The case was a trover action by plaintiff Lowney against defendant Knott for conversion of a diamond ring that Lowney had entrusted to her brother in a gratuitous bailment for an indefinite period, with instructions to return it later for her son. The trial court permitted the defendant to file a late plea of the statute of limitations and entered judgment for her, ruling that the six-year limitations period began running at the 1945 conversion and barred the 1952 suit. The appellate court reversed, reasoning that in such a bailment the cause of action accrues only upon demand and refusal or the bailor's knowledge of the bailee's wrongful act rather than at the time of the secret transfer, so the suit was timely. The court also addressed the procedural issue of allowing the late plea but focused its reversal on the limitations accrual rule for this type of bailment.
The case concerned a petition by Samuel and Anna Sklaroff, Rhode Island residents, to adopt James Michael Stevens, an infant born in Massachusetts to unmarried mother Catherine Stevens. The juvenile court denied the petition, but a superior court jury ruled in the petitioners' favor; on appeal, the Rhode Island Supreme Court addressed the mother's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The court held that adoption is purely statutory and requires the voluntary written consent of both parents under the governing statute. Because the mother and father had married in Massachusetts, legitimized the child under that state's law, and the father had never consented and objected to the adoption, the superior court lacked jurisdiction to grant the petition.
The case involved Ralph Zannelli, a professional boxer, who was denied a 1954 boxing license by the Rhode Island state commission on racing and athletics after medical examinations raised concerns about possible brain damage from prior fights. Zannelli appealed to the racing and athletics hearing board, which upheld the denial following a de novo hearing, and he then petitioned the Supreme Court of Rhode Island for a writ of certiorari to review the decision as arbitrary and unsupported by evidence. The court examined the statutory authority of the commission under state law to investigate applicants' competency and character, finding that the commission and board had implied power to deny licenses even without explicit rules, based on factors like age, health risks, and public interest. It concluded that the denial was supported by legal evidence, including updated medical reports recommending against relicensing due to vulnerability to injury, and was not arbitrary. The petition was denied and dismissed.
This case involved a dispute between neighboring property owners over a 1951 written agreement granting a right of way in exchange for grading a street, extending it, and providing an option to purchase additional land at a set price, all to be completed within two years. The complainants sought specific performance after the respondents failed to fulfill the conditions. The trial court denied the bill, and the Supreme Court of Rhode Island affirmed, holding that the agreement expressly limited the easement to terminate after two years unless conditions were met, the option expired with the deadline, and specific performance is a discretionary equitable remedy not warranted here. The court rejected arguments that the grant created an unlimited easement in fee under state conveyance statutes, emphasizing that the full agreement imposed clear time and performance limits that were not satisfied.
The case was an assumpsit action by a minor plaintiff, through his next friend, seeking to recover payments made to a used car dealer for two vehicles after disaffirming the contracts on grounds of minority. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, which the trial justice upheld on a motion for new trial, finding that the evidence showed the dealer knew of the plaintiff's age and structured the sales to appear as if made to the plaintiff's adult brother. The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed the denial of a directed verdict and upheld the liability determination based on conflicting evidence resolved by the jury and trial justice, but ruled the damages excessive by $51.05 paid to a third-party finance company and ordered a remittitur or new trial on that amount.
This case involved a petition for workers' compensation benefits after the petitioner severely injured his wrist while operating a power saw at the respondent jewelry company's plant on December 1, 1952. The superior court awarded him compensation for total disability through March 1954, partial incapacity thereafter, and medical expenses, leading to appeals by both parties. The core issue was whether the petitioner, who was also a vice president, secretary, and shareholder, qualified as an "employee" under the workers' compensation act or was acting solely in an executive capacity. The court affirmed the decree, holding that he remained an employee because he performed the same non-executive work as before the company's incorporation, was listed on payroll records, and was subject to the company's control under common-law master-servant principles, with no evidence supporting total permanent disability.