The case involved a defendant arrested and charged with raping his sixteen-year-old daughter, who waived indictment, pleaded guilty, and received a sentence of up to 20 years in prison. On appeal, the only issues considered were whether the punishment was excessive, cruel, or unusual and whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea more than three years later. The court affirmed the judgment, holding that the sentence was within statutory limits for the offense, supported by a psychiatric report indicating the defendant posed a menace to his family, and not shown to be disproportionate, while the denial of the plea withdrawal was within the court's discretion given the voluntary and knowing nature of the original plea and lack of specific defense grounds presented.
This case was a mandamus proceeding brought by a state senator against the Oregon Secretary of State to compel payment of additional legislative salary under a 1959 statute (ORS 171.071) that provided for $175 monthly compensation. The statute was challenged as violating the 1950 amendment to Article IV, section 29 of the Oregon Constitution, which fixed legislators' salary at $600 per year plus mileage and additional pay for presiding officers. The court took original jurisdiction and addressed the defendant's demurrer asserting that the writ failed to state a claim. It sustained the demurrer, ruling that the legislature lacked authority to enact a statute increasing compensation beyond the amount set in the constitution. The core reasoning rested on the plain text of the 1950 amendment, which expressly established the salary "payable as provided by law," the history of prior failed attempts to change compensation by statute or amendment, and the absence of any constitutional grant of power to the legislature to alter its own pay.
The case concerned a petition by a relative to declare minor Roger Paul Murphy a dependent child under Oregon juvenile law on grounds that he was without parental care after his mother's death. The stepfather, who had married the mother and continued supporting the boy, had arranged for him to live with a half-sister; the circuit court declared the child a dependent ward, placed him under court supervision, and denied competing guardianship petitions while leaving him in the sister's home. The Oregon Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that the record showed the child was receiving proper care and affection in a suitable home with no evidence of neglect, destitution, or an unfit environment as required by the dependency statute.
This case involved a restaurant owner suing union defendants for damages caused by picketing that sought to coerce the owner into signing a union contract and compel employees to join the union. The conduct violated ORS 662.750, which prohibits coercive picketing and related intimidation to influence union selection. The circuit court sustained a demurrer to the complaint, and the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed the resulting judgment for the defendants. The court held that the statute provides no private right to recover damages, based on legislative history showing that remedies were limited to cease-and-desist orders rather than damages or injunctions.
This case involves a personal injury lawsuit arising from a motorcycle collision at an intersection parking area, where plaintiff alleged concurrent negligence by the Shippey defendants (whose car obstructed views after exiting a parking spot) and Dairy Cooperative Association (whose delivery truck was parked partially on the road). The court first denied Dairy Cooperative's motion to dismiss the Shippeys' appeal, holding that as joint tortfeasors with no right of contribution they were not adverse parties requiring service of the notice of appeal. On the merits, the court found sufficient evidence for the jury to consider whether the truck's parking position constituted negligence and a proximate cause of the accident, but held that one specification of negligence—blocking the plaintiff's view regardless of exact parking location—should not have been submitted to the jury because it would permit liability even if the truck was fully off the road. The judgment was therefore reversed and the case remanded for a new trial with opportunity to amend pleadings.
This case was a declaratory judgment action brought by Oregon livestock owners challenging the constitutionality of ORS 597.206(2), part of a 1957 statute authorizing the state Department of Agriculture to adopt and enforce federal regulations to eradicate brucellosis, tuberculosis, and paratuberculosis in cattle and achieve certified disease-free status. The plaintiffs argued that the provision improperly delegated legislative power in violation of the Oregon Constitution's separation of powers and non-delegation clauses. The circuit court upheld the main provisions authorizing adoption of minimum federal regulations as constitutional but struck the broader grant of authority to adopt any other necessary regulations as invalid, finding it severable. The Oregon Supreme Court affirmed, reasoning that the statute's core delegation was a valid exercise of the state's police power to control animal diseases by incorporating federal standards, while the severed language did not undermine the remainder of the act.
