Marshall v. City of Providence
Supreme Court of Rhode Island · 1993-10-18 · cited 8×
The case involved plaintiffs suing the City of Providence for injuries from a sidewalk defect, after the Superior Court granted the city summary judgment on the grounds that the plaintiffs' notice of injury was legally insufficient under G.L. 1956 § 45-15-9. The Supreme Court affirmed the ruling, finding that the notice failed to adequately specify the time, place, and cause of the injury, as required by the statute and prior precedent such as Maloney v. Cooke. The court held that the notice requirement is a strict, non-waivable condition precedent to suit, and any alteration to this longstanding interpretation must come from the legislature rather than judicial decision.
torts & liabilityprocedure
State v. Soprano
Supreme Court of Rhode Island · 1993-10-14 · cited 5×
The case concerned a defendant appealing his adjudication as a probation violator based on an alleged arson committed in August 1992. The Rhode Island Supreme Court sustained the appeal, holding that the trial justice lacked authority to extend the original probation term when the defendant appeared on a violation charge in December 1991. Because the probation period had expired in January 1992, the court concluded the defendant was no longer subject to probation at the time of the alleged offense. It therefore vacated the violation finding and ordered the defendant's immediate release from custody.
criminal lawprocedure
State v. Soares
Supreme Court of Rhode Island · 1993-10-14 · cited 6×
The case involved defendant Miguel Soares appealing the Superior Court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence and statements following his arrest. Soares had entered a plea of nolo contendere while reserving the right to appeal the suppression ruling, similar to federal procedure under Rule 11(a)(2). However, the Rhode Island Supreme Court determined that no comparable state rule exists permitting such conditional pleas. Consequently, the court denied the appeal and remanded the case to vacate the plea, allowing Soares to renew his motion to suppress or proceed to trial, after which any conviction could be appealed on those grounds.
criminal lawprocedure
State v. Baker
Supreme Court of Rhode Island · 1993-06-28 · cited 5×
The case involved Richard E. Baker, Jr., who was convicted by a jury of leaving the scene of an accident resulting in personal injury after his truck struck and injured two men in a parking lot following a bachelor party. The Rhode Island Supreme Court reversed the conviction and directed a judgment of acquittal. The court reasoned that due to the severe beating Baker had endured prior to driving, there was insufficient evidence to prove he had actual or constructive knowledge of the accident, as required by the statute. Therefore, the prosecution failed to meet its burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
criminal law
In Re Samuel P.
Supreme Court of Rhode Island · 1993-06-17 · cited 2×
This case involved a juvenile, Samuel P., who was found delinquent by the Family Court for possessing an unlicensed handgun in violation of Rhode Island law. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment on appeal. The court reasoned that the statute exempts possession of a handgun in one's dwelling house, and the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the attic where the gun was found was not part of the defendant's family's exclusive dwelling, as opposed to a common area.
criminal lawguns
Fremming v. Tansey
Supreme Court of Rhode Island · 1993-06-16 · cited 9×
In Fremming v. Tansey, the plaintiff sued the defendant for personal injuries allegedly caused by negligence when part of a garage fell and struck her foot, and the defendant sought production of the plaintiff's employment records and tax returns during discovery to assess the severity of injuries and potential lost wages. After the trial justice initially granted limited production but then reversed course upon learning no lost-wages claim had been made, she denied the motion to compel and awarded the plaintiff $325 in costs. The Rhode Island Supreme Court granted certiorari, quashed the sanctions order, and held that the discovery request was substantially justified under Superior Court Rule of Civil Procedure 37 because the documents were relevant to damages and the plaintiff could have amended the complaint to add a wage claim. The court concluded that the trial justice abused her discretion by imposing fees without evidence of groundless or harassing conduct, as the motion rested on sound litigation strategy.
proceduretorts & liability
Ferland Corp. v. Bouchard
Supreme Court of Rhode Island · 1993-06-16 · cited 37×
This case involved property owners challenging the city of Woonsocket's tax assessments on two federally subsidized apartment complexes, Plaza Village and Walnut Hill, for the years 1988 through 1991, arguing that the assessments exceeded fair market value. The Superior Court ruled that the assessments were excessive for most years, ordered refunds with interest, and dismissed one petition as untimely. On appeal, the Rhode Island Supreme Court addressed the proper valuation methods, including the income capitalization approach for HUD-regulated properties and the treatment of depreciation in those calculations. The court upheld the dismissal of the 1989 petition, corrected the trial court's valuation error for Plaza Village in 1988, 1990, and 1991 by excluding improper additions of depreciation, and remanded for entry of a revised judgment reflecting those adjustments while accepting the lower valuation for Walnut Hill.
