Stephen A. Zappala

This case concerned whether Fayette County, Pennsylvania, could lawfully impose real estate (ad valorem) taxes on private parties' leasehold interests in oil and gas. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that no such taxation is authorized under state law and reversed the Commonwealth Court's decision upholding the assessments. The court reasoned that the power to tax is strictly statutory and must be expressly granted by the General Assembly; review of the Oil and Gas Act and the General County Assessment Law revealed no provision listing oil and gas interests among the subjects of real-estate taxation. Earlier procedural disputes over exhaustion of administrative remedies and subject-matter jurisdiction were resolved in the taxpayers' favor, but the dispositive issue remained the absence of statutory authority.

taxesproperty

The case involved appellant Jody Lee Hess's conviction for driving under the influence based on a blood alcohol content of .241 percent following a traffic stop at a DUI checkpoint. After his post-trial motion was denied by operation of law, Hess filed a notice of appeal, but the trial court issued an order directing him to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of matters complained of on appeal, which he never received or filed. The Superior Court affirmed the conviction, finding all claims waived under Commonwealth v. Lord due to noncompliance with the 1925(b) order. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed, holding that waiver does not apply where the appellant was not served with the order and the clerk of courts failed to note service on the docket as required by Pa.R.Crim.P. 114, so the strict waiver rule could not be invoked without proper notice.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a certified nurse's aide fired from a nursing home after admitting to daily off-duty marijuana use and illegal prescription medication use, with no evidence linking the conduct to impaired work performance. She was denied unemployment benefits under section 402(e) of the Unemployment Compensation Law for willful misconduct, a decision affirmed by the Commonwealth Court on grounds that the admissions created legitimate employer safety concerns and alternatively under section 3 for conduct inconsistent with acceptable standards. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed, ruling that off-duty misconduct does not qualify as willful misconduct under section 402(e) absent a connection to job performance and that the section 3 theory was waived because it was not raised before the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review. The court remanded the matter solely for computation of benefits.

labor & employment

The case concerned a challenge by the City of Philadelphia to Act 22, which transferred appointment and removal authority over the Philadelphia Parking Authority board from the Mayor to the Governor. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court addressed whether the Commonwealth Court had original jurisdiction over the City's action for declaratory and injunctive relief. The Court vacated the Commonwealth Court's order and remanded for a decision on the merits, concluding that the Parking Authority is part of the Commonwealth government and that the Governor is an indispensable party because the litigation directly implicates his statutory appointment powers under the Act. This determination established exclusive original jurisdiction in the Commonwealth Court under the Judicial Code.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

In Commonwealth v. Shaw, the defendant was involved in a car accident and taken to a hospital where blood was drawn for medical purposes; police later obtained the blood alcohol content results without a warrant or formally requesting the test under 75 Pa.C.S. § 3755. The case addressed whether this practice violated Article 1, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution in a prosecution for driving under the influence. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that the warrantless acquisition of the results was unconstitutional under the state charter, even though it had been upheld under the Fourth Amendment in prior precedent. The court reasoned that Pennsylvania's constitutional protections require police either to request the test pursuant to the statute or to obtain a warrant, as the state provision provides broader privacy safeguards for medical information than federal law.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved parents filing a medical malpractice lawsuit on behalf of their minor daughter for injuries sustained at birth, followed by repeated failures to file a complaint and attempts to discontinue the action without prejudice. The trial court denied the discontinuance petition and entered a judgment of non pros after missed deadlines, which the Superior Court affirmed. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed, holding that the trial court abused its discretion by not permitting the discontinuance without prejudice. The core reasoning was that Pennsylvania's minority tolling statute suspends the statute of limitations for minors until age 18, so the possibility of refiling within that period does not constitute unreasonable prejudice to defendants under Pa.R.C.P. 229(c).

proceduretorts & liability

This case involves the validity of a warrantless search of an automobile in a criminal prosecution after remand from the U.S. Supreme Court. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reaffirmed its prior ruling that the evidence obtained from the search must be suppressed. The court held that its decision rested on independent state constitutional grounds under Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, which requires both probable cause and exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless automobile search. This standard provides greater deference to individual privacy interests than the Fourth Amendment as interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court, which had found the search valid based on probable cause alone. The court therefore reinstated its order reversing the Superior Court's decision admitting the evidence.

criminal lawcivil rights

This case involved Judith Wilson's workers' compensation claim for severe depression allegedly caused by stress from changes in her job duties and status at Aluminum Company of America after her supervisor's transfer. The referee and Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board denied benefits, concluding that Wilson had not shown her psychic injury was caused by abnormal working conditions. The Commonwealth Court reversed, but the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed that ruling and reinstated the denial of benefits. The Court applied precedent requiring objective evidence that a psychic injury resulted from abnormal rather than normal working conditions to establish causation under the Workmen's Compensation Act, finding the record did not support abnormal conditions here.

