James R. Carrigan

This case involved plaintiff William Conway suing the United States to declare an IRS assessment for unpaid employment taxes under 26 U.S.C. § 6672 void, seeking a refund of a $100 payment toward that assessment after the IRS denied his claim. The IRS counterclaimed to reduce the assessment to judgment. The court granted summary judgment for the plaintiff, holding the assessment void because it was made during the pendency of Conway's Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding in violation of the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362, and Tenth Circuit precedent treats such violations as void absent equitable exceptions that did not apply here since the IRS had notice of the bankruptcy. The court also ordered a refund of the $100, finding that Conway's prior claim for refund regarding the full assessment provided sufficient informal notice to the IRS under 26 U.S.C. § 7422, but denied attorney fees and declined to address an unripe statute of limitations issue.

taxesprocedurefederal power

In this patent case, Gambro Lundia AB sued Baxter Healthcare Corporation for infringing claim 1 of U.S. Patent No. 4,585,552, which covered an ultrafiltration monitor for hemodialysis machines that used flow sensors with a recalibration method to reduce drift and improve accuracy over prior weighbed and flowmetric systems. Baxter asserted affirmative defenses and counterclaims seeking declaratory judgments of invalidity and unenforceability. After a bench trial, the court held the patent invalid as obvious in light of prior art including the Repgreen UFM 1000 system and the Wittingham proposal, invalid for derivation from that prior work, and unenforceable due to inequitable conduct from nondisclosure of highly material references during prosecution. The court entered judgment for Baxter on all claims and counterclaims, declared the patent invalid and unenforceable, and denied attorneys' fees to either party.

business & regulatoryhealthcare

The case concerns Medicaid pharmacies and recipients suing Colorado officials, alleging that the state's assignment of recipients to managed care providers like HMOs, including automatic enrollment when providers reorganize, violates the freedom of choice requirements in 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(23) and related state laws. The court addressed cross-motions for summary judgment, first determining that the pharmacy plaintiffs lacked standing under the relevant statute while certain recipients had standing. It then held that Colorado's PCP program and automatic enrollments comply with federal law because recipients retain the ability to choose or disenroll from providers and HMOs, with no violation arising from the state's implementation of waivers or assignments.

healthcarefederal power

In Fuller v. Norton, plaintiffs including the trustee of an ERISA-governed multiple-employer welfare arrangement (MEWA) Benefit Trust and an employer challenged a Colorado cease-and-desist order prohibiting unauthorized sale of workers' compensation insurance, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief on grounds that ERISA preempts state insurance regulation and violates federal rights. The court dismissed all claims against the state Attorney General because Colorado law assigns enforcement of insurance and workers' compensation statutes to the Insurance Commissioner and Division of Workers' Compensation Director, not the Attorney General. It denied the motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction under Younger abstention, reasoning that ERISA's exclusive federal jurisdiction under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e) means the claims cannot be raised in state court proceedings. The opinion then began analyzing ERISA preemption of state laws applicable to non-fully-insured MEWAs.

federal powerbusiness & regulatorylabor & employment

Irene Rosenblum sued her former employer, the Colorado Department of Health, under the Americans with Disabilities Act, alleging disability discrimination based on her diabetes and related stress, including inadequate training accommodations, harassment by a coworker, interception of mail, exclusion from events, and failure to transfer her despite medical advice. After Rosenblum's death, her estate's representative continued the case. The defendant moved for summary judgment, conceding it was a covered entity and that diabetes could qualify as a disability, but arguing no substantial limitation on major life activities or violation occurred. The court identified genuine disputes of material fact on issues such as the reasonableness of accommodations and transfers within the department, which could not be resolved on summary judgment, and addressed multiple claims under different ADA provisions regarding accommodations, job assignments, and administrative methods.

labor & employmentcivil rights

In this case, a Colorado law firm sued the EPA under FOIA seeking two studies in the agency's possession that calculated economic benefits gained by the Telluride Company from alleged Clean Water Act violations, which EPA had withheld under FOIA exemptions for confidential commercial information and law enforcement records. The district court granted summary judgment to the plaintiff and denied the EPA's cross-motion, holding that the requested studies must be disclosed. The court reasoned that the studies concerned information EPA could have compelled under section 308 of the Clean Water Act, so that statute's disclosure rules (requiring public availability except for trade secrets) applied instead of FOIA's exemptions; because the more specific CWA provision controls over the general FOIA statute and Congress created only a narrow trade-secrets exception in section 308, the documents were not exempt.

environmentfederal powerprocedure

In Spruce Oil Corp. v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., Spruce sued ADM for alleged violations of Section 2 of the Sherman Act and its Colorado counterpart, claiming ADM leveraged monopoly power in the Colorado bulk ethanol market to gain an unfair advantage in other states. After a jury returned verdicts for ADM, Spruce moved for a new trial on the ground that the court had improperly refused to instruct the jury on its monopoly leveraging theory. The court denied the motion, holding that the tendered instruction misstated the law by failing to require proof of threatened or actual monopoly in the second market. Relying on Spectrum Sports v. McQuillan and decisions from the Third and Ninth Circuits, the court concluded that Section 2 liability requires conduct that actually monopolizes or dangerously threatens to do so, not merely the use of power to obtain a competitive advantage.

