W. Michael Gillette

This case involves two prisoners, Severy and Wilson, each convicted of multiple counts of aggravated murder and sentenced to consecutive life terms with 30-year mandatory minimum sentences. After serving 20 years on the first sentence, the Board of Parole found each prisoner capable of rehabilitation within a reasonable time and converted the terms of the first sentence to life with the possibility of parole under ORS 163.105. The Court of Appeals, following Norris v. Board of Parole, held that the conversion applied only to the first sentence, so each prisoner would need to serve another 20 years before a rehabilitation hearing on the second sentence. The Oregon Supreme Court granted review to address the board's authority over consecutive sentences in light of its recent decision in Janowski/Fleming, which permitted override of a single 30-year minimum after a rehabilitation finding.

criminal law

This case concerns two prisoners convicted of aggravated murder in 1985 and 1986 who received life sentences with 30-year mandatory minimum terms under ORS 163.105(1) (1985). After 20 years of incarceration, each petitioned the Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision for a hearing under ORS 163.105(2) and (3) to determine whether they were likely to be rehabilitated within a reasonable time; the board found in their favor and converted their sentences to life with the possibility of parole. The Court of Appeals held that the board had authority to override the mandatory minimums but remanded for the board to decide which rules applied. The Oregon Supreme Court affirmed that the board possesses such override authority but reversed the remand, holding that the legislature intended the board to apply the parole matrix rules to set release dates once the conversion occurs.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Salas-Juarez, the defendant was convicted of murder and attempted murder after a street fight in which a participant was fatally stabbed. The trial court excluded evidence that Russell, another instigator in the fight, had earlier stated he wanted to "slash" someone and displayed a knife; the Court of Appeals affirmed without opinion. The Supreme Court reversed, ruling that the statement was admissible under OEC 404(3) as evidence of Russell's state of mind and motive rather than character, that it was relevant under OEC 402, and that its exclusion was not harmless because the evidence against the defendant was not overwhelming and the statement could have supported reasonable doubt about his guilt.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Ashbaugh, the defendant moved to suppress evidence of methamphetamine found during a police search of her purse in a public park, arguing that her consent was invalid because it resulted from an earlier unlawful seizure of her person in violation of Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution. The trial court denied the motion, but the Court of Appeals remanded for further fact-finding on whether the encounter constituted a seizure. The Oregon Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and affirmed the trial court's judgment, holding that the officers' interactions with the defendant, including requesting identification and later asking to search her purse, did not amount to a seizure because a reasonable person would have felt free to leave or decline the requests. The court reasoned that the initial approach and identification check were consensual and relaxed, the officers returned the defendant's ID before arresting her husband, and the subsequent request to search occurred after the husband had been removed, without any show of authority that would have objectively restricted the defendant's liberty. As a result, the consent search was lawful and the evidence admissible.

criminal lawcivil rights

This land use case concerned Wal-Mart's application for site plan and architectural review approval to build a large store in Medford, Oregon. Petitioners challenged the city's approval, arguing that city code provisions (MLDC 10.460-10.462) required Wal-Mart to submit a comprehensive traffic impact analysis and demonstrate that surrounding roads would maintain level of service D. The city and Wal-Mart contended that those provisions were not applicable to site plan review decisions. LUBA sided with petitioners and remanded, but the Court of Appeals reversed, holding the city's interpretation plausible. The Oregon Supreme Court affirmed, ruling that LUBA and courts must defer to the city's plausible reading of its own code, under which the traffic requirements did not apply to the site plan process.

propertybusiness & regulatory

This case involved a dispute over life insurance proceeds following a divorce. The dissolution decree required the decedent to maintain a $100,000 life insurance policy naming his ex-wife as trustee for their child, but he instead purchased a $600,000 policy naming his girlfriend as beneficiary and died without fulfilling the decree. The ex-wife sued the girlfriend, seeking a constructive trust on $100,000 of the proceeds under theories of unjust enrichment and money had and received. The trial court granted summary judgment to the ex-wife, but the Court of Appeals reversed in favor of the girlfriend; the Oregon Supreme Court held that neither party was entitled to summary judgment due to unresolved factual issues regarding the girlfriend's knowledge and the applicability of the decree's constructive trust provision, and remanded the case.

family lawproperty

This case concerns a certified question from the Ninth Circuit about the interpretation of Oregon's split-recovery punitive damages statute, ORS 31.735. After a jury awarded Patton compensatory and punitive damages against his employer Target in a wrongful discharge suit, the parties settled before entry of judgment, with no payment allocated to punitive damages or the state. The state sought to intervene, arguing that the statute made it a judgment creditor upon the verdict and that its consent was required to settle in a way that eliminated its 60% share. The Oregon Supreme Court examined the statute's text, context, and prior precedent such as DeMendoza v. Huffman, concluding that the state does not acquire a vested interest or rights as a judgment creditor until a final judgment is entered. Accordingly, the parties could settle without the state's consent, and the district court's approval of the stipulated judgment was consistent with the statute.