labor & employment

This case involved disciplinary proceedings against Pennsylvania attorney Michael S. Geisler, who faced multiple charges of client neglect in divorce and bankruptcy matters, failure to communicate, and misrepresentations about case status after taking on an excessive caseload as a new practitioner. The Disciplinary Board recommended a three-month suspension, but the Supreme Court issued a rule to show cause for disbarment and ultimately imposed a six-month suspension. The court accepted findings that the violations stemmed from inexperience and poor business judgment rather than intentional misconduct or a scheme to defraud clients, while emphasizing the need for the sanction to underscore that law practice requires professional competence and diligence beyond mere business operations. The decision discharged the rule to show cause and ordered compliance with reinstatement rules and payment of costs.

procedure

The case concerned whether a trial court erred in admitting police testimony that no further crimes matching the pattern of the charged offenses occurred after the defendant's arrest in a series of burglaries, rapes, and robberies targeting elderly women in Homestead, Pennsylvania. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled that the testimony was inadmissible, as it was irrelevant and its probative value was outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice given multiple possible innocent explanations for the lack of additional reports. Nevertheless, the court found the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt due to overwhelming independent evidence of guilt, including the defendant's confession, matching fingerprints, recovered stolen property, and forensic evidence linking him to the scenes. The judgment of sentence was affirmed on this alternative basis.

criminal lawprocedure

This case concerned whether the notice requirements under Pennsylvania's Loan Interest and Protection Law (Act 6) and Homeowner's Emergency Assistance Act (Act 91) apply to a lender's lawsuit to collect on a consumer loan secured by both a mortgage on the borrower's home and a security interest in personal property, when the lender limits recovery to execution on the personal property alone. The trial court ruled in favor of the lender by granting judgment on the pleadings, but the Superior Court reversed. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the Superior Court, holding that the Acts' notice provisions govern mortgage foreclosure actions and do not apply to suits on the note that seek recovery solely from personalty. The Court reasoned that although the underlying obligation was secured by a mortgage, the lender's choice to pursue only non-mortgage assets meant the statutory foreclosure notices were not triggered.

business & regulatorypropertyprocedure

The case concerned whether a defendant's trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to a pediatrician's expert opinion that a child victim had been sexually abused, where the opinion rested solely on an undisclosed case history rather than facts presented to the jury. The court reversed the Superior Court's order and remanded for a new trial, holding that counsel's failure constituted ineffective assistance. It reasoned that expert opinions are admissible only when the underlying facts are in the record, allowing the jury to assess their validity, as established in precedents like Commonwealth v. Paskings and Commonwealth v. Daniels. Here, the expert explicitly stated that the history was the paramount basis for her conclusion, yet no such facts were disclosed, leaving the jury unable to evaluate the opinion. The court further found the omission prejudicial because it prevented any challenge to the accuracy of the history on which the ultimate conclusion depended.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned whether a Memorandum of Understanding between Allegheny County's Recorder of Deeds and a union constituted a collective bargaining agreement under the Public Employe Relations Act (PERA), making the Recorder a public employer obligated to arbitrate employee grievances. The Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board found an unfair labor practice when the Recorder refused arbitration, but the Court of Common Pleas reversed that determination. The Commonwealth Court reinstated the Board's order on estoppel grounds, but the Supreme Court reversed, holding that county row officers such as the Recorder are not independent public employers under PERA. Instead, the county commissioners serve as the exclusive managerial representative for collective bargaining with county employees, consistent with the Court's prior interpretations in Ellenbogen and related cases. The Court concluded that the Memorandum could not create binding obligations or confer jurisdiction on the Board.

labor & employment

The case concerned whether teachers, their union, and taxpayers had standing to sue a joint committee of school districts for failing to reschedule 180 days of vocational-technical instruction after a teachers' strike shortened the 1980-81 school year, in alleged violation of state law requiring that minimum. The trial court dismissed the declaratory judgment action for lack of standing, but the Commonwealth Court reversed, finding taxpayer standing. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed again, holding that the plaintiffs lacked standing because they failed to allege or show a substantial, direct, and immediate interest harmed by the committee's decision—specifically, no causal link between any lost state subsidy and increased taxes or other taxpayer injury, and insufficient connection to the teachers' contract or benefit rights. The Court emphasized that taxpayer standing exceptions apply only when judicial review would otherwise be unavailable due to beneficial effects on directly interested parties.

labor & employmentprocedure