Job Durfee

The case concerned a promissory note issued by a dissolved partnership, on which the plaintiffs later entered into statutory compositions discharging two of the three former partners individually, while preserving their right to sue the remaining partner, Ross. Ross raised the statute of limitations as a defense. The court ruled that the compositions and payments did not renew the note or remove the demand from the statute of limitations. It reasoned that the statute severs joint liability by allowing individual compromises that discharge the debtor without any new promise binding the undischarged partners, in contrast to common-law rules for joint obligations.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved a criminal indictment against Benjamin P. Wilbor for an offense under a statute authorizing town councils to grant licenses, with the defendant moving to arrest judgment based on a later amendatory act that altered how penalties were distributed between towns and complainants. The court overruled the motion and upheld the proceedings. It reasoned that the court's common-law authority to adjudicate criminal cases derives from its organization rather than specific statutes, and that the amendment did not repeal the underlying offense or penalty but only changed the mode of distributing any fine recovered. Because the offense occurred after the amendment, the statutes could be construed together consistently to allow judgment without retroactive effect or inconsistency in the penalty itself.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned a lawsuit by contractors against a town treasurer for payment on bridge construction work in Smithfield after the original written contract with the town's committee proved impossible to perform due to the mathematical requirements of the arch design. The defendant moved for a new trial, arguing that the plaintiffs had pleaded and proved a different contract than the written one, that evidence of abandonment was improperly admitted, and that the jury should have been instructed on the need for a formal committee meeting to adopt a new agreement. The court denied the motion, reasoning that the original contract was void from the start as self-contradictory and thus could not be abandoned, that a majority of the committee could validly bind the town, and that the facts supported the inference that the substitute contract was properly authorized with due notice to all members. The court further found that any instructional omissions did not prejudice the defendant given the evidence presented.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case concerned the effect of a 1846 statutory amendment on pending indictments for violations of an earlier liquor licensing law, which had required penalties to be split between the state and the town where the offense occurred. The amendment changed the distribution to split penalties between the state and the complainant and repealed inconsistent provisions of the prior act without a saving clause. The court held that judgments could be entered under the old distribution rules only for indictments in which convictions had already been obtained before the amendment took effect; all other pending indictments, including those for pre-amendment offenses where no conviction had yet occurred, had to be dismissed. The reasoning centered on the amendment's prospective language, the requirement that any judgment match the process and rights established at the time it was sought, and the principle that the legislature could not retroactively transfer penalty rights from towns to complainants.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved John Gordon's motion for a new trial after his conviction in a criminal prosecution related to the death of Amasa Sprague. The court addressed claims that evidence of threats made by Gordon's brother Nicholas against the deceased should not have been admitted, along with issues regarding a witness reading from trial notes. The court overruled the motion, holding that the evidence was properly admitted because testimony established the close brotherly and dependent relationship between John and Nicholas, making Nicholas's threats relevant to show possible motive for John. The court further found that the admission of the witness notes did not constitute error, as they were accurate and no prejudice resulted. The opinion concluded that the evidence was relevant to the issues and could be considered by the jury.

criminal lawprocedure

This case concerns a bill in equity filed by J.M. Daniels to redeem a one-seventh interest in mortgaged property known as the Branch Factory estate in Smithfield, following multiple assignments of the mortgage and the equity of redemption, as well as a statutory surrender by an intermediate holder and subsequent agreements extending the redemption period. The court held that the complainant retained the right to redeem despite stipulations in the 1838 agreement that purported to bar filing any bill during the extension year and to effect foreclosure upon nonpayment. The core reasoning was that the parties' intent to eliminate the legal remedy of redemption while extending the right itself was contradictory and unenforceable, rendering those provisions voidable, though the remainder of the contract remained binding such that redemption required payment of the principal, legal interest, the excess of compound over simple interest, expenses, and costs.

propertyprocedure

The case involved a claim for breach of a one-year employment contract under which the plaintiff agreed to perform labor for the defendants at a daily rate of $1.42. After being discharged shortly after starting work, the plaintiff repeatedly offered to continue performing but was refused, leading to a jury verdict in his favor with damages of $367.57. The defendants sought a new trial, arguing that evidence of a local usage permitting either party to terminate such contracts at will should have been admitted and that the damages were excessive. The court denied the motion, holding that the alleged usage was inconsistent with the express contract terms, would render the contract a nullity if incorporated, and could not be proven to override a complete and binding agreement. The court further found the damages not so excessive as to warrant a new trial.

labor & employmentprocedure

This case involved an action of debt on a bond executed by a judgment debtor and sureties to secure the debtor's liberty within the prison limits after his commitment on an alias execution for an unsatisfied 1837 judgment. The defendants pleaded duress, among other defenses, arguing that the alias execution was improperly issued and that an earlier interaction with the officer constituted a full service or satisfaction of the judgment. The court held that the alias execution was legally issued because the original execution remained wholly unsatisfied in fact, that no prior arrest or custody under the execution had occurred, and that the later commitment was valid without duress. Accordingly, the bond was enforceable, and judgment was entered for the plaintiff.

