Hugh B. Baker

This case involved an employee's petition to hold his employer in contempt for failing to pay the maximum rate of partial incapacity workers' compensation under an approved agreement after the employee was laid off from light-duty work. The superior court denied the contempt petition, but the Rhode Island Supreme Court reversed that denial on appeal. The court held that the employer could not unilaterally determine the extent of the employee's partial incapacity or reduce payments based on its own formula projecting prior earnings, as the approved agreement required compensation at varying rates up to the statutory maximum for the duration of partial incapacity unless modified through proper procedures under the workers' compensation act. The court reasoned that only the director of labor or the court could modify the agreement, and a contempt proceeding does not permit retroactive modification; the employer therefore should have been adjudged in contempt and given an opportunity to pay the balance owed.

labor & employmentprocedure

This case involved an employee's petition for workers' compensation benefits under Rhode Island law after chemicals splashed into his left eye while he was working, allegedly causing total disability for one month. The superior court, hearing the matter de novo, entered a decree finding that the petitioner received a compensable injury in the course of employment and was incapacitated from September 29 to October 28, 1952. The employer appealed, arguing that there was no probative evidence supporting the findings on causation and the period of incapacity. The court affirmed the decree, ruling that the trial justice's findings were conclusive because they were supported by legal evidence, including testimony from the petitioner, a coworker, and a doctor, and that questions of the weight and credibility of conflicting evidence are for the trial justice rather than the appellate court.

labor & employmentprocedure

This case involves an employee's petition under the workmen's compensation act to set aside an approved compensation agreement for suspension and settlement receipt, originally on grounds of fraud or coercion and later amended to include mutual mistake of fact. The single commissioner denied the petition after finding no fraud or coercion, and the full commission affirmed that decree. The court upheld the denial on appeal, reasoning that the governing statute allows challenges to such agreements only for fraud or coercion and contains no provision for mutual mistake of fact, while a separate proviso permitting mistake applies only to correcting injury descriptions rather than nullifying an agreement entirely. The court found sufficient evidence supporting the commission's factual findings on fraud and coercion and distinguished prior precedent that did not decide the validity of mistake as a ground.

labor & employmentprocedure

This case involved a workers' compensation petition filed by Edward Gosselin, a foundry worker who became totally disabled by silicosis, an occupational disease, and later died from it. After Gosselin's death, his widow was substituted as petitioner to continue the claim under the 1950 amendment to Rhode Island's workers' compensation law for occupational diseases. The superior court granted the petition and ordered the last employer, Parker Brass Foundry, to pay disability benefits from the date of discovery until death. On appeal, the Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed, holding that under the amended statute it was sufficient to show a causal connection between the incapacitating disease and the nature of the employment, without proving the disease was contracted during the final employment, and that the widow was a proper party to prosecute the pending claim for the benefit of the estate.

labor & employmentprocedure

This case involved a defendant charged with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor in East Providence, Rhode Island, on May 31, 1953. A jury convicted him after trial, and the trial court denied his motion for a new trial; on appeal, he challenged the conviction on grounds that police failed to properly notify him of his statutory right to an independent physician examination and that the police surgeon's exam violated his state constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. The Rhode Island Supreme Court overruled the exceptions, holding that officers substantially complied with the statute by informing the defendant of his rights multiple times before formal arrest and that he participated voluntarily without objection, so the examination evidence was admissible. The court also found the jury instructions adequately covered the elements of the offense and did not prejudice the defendant when read as a whole.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a defendant who in 1943 pleaded nolo contendere to indictments for nighttime breaking and entering with intent to commit larceny and for possessing burglar's tools; he received a deferred sentence on the first charge in 1947 under a written agreement with the attorney general while serving a prison term on the second charge, and was later sentenced in 1953 after violating the agreement's terms. The defendant moved to be discharged, arguing that the superior court lacked jurisdiction because the five-year period for imposing sentence under the 1938 deferred-sentence statute had expired. The court held that the 1945 amendment to the statute controlled, extending the period to five years from the defendant's 1948 parole date, and therefore the court retained authority to impose the eight-year sentence. The core reasoning was that a deferred sentence is a conditional privilege rather than a substantive right, so the version of the statute in effect when the deferral was granted in 1947 governed the time limit.

criminal lawprocedure