Thomas H. Roberts

The case involved the Blackstone Valley Chamber of Commerce's petition for certiorari challenging a Public Utilities Commission order that replaced a declining block rate structure with a flat rate for residential electric customers of Blackstone Valley Electric Company. The commission had consolidated dockets on a rate increase and prior remands, ultimately applying an across-the-board revenue allocation and altering the residential rate design. The court focused on the threshold issue of standing under G.L. 1956 § 39-5-1, which permits review only by persons aggrieved by the commission's order. It reasoned that standing requires a showing of injury in fact to the petitioner, that the chamber had not demonstrated any personal stake or adverse effect from the residential rate change (as opposed to business interests), and that no substantial public interest justified bypassing the statutory requirement.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved challenges by the Rhode Island Chamber of Commerce Federation and Newport Electric Corporation to actions by the Public Utilities Commission regarding electricity rate designs for Newport. The court addressed whether the commission could modify a utility's proposed rate design and whether there was sufficient evidence for an intra-class allocation of costs among residential customers. The court held that the commission has the authority to formulate rate designs different from those submitted by the utility, based on state statutes granting it broad regulatory powers to ensure just and reasonable rates. However, it remanded the case for further proceedings because the record did not adequately support the specific residential rate design adopted. The decision emphasized the legislative intent for the commission to have implied powers necessary for effective regulation.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case concerns a petition by Capitol Building Company for a refund of a use tax assessed by the state tax administrator on prefabricated garage components purchased from an out-of-state supplier and used in Rhode Island construction projects. The superior court certified the matter to the supreme court on an agreed statement of facts, with the taxpayer arguing that the transaction was subject to sales tax and that imposition of the use tax was improper or that an exemption under §44-18-34 applied. The court held that the use tax was validly assessed and that the petition for refund should be denied. It reasoned that the use tax provisions are complementary to the sales tax and apply unless the taxpayer demonstrates either payment of the sales tax via receipt or qualification for the exemption by showing that the gross receipts from the property's disposition would be included in its own sales tax measure, which the taxpayer failed to establish here.

taxesbusiness & regulatory

The case concerned whether evidence seized from a dwelling house pursuant to a federal search warrant could be used in Rhode Island state court prosecutions for gambling offenses, even though the warrant did not comply with additional state statutory requirements under G.L. 1956 §11-19-24 for gambling apparatus searches in dwellings. Defendants moved to suppress the evidence obtained in a joint federal-state raid, and the superior court certified the admissibility question to the supreme court. The court decided that the evidence was admissible and answered the certified question in the affirmative. It reasoned that the federal warrant satisfied the probable cause standards of the Fourth Amendment and the equivalent state constitutional provision, that the state exclusionary statute (§9-19-25) bars only evidence from constitutionally illegal searches, and that the specialized state warrant procedures do not apply to or invalidate a federal warrant.

criminal lawprocedurefederal power

This case involved a claim of false arrest after a police officer detained the plaintiff based on a description of a suspected peeping Tom, took him to the station for identification, and released him within two hours when no one identified him. The trial court ruled in favor of the defendant officer, finding the detention justified under a state statute allowing up to two hours of detention upon reasonable suspicion. On appeal, the plaintiff argued the statute was unconstitutional, but the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, holding that the officer could rely on the presumptive validity of the statute without liability for false arrest, following precedent that protects officers enforcing statutes later found invalid.

criminal lawproceduretorts & liability

The case involved an indictment against employer Howard N. Feist, Jr. and Shepard Company for violating a Rhode Island statute (G.L. 1956 §28-14-2) by failing to pay wages to employees on a weekly basis, with penalties under §28-14-17 that included possible imprisonment. Feist moved to dismiss, arguing the law violated article I, section 11 of the state constitution by authorizing imprisonment to enforce a debt. The trial court granted the motion, but on appeal the Rhode Island Supreme Court reversed, holding that the statute is a valid penal measure. The court reasoned that the 1941 amendments to the wage-payment law—extending coverage to all employers, eliminating any share of fines for complainants, and explicitly labeling violations as misdemeanors—demonstrated a legislative intent to protect public welfare through criminal sanctions rather than to collect private debts. Because the constitution only bars continued imprisonment for debt after surrender of assets (absent fraud), the criminal penalties did not violate the provision.