procedure

In Reed v. Johnson, the plaintiff sued on a 1825 promissory note, and the defendant raised the statute of limitations as a defense after the 1836 writ; the plaintiff countered that a 1826 deed of assignment, the assignee's subsequent partial payment on the note, and a related letter constituted a new promise reviving the debt. The court held for the defendant, ruling that the partial payment did not take the claim out of the statute. The core reasoning was that the assignee acted as a trustee for creditors rather than as the defendant's agent under the debtor's control, so the payment could not support a clear inference of a new promise by the defendant; modern precedent requires an express promise or unambiguous implication to toll the limitations period.

procedure

The case involved an indictment against Abner Peckham for selling wine in violation of a city of Providence regulation that restricted such sales under 1838 state acts authorizing licensing of wine and liquor. The court held that the sale violated the regulation and that the acts were constitutional exercises of state authority. It reasoned that the laws served the state's exclusive police power to maintain order and prevent pauperism through restrictions on internal trade, rather than imposing duties on imports or regulating foreign or interstate commerce under the U.S. Constitution. Once an imported article enters the stream of in-state sales, it becomes subject to state regulation without conflicting with federal authority over imports or commerce. The opinion also addressed the limits of legislative power in related contexts but focused on upholding the regulatory scheme as within the state's domain.

criminal lawbusiness & regulatoryfederal power

This case involved an action in Rhode Island to enforce a Connecticut justice-of-the-peace judgment obtained by default after a copy of the writ was left with a supposed agent but without personal service on the defendant, who was a Rhode Island resident at all relevant times and had no actual notice. The defendant pleaded lack of jurisdiction and other defenses; the plaintiff demurred. The court held that the judgment was a nullity and unenforceable against the defendant personally because the Connecticut court lacked jurisdiction over him, as he was neither domiciled nor served in that state and did not appear. It reasoned that the Full Faith and Credit Clause and implementing federal statute require sister-state judgments to receive the same effect as in the rendering state, but only if the rendering court had jurisdiction over the parties, and that a judgment without such jurisdiction cannot be treated as conclusive evidence of a debt.

procedurefederal power

The case concerned shares in the Washington Bridge Society, a corporation, and whether they constituted real or personal property in the context of estate distribution following the death of Lemuel H. Arnold and a subsequent partition judgment involving his daughter Sarah B. Ruggles and her husband. The court held that the shares were personal property, specifically choses in action representing rights to vote and receive dividends. The reasoning emphasized that the corporation itself held title to the underlying real estate and franchises, while shareholders possessed only indirect interests in profits that did not encumber or derive directly from the realty; this classification aligned with taxation practices, legislative treatment, and the need to treat shares as an indivisible entirety rather than splitting them between heirs and executors. The judgment in partition merely suspended the wife's control during marriage without altering the personal nature of her interest, which would revert fully to her upon her husband's death.

propertyfamily lawprocedure

This case involved a dispute over the inheritance of real estate owned by George Curlis Man, who died without issue after acquiring the property by purchase; his mother claimed the entire estate as next of kin under one clause of the 1798 intestacy statute, while his surviving brothers and sisters (through the plaintiffs) claimed equal shares under another clause providing that brothers and sisters inherit equally with the mother when a child dies without issue. The court held that the statute's relevant clause applied to the estate regardless of whether it was acquired by descent or purchase, entitling the mother and siblings to equal shares, and awarded the plaintiffs judgment for one-fifth of the land. The core reasoning was that the statutory language made no reference to the origin of title, the preceding clauses broadly covered all estates without such limitation, and restricting the clause to estates by descent from the father would render it and related provisions meaningless or contradictory when read with the proviso on bloodlines.

propertyfamily law

This case concerns a dispute between the towns of Exeter and Warwick over the legal settlement of Pruda Tillinghast, a pauper born in Exeter in 1797, for purposes of poor relief and removal. The court confirmed the order of removal to Exeter as her place of legal settlement. The core reasoning was that under the 1748 statute governing settlements, birth in a town establishes legal settlement when no other settlement has been acquired by notice, freehold purchase, or apprenticeship; Pruda acquired none elsewhere. The court further held that her father Braddock's status as a former slave who had purchased property and paid taxes in Exeter did not alter this outcome, as Pruda was freeborn after 1784 and the manumission laws applied only to the support of the former slave himself, not his free children.

procedurecivil rightsproperty

This case concerned which town was responsible for supporting the paupers Mary Ann Hill and her daughter Elizabeth after West Greenwich ordered their removal to Exeter. The court confirmed the removal order, holding Exeter liable. The core reasoning was that under the 1748 statute and longstanding common-law principles, a legitimate child's settlement follows the father's settlement rather than the place of birth, and a wife's settlement follows her husband's; because Arthur Hill's father was settled in Exeter and Arthur himself acquired no independent settlement, the paupers' settlement was in Exeter.

family law