William I. Schaffer

The case involved a dispute between railroad companies and landowners over rights to maintain a telegraph line on a former right-of-way easement across a farm in Butler County. Jacob Hite had granted the easement in 1881 for railroad purposes, but the railroads later abandoned the line by building a new branch, passing abandonment resolutions, obtaining ICC approval, removing tracks, and blowing up a bridge, with no intent to resume rail operations. The plaintiffs sought to enjoin the defendants from interfering with the telegraph line, which was installed and primarily maintained by the Western Union Telegraph Company but used in part for railroad signaling. The court affirmed the lower court's decree that the plaintiffs had no rights under the grant after abandonment, reasoning that the easement's language tied it strictly to railroad use and operation benefiting the grantor's property, so it could not be preserved for the telegraph company's benefit even with incidental railroad wire usage; it directed a reasonable removal period before dismissing the bill.

propertybusiness & regulatory

The case involved exceptions filed by the widow of Chester A. McDaniel to the administrator's account in Orphans’ Court, claiming she had not received her exemption and that personal property valued over $34,000 had not been accounted for, with a suggestion for an audit. The administrator petitioned the court to require the widow to post a $1,000 bond covering audit costs, citing her alleged desertion of the deceased and potential expense to the estate. The lower court granted the petition and ordered the bond as a condition for appointing an auditor. The court reversed this decree, holding there was no authority for requiring such a bond and noting that the court itself could hear the matter to avoid audit expenses.

family lawpropertyprocedure

The case involved a suit by plaintiff Scott against defendant Troop Water Heater Co. for breach of an alleged oral contract to sell 100 water heaters at $15 each, reached via telephone after Scott saw a circular offering a miscellaneous warehouse lot. Defendant denied forming any such contract for 100 new heaters and had only delivered and been paid for a single sample heater. The court held that no enforceable contract existed under the Uniform Sales Act (requiring a writing, part payment, or acceptance and receipt of goods for sales of $500 or more), because the single heater was shipped separately for inspection rather than as part performance of the larger deal, the parties' communications showed no meeting of the minds on the terms or condition of the heaters, and the statute's requirements were not met. Judgment was therefore entered for the defendant.

business & regulatory

The case concerned the inheritance rights of Helen M. Githens, who was adopted in New Jersey by a decree that reserved her right to inherit from her natural parents, in the estate of her natural uncle who died intestate domiciled in Pennsylvania with all his property there. The court decided that she was not entitled to share in the estate. The core reasoning was that Pennsylvania's Intestate Act of 1917 explicitly bars adopted persons from inheriting from their natural collateral relatives without exceptions, and while the full faith and credit clause requires recognition of her adopted status, it does not require Pennsylvania to apply New Jersey law or the decree to alter its own rules of descent for property located within the state.

family lawproperty

This case involved a lawsuit by the plaintiff against Pittsburgh Railways Co. for damages from injuries sustained when her skidding automobile collided with the defendant's streetcar on a bridge. After the jury disagreed, the trial court entered judgment for the defendant, but the appellate court reversed this decision to allow a new trial. The court reasoned that it was a jury question whether the motorman was negligent in not applying brakes sooner when the skidding car approached his path, as the events unfolded quickly and he had a duty to keep a lookout and control the car to avoid dangers he could see in time, per established principles from prior cases.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved an appeal by Warner Bros. Theatres, Inc. from a judgment upholding a tax settlement of $8,262.01 under Pennsylvania's Act of May 16, 1935, as amended, which imposed a 10% excise tax on corporations for the privilege of doing business in the state, measured by net income as reported to and ascertained by the federal government for the fiscal year ending in 1937. The court decided that the tax was constitutional and that the corporation was liable, affirming the lower court's judgment. The core reasoning was that the levy was an excise tax using federal net income merely as a fixed base for measurement rather than delegating legislative taxing power, that variations in federal deductions did not affect the state's authority, and that the statute applied uniformly to all covered corporations without violating state constitutional provisions on delegation, revival of laws, or uniformity.

