District Court, N.D. Ohio — appointed by William Jefferson Clinton

Woods v. Willis
District Court, N.D. Ohio · 2011-09-12 · cited 2×
This § 1983 case involved present and former participants in the federal Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher Program administered by the Lucas Metropolitan Housing Authority in Ohio, who alleged that the authority terminated their benefits without due process of law or in violation of federal regulations. The plaintiffs sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief based on claims that the termination process, including the conduct of informal hearings, deprived them of a protected property interest. The court granted summary judgment to the defendants on all claims brought by plaintiff Nancy Woods, finding no due process violation in her termination proceedings. As to plaintiff Caulene Fuller, the court granted summary judgment to the defendants on most claims but denied it on the claim that the hearing officer improperly relied solely on untested hearsay evidence in terminating her benefits, which violated due process requirements for an opportunity to confront evidence. The core reasoning centered on whether the administrative procedures, including notice, hearing opportunities, and the burden of proof, satisfied constitutional and statutory standards for terminating federal housing assistance.
civil rightsfederal powerpropertyprocedure
Peart v. SENECA COUNTY
District Court, N.D. Ohio · 2011-08-18 · cited 5×
This case arose from an assault on immigration detainee Anthony Peart by fellow inmate Larry White at the Seneca County Jail, where Peart sued the county, its former sheriff, and commissioners under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights due to inadequate inmate classification and failure to protect, along with related state-law claims. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing lack of deliberate indifference and no policy or custom causing the harm. The court granted the motion in part and denied it in part, holding that evidence of the jail's complete abandonment of required classification procedures—despite known risks from White's history—created triable issues on whether officials were deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of harm under Fourteenth Amendment standards for pretrial detainees. Core reasoning focused on Monell liability principles, the duty to segregate based on objective criteria, and the foreseeability of harm from ignoring classification protocols.
civil rightscriminal law
Miller v. Whirlpool Corp.
District Court, N.D. Ohio · 2011-08-12 · cited 5×
This case involved an ADA claim by Roger Miller, a former Whirlpool toolmaker, who was fired after refusing to complete a detailed medical questionnaire required for certification to operate Powered Industrial Vehicles (PIVs). Miller alleged the questionnaire violated the ADA's prohibition on disability-related inquiries of employees. The court denied both parties' motions for partial summary judgment. It reasoned that the questionnaire qualified as a protected disability-related inquiry under 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A) because it sought information on medications, illnesses, and medical conditions that could reveal disabilities, and Whirlpool failed to demonstrate the inquiry was job-related and consistent with business necessity or required by OSHA regulations.
labor & employmentcivil rights
United States v. Cook
District Court, N.D. Ohio · 2011-07-11
This case involves federal criminal charges against defendant Alex David Cook for possession and distribution of child pornography. The court addressed the defendant's motion to suppress statements made to FBI agents and consents to search obtained during execution of a warrant at his apartment and a subsequent polygraph examination at the FBI office. The court granted the motion in part, suppressing the defendant's statements made outside his apartment because they resulted from custodial interrogation without Miranda warnings. The court denied the motion in part, holding that statements during and after the polygraph were admissible because the defendant voluntarily participated and any deception by agents did not render the confession involuntary under the circumstances.
criminal lawprocedure
Younglove Construction, LLC v. PSD Development, LLC
District Court, N.D. Ohio · 2011-03-18 · cited 4×
The case involves a breach of contract dispute between Younglove Construction, LLC and PSD Development, LLC arising from a design/build agreement to construct an animal feed manufacturing plant, with Younglove seeking payment and foreclosure of a mechanics lien and PSD counterclaiming for construction defects. The court ruled on Younglove's motion to exclude certain testimony from PSD's expert appraiser Jeffrey Pelegrin regarding diminution in the property's fair market value. It granted the motion in part, holding that Pelegrin's approach of analogizing construction defects to environmental contamination stigma was not a reliable or generally accepted method under Daubert standards for proving contract damages, as Ohio law demands greater certainty in such cases and the expert's interview-based methodology lacked sufficient rigor or foundation in standard appraisal practice for this context.
propertyprocedure
HSBC BANK USA, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION v. Arnett
District Court, N.D. Ohio · 2011-02-09
This case originated as a state-court foreclosure action by HSBC Bank against John Arnett, who later filed counterclaims including a putative class action against additional counterclaim defendant Litton Loan Servicing for alleged mortgage-servicing misconduct. Litton removed the case to federal court under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), asserting minimal diversity, numerosity, and an amount in controversy exceeding $5 million. Arnett moved to remand, arguing that CAFA does not authorize removal by a counterclaim defendant. The court granted the motion, holding that the text of the removal statutes limits removal authority to original defendants and that CAFA does not expand this authority to additional counterclaim defendants, consistent with decisions from other circuits and indications from the Sixth Circuit. The case was therefore returned to state court.
procedure