Robert von Moschzisker

This case involved stockholders of an Arizona corporation registered and operating in Pennsylvania who sought a writ of mandamus to inspect the company's books and records, including through agents, in order to investigate alleged mismanagement and prepare a potential equity suit. The lower court granted the writ with conditions for reasonable timing and convenience, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed. The court held that jurisdiction was proper over a foreign corporation doing substantial business in the state with assets there, following precedents allowing stockholder inspections. It further ruled that plaintiffs could use agents, attorneys, and experts for the review, as supported by prior decisions, while noting the trial court's authority to prevent undue burden or interference with business operations.

business & regulatoryprocedure

In Hein v. Fetzer, the plaintiff entered judgment on a promissory note against the defendant via a warrant of attorney authorizing entry at any time, prompting the defendant to petition to open the judgment on grounds of alleged oral side agreements that the note served only as security for collectible accounts and would not be entered of record. The trial court opened the judgment solely as to a portion involving possible failure of consideration and permitted the plaintiff to proceed on the balance after applying credits for admitted amounts. On appeal, the court affirmed, ruling that parol evidence was legally incompetent to vary or contradict the written warrant's plain terms absent fraud, accident, or mistake, and that the defendant's proofs were factually insufficient to support opening the judgment further.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

The case concerned a petition for a declaratory judgment in orphans' court by the surviving executrix of S. Anice Cryan's estate to clarify ownership interests in certain real estate under the decedent's will. The lower court construed the will as granting vested fee interests to the original devisees, with shares of those who later died intestate passing to surviving siblings, an adopted child, and other heirs, resulting in ownership by Minnie C. Wineman (one-third), Mary E. Hall (one-third), Annie Creswell Turner (one-sixth), and Ella Creswell Turner (one-sixth) as tenants in common. On appeal, the Supreme Court first confirmed jurisdiction under the Declaratory Judgments Act of 1923, which permits such relief to resolve uncertainties in will construction and estate administration. It then affirmed the lower court's reading, holding that the will created fee estates not diminished by any conditional language and that intestate succession under the 1917 Intestate Act determined the final shares.

propertyfamily lawprocedure

The case concerned the proper distribution of stock dividends received by the executors of John M. Maris's estate under the terms of his will, which created a residuary trust paying net income to his widow for life and directed that all stock dividends be treated as principal. The court held that the will's direction to treat the dividends as principal was invalid because it violated the Act of April 16, 1853 against accumulations of income, and therefore the dividends—classified as income under established rules of property because they were paid from post-death earnings without reducing the stock's intact value—were currently distributable. The core reasoning was that a testator cannot avoid rules classifying certain stock dividends as income, or the statutory prohibition on accumulations, simply by relabeling them as principal in the will; since the widow held a vested right to all net income from the residuary trust, the dividends belonged to her rather than to the testator's heirs at law under intestacy rules.

property

In Johnson v. Hetrick, the widow of a passenger killed in a car-train collision sued the estate of the driver, alleging negligence caused the death. The trial court entered judgment for the plaintiff based on a jury verdict, and the Supreme Court affirmed, finding no basis for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The court reasoned that direct evidence showed the driver's failure to stop and look before crossing, while a presumption of due care applied to the passenger in the absence of contrary evidence; it rejected arguments that the men were in a joint enterprise or master-servant relationship that would bar recovery at the time of the accident after work hours.

torts & liability

This case concerned whether a 1924 will remained valid for probate after a 1927 will containing a revocation clause was destroyed by the testator. The dissenting opinion contended that section 20 of the Wills Act of 1917 requires any revocation to appear in a writing that itself meets the formalities for probate, and that the destroyed document therefore provided no effective revocation. It further reasoned that the statute's provision for revocation by burning or destroying a will applies to the entire instrument, not merely its dispositive provisions, and that legislative rules on will revocation must be followed without regard to the testator's subjective intent.

family lawproperty