Betty Roberts

The case concerned a workers' compensation claim by an employee who suffered a shoulder and arm injury from repetitive lifting at work, which required a discectomy and spinal fusion. Prior to that surgery, a carotid endarterectomy was performed as a necessary preliminary step due to an artery condition, and that procedure caused the claimant to develop memory loss and mild dementia. The Court of Appeals had denied compensation, finding only a fortuitous connection between the injury and the endarterectomy because the claimant would have needed it independently. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the endarterectomy was an integral part of the required treatment for the industrial injury with no evidence that it would have occurred otherwise, making the insurer liable for all resulting consequences.

labor & employment

The case concerned whether the Assistant Director of the Employment Division was required to promulgate a rule defining the statutory phrase “systematic and sustained effort to obtain work” before denying a claimant extended unemployment benefits for failing to meet the active work search requirement under ORS 657.325. The Court of Appeals had reversed and remanded, holding that the agency must provide fair notice of the term’s meaning. The Oregon Supreme Court explained that whether prior rulemaking is required is resolved by interpreting the particular statutes that govern the agency in question, which identify the agency’s tasks, discretion, and procedures; general administrative law principles, the APA, or judicial review categories do not themselves compel rulemaking versus adjudication. The court therefore remanded for further analysis under the unemployment insurance statutes rather than deciding the benefits issue on the existing record.

labor & employmentprocedure

The case concerned whether ORS 109.010 creates an enforceable cause of action allowing an adult mentally handicapped child, unable to work due to his disability, to obtain support from a parent. The parents had divorced, and after support for two adult children ended, the mother (as guardian ad litem) sought ongoing payments for 20-year-old James; the trial court awarded $225 monthly, but the Court of Appeals reversed on the ground that the statute stated only a duty without a mechanism for enforcement. The Supreme Court reviewed the statute's history, distinguishing its roots in private familial obligations from the separate Elizabethan poor-law-based public welfare scheme in ORS chapter 416, and concluded that ORS 109.010 independently authorizes a private action to enforce the support duty for qualifying adult children.

family law

The case concerned a defendant convicted in Salem Municipal Court of violating a city ordinance prohibiting driving under the influence of intoxicants. After losing a suppression motion and being convicted following a trial de novo in circuit court, the defendant attempted to appeal evidentiary issues to the Court of Appeals but was barred by ORS 221.360, which limits such appeals from municipal court ordinance violations to challenges against the constitutionality of the ordinance or charter. The defendant argued that this restriction, which did not apply to defendants charged with the same conduct under state law or in district court, violated the equal privileges and immunities guarantee of Article I, section 20 of the Oregon Constitution due to unchecked police discretion in selecting the charging forum and appeal path. The court analyzed the statutory framework creating these differing appellate rights and prior decisions interpreting the limits on jurisdiction.

criminal lawprocedure

This case concerns whether the Oregon Department of Revenue could require Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. to use a non-statutory apportionment method for its corporate excise tax returns for 1975-1977 instead of the standard three-factor formula (property, payroll, and sales) under the Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act. The taxpayer's only Oregon activity was licensing films to independent theaters, and it calculated its property factor using the basis of film prints located in the state. The Department contended that this did not fairly represent the extent of business activity in Oregon and sought to include a portion of film negative production costs allocated by sales percentages, following California guidelines. The Tax Court ruled for the taxpayer, and the reviewing court assessed whether the Department had met its burden of proof through pleadings, stipulations, and witness testimony showing that the statutory formula was inadequate.

taxesbusiness & regulatory

The case involved a dispute over whether a life insurance policy issued by Federal Kemper Life Assurance Company to Susan Olsen's deceased husband became effective, given that the insured learned he had terminal cancer after applying but before the policy was delivered and the first premium paid, without informing the insurer. The Supreme Court of Oregon affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision in favor of the insurer, holding that the policy did not take effect. The court reasoned that the application contained a clear condition precedent requiring the insured's health to remain as described at the time of policy delivery and premium payment, which was not satisfied here, and rejected arguments that policy provisions created ambiguity or superseded the condition.