business & regulatory

The case involves the State of Colorado seeking reimbursement from the United States and Shell Oil Company for response costs incurred in cleaning up the Rocky Mountain Arsenal under section 107 of CERCLA. The court ruled on cross-motions for summary judgment concerning the date prejudgment interest begins to accrue and the definitions of removal versus remedial actions. It held that interest accrues only from the later of a written demand specifying a dollar amount or the date costs were incurred, and that neither the original 1983 complaint nor later amended complaints satisfied the demand requirement because they did not state a specific amount. The court reasoned that the statutory language of 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4) requires an explicit, quantified written demand before interest can run, and it interpreted the Act's definitions of removal and remedial actions to determine which costs qualify for recovery.

environmentprocedure

Dr. Joseph Custodio sued individual federal physicians and officials along with the United States after his CHAMPUS agreement and hospital staff privileges at an Army facility were terminated without a hearing, asserting Fifth Amendment due process violations, interference with economic relations, and negligence claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act. The court granted the motions to dismiss all federal claims, holding that the plaintiff lacked a protected property interest in the agreement because it was terminable at will upon notice, that Bivens actions were unavailable due to alternative remedies such as APA review, and that FTCA claims were barred by the discretionary function exception, lack of analogous state-law duties, and the plaintiff's own criminal convictions for filing false claims. The court also declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law interference claim after dismissing the claims conferring original jurisdiction.

civil rightsfederal powerproceduretorts & liability

In Miles v. Martin Marietta Corp., plaintiff Karen Miles, a chemist, sued her former employer alleging wrongful discharge in violation of public policy after she was laid off following a toxic chemical release, her workers' compensation claim, and her report to OSHA. The defendant moved for partial summary judgment on the portion of the claim based on retaliation for the OSHA filing. The court granted the motion, holding that under Colorado law a public policy wrongful discharge claim is unavailable where the underlying statute provides its own remedy for retaliation, and 29 U.S.C. § 660(c) supplies such a remedy through an administrative complaint process leading to federal court action. The ruling did not affect the separate aspect of the claim tied to the workers' compensation filing.

labor & employmenttorts & liabilityprocedure

This case concerns competing claims to assets held in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court registry for the District of Colorado, arising from securities fraud litigation in Pennsylvania and related bankruptcy proceedings involving Blinder Robinson and its principals. The Hoxworth plaintiffs obtained a large judgment against Meyer Blinder and others that included a constructive trust and equitable lien on assets traceable to $23 million in fraud proceeds, while bankruptcy orders and settlements had placed the Blinders' remaining assets under the control of the bankruptcy estate. The court held that the plaintiffs' equitable lien on the excluded assets traceable to the fraud is valid and superior to the claims of the Blinders, the Lillian Blinder Trust, the Walfords, and the bankruptcy trustee, because the lien survived transfers and the other parties were not bona fide purchasers for value. Core reasoning rested on the preemptive effect of the Pennsylvania judgment, the limited scope of the bankruptcy court's alter ego rulings and settlements, and principles governing equitable liens under Colorado law.

business & regulatorypropertyprocedure

This case involves a bankruptcy trustee's adversary proceeding against a law firm and its partners, asserting claims including fraudulent transfers, preferences, breach of contract, unjust enrichment, breach of fiduciary duty, civil conspiracy, and aiding and abetting. The court addressed motions to reopen an administratively closed case and to withdraw the reference of the proceeding from the bankruptcy court. It granted the motion to reopen and ruled that withdrawal of the reference would occur only if jury-triable issues remained when the case was ready for trial. The decision relied on Supreme Court precedent establishing a right to jury trial for fraudulent transfer claims where the defendant has not filed a claim against the estate, while noting that bankruptcy courts retain authority to handle pretrial matters such as discovery and motions to promote judicial economy.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

This case involves a product liability claim by Maureen Oja against Howmedica regarding a hip replacement device marketed under FDA § 510(k) procedures. Howmedica moved for reconsideration of the denial of its summary judgment motion, citing a First Circuit decision holding that the Medical Device Amendments preempt state tort claims. The court granted reconsideration but again denied summary judgment, determining that the MDA's express preemption clause applies only when the FDA has established specific counterpart regulations for a device, not merely general controls on labeling or manufacturing. The court rejected the First Circuit's broader analysis that would preempt all state product liability claims involving medical devices.

