Francis Condon

The case involved a dispute between the Town of Bristol and Castle Construction Co. over whether the company was obligated to construct roads shown on a subdivision plat. The town sought to enforce platting regulations adopted in 1949, which required road construction to subgrade before recording new plats, against a replat filed by the company that only altered lot frontages on an existing recorded plat from 1948. The superior court denied and dismissed the town's bill in equity, and the Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a reasonable interpretation of the regulations did not impose road-building obligations on a replat that made no changes to road locations or created new roads. The court reasoned that the original plat had already effected a dedication of the roads to the public, and it would be unjust to require the replat applicant to assume construction duties merely for changing lot sizes on an unaffected road.

propertybusiness & regulatory

This case involved a contract dispute (assumpsit) in which the plaintiff obtained a jury verdict against the defendant, who then sought a new trial that was denied. The Rhode Island Supreme Court declined to review the defendant's bill of exceptions on the merits because the defendant failed to comply with statutory procedures under G.L. 1956, § 9-24-20, requiring submission of the bill and transcript to the trial justice for allowance, and no proper motion was filed under § 9-24-22 to establish their truth. The court held that such procedural compliance is jurisdictional and cannot be waived by party stipulation or inaction, though it allowed the parties an opportunity to correct the defect. A concurring opinion agreed with the outcome but argued that jurisdiction had been conferred by certification to the court.

procedure

This case involved a workers' compensation claim by petitioner Araujo, a wax molder, who sought benefits for disability allegedly caused by carpal tunnel syndrome in her wrists, which she attributed to repetitive hand pressure from her job at Technical Casting Co. The trial commissioner denied the claim after finding no causal connection to employment, based on medical testimony including a doctor's response to a hypothetical question about the timeline of symptoms and prior treatment for thumb issues. The full commission affirmed the denial, and the Rhode Island Supreme Court upheld that decision on appeal, ruling that the hypothetical question was properly based on evidence and that the overall record supported the finding of no work-related causation. The court also rejected challenges to the denial of additional disability payments, witness fees, and higher attorney fees.

labor & employment

This case involves an action of assumpsit brought by plaintiff Scullian against defendant Finley for $4,000 allegedly owed for goods including a portable diner and equipment that had been sold and delivered. The superior court ruled for the defendant after taking judicial notice of records from two prior related cases: an equity proceeding enforcing a common-law lien that resulted in a sale of the chattels to a third party, and a trover action in which the same plaintiff unsuccessfully challenged the legality of that sale. The court held that the prior decision upholding the sale made the question of its validity res judicata, so the plaintiff lacked general title to the chattels and could not prevail on his claim. Exceptions to an evidentiary ruling and to the decision on the merits were overruled, and the case was remitted for entry of judgment.

propertyprocedure

This case involved a breach of contract claim by the United Master Plumbers Association of Rhode Island on behalf of one member (Bassett) against another member (Bookbinder) for violating an association bylaw. The bylaw required any member who was not declared the lowest bidder on a job to pay 10% of the low bid amount to the lowest bidder, with the association authorized to sue in its own name to collect the sum. The defendant demurred, arguing the association lacked standing to sue in its own name as it held no legal interest in the contract. The trial court overruled the demurrer and ruled for the association on the merits, but the Rhode Island Supreme Court sustained the defendant's exception, holding that the bylaw did not create a legal interest in the association or qualify as a proper written assignment under state statute, so the action could not proceed in the association's name under common law pleading rules.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involved a state trooper whose application for reappointment after two three-year terms was denied by the superintendent of the Rhode Island state police on the ground of inadaptability, following an internal hearing before a board of officers. The petitioner contended that he was entitled to reappointment or, at minimum, to removal procedures including written notice of charges and a full hearing with counsel, citing prior case law on police tenure. The court denied the petition for certiorari and dismissed the writ, ruling that the superintendent holds sole authority to appoint members for fixed three-year terms under G.L. 1956, §42-28-10, with no statutory right to reappointment, continued tenure, or civil service protections. The core reasoning was that the petitioner had completed his term and was not removed from office, so procedural protections for removal did not apply, and any hearing provided was a courtesy rather than a legal requirement.

labor & employmentprocedure

This case involved poultry farmers who sued a feed manufacturer in assumpsit for breach of implied warranty after allegedly defective poultry feed harmed their chickens; the feed had been purchased through a local dealer rather than directly from the defendant. The trial court sustained the defendant's demurrer for lack of privity of contract, and the Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed that decision. The majority held that under existing state precedent such as Lombardi v. California Packing Sales Co., an action for breach of implied warranty sounds in contract and requires privity between the parties, rejecting arguments to extend liability to remote manufacturers or to recharacterize the claim as tortious. The court reasoned that any expansion of warranty liability without privity would constitute judicial legislation and should instead be addressed by the legislature, while distinguishing the case from tort-based negligence claims where privity had already been relaxed. A concurrence emphasized the historical roots of warranty actions but agreed that public policy considerations did not warrant changing the privity rule on these facts.