taxesbusiness & regulatoryfederal power

The case involved attorney Nicholas R. Degillio, who was cited for misconduct after receiving $1,073.14 in insurance proceeds belonging to a client's estate, depositing the funds in his personal bank account, using them for his own purposes, and failing to pay the estate's debts despite demand for repayment. The Board of Governance found that he had improperly retained the client's money and recommended disbarment under the Act of April 14, 1834, which requires striking an attorney's name from the record if client funds are retained after demand. On appeal, the court approved the recommendation, concluding from the facts—including repeated overdrafts, delayed and partial repayment only after criminal charges were filed, and lack of credible records—that Degillio had converted the funds to his own use. The court ordered his disbarment and payment of costs.

criminal law

This case involved plaintiffs seeking damages for injuries from a collision caused by the negligent driving of an automobile owned and operated by Bassett, an independent sales agent for the defendants who sold pig iron on commission. The court reversed the judgments of the Superior Court and County Court in favor of the plaintiffs and entered judgments for the defendants. The core reasoning was that Bassett acted on his own initiative without direction or control from the defendants as to his use of the vehicle, which was not under their actual or potential control and was not of vital importance in furthering their business.

torts & liability

This case involved an appeal seeking to surcharge trustees of an estate created under Michael J. Mallon's will for allegedly breaching their duty of loyalty by investing $40,000 of trust principal in mortgages on land in which some trustees and adult beneficiaries held fractional interests. The Orphans’ Court refused the surcharge, and the Supreme Court affirmed that decision. The court reasoned that the will gave the father (a trustee) the power to convert his interest into an absolute estate at any time, and the other life beneficiaries effectively held a similar interest that could be converted, meaning the minor beneficiaries received their shares subject to the existing investments. Under these circumstances, the usual duty-of-loyalty rules did not apply, and the minors were required to accept the estate with its encumbrances.

propertyfamily law

The case involved plaintiffs injured by an automobile driven by Paul Owen, a salesman for Perma-Maid Co. who worked on commission and used his own car to travel between sales demonstrations and customer calls. The trial court and Superior Court held the company liable for Owen's negligence, and the Supreme Court affirmed. The court applied precedent requiring employer liability where an automobile's use is of vital importance to the business, even without actual or potential control over the vehicle, because Owen could not perform his required duties without it. The opinion noted that Owen supplied his own car, paid all expenses, and controlled its operation, but the company's sales method made the car essential.

torts & liabilitylabor & employment

This case involved the interpretation of a codicil to the will of S. E. Walker, which added a trust for 1800 shares of Times Publishing Company stock benefiting three of his children, with specific provisions for income during life and distribution of the corpus upon the death of one beneficiary. The lower court held, and the Supreme Court affirmed, that the executors of Ross A. Walker were entitled to 300 shares of the stock plus accrued income, as Ross survived the testator. The court reasoned that the will's language was unambiguous and created a vested remainder interest in Ross and Eleanor upon the testator's death, even though the life tenant Richard predeceased the testator, consistent with established precedent on testamentary gifts of remainders following life estates. No contrary intent appeared in the codicil or will to prevent immediate vesting.

property

This case was a creditor's equitable action to set aside title to a house and lot allegedly transferred in fraud of the plaintiff judgment creditor of Jacob M. Frable. The chancellor dismissed the bill after finding that Ursula C. Frable, Jacob's wife, had purchased the lot and built the home entirely with her own money and rental income, while Jacob had no assets of his own. Following Ursula's death, Jacob conveyed his resulting one-third interest to their son Norman in satisfaction of preexisting debts owed to the son, and the court found this transfer was made in good faith for full consideration. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the transactions were not fraudulent as to the plaintiff.

property

The case involved an appeal from the dismissal of exceptions to a sheriff’s sale of the defendant’s fractional interest (about one-ninth) in a farm property to satisfy a judgment of over $20,000. The court affirmed the lower court’s decree confirming the sale over objections that the property should have been sold in parcels and that the $1 bid price was inadequate. The core reasoning was that the appellant offered no evidence that separate sales would produce more or that the price was insufficient when weighed against unpaid taxes exceeding $25,000, numerous other judgments, the plaintiff’s remission of $10,000 of its claim, and the defendant’s refusal of an appraisal or a conditional resale bond; procedural continuances to comply with the deficiency judgment act were also upheld as proper.

