This case concerns a mortgagor's attempt to redeem property sold at a sheriff's execution sale following foreclosure. The purchasers objected to the redemption notice on grounds that it was untimely, failed to specify the time and place of redemption, and lacked a tender of funds. The trial court denied redemption, finding it was not performed within the time and manner required by law. The appellate court reversed, holding that the notice was timely under ORS 23.560 and ORS 174.120 (excluding the day of sale), that defects in the notice form were waived by the purchasers' failure to object to them, and that the matter should be remanded to determine the redemption amount.
The case involved Paul Bailleaux appealing his enhanced 30-year sentence under Oregon's Habitual Criminal Act after a jury found four prior felony convictions, following his earlier burglary conviction and initial five-year sentence. The court affirmed the judgment, rejecting the defendant's claims that he should have remained in county jail during the habitual criminal proceedings to consult counsel more easily, that selective enforcement of the act violated equal protection, and that the information was not filed immediately after conviction. The reasoning held that state statutes require continued penitentiary incarceration without exception here, the defendant had multiple opportunities to confer with appointed counsel across several court dates and continuances, and the equal protection and timing issues were controlled by the court's prior decision in State v. Hicks. No merit was found in any assignment of error.
In Drake v. Anderson, the plaintiff sued the defendant for malicious prosecution after the defendant swore out a criminal information charging larceny by bailee in connection with chattels from a 1951 real and personal property sale; this led to the plaintiff's arrest and jailing, but the grand jury returned a not true bill. The trial court entered a $1,000 judgment for the plaintiff on the jury verdict, and the appellate court affirmed. The court reasoned that the complaint sufficiently alleged lack of probable cause by stating the defendant knew the charges were false, evidence showed no mortgage existed (a required element of the crime) and the defendant acted from an improper debt-collection motive, and any error regarding proof of special damages was not reversible.
The case concerned the proper method for calculating Oregon inheritance taxes, specifically the additional 'collateral tax' under ORS 118.100(2) and (3), on residuary legacies when a will directed the estate to pay all death taxes without apportionment. The decedent's estate totaled over $800,000, with specific legacies to non-lineal beneficiaries and the residue left to two nieces; the executors argued that the residuary beneficiaries' share of the basic tax should first be deducted before assessing collateral tax, while the State Treasurer contended it should be computed without such deduction, treating the tax payments as additional taxable benefits. The court held for the Treasurer, ruling that the will's tax-payment direction created further taxable value for the residuary legatees in the same manner applied to specific legacies, and reversed the probate court's order.
This case involved a dispute over contracts for the sale of land and timber rights in Oregon, where plaintiffs as assignees of a vendee's interest in the Owens contract sought specific performance and damages after another party removed timber from 144 acres covered by the agreement. The defendant, as executor of the original vendor's estate, cross-complained for reformation of the Owens contract to exclude timber and disputed the measure and amount of damages. The court affirmed the trial court's decree as modified, denying reformation on grounds of no mutual mistake and finding plaintiffs acquired their interest without notice of prior timber claims. It applied Oregon's loss-of-bargain rule to award damages based on the value of the removed timber, with a reduction for timber cut prior to the Owens contract date, and ordered specific performance with credits to the defendant.
The case involved plaintiffs operating a portable sawmill who sued defendant timber owner for breaching an oral contract under which defendant was to deliver logs from his 320-acre tract (including about 3 million feet of merchantable timber) to plaintiffs' mill pond, with the parties splitting lumber sale proceeds 50-50 after plaintiffs milled the logs. Plaintiffs alleged that defendant stopped deliveries around October 24, 1951, removed logs from a cold deck for sale to others, and thereby caused them lost profits and the eventual loss of their mill due to lack of operating funds. Defendant denied the contract terms, raised an accord-and-satisfaction defense based on a later promissory-note settlement of unrelated debts, and appealed after the trial court entered judgment for plaintiffs. The appellate court affirmed, ruling that no accord and satisfaction existed because the parties never discussed or reached a meeting of the minds on releasing the contract claims during the note settlement, and that admission of irrelevant testimony about requests for a written agreement was harmless error.