Jacob Tanzer

This case is a mandamus action by French tire manufacturer Michelin France to require dismissal of a products liability suit filed against it in Oregon circuit court by Oregon corporation Lamb-Weston. The underlying claim alleged that a defective Michelin tire caused damage to a truck and lost profits, though the tire's purchase, installation, and explosion all occurred outside Oregon. The Oregon Supreme Court granted the writ and ordered dismissal, holding that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction. The court first found no jurisdiction under any specific provision of Oregon's long-arm statute, ORCP 4, then concluded that the general due-process provision also did not permit jurisdiction because Michelin France lacked minimum contacts with Oregon related to the claim, as required by World-Wide Volkswagen.

proceduretorts & liability

This case was a marital dissolution proceeding involving the division of real property acquired partly as gifts to the husband, along with awards of spousal and child support after a 13-year marriage with four children. The Oregon Supreme Court held that property received by one spouse as a gift during marriage qualifies as a marital asset under ORS 107.105(1)(e) and is subject to equitable division, applying a rebuttable presumption of equal spousal contribution that accounts for homemaker efforts. The court upheld the trial court's roughly equal division of assets, awarding the wife the family home and 10 acres while giving the husband the remaining acreage, and affirmed spousal support of $300 monthly for 10 years plus child support, with remand only for child support recalculation. The reasoning centered on the statute's directive to consider homemaker contributions to marital assets and the length of the marriage in determining a just division, even where initial acquisition was by gift rather than joint effort.

family lawproperty

This case involves the equitable division of property in the dissolution of a 24-year marriage between parties in their early forties with grown children and no requests for spousal support. The disputed assets included the family home, a house purchased with savings after separation, a condominium, and farmland inherited by the wife shortly before the parties separated. The trial court awarded the family home to the husband and the inheritance and condominium to the wife while ordering the other house sold and proceeds split; the wife appealed seeking an even split of non-inherited assets. On de novo review, the Oregon Supreme Court held that inherited property is not subject to the statutory presumption of equal contribution applicable to marital assets, affirmed that the inheritance should remain with the wife, and modified the decree to award the second house entirely to the wife along with a $20,000 judgment lien on the family home to achieve a just and proper overall division considering the parties' incomes and the desirability of a clean break.

family lawproperty

The case involved taxpayers challenging a county assessor's valuation of a 14-acre undeveloped portion of a 26-acre parcel for ad valorem tax purposes after they purchased the entire property in an arm's-length transaction for $500,000. The Tax Court upheld the Department of Revenue's reduced assessed value of $154,860 for the tract, and on de novo review the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed that decision. Plaintiffs argued that subtracting the assessed value of the remaining 12 acres from the purchase price established a lower fair market value, but the court held that a recent sale price of the whole property is not necessarily determinative of the value of a part and found the evidence unpersuasive. The court instead credited the assessor's comparable sales analysis, which supported the higher valuation after adjustments for differences in the properties, and concluded that plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of proving the assessment incorrect under ORS 305.427.

taxesproperty

This case was a mandamus proceeding brought by a defendant who had entered a no-contest plea to first-degree sexual abuse; he challenged the trial court's denial of his motion to have counsel attend presentence investigation interviews conducted by a county diagnostic center. The Oregon Supreme Court held that the defendant was entitled to the presence of counsel at those interviews. The court reasoned that Article I, section 11 of the Oregon Constitution and the Sixth Amendment guarantee the right to counsel in all criminal prosecutions, that sentencing is a critical stage of such a prosecution at which a defendant must be heard, and that presentence interviews are an integral part of the sentencing process from which counsel therefore cannot be excluded.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved former employees suing their employer for breach of contract after being discharged for alleged threats of violence, claiming the discharge violated the 'just cause' provision in the employee handbook. The trial court and Court of Appeals found for the employer, determining that just cause existed based on the employer's good faith investigation and reasonable belief in the facts, without needing to confirm if the threats actually occurred. The Supreme Court of Oregon affirmed, holding that the handbook's just cause clause did not transfer the employer's common law right to unilaterally decide factual matters to a court or other arbiter. The court reasoned that in the absence of explicit or implicit contractual terms shifting this authority, the employer retains the prerogative to make factual determinations regarding just cause.