torts & liabilityhealthcarefederal power

In Pederson v. Resolution Trust Corp., former RTC employees who had investigated and testified before the Senate Banking Committee about alleged waste in the agency's Professional Liability Section reorganization filed suit under FOIA seeking to compel waiver of search and copying fees for related documents, plus attorneys' fees and a referral for potential disciplinary action against agency personnel. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment on an undisputed factual record, with jurisdiction under 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B). The court analyzed whether disclosure met the statutory public-interest standard under 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(iii) by applying regulatory factors on government operations, contribution to understanding, public dissemination, and significant impact, noting the RTC's concession that the request was noncommercial while disputing the public-interest showing. The opinion addressed the plaintiffs' whistleblower status, media coverage, and intent to share information with Congress and advocacy groups in evaluating the fee-waiver criteria.

federal powerbusiness & regulatory

In United States v. Sanders, defendant Gary Lee Sanders was charged with making a false statement on an ATF firearm acquisition form under 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6) and with being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) based on five prior Colorado felony convictions. Sanders moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that his civil rights had been restored by operation of Colorado law upon completion of his sentences, rendering him not a prohibited person under federal law. The district court applied 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20), which provides that a conviction does not count for purposes of § 922(g)(1) if civil rights have been restored under the law of the convicting jurisdiction unless that law expressly prohibits firearm possession. The court determined that Colorado law automatically restores the rights to vote, hold office, and serve on a jury after release from prison, that Sanders's specific prior convictions did not fall within Colorado's enumerated firearm prohibitions, and therefore that his rights had been restored without any express restriction. Accordingly, the court granted the motion and dismissed both counts of the indictment.

gunscriminal lawcivil rights

In Galusha v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, a Colorado resident sued her insurer, Farmers, for bad faith in handling both a third-party liability claim against another Farmers policyholder and her own underinsured motorist (UIM) claim following a 1985 car accident. The plaintiff alleged breaches involving arbitration agreements, misrepresentations about coverage, failure to pay an arbitration award, and inadequate responses to inquiries. The court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, holding that no duty of good faith and fair dealing was owed on the third-party claim and that the plaintiff failed to allege facts showing unreasonable conduct or reckless disregard of unreasonableness on the first-party UIM claim. As a result, the complaint was dismissed with prejudice.

torts & liability

The case involved a motion to dismiss a federal indictment charging 18-year-old Alejandro Ornelas with violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) by knowingly possessing a firearm on or near school grounds at West High School in Denver, Colorado. The defendant argued that the statute, which lacks an explicit interstate commerce nexus, exceeds Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause and violates the Tenth Amendment. The court denied the motion to dismiss, holding that Supreme Court and Tenth Circuit precedents allow Congress to regulate intrastate activities affecting interstate commerce without requiring proof of a specific nexus in each statute or case. The opinion noted that, absent binding precedent, the court would find the statute unconstitutional for failing to articulate how the regulated conduct affects commerce, but followed higher court authority upholding broad Commerce Clause power.

gunscriminal lawfederal power

This case arose after the 1991 crash of United Airlines Flight 585 when plaintiff Jack McGilvra filed a FOIA request with the NTSB seeking a copy of the cockpit voice recorder tape for use in accident reconstruction. The NTSB denied the request under FOIA Exemption 3, citing 49 U.S.C. App. § 1905(c), which directs the agency to withhold CVR recordings from public disclosure. The court granted the NTSB's motion for summary judgment and denied the plaintiff's, holding that § 1905(c) qualifies as an Exemption 3 statute because it mandates withholding without agency discretion on the issue of public release. The opinion notes that limited access granted to parties participating in the NTSB investigation does not convert the statute into a discretionary one or waive the exemption.

procedurefederal power

This diversity case involves negligence claims brought by minor skier Heather Del Bosco and her father against the United States Ski Association after Heather suffered serious leg and ankle injuries in a fall during a 1991 ski race. The defendant moved for summary judgment, contending the claims were barred by an exculpatory release signed by Heather and her mother, the Colorado Ski Safety and Liability Act, and the state's assumption-of-risk statute. The court analyzed the release under Colorado law, concluding that the parent's signature did not waive the minor's claims and that a minor may disaffirm such a contract, while also noting the Ski Act imposes specific duties on ski operators that could support a negligence claim. It further rejected equitable estoppel and addressed how the Ski Act interacts with assumption of risk and comparative fault rules. The opinion applies the summary-judgment standard requiring no genuine issue of material fact and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case involved a lawsuit by Kenneth Strachan against the City of Federal Heights, its police officers, and apartment management companies after police entered his apartment without a warrant and shot him in the leg during a security sweep. Strachan had been drinking and using drugs, fired shots from his window, and police responded to reports of gunfire, believing exigent circumstances justified entry. The court granted summary judgment to the defendants on the plaintiff's Eighth Amendment, unreasonable search, and negligence claims, as well as all claims against the apartment companies, but denied summary judgment in part on the remaining § 1983 claim against the municipal defendants. The reasoning focused on the plaintiff's confessions to certain claims, lack of legal duty or control for the apartment defendants, and procedural grounds for dismissal of specific allegations.

civil rightscriminal lawproceduretorts & liability