taxesproperty
State v. Kane
Supreme Court of Rhode Island · 1993-06-09 · cited 15×
This case involved Jeffrey Kane, who was charged in Superior Court with child snatching under R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-26-1.1 after allegedly refusing to return his minor child to the mother in violation of a Family Court joint-custody consent order and fleeing with the child to Texas. Kane moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, arguing that any violation occurred outside Rhode Island and that the Family Court had exclusive authority, and he also challenged the no-contact order imposed as a bail condition. The Superior Court denied the motion, ruling that it retained jurisdiction over the criminal offense separate from custody matters, and the trial justice later refused to lift the no-contact order pending Family Court review. On certiorari, the Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the statute's plain language expressly applies to acts committed "within or without" the state and that the Superior Court properly exercises jurisdiction over the criminal charge while leaving custody determinations to the Family Court; it also upheld the bail condition as within the trial justice's discretion to ensure public safety and court appearance. The court denied the petition and remanded the case.
criminal lawfamily lawprocedure
Miller v. Rhode Island Hospital
Supreme Court of Rhode Island · 1993-06-03 · cited 15×
The case concerned a patient who, after a car accident while intoxicated with a blood-alcohol level of 0.233, was taken to Rhode Island Hospital where doctors performed a diagnostic peritoneal lavage despite his verbal objections and attempts to resist. A jury found the hospital liable for battery and awarded compensatory and punitive damages. On appeal, the Rhode Island Supreme Court examined the trial court's exclusion of evidence about a prior insurance settlement, the jury instructions on consent and capacity to refuse treatment, and the applicability of emergency exceptions to informed consent when a patient is impaired. The court upheld the evidentiary ruling but identified errors in the handling of the consent issues and remanded for a new trial consistent with its opinion.
torts & liabilityprocedurehealthcare
Newport Electric Corp. v. Public Utilities Commission
Supreme Court of Rhode Island · 1993-05-26 · cited 6×
The case concerned a challenge by Newport Electric Corporation to an order from the Public Utilities Commission requiring the company to record a $1.2 million accounting gain from transferring its right to a 4.9 percent equity interest in the Ocean State Power Project to an affiliate of its parent company, with the gain to be credited against the company's Storm Contingency Fund for the benefit of ratepayers. The dispute centered on whether ratepayers were entitled to any benefit from the transferred interest, which stemmed from early "soft cost" contributions to the project made by a subsidiary. The Rhode Island Supreme Court granted the petition for certiorari and quashed the commission's order. The court reasoned that the contributions were treated as below-the-line expenses never included in the rate base, the right was never devoted to utility service, construction risks fell on lenders rather than ratepayers, and therefore ratepayers had no claim to any gain from the disposition.
business & regulatory
Providence Water Supply Board v. Malachowski
Supreme Court of Rhode Island · 1993-05-03 · cited 4×
The case involved the Providence Water Supply Board seeking review of the Public Utilities Commission's order in docket No.2022 regarding a proposed surcharge tariff to repay city advances under a promissory note. The commission approved a lower surcharge than requested, limited the amount repayable to the city, and directed portions of the funds to specific accounts rather than full retroactive recovery. The court affirmed the commission's order after reviewing the record, holding that the commission had statutory authority under § 39-3-11.1 to regulate such municipal utility borrowings and surcharges. The decision rested on the principle that the commission could prevent recovery of revenues lost due to the utility's own errors or violations of prior directives while balancing ratepayer and taxpayer interests.
business & regulatory
State v. Martinez
Supreme Court of Rhode Island · 1993-04-26 · cited 10×
This case involved a defendant's appeal from his Superior Court convictions for second-degree murder and assault with a dangerous weapon arising from a 1990 shooting outside a Providence bar. The defendant argued that the trial justice erred by informing the jury of his custody status during deliberations, by admitting evidence seized from his wife's car, and by admitting out-of-court photographic identifications made by three witnesses. The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, concluding that the custody remark did not prejudice the jury, that the car evidence was properly admitted, and that the identifications were not impermissibly suggestive under the two-prong test from Manson v. Brathwaite because the photographic array and instructions were neutral and did not single out the defendant.
criminal lawprocedure
New England Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Clark
Supreme Court of Rhode Island · 1993-04-26 · cited 26×
This case concerned whether engineering services provided by AT&T to New England Telephone & Telegraph Co. for updating central-office equipment were subject to Rhode Island use tax as services that are part of the sale of tangible personal property under G.L. 1956 § 44-18-12. The tax administrator had assessed tax on these services following an audit, but the District Court ruled they were not taxable. The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the services constituted a separate transaction from the equipment purchase rather than being inextricably interwoven with it. The court applied its framework for mixed transactions, determining that the real object of the deal included both the equipment and the professional engineering services as distinct components, and it rejected the tax administrator's evidentiary challenges as harmless error.
taxesbusiness & regulatory
Rodrigues v. Miriam Hospital
Supreme Court of Rhode Island · 1993-04-20 · cited 51×
This case involved plaintiff Karen Rodrigues, who had a complex history of lupus and rheumatoid arthritis, suing Miriam Hospital after she arrived at its emergency room in October 1984 with epiglottitis and suffered respiratory collapse while awaiting a tracheostomy. Multiple physicians, including ENT specialist Dr. Issenberg who had staff privileges at the hospital, were involved in her care; Dr. Issenberg declined to perform the procedure due to lack of recent experience, and arrangements with another surgeon were incomplete when the emergency occurred. The Superior Court granted the hospital a directed verdict on the corporate-negligence claim, and the Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed. The court held that the plaintiff had not shown the hospital possessed actual or constructive knowledge of any defect in Dr. Issenberg’s privileges that a reasonable credentialing review would have revealed, because there were no prior complaints or indications he would refuse the procedure. The appeal was denied and the case remanded.