labor & employment

This case involved a challenge to the conviction of Gary Patrick Roberti for driving under the influence of intoxicants, specifically the admission at trial of a statement he made to a police officer. After stopping Roberti's weaving and speeding vehicle, observing signs of intoxication, and administering field sobriety tests, the officer internally decided to arrest him but had not yet communicated that decision or given Miranda warnings when he asked Roberti to rate his own level of intoxication on a scale; Roberti responded that he was a 'low five' and should not have been driving. The trial court admitted the statement and found Roberti guilty, but the Court of Appeals reversed on the ground that the questioning amounted to custodial interrogation requiring warnings. The Oregon Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the conviction, holding that Miranda warnings were not yet required because the officer had not communicated an intent to arrest and Roberti was not otherwise subjected to restraints equivalent to formal arrest.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a probationary elementary school teacher terminated one month into a one-year contract by Clackamas County School District No. 25, who sued the district and board members for breach of contract and for depriving him of a property interest in continued employment without due process under 42 USC § 1983. The trial court dismissed both claims, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the contract claim could not bypass the limited statutory review under ORS 342.835(3) and that the teacher lacked a constitutionally protected property interest. On review, the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed on different reasoning: the employment contract was subject to the termination procedures in ORS 342.835, which the district followed, and while the teacher had a property interest arising from his fixed-term contract, the combination of pre-termination notice and opportunity to respond plus a later informal public hearing satisfied due process requirements. The court clarified that probationary teachers dismissed mid-contract have access to statutory remedies but cannot pursue separate contract or constitutional damages claims when those procedures are provided.

labor & employmentcivil rightsprocedure

This mandamus proceeding arose from a criminal case in which the defendant had entered a pretrial diversion agreement under ORS 135.881 et seq. that stayed proceedings, with the district attorney later sending notice to resume prosecution due to alleged noncompliance with the agreement's terms such as providing a truthful statement and monthly reports. The defendant moved for a court hearing to determine compliance, which was initially granted but later denied by the circuit judge. The court held that no judicial hearing is required before termination. The statutes assign sole responsibility for offering and terminating diversion to the district attorney, while limiting the court's role to passively staying or resuming proceedings upon the district attorney's action.

criminal lawprocedure

The case was a judicial review under ORS 183.400 challenging an LCDC rule that amended Statewide Planning Goal 14 on urbanization. The amendment automatically classified all land inside city limits as urban or urbanizable without applying the goal's seven factors for establishing urban growth boundaries and permitted city limits to be used as those boundaries based only on demonstrated need for population growth and housing. The court examined the amendment's text and effect on the process for designating urbanizable land and converting rural land. It determined that the amendment conflicted with legislative policy under the statewide goals because it bypassed required consideration of all factors and the goal exception procedures of Goal 2.

environmentproperty

This case concerns a father's motion to modify a 1967 divorce decree to declare his oldest daughter emancipated and to receive credit for child support payments that accrued after her emancipation. The Oregon Supreme Court held that the father's support obligation terminated automatically upon the daughter's emancipation in November 1978, as specified in the decree's terms and consistent with statutes limiting support to minor or qualifying children. The court reasoned that the proceeding sought only a declaration of the decree's existing scope rather than a retroactive modification barred by ORS 107.135(2), and that statutory limits on support authority inhere in any decree regardless of explicit wording. It therefore affirmed the result reached by the Court of Appeals on different grounds.

family law

This case involved a dispute over whether a father could receive credit against accrued child support payments ordered in a 1973 divorce decree. The child had lived primarily with the father after the dissolution until her marriage in 1977, during which time no support payments were made. The trial court and Court of Appeals granted credit based on equitable considerations, but the Oregon Supreme Court reversed, holding that under ORS 107.135(2), accrued support installments are final judgments that cannot be modified or satisfied by alternative means absent an express agreement. The court reasoned that any defenses or agreements prior to judgment merge into the final judgment, and equitable reasons do not permit setting aside such judgments.

family law

The case involved a defendant charged with theft who sought to present an alibi defense at trial. She provided timely notice under ORS 135.455 identifying herself and one other person as potential alibi witnesses but later sought to introduce testimony from an unlisted witness and to testify herself about being elsewhere at the time of the offense. The trial court barred all alibi evidence due to noncompliance with the statute's notice requirements, the Court of Appeals affirmed, and the Oregon Supreme Court granted review. The court held that the statute requires notice only for witnesses the defendant intends to rely upon and that the defendant had complied by noticing her own testimony, so the preclusion sanction was erroneous; the conviction was reversed and the case remanded for a new trial on statutory grounds without reaching constitutional claims.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned whether the City of Roseburg could refuse to follow the state's Public Employe Collective Bargaining Act (PECBA) procedures for negotiating with its firefighters' union and instead apply its own municipal ordinance, which differed on management rights, unfair labor practices, negotiation timelines, and post-impasse factfinding rather than compulsory binding arbitration. The Employment Relations Board found the city's refusal to bargain under PECBA to be an unfair labor practice and ordered it to cease, a ruling affirmed by the Court of Appeals. On review, the Oregon Supreme Court examined the state constitution's home rule amendments to assess whether they permitted local legislation to override state rules on public-sector collective bargaining. The court analyzed the scope of municipal authority over local matters versus statewide concerns in employment relations and determined the applicability of state law.

labor & employmentprocedure

This case involved a prosecution for driving under the influence of intoxicants in which the defendant requested to consult a lawyer before submitting to a breathalyzer test but was told by police that he had no such right and that any delay would count as a refusal. The district court suppressed the test results, and the Court of Appeals affirmed based on prior precedent holding that the implied consent statute requires a voluntary and informed choice. On review, the Oregon Supreme Court reexamined the statute's meaning, explaining that implied consent is a legal status removing any right to refuse while physical refusal is excused only to avoid forcible testing, and that the warning of license suspension enforces compliance rather than restoring a right of choice. The core reasoning traced the statute's history as a response to due process concerns and concluded that the legislative policy does not guarantee access to counsel before testing.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a defendant convicted by jury of driving under the influence of intoxicants as a Class A misdemeanor, enhanced from a traffic infraction due to a prior similar conviction within five years under ORS 484.365(1). The defendant objected to use of an abstract of the prior conviction, arguing it was obtained via an uncounseled guilty plea in violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The trial court overruled the objection and the Court of Appeals affirmed, but the Oregon Supreme Court reversed, holding that the abstract was insufficient to prove a valid prior conviction because it showed no attorney and no waiver of counsel, and precedent establishes that a valid waiver cannot be presumed from a silent record. The court therefore remanded for a new trial on the unenhanced infraction charge alone, as the error in admitting the prior conviction was not harmless.

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure

The case involved a tort action by plaintiff Jeff Brown against Portland School District No. 1 and Clackamas County for personal injuries from a 1978 car accident. Brown alleged that he had sent written notices of his claim by first-class mail to the appropriate officials, who received and processed them as tort claims, but the defendants demurred, arguing that the notices failed to comply with the certified mail requirement of ORS 30.275(1). The trial court sustained the demurrers and dismissed the complaint, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Oregon Supreme Court reversed, holding that Brown's allegations of actual receipt and processing by the proper authorities constituted substantial compliance with the statute's notice provisions, even though the 1977 amendments to the Tort Claims Act were intended to limit judicial relaxation of those requirements.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case involved a petition for attorney's fees following a successful habeas corpus proceeding in which a juvenile was released from detention due to the lack of a judicial probable cause determination under Oregon law. The court declined to award fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 based on the inclusion of a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The reasoning was that the state habeas corpus remedy was fully adequate to address the civil rights violation, rendering the federal claim superfluous, and that the purpose of § 1988—to ensure meaningful access to counsel—was already satisfied because the attorney had been provided through the underlying juvenile proceeding.

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure

This case concerns a petition for postconviction relief from a murder conviction, in which the petitioner alleged that her appointed trial counsel denied her the effective assistance of counsel by failing to develop and present evidence supporting a murder/suicide theory. The trial court denied relief, but the Court of Appeals reversed, applying a reasonableness standard for counsel's performance. The Oregon Supreme Court allowed review to clarify the constitutional standard, rejecting the longstanding 'farce and mockery of justice' test as inadequate and instead adopting the rule that strategic or tactical decisions by counsel are effective unless no reasonably qualified defense attorney would have made them under the circumstances. The court reasoned that scrutiny should focus on the quality of representation under the specific right to counsel rather than general due process requirements, while noting that any shown incompetence must affect the outcome to warrant relief.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involves consolidated state proceedings to terminate the parental rights of mother Judy Holland in her three children and father Casey Holland in his daughter Stacy. The trial court denied termination for the two girls but granted it for the son Patrick; the Court of Appeals reversed as to Patrick, resulting in no terminations. Following the mother's death, the Oregon Supreme Court dismissed the appeals as to her rights as moot, since her death irrevocably terminated the parent-child relationship and no practical relief remained possible. As to the father, the court affirmed denial of termination, holding that a single incident of abusive conduct toward Patrick was insufficient under ORS 419.523(2) to establish unfitness as to Stacy or to show that integration into his home was improbable.

family lawprocedure