criminal lawlabor & employment

This case involved a husband's petition in Family Court to modify a 1972 divorce decree, which was denied in 1974; the husband appealed that denial but failed to order a transcript of the hearing within the required 10 days under Supreme Court Rule 10(b). The wife moved to dismiss the appeal for noncompliance with Rules 10, 11, and 12 regarding the record and transcript, and the Family Court granted the dismissal. On appeal from that dismissal, the Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the trial justice did not abuse discretion in dismissing, as the husband showed no excusable neglect or causes beyond his control for the delay, the pendency of a related certiorari petition did not suspend the rules, and distinctions from precedents like In re Shannon did not apply. The court affirmed the dismissal and remanded the case.

family lawprocedure

The case involves New England Telephone and Telegraph Company seeking judicial review of a Public Utilities Commission order that approved a rate increase generating $7.245 million in additional revenue, less than the $19.5 million sought by the company. The company moved for a stay of the order to implement its proposed rates while maintaining records for potential adjustments. The court denied the stay motion, scheduled the petition for the October 1975 calendar, and ordered briefing on whether it could direct a new rate schedule to recover any shortfall if the Commission's order was erroneous.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involved a defendant tried and convicted on charges of illegal possession of a firearm, assault with intent to kill, and robbery arising from a store holdup in which the manager was shot and identified the defendant. On appeal, the defendant argued that testimony about a blue shirt he allegedly wore was improperly admitted as evidence and that his motion for a directed verdict should have been granted. The court ruled that the blue shirt testimony was relevant to identification, its probative value outweighed any prejudicial effect, and the trial justice did not abuse discretion in admitting it. The court further held that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the state, raised a jury question on the charges. The appeals were denied and dismissed.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved three criminal charges against defendant Alphonse Mancino for traffic violations under Rhode Island law: operating a vehicle to the left of the roadway center line, speeding at 55 mph in a 35 mph zone, and driving under the influence of alcohol based on breathalyzer readings of .10 and .09 percent. After a jury trial resulting in convictions on all counts, the defendant appealed, arguing prejudice from the trial justice's comments to the jury about his not-guilty pleas, the presence of an armed officer at counsel table, improper admission of speedometer evidence without proof of its accuracy, and insufficient proof on the left-of-center charge due to statutory exceptions. The court affirmed the left-of-center and DUI convictions, holding that the defendant failed to show prejudice from judicial comments or the officer's presence, that the state need only prove the essential elements of the offenses, and that exceptions to the left-of-center statute were an affirmative defense for the defendant to raise; it reversed the speeding conviction due to inadequate foundation for the speedometer evidence and remanded the cases.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a petition for unemployment security benefits under Rhode Island law after the claimant left her manufacturing job to marry and relocate to Georgia with her fiancé. The Director of Employment Security denied the claim, finding that she had voluntarily quit without good cause under G.L. 1956 §28-44-17, and both the board of review and Superior Court affirmed. On certiorari, the Rhode Island Supreme Court upheld the denial, holding that the statutory term 'good cause' requires a substantial degree of compulsion beyond the employee's control, such as health risks from job conditions, and does not extend to personal decisions like marriage and relocation. The court reasoned that the Employment Security Act's purpose is to protect against economic insecurity from involuntary terminations, not voluntary choices, consistent with prior precedents construing the provision.

labor & employment

This case involved a tenant, Lydia Robitaille, who sued her landlords for injuries from slipping on snow or ice on a common walkway at her duplex rental property. The trial court directed a verdict for the defendants, finding no landlord duty to clear the walks, contributory negligence by the plaintiff, and lack of notice of the hazard. On appeal, the Rhode Island Supreme Court reversed, holding that the evidence raised jury questions on whether the landlords owed a duty to maintain common areas (which could be altered by agreement), whether the plaintiff was negligent, and whether the landlords had notice of the condition after a snowfall days earlier. