The case involved a Chapter XIII Wage Earners bankruptcy petition filed by Richard Willett in 1966, after which a plan of arrangement was confirmed. Prior to the filing, Willett had been ordered in a divorce proceeding to pay support and attorney's fees to his former wife and her attorney, T.T. Crittenden, leading to a contempt finding, a judgment, an attachment on Willett's life estate in real property, and a wage garnishment. The bankruptcy referee issued and modified orders restraining collection efforts on pre-petition obligations, including the property sale and garnishment, to protect the debtor's ability to complete the plan. On review, the court affirmed the referee, holding that Section 614 of the Bankruptcy Act permits such injunctions upon notice and cause shown, that pre-petition alimony and fees are allowable claims in Chapter XIII proceedings, and that the injunctions were necessary to preserve the estate and effectuate the rehabilitative plan without exempting the obligations.
The case concerned a shareholder's lawsuit against a national bank challenging the validity of bylaw amendments that imposed a one-year San Diego County residency requirement for directors, barred affiliations with other banking entities, and required extensive disclosures for nominees. Plaintiff McKee & Company, owning about 8% of the bank's stock, alleged the changes were adopted to block its two proposed candidates (one non-resident and one connected to another bank) from board election and to undermine its cumulative voting rights under federal law. The court addressed the bank's motion for summary judgment, assuming the facts alleged by the plaintiff, and concluded that the bylaws were reasonable on their face and presumptively valid under corporate law principles. It held that questions of bylaw validity are legal issues for the court, not factual disputes requiring trial, and granted summary judgment to the defendant.
In Silver v. Dunbar, a state prisoner petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum to be transported from a California facility outside the court's district to testify in his pending federal civil rights actions under the old Civil Rights Act, which were set for trial. The court first considered whether a U.S. District Court has authority under the all writs statute to issue such a writ extraterritorially and concluded it does not, following precedents like Edgerly v. Kennelly that limit the writ to the issuing court's territorial jurisdiction and distinguishing Carbo v. United States, which addressed a different writ. Even assuming the power existed, the court declined to exercise it, citing the high costs and logistical burdens of transport, the security risks given the petitioner's convictions for attempted murder and escape, and the availability of alternatives such as depositions under California law or proceeding after release from prison. The court therefore denied the requested relief and dismissed the petition, while also vacating and resetting trial dates in the underlying cases.
This case concerns a claim by an appointed attorney for compensation under the Criminal Justice Act of 1964 for representing a defendant in a hearing to revoke probation from a 1955 federal conviction. The court held that the hearing qualifies as a "criminal case" under the Act, so the attorney's claim for time spent was approved. The core reasoning was that the probation revocation proceeding is an extension of the original criminal action, that the Act requires representation at every stage through appeal, and that an order revoking probation is an appealable final judgment.
In Marshall v. United States, the plaintiffs sold the assets of their agricultural business to a newly formed corporation for $110,513.22, with the buyer assuming $25,568.86 in current liabilities and an account payable to the sellers, plus issuing a promissory note for the balance; the sellers' basis was $90,225.83, resulting in a long-term capital gain of $20,287.39 that they sought to report on the installment method under Section 453 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. The Commissioner disallowed the installment method on the ground that the assumption of liabilities counted as payments actually received in the year of sale exceeding 30% of the selling price. The court held that the assumption of the accounts payable did not constitute payments actually received in the year of sale, so the sellers were entitled to use the installment method. The core reasoning drew an analogy to established rules for mortgages in real estate sales, where assumed debt is not treated as an initial payment to the extent it does not exceed the seller's basis, and extended that principle to the assumption of other vendor debts in a personal property sale based on regulations, case precedent, and tax commentary.
This case involved a federal land condemnation proceeding for over 3,200 acres near Miramar, where the government took the fee title in July 1958 but disputed the impact of prior military overflights on the property's value. The jury returned alternative verdicts of $3.25 million (ignoring pre-August 1955 flights) and $3.075 million (accounting for them). The court found after a non-jury hearing that the flights did not become so extensive and oppressive as to constitute an incipient taking until August 1955, at which point the six-year limitations period for acquiring an aviational easement by adverse possession began to run. Because the government deposited compensation in 1958 before that period expired, it acquired the easement as of the 1955 start date; the court therefore entered judgment on the lower verdict that reflected the property's subjection to the earlier flight pattern.