torts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory

The case involved a petition for certiorari challenging the Pawtucket zoning board's denial of an application to build a gasoline filling station in a residence B district, where such use required board approval under the zoning ordinance. The board denied the application after a hearing, citing concerns over property values, lack of public necessity, and nearby existing stations. Before the board issued its decision, the city council amended the ordinance to eliminate gasoline stations as a permitted use in that district, depriving the board of authority to act on the application. The court considered the amendment despite it being outside the original record, holding that the zoning statute permitted broader review including supplemental evidence, and concluded the board lacked jurisdiction. The court quashed the decision and directed the board to enter a new decision denying the application for lack of jurisdiction.

business & regulatorypropertyprocedure

This case involved a tenant who sued her landlords for negligence after slipping and falling on an icy spot on a common walkway leading to a shared garbage area, which had accumulated ice and snow from natural causes. The trial justice ruled in favor of the plaintiff after a bench trial, but the Rhode Island Supreme Court reversed that decision. The court held that landlords owe no duty to tenants to keep common passageways free of dangerous conditions caused by the natural accumulation of ice and snow. It adopted the Massachusetts rule on this issue, under which such accumulations do not give rise to landlord liability, and directed entry of judgment for the defendants. The majority rejected arguments that the duty to tenants matched that owed to business invitees.

propertytorts & liability

This case involves two related petitions under Rhode Island's workmen’s compensation act filed by an employee who injured his right index finger at work when struck by a sledgehammer. In the first petition, the employee sought review of a preliminary compensation agreement, claiming ongoing partial incapacity that prevented him from performing heavy labor; the trial commissioner and full commission denied the petition based on conflicting medical testimony about the finger's condition and improvement potential. In the second, the employee petitioned for specific compensation for total loss of use of the finger, but the commission awarded only 50 percent loss for 18 weeks plus counsel and expert witness fees. The court affirmed both decrees on appeal, holding that the commission properly weighed the medical evidence from Drs. Savastano and Catullo regarding incapacity and loss of use, and that the employee's additional requests for fees did not qualify under the governing statute.

labor & employmentprocedure

This case involved a petition for a writ of mandamus against the clerk of the Providence probate court, who refused to file the petitioner's request for appointment as administrator de bonis non of an estate on the grounds that the petitioner was not the public administrator. The superior court denied the peremptory writ, but the Rhode Island Supreme Court reversed, holding that the clerk's duty to file papers is purely ministerial and that questions about the petitioner's qualifications or title to office must be decided by the probate judge, not the clerk. The court reasoned that allowing the clerk to make such determinations would usurp judicial authority and deprive the petitioner of the right to appeal under the relevant statute. Therefore, the clerk must file the petition as directed.

procedure

This case involved a suit in equity by M. S. Alper & Son, Inc., the former owner of land condemned by the state for highway construction, seeking to invalidate the state's conveyance of an easement with an option to purchase the unused parcels to Laredef Realty Operators, Inc., for $1 and to require the state to convey the land to Alper on identical terms. The trial court ruled for Alper, finding that article XVII of the state constitution required the state to first offer the land to the condemnee before conveying it to a third party. On appeal, the Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the state violated the constitutional provision by negotiating and conveying the property to Laredef without providing Alper an equivalent opportunity, though it upheld a decree provision allowing the state to recover certain improvement costs from Alper to prevent unjust enrichment. The court reasoned that expenditures made solely to benefit Laredef could not be charged to Alper, but other value-enhancing improvements could be considered in the reconveyance terms.