propertyprocedure

The case involved two related equity bills concerning the partnership known as Associate Tax Consultants: one filed by Scheckter and others seeking dissolution of the partnership and appointment of a receiver due to Rubin's conduct, and the other filed by Rubin seeking to enjoin Scheckter and others from competing or using a similar business name, alleging fraud and conspiracy in the formation of the partnership agreement dated January 3, 1940. The court affirmed the lower court's decree dissolving the partnership and appointing a receiver to handle its affairs and accounting. The core reasoning was that a valid and binding partnership agreement had been executed between Rubin and Scheckter, as Rubin had read and understood its terms, the parties had dealt at arm's length rather than in an attorney-client relationship, and Rubin had subsequently ratified the agreement through affidavits, announcements, and joint financial control. Rubin's actions had made continuation of the partnership impossible, justifying the dissolution.

business & regulatory

This case involved a disciplinary proceeding against attorney W. Lloyd Snyder, who retained $183.58 for four years that a building association had given him as its solicitor to pay a municipal lien, before eventually returning the funds after a complaint was filed. The Board of Governance recommended disbarment under Section 74 of the Act of April 14, 1834, which mandates removal from the bar if an attorney retains client money after a demand for payment. The court declined to apply that mandatory provision, noting the absence of any demand by the actual client (the association) and the presence of mitigating factors such as Snyder's decades-long unblemished record, his illness at the time, and the small sum involved. Instead, it suspended Snyder from practice for six months under the more flexible Section 73 of the Act, which allows suspension or other penalties for attorney misbehavior.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

The case involved August Chernoff, a lawyer and detective in the coroner's office, who faced charges of soliciting bribes or extorting money from individuals under investigation for manslaughter or related offenses in three separate incidents, offering to influence or halt prosecutions for payments. A special court of common pleas judges unanimously ordered his disbarment after reviewing testimony from witnesses, including marked bills used in one sting operation, and the Board of Censors' findings; the Supreme Court affirmed this decree. The court reasoned that the evidence established Chernoff's misconduct and unfitness to practice, emphasizing that disbarment is a civil proceeding aimed at preserving the bar's integrity rather than punishing crime, with lower evidentiary thresholds than criminal trials and no bar from prior acquittals or lack of convictions.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned whether tax-paid malt or brewed beverages held by a licensed brewing company could be levied upon and sold by a sheriff to satisfy a creditor's judgment under a writ of execution. The trial court permitted the sale, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed. The court reasoned that the 1836 execution statute broadly authorizes sheriffs to sell a defendant's personal property, and the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Act and Beverage License Law prohibit unlicensed sales only when not otherwise authorized by law; a court-ordered execution sale qualifies as authorized. The court noted that unpaid-tax beverages could not be sold but found no bar for those on which taxes had been paid, emphasizing that owners could themselves sell such stock without violating the licensing regime.

business & regulatoryproceduretaxes

This case involves Pomeroy's, Inc., a department store company, appealing the valuation of its capital stock for state tax purposes, where the company set the value at $1,387,744.20 but the taxing authorities raised it to $2,500,000 and the trial court determined the correct amount to be $2,750,000. The court affirmed the higher valuation. The core reasoning was that the company's officers had failed to consider all required statutory factors under the Act of June 1, 1889, such as net earnings, dividends, intrinsic value of tangible assets, goodwill, and franchises, and instead focused only on assets less debts; the lower court had properly applied the full multi-factor analysis, which calls for judgment rather than a strict formula.

taxesbusiness & regulatory

The case involved a wife who fell and was injured while walking on a sidewalk in the defendant borough, carrying her seven-month-old baby, after stepping into a depression or hole next to the curb. She and her husband sued the borough for damages, but the jury disagreed and the trial court entered judgment for the defendants on grounds of contributory negligence. The plaintiffs appealed. The court affirmed the judgment, holding that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent as a matter of law because carrying the baby in the manner she did obstructed her view and prevented her from seeing the hole, despite her admission that she noticed part of the broken sidewalk and could have avoided the hole.

torts & liability

The case involved a lawsuit by Transbel Investment Co. to recover on a promissory note executed by John B. Scott and his wife for Florida real estate. The note had been transferred through banks as collateral and was now held by the plaintiff. The court affirmed judgment for the plaintiff, holding it was a holder in due course deriving rights from the original bank holder, that no evidence supported claims of using the corporation to evade notice, and that laches did not bar the action at law which was governed by the twenty-year statute of limitations.

business & regulatorypropertyprocedure