proceduretorts & liability

This case involved a defendant convicted of multiple sex crimes who successfully appealed parts of his original 420-month sentence, leading to resentencing by the trial court that increased the total term to 600 months without new evidence or stated reasons. The Oregon Supreme Court addressed whether the longstanding rule from State v. Turner, barring harsher sentences after a successful appeal, should apply to resentencings. The court decided to abandon the Turner rule, which had been based on an unexamined assumption about legislative intent in ORS 138.020, and instead adopted a new approach allowing longer sentences on remand if the trial court provides nonvindictive justifications on the record. It remanded the case to the trial court for further development of the record to apply this standard. The decision also clarified that a 1993 statutory amendment did not impliedly repeal the prior rule.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Ayles, the Oregon Supreme Court addressed whether evidence seized from a passenger in a lawfully stopped vehicle should be suppressed after an officer unlawfully detained the passenger by retaining his identification without reasonable suspicion. The officer obtained the passenger's consent to a patdown search during the detention, discovered methamphetamine, arrested him, administered Miranda warnings, and then obtained further incriminating statements leading to additional evidence in a backpack. The court held that the defendant had established the minimal factual connection between the illegal detention and his consent, shifting the burden to the state, which failed to show that the consent or later evidence was not the product of the prior illegality. It further held that the Miranda warnings did not sufficiently attenuate the taint of the unlawful detention under Article I, section 9 of the Oregon Constitution, requiring suppression of the evidence and statements. The decision affirmed the Court of Appeals' ruling suppressing the evidence.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a criminal prosecution in which defendant was convicted of unlawful possession of methamphetamine after a jury trial. The key issue on appeal was the trial court's admission of a laboratory report identifying the substance as methamphetamine, without testimony from the criminalist who prepared it, which the state conceded violated defendant's confrontation rights under the state and federal constitutions. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction on harmless-error grounds, but the Oregon Supreme Court reversed, holding that the error was not harmless. The court reasoned that the report went to the heart of the case because the other evidence—defendant's admission to possessing "contraband," an officer's uncertain visual identification, and no other affirmative proof—was insufficient to establish the substance's identity beyond a reasonable doubt, making it likely that the report affected the verdict.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

This case involved criminal charges against defendant for sexually abusing or attempting to abuse several young children at a fitness club daycare over several weeks, based primarily on the children's statements to parents, police, and medical professionals. The trial court admitted expert testimony from a nurse and social worker who described general traits of truthful child abuse victims and then opined that the children's accounts matched those traits and lacked signs of fabrication or suggestion. The Oregon Supreme Court reversed the convictions, holding that the experts' testimony constituted improper vouching for the children's credibility in violation of evidentiary rules. The court further reasoned that the error was not harmless because there was no physical evidence of abuse and the children's credibility was central to the case, requiring remand for a new trial; it also addressed but did not resolve a related motion for judgment of acquittal on one count.

criminal lawprocedure

In this criminal case, the defendant was convicted of unlawful possession of heroin after a police officer seized her purse during a traffic stop, discovering drug paraphernalia inside. The trial court denied the motion to suppress the evidence, a divided Court of Appeals panel affirmed, and the Oregon Supreme Court upheld those rulings. The court reasoned that the defendant's sudden change to a nervous demeanor and her act of reaching into the purse, after being warned about a potential weapons search, created reasonable suspicion of an immediate threat to officer safety, permitting the seizure under Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution.

criminal lawprocedure

This case is a proceeding to review the ballot title drafted by the Legislative Assembly for Senate Joint Resolution 48, a proposed constitutional amendment referred to Oregon voters. The measure would add a new Article XI-P authorizing the state to issue general obligation bonds, backed by full faith and credit but not property taxes, to finance state-owned or operated real and personal property projects, subject to a limit of one percent of real market value and superseding the existing debt ceiling in Article XI, section 7. Petitioner, an elector, challenged the caption, yes/no vote result statements, and summary for failing to accurately describe the measure's major effects. The court concluded that some challenges were well taken because the ballot title did not sufficiently identify key aspects like overriding the constitutional debt limit, and therefore referred the ballot title to the Attorney General for modification.