propertyprocedure

This case is a negligence action brought by plaintiff Hill against defendant A. L. A. Construction Co. after Hill, a city employee cleaning the floor of a reservoir, was struck and injured by falling lumber thrown from the rim above where defendant's workers were performing construction tasks. A jury awarded Hill $18,009, and the trial court denied the defendant's motions for a directed verdict and new trial. On appeal, the Rhode Island Supreme Court overruled the defendant's exceptions, finding sufficient circumstantial evidence—including the location of the workers, the materials involved, and the absence of contrary testimony—for the jury to conclude that one of the defendant's employees had negligently caused the injury, and determining that the trial justice committed no error in responding to the jury's request to review testimony.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case involved a criminal complaint charging the defendant with operating a motor vehicle at an unreasonable speed under G. L. 1956, §31-14-1. The superior court found the defendant guilty after a bench trial. On appeal, the Rhode Island Supreme Court reversed, holding that the complaint and warrant were constitutionally defective because they lacked the reasonable certainty required to charge an offense known to the law, as previously decided in State v. Brown and State v. Campbell. The court reasoned that such a defect implicated jurisdiction, requiring dismissal of the complaint and discharge of the defendant even though the issue was not raised in the bill of exceptions. The case was remitted to the superior court with directions to dismiss.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involves a civil action for false imprisonment brought by plaintiff Berberian against defendant Smith, a police officer, after the plaintiff was stopped and detained for driving on a newly completed but closed bridge in Pawtucket, Rhode Island, on November 20, 1958. The plaintiff was prevented from leaving the scene, placed in a patrol wagon, and held at the police station for about 45 minutes without charges before being released. The trial justice ruled for the defendant, finding the officer had not effected the arrest and had reasonable cause for suspicion, but the Supreme Court reversed this decision. The court held that the undisputed facts showed the defendant had no reasonable ground to suspect a crime and instead detained the plaintiff merely to resolve questions about his own authority, which did not justify the arrest under state law, entitling the plaintiff to nominal damages of $1.

criminal lawtorts & liability

This case involved a night watchman in the city of Woonsocket who was dismissed from his position after refusing a superior's order to remove a dead dog from the street, asserting that the task fell outside his job duties as defined in the city's personnel ordinance. The personnel board upheld the dismissal after a hearing, and the employee petitioned for certiorari review. The court denied the petition, ruling that the ordinance's job specifications are descriptive rather than exclusive and must be interpreted with reasonable flexibility to support efficient public service administration. It concluded that the order was within the reasonable scope of the watchman's duties and that strict adherence to the letter of the classification was not required when public interest in effective operations takes priority.

labor & employmentprocedure

The case involved a criminal prosecution of Bradford E. Dufour for knowingly possessing three reels of obscene motion picture film for the purpose of loan, in violation of G.L. 1956, § 11-31-1. After a jury trial resulting in a guilty verdict, the defendant challenged the admission of evidence obtained from a search of an automobile registered to his father, arguing that the search and his arrest were illegal under the state constitution and statutes. The court addressed pretrial motions to suppress the evidence and quash the indictment, focusing on whether the defendant had standing to contest the search conducted pursuant to a warrant naming his father and on the validity of the officers' actions based on information from an informant. It held that the evidence was inadmissible due to the illegal search and seizure, applying the exclusionary rule under both the Fourth Amendment and state law, without needing to reach trial errors. The core reasoning centered on the requirements for a valid search, the defendant's connection to the seized property, and legislative intent behind Rhode Island's exclusionary statute.

criminal lawfree speech

This case involved a plaintiff's claims against defendants for false arrest and imprisonment, assault and battery, and violation of federal civil rights law under 42 U.S.C. §1983, arising from an arrest and ten-day detention without a warrant or probable cause on September 16, 1962, in Providence, Rhode Island. The superior court sustained the defendants' demurrer to the three-count declaration, and on appeal the Rhode Island Supreme Court overruled the plaintiff's exception, affirming dismissal. The court held that the first count failed to allege an unlawful detention essential to false imprisonment, the second count did not properly plead a continuous trespass via continuando, and the third count was invalid because §1983 applies only to state action, not private individuals. The court also clarified that a single ad damnum clause at the end of the declaration was sufficient and did not render the pleading vague.

civil rightscriminal lawproceduretorts & liability

The case involved a defendant charged with driving a motor vehicle without eyeglasses in violation of a restriction on his operator's license under Rhode Island law. The superior court jury found the defendant guilty, and the Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed exceptions regarding the admission of testimony, denial of a directed verdict, and the jury instructions. The court overruled all exceptions, holding that the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict when viewed favorably to the state, the evidentiary rulings were proper, and the jury charge accurately reflected the applicable law regarding the license restriction.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a petition for certiorari challenging the Newport zoning board's grant of a special exception allowing conversion of a two-family dwelling into a five-family dwelling on a lot with only 140 feet of frontage in an R-40 district that required a minimum of 200 feet. The board had approved the application after concluding it had jurisdiction because the lot's frontage predated the 1956 ordinance amendment and that the conversion would not harm neighboring properties. The court held that the board lacked jurisdiction to grant the exception, as the frontage requirement was an express condition precedent under the zoning ordinance that the board had no authority to vary. The court further noted there was no evidence supporting an exception under the general enabling statute for public convenience or welfare. It quashed the board's decision and returned the records.

property