healthcaretorts & liability
In Re Barnacle
Supreme Court of Rhode Island · 1993-04-16 · cited 23×
This case involved two questions certified by the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Rhode Island to the Rhode Island Supreme Court concerning the effect of recorded but defective mortgages on bona fide purchasers, including bankruptcy trustees under 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(3). In the first scenario, a mortgage securing a loan on property purchased by a married couple was executed and recorded without one spouse's signature. In the second, a mortgage on a condominium unit described the entire project rather than the specific unit. The court held that both recorded mortgages provided constructive notice to subsequent purchasers, reasoning that Rhode Island's recording statute (G.L. 1956 § 34-13-2) imparts record notice of all claims revealed in properly recorded instruments, and a diligent title search would uncover the relevant details, including through related recorded documents like assignments.
propertyprocedure
State v. Tutt
Supreme Court of Rhode Island · 1993-03-24 · cited 17×
In State v. Tutt, the defendant appealed his convictions for robbery, assault with intent to commit murder, and related firearm and kidnapping charges, arguing that the trial court erred by excluding testimony from a defense witness about the victim's alleged misconduct, limiting cross-examination of the victim regarding his illegal entry and alias, and declining to hold an evidentiary hearing on when police learned of the victim's true identity. The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding that the excluded witness lacked personal knowledge of the alleged events, that questions about posting bond in San Diego were irrelevant to bias or the charges, and that the state's nondisclosure of the victim's alias was neither deliberate nor prejudicial to the defense. The court reasoned that the victim had already admitted his immigration status and use of an alias, defense counsel had explored those facts on cross-examination, and the defendant had not shown prejudice from the timing of the disclosure.
criminal lawprocedure
Environmental Scientific Corp. v. Durfee
Supreme Court of Rhode Island · 1993-03-02 · cited 153×
This case involved the Environmental Scientific Corporation seeking a permit from the Rhode Island Department of Environmental Management to alter freshwater wetlands for a development project in Aguntaug Swamp. After a hearing officer recommended approval for phase II of the project, the DEM director denied the application and water-quality certificate. The Superior Court affirmed the denial, but upon review the Supreme Court granted certiorari and quashed the judgment. The court reasoned that the director's final decision lacked substantial evidence and an adequate rationale to overcome the deference owed to the hearing officer's findings on credibility and facts under the Administrative Procedures Act, without reaching the takings claim.
environmentpropertyprocedure
State v. Brisson
Supreme Court of Rhode Island · 1993-02-04 · cited 25×
The case involved the conviction of Edmond A. Brisson for first-degree sexual assault against his stepson, John D., with the defendant sentenced to sixteen years imprisonment. Brisson appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the indictment due to prosecutorial misconduct involving lost DCF records and in allowing the impeachment of a defense witness by questioning his failure to report exculpatory information to police. The court affirmed the conviction, holding that the trial justice properly denied the motion after the prosecutor disclosed redacted information from memory and that the cross-examination was within the trial justice's discretion to test the witness's credibility.
criminal lawprocedure
Caithness Rica Ltd. Partnership v. Malachowski
Supreme Court of Rhode Island · 1993-01-27 · cited 6×
The case involved a dispute over whether the Rhode Island Energy Facility Siting Board had jurisdiction to license a proposed coal-fired cogeneration facility by Caithness Rica Ltd. Partnership and related entities. The Board determined it had jurisdiction after calculating the facility's capacity to include converted energy from steam output and using an earlier design exceeding 80 megawatts. The court ruled that the Board lacked jurisdiction, holding that the statute's threshold applies to electric generating capacity without including steam, and that capacity must be assessed based on the design at the time of the jurisdictional hearing rather than a preliminary design. The decision quashed the Board's order and remanded the matter.
business & regulatoryenvironment
Pirri v. Toledo Scale Corp.
Supreme Court of Rhode Island · 1993-01-26 · cited 11×
In Pirri v. Toledo Scale Corp., the plaintiff filed a product-liability suit against the manufacturer of a meat-cutting machine, alleging negligence, strict liability, and breach of implied warranty for a hand injury sustained more than three years earlier. The trial justice denied the defendant's motion to dismiss on statute-of-limitations grounds, but the Rhode Island Supreme Court granted certiorari, quashed the order, and directed dismissal. The court held that the three-year limitations period in G.L. 1956 § 9-1-14(b) for personal-injury actions controlled because the nature of the right invaded—rather than the legal theories pleaded—determined the applicable statute, and no buyer-seller relationship existed to invoke the UCC's four-year warranty provision.
proceduretorts & liability