This case involves a father suing his son in equity to cancel a deed to land that the father claims was obtained through fraud by the son misrepresenting boundaries to the surveyor, along with claims for accounting of debts and return of household furniture. The trial court denied cancellation of the deed, ordered the son to repay an $1800 loan with interest, and largely denied the son's counterclaims for various debts owed by the father. On appeal, the court upheld these findings but reversed in part, holding that the father must credit the son for hospital and medical bills paid for the father's deceased wife, as it was the father's primary legal duty to pay those expenses and there was no evidence the son intended to assume that liability.
This case involved a contract dispute in which the plaintiff sued the defendant in assumpsit for approximately $3000 allegedly owed for goods sold, labor performed, and money lent. The defendant responded with a plea of the general issue and a special plea asserting that the plaintiff had executed a general release of all claims for valuable consideration. After a bench trial with conflicting evidence on the underlying transactions involving real estate lots and construction work, as well as on the validity of the release, the trial justice found the release valid and effective and entered judgment for the defendant. On appeal, the court reviewed the evidence and held that it could not say the trial justice's credibility determinations and decision were clearly wrong, overruling the plaintiff's exception and remitting the case for entry of judgment on the decision.
This case involved an appeal from a superior court decree denying a marine electrician's petition for workers' compensation benefits under the 1938 Workmen's Compensation Act for substantial vision loss in his right eye, which he claimed resulted from welding flashes or head impacts on February 1, 1945. The trial justice found that the eye condition, diagnosed as a retinal vein thrombosis, was not caused or aggravated by any work-related accident and instead stemmed from a non-traumatic systemic disorder, based on conflicting medical testimony. The appellate court examined the evidence, including the petitioner's account and expert opinions from multiple eye specialists, and determined that the trial justice's factual findings were supported by legal evidence showing no probable causal link to employment. Accordingly, the court affirmed the denial of the petition and dismissed the appeal.
This case involves a former employee's petition for worker's compensation benefits under Rhode Island's Workmen’s Compensation Act for a back injury allegedly sustained while packing and moving boxes at United States Rubber Co. on August 24, 1945. The Department of Labor initially awarded compensation, but the superior court denied it after finding no accident occurred. On appeal, the Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed the denial, holding that there was no legal evidence of a personal injury by accident arising out of employment, as the pain occurred during routine work without any unusual strain or mishap, and the trial court's factual findings based on conflicting evidence were conclusive.
The case involved a plaintiff who sued the estate of Nathaniel B. Wootton to recover compensation for domestic services she claimed to have provided him from 1936 to 1942, including cooking, cleaning, and nursing, based on his alleged promise to leave her his entire estate in his will. After the decedent died intestate without making such provision, the plaintiff sought $1560 or more in the superior court following denial of her probate claim. The trial justice, sitting without a jury, awarded her $200 on the basis of the evidence presented. On appeal, the Supreme Court upheld this limited recovery, applying the rule that contracts to devise property by will must be proven by clear and convincing evidence and finding that the highly contradictory testimony, combined with a 1939 letter from the decedent stating he had no one to help him, did not meet that standard.
This case involves plaintiffs who filed a writ of attachment against two defendants, including Rhode Island resident Arthur Unwin, doing business under an assumed name, but the sheriff was unable to serve Unwin personally or at a known address. The superior court sustained Unwin's motion to discharge the writ and vacate the attachment for lack of proper service under G.L. 1938, ch. 547, §11. Plaintiffs argued that the defendants' failure to file a certificate for their assumed business name under G.L. 1938, ch. 386, §1 relieved them of the need for service to establish jurisdiction. The court held that noncompliance with the business name statute did not excuse the statutory service requirements, overruled the plaintiffs' exception, and remitted the case for further proceedings.