motion constituted sufficient 'other materials' under District Court Rule 13 to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact regarding Dorothy's knowledge, making summary judgment improper.

propertyprocedure

The case concerned a challenge by Quinn to a special election held by the City of Tulsa on October 6, 1987, regarding extension of a temporary one-percent sales tax and issuance of bonds for various projects. Quinn alleged that city officials improperly used public funds to promote passage of the measures, made misrepresentations, failed to comply with ordinance time limits by using an invalid emergency clause, and engaged in other procedural irregularities, seeking to enjoin the resulting tax and bonds as well as future similar conduct. The trial court found the ballot forms sufficient, no fraud or coercion, and that officials did not act improperly in supporting the proposals individually, though it noted improper expenditure of public funds; it denied injunctive relief against the bonds or future acts. On appeal, the Oklahoma Supreme Court addressed claims including the validity of the emergency clause in the authorizing resolution and ordinance, holding that courts will not examine the underlying factual basis for a legislative body's determination that an emergency exists for immediate effect. The court affirmed the judgment upholding the election results.

electionstaxes

The case concerned whether two City of Broken Arrow land-use ordinances regulating development in a 100-year flood plain effected a permanent taking of a landowner's 40-acre agricultural property without just compensation under the U.S. and Oklahoma Constitutions. The owner had purchased the land for investment, obtained initial R-2 residential zoning, and later sought rezoning; after the ordinances limited uses to flood-tolerant activities and required elevated building pads, he sued in inverse condemnation alleging the rules destroyed the land's economic value and investment expectations. The court held that the mere enactment of the ordinances did not constitute a taking because the property's flooding was a natural condition, the city had made no physical invasion or diversion of water, and the owner had never applied for or been denied a building permit or variance, leaving open the possibility of economically viable use.

propertyenvironment

This case arose from a 1984 car accident in which the tort-feasor's liability insurer became insolvent; the injured claimant sued both the tort-feasor and his own uninsured-motorist carrier, Union Mutual, while Union Mutual cross-claimed for indemnity against the tort-feasor. The Oklahoma Supreme Court held that, under the pre-amendment versions of 36 O.S. §§ 3636 and 2012, a claimant must first exhaust uninsured-motorist coverage before recovering from the Oklahoma Property and Casualty Insurance Guaranty Association, and that the UM carrier may pursue indemnity against the tort-feasor only for amounts exceeding the limits of the insolvent policy. The court reached these conclusions by reading the statutes together to treat the UM carrier as primarily liable and to limit subrogation-style claims against the tort-feasor to amounts above the insolvent insurer's policy limits, thereby placing the tort-feasor in the same position he would have occupied had his insurer remained solvent.

torts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory

The case concerned whether a two-year or three-year statute of limitations applied to an employee's claim for retaliatory discharge under the Workers’ Compensation Retaliatory Discharge Act, 85 O.S.1981 §§ 5-7, after termination following a workers' compensation filing. The Oklahoma Supreme Court ruled that the three-year period under 12 O.S.1981 § 95 (Second) governs, as the claim asserts a liability created by statute other than a forfeiture or penalty. The core reasoning was that the Act established a new substantive cause of action with no counterpart at common law for at-will employees, distinguishing it from general tort claims for injury to rights that would fall under the two-year limit.

labor & employmentprocedure