This case concerned a dispute over the ownership of certificates of deposit valued at over $140,000 that were held solely in the name of the decedent at his death, with the surviving widow claiming they derived from marital assets and thus belonged to her by survivorship rather than forming part of the intestate estate shared with the decedent's father. The widow, who initially served as administratrix, had the assets listed in the estate inventory and paid inheritance tax on them, but years later asserted her ownership claim through her new attorney. Lower courts dismissed her objections as untimely under the six-year statute of limitations, holding that notice of her claim against the estate was required within that period after the decedent's death. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed, ruling that a February 1986 letter from the widow's second attorney to the estate's attorney satisfied the written notice requirement of 20 Pa.C.S. § 3384 and tolled the limitations period, allowing her to pursue her claim that the assets were wrongfully included in the estate.
This case arose after the 1990 census reduced Pennsylvania's congressional seats from 23 to 21, but the state legislature failed to enact a new reapportionment plan by early 1992. Appellants, Democratic state senators, sued state election officials in Commonwealth Court seeking to enjoin the existing 23-district map as unconstitutional and to have a court adopt a valid 21-district plan. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court assumed plenary jurisdiction, appointed a master to evaluate timely submitted plans, and ultimately adopted the bi-partisan Murtha-McDade plan. The court reasoned that federal equal-population requirements and Voting Rights Act considerations were best satisfied by that plan's near-zero population deviation, respect for minority voting strength, compactness, and avoidance of unnecessary splits of political subdivisions, while rejecting late-filed or more partisan alternatives.
This case concerned a dispute in the estate of A. Carolyn Schofield over the distribution of proceeds from real property that she had specifically devised to her nephew, Lawrence F. Hitchon, but sold before her death in 1979. The executor recovered the commingled sale proceeds from the decedent's husband after an equity action and proposed distributing them to the eleven residuary legatees, including the nephew. Hitchon objected, claiming the proceeds under a statute providing for non-ademption when property of an incompetent is sold. The trial court, en banc court, Superior Court, and Supreme Court all rejected his claims. The core reasoning was that 20 Pa.C.S. § 2514(16.1) applies only where there has been a prior formal adjudication of incompetency, which did not occur here, and that no other basis such as fraud supported awarding the proceeds to the specific devisee rather than the residuary estate.
This case concerned the constitutionality of Pennsylvania's Real Estate Tax Sale Law provisions that require only publication notice, rather than personal or mailed notice, to judgment creditors before a tax sale of real property. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held the notice requirements unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because they fail to adequately protect judgment lienholders' substantial property interests. The court reasoned that, consistent with U.S. Supreme Court precedents such as Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams, due process demands actual notice to all parties whose interests are significantly affected by the proceeding, and a recorded judgment lien qualifies as such an interest. The tax sale to the purchasers was therefore invalidated, allowing the judgment creditor to proceed with a sheriff's sale of the property.
This case concerned a petition filed by Lowman S. Henry and other electors to recanvass voting machines in seventeen election districts after the Westmoreland County Board of Elections certified that Robert H. Miller had won the 1983 County Commissioner race by three votes. The trial court permitted recanvassing in three districts but dismissed the petition for the remaining fourteen due to timeliness concerns and defects in the verifying affidavits. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the petition was timely under Sections 1702 and 1703 of the Election Code, which allow filing within twenty days after the election or five days after certification, whichever is longer, and that the failure of notaries to administer oaths could be cured by the affiants' sworn testimony at the hearing. The court therefore ordered recanvassing in ten additional districts.
In Commonwealth v. Henley, the defendant was charged with attempted theft by receiving stolen property after he purchased chains from a police informant who falsely claimed they were stolen; he was arrested when police entered his jewelry store. The trial court sustained a demurrer, holding that legal impossibility was a defense because the chains were not actually stolen. The Superior Court reversed, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed that reversal, ruling that legal impossibility is not a defense to attempt under Pennsylvania's Crimes Code. The court reasoned that the statute, modeled on the Model Penal Code, focuses on the defendant's belief about the circumstances, so an attempt occurs if the defendant acts with the required culpability and believes the goods are stolen even if they are not.