electionspropertytaxes

This case involved a defendant charged with exceeding the bag limit on coast bull elk after he legally tagged and killed one elk but also took possession of and removed a second already-dead elk from the field without a tag. The trial court refused the defendant's requested jury instruction requiring proof that he knowingly killed both elk and instead instructed the jury that guilt could be based on "taking" more than one elk; the jury convicted him. On appeal, the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that the applicable wildlife regulations and statutes, including former OAR 635-065-0001 and ORS 498.002, define the offense in terms of "taking" wildlife (which includes possessing or removing it) rather than solely killing it, and that the jury instructions accurately stated the law. The court reasoned that the regulatory scheme, read with related definitions of "tag" and "hunt," supports liability for possessing more elk than authorized by a single tag.

criminal lawenvironment

This case is a ballot title review proceeding for Initiative Petition 43 (2010), a proposed constitutional amendment guaranteeing that every registered voter's signature on filed initiative or referendum petitions must be counted toward qualification for the ballot and prohibiting any statutes or rules restricting that right. The Oregon Supreme Court had previously ruled the Attorney General's initial ballot title deficient in all parts and, upon review of the modified ballot title, again found the caption, result statements, and summary noncompliant with ORS 250.035. The court reasoned that the modified title remained under-inclusive by focusing narrowly on signature counting rather than the measure's broader subject of eliminating statutory or regulatory impediments to counting signatures, and it improperly highlighted particular verification processes like sampling. As a result, the court referred the ballot title back to the Attorney General for further modification.

elections

In State v. Mejia, the defendant was charged with kidnapping after grabbing the victim at her apartment door despite a restraining order, moving her inside toward the bedroom, taking her phone, stifling her calls for help, and assaulting her over the course of about 90 minutes. The trial court denied the defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal on the kidnapping charges, the jury convicted him of second-degree kidnapping (among other offenses), and the Court of Appeals affirmed without opinion. The Oregon Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the evidence permitted a finding that the defendant's actions in moving and confining the victim were more than incidental to the assault and showed an intent to interfere substantially with her personal liberty.

criminal law

The case involves a challenge to the Attorney General's certified ballot title for Initiative Petition 43 (2010), a proposed Oregon constitutional amendment that would guarantee every registered voter's signature on filed initiative or referendum petitions must be counted individually to determine if the measure qualifies for the ballot, rather than using statistical sampling. Petitioner, an elector who commented on the draft title, argued that the caption, 'yes' and 'no' vote result statements, and summary failed to substantially comply with statutory requirements under ORS 250.085. The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the ballot title for substantial compliance with the law and held that it was deficient because it did not fully or accurately describe the measure's subject and major effects, including how it would alter or invalidate existing laws and rules on signature verification and petition qualification. The court referred the ballot title back to the Attorney General for modification.

elections

In State v. Luman, the defendant was charged with multiple counts of invasion of personal privacy after employees discovered and turned over videotapes secretly recorded in a restaurant restroom to sheriff's deputies, who viewed the tapes without a warrant. The trial court suppressed most tapes but admitted one 'master' tape that employees had already partially viewed, leading to convictions on 11 counts; the Court of Appeals reversed that admission, but the Oregon Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals. The court held that no warrant was required under Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution because the private employees' prior viewing and description of the tape's contents eliminated any remaining privacy interest the defendant had in those images. The decision relied on the principle that a private search that reveals the contents of an item to authorities does not trigger further constitutional protections when police later examine the same item.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved an insurance dispute where homeowners sought coverage under a landlord policy for damage to their rental property from a methamphetamine lab seizure and cleanup costs. After phone calls to their agent describing the incident and expenses, the insureds sued for breach of contract and other claims; the parties settled for over $22,000, after which the trial court awarded attorney fees under ORS 742.061. The Court of Appeals reversed the fee award, but the Oregon Supreme Court reversed that decision and reinstated the fees. The court reasoned that the telephone conversations provided sufficient notice of the loss to constitute the required "proof of loss" more than six months before the insurer's settlement tender, satisfying the statute's conditions even though coverage was disputed and the policy contained a pollution exclusion.

business & regulatorypropertyprocedure

This case is a ballot title review proceeding under ORS 250.085(2) challenging the Attorney General's certified ballot title for Initiative Petition 44 (2010), a proposed measure that would alter Oregon law by granting owners broad civil immunity from liability for injuries to trespassers (with a narrow exception for spring guns) and creating a presumption that residents using physical or deadly force against defined intruders (those committing trespass or burglary) act in justified self-defense without criminal or civil liability. The court reviewed whether the ballot title substantially complies with ORS 250.035(2)(a)-(d). It concluded that the caption, 'yes' vote result statement, and summary do not, because they fail to accurately reflect the measure's multiple major effects, including the presumption of justification for force even without an actual threat and the elimination of liability for child trespassers. The court therefore referred the ballot title to the Attorney General for modification.

electionscriminal lawpropertytorts & liability