business & regulatory

The case involved a taxpayer suit against Multnomah County officials alleging they unlawfully spent public grant funds on a fluoridation public information project, including media campaigns and employee activities, while an anti-fluoridation measure appeared on the Portland ballot. Plaintiff claimed this violated ORS 260.432's limits on public employees promoting ballot measures, making the expenditures unauthorized under ORS 294.100 and subjecting officials to personal liability for repayment. The trial court granted summary judgment for defendants based on general public health statutes authorizing the spending, but the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the specific election finance law controls and remanding for a factual determination of whether the activities were promotional rather than informational. The opinion reviews the history of taxpayer actions for recovery of public funds and varying state approaches to government speech on ballot issues.

electionsprocedure

The case concerned whether probable cause supported a search warrant for defendants' home after police observed marijuana plants on their property from a public road. Defendants moved to controvert the supporting affidavit, which contained factual omissions and inaccuracies about the distance between the plants and residence, lack of connecting paths or activity, use of a spotting scope rather than binoculars, and the road's location. The trial court found these errors were made to present the most favorable case for the warrant and, after correcting the affidavit, determined no probable cause existed, leading to suppression of the seized evidence. The Court of Appeals affirmed, and the Oregon Supreme Court also affirmed, holding that under ORS 133.693, inaccuracies in the affidavit must be evaluated and the corrected facts re-examined to determine if a magistrate would still have issued the warrant.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Severson, the defendant was convicted of first-degree robbery after the trial court denied her motion to suppress statements made to police, finding her competent to waive Miranda rights despite her claim of low intelligence. The key issue was whether a portion of a state psychiatrist's report, quoted by defense counsel in an affidavit objecting to the examiner, was properly admitted as an adoptive admission under OEC 801(4)(b)(B) to support the competency finding. The Oregon Supreme Court held that including the excerpt did not manifest the defendant's adoption or belief in the truth of the report, so her hearsay and confrontation objections were not waived and the report was erroneously considered. The court reversed the conviction and remanded because the trial judge had relied in part on the inadmissible report in ruling on competency. The topics are criminal law and procedure.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a defendant who broke into a locked barn using a seven-and-a-half-foot steel signpost to pry off a hasp and padlock and was convicted of first-degree burglary. The court addressed whether the signpost qualified as a burglar's tool under ORS 164.235, which elevates second-degree burglary (a Class C felony) to first-degree burglary (a Class A felony) if the defendant is armed with such a tool. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction and the Court of Appeals decision, ruling that the signpost was not a burglar's tool. The core reasoning examined the statute's text and legislative history, which defined burglar's tools as specialized devices like explosives or burning bars adapted or commonly used for forcible entry, not ordinary objects like the signpost.

criminal law

In this post-conviction proceeding, petitioner Lyons, a Jamaican citizen, challenged his guilty plea to theft of unemployment benefits on grounds that it was not knowing and voluntary because neither the trial court nor his counsel advised him of the risk of deportation under federal immigration law. The Oregon Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' ruling that the trial judge's failure to personally advise the defendant about deportation did not violate state or federal constitutional requirements for a valid guilty plea, as the plea petition contained the information and the defendant confirmed he had read it. However, the court held that counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to discuss the deportation consequences with the client or to request a judicial recommendation against deportation under 8 USC § 1251(b), rendering the plea constitutionally deficient.

criminal lawimmigrationprocedure

This case involved a defendant convicted after a stipulated facts trial on assault charges who claimed ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to advise about potential deportation consequences or request a judicial recommendation against deportation. The court held that counsel had no such obligations here because the proceeding was a stipulated facts trial rather than a guilty plea, and the conviction was the defendant's first, creating no risk of deportation under federal law (which requires two crimes of moral turpitude). The decision reasoned that unlike guilty pleas, stipulated facts trials lack specific statutory notice requirements, and without any actual deportation exposure, the attorney's performance was adequate. The court affirmed the lower ruling.

criminal lawimmigration

The case concerned whether an affidavit supporting a search warrant application provided sufficient facts to establish probable cause for searching the defendants' home in connection with marijuana cultivation. The trial court and Court of Appeals suppressed the evidence, finding the affidavit lacking a connection between the residents and the plants or reason to believe evidence would be in the home. The Oregon Supreme Court reversed, holding that the proximity of the marijuana plants to the sole residence on the private 51-acre lot, combined with the officer's knowledge that growers often store related items in their homes, established probable cause under the state constitution.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Hill, the defendant was convicted of third-degree assault after recklessly driving while intoxicated, crashing his car, and causing serious injury to his passenger. The sole issue on review was whether an automobile could qualify as a 'dangerous weapon' under ORS 163.165(1)(a), which requires that serious physical injury be caused 'by means of a deadly or dangerous weapon.' The Oregon Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that a vehicle can meet the statutory definition of a dangerous weapon when the circumstances of its use make it readily capable of causing serious injury. The court reasoned that the dangerous-weapon element focuses on the manner and context of use rather than the actor's specific intent, that the legislature specifically contemplated automobiles in enacting the assault statutes, and that recklessness and weapon use are distinct statutory components.

criminal law

The case concerned whether a conviction for driving while revoked could stand when the underlying license revocation by the Motor Vehicles Division was based on an error, specifically misreading a misdemeanor conviction record as a felony, which provided no statutory authority for revocation under ORS 482.430 and related provisions. The court decided that an erroneous revocation could not properly form the basis for the conviction under ORS 487.560. The core reasoning was that the motor vehicle statutes require the Division to provide notice and an opportunity for a hearing before revocation takes effect, allowing the licensee to contest the action, and that driving is not prohibited merely upon receipt of an invalid notice without such process.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a property owner suing her real estate broker for negligence, fraud, breach of contract, and unlawful trade practices after discovering that the broker had undervalued her land, resulting in an earnest money agreement to sell at a substantial loss. The trial court dismissed the claims as barred by the statute of limitations, and both the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court affirmed. The court reasoned that the cause of action accrued in May 1978 when the plaintiff learned of the actual market value and resulting harm from the contract, rather than later when related litigation with the buyer concluded and she conveyed the property. The court held that the occurrence of harm, not the extent of damages or resolution of the contract dispute, starts the limitations period under the applicable statute.

procedurepropertytorts & liability

The case concerned whether a defendant could be denied diversion from criminal prosecution for a DUII charge based on a prior uncounseled DUII conviction. Defendant Standerfer had a 1979 DUII conviction entered without counsel and was later charged again in 1982; the trial court denied his diversion petition under ORS 484.450(4)(a) due to the prior conviction, leading to trial, conviction, and sentencing. The Oregon Supreme Court reversed and remanded, ruling that the Sixth Amendment prohibits using a constitutionally invalid prior conviction to enhance punishment in a subsequent proceeding. The core reasoning, drawing on precedents such as Baldasar v. Illinois, Burgett v. Texas, and State v. Grenvik, is that an uncounseled conviction invalid for direct use remains invalid when relied upon to impose more onerous sanctions like denial of diversion.

criminal lawprocedure

This case concerned proponents of the Oregon Marijuana Initiative who petitioned for a writ of mandamus against the Secretary of State and county clerks, claiming that improper signature verification procedures, including issues with statistical sampling, led to the disqualification of sufficient signatures to keep the measure off the ballot. The Oregon Supreme Court exercised its original jurisdiction under the state constitution to hear the matter directly due to the public importance and novelty of the issues, while noting that other review paths like circuit court appeals under ORS 246.910 exist and that mandamus is available when no plain, speedy alternative remedy applies. The court examined the constitutional and statutory framework for initiative petitions, the Secretary's authority to adopt sampling rules, and potential flaws in the verification formula's accuracy and application to county-by-county checks, without yet resolving the factual merits.

electionsprocedure

In this case, petitioners appealed the dismissal of their legal malpractice claims against third-party defendants Ball and Orchard but did not serve the notice of appeal on those defendants or their attorney, serving only the plaintiff law firm of which Ball and Orchard were members. The court affirmed the Court of Appeals' dismissal of the appeal, holding that service on the law firm was insufficient to notify Ball and Orchard in their individual capacities as third-party defendants. The reasoning was that Ball and Orchard were parties to a separate third-party action, had their own attorney at the time of dismissal, and service requirements under ORS 19.023(2)(a) demand proper service on all parties who appeared, which was not satisfied here despite arguments about attorney changes or firm membership.

procedure

The case involved a defendant charged with failure to appear after missing an arraignment on forgery charges; he had been released pending proceedings after signing a security agreement. At trial, the prosecution called the defendant's former attorney to testify that he had sent the client a letter notifying him of the court date, and the defendant objected on attorney-client privilege grounds. The Oregon Supreme Court held that the testimony was properly admitted because it was not a confidential communication under OEC 503. The court reasoned that notice of a court date is a public matter, not legal advice, and that the attorney was acting merely as a conduit for transmitting non-confidential information rather than facilitating professional legal services.

criminal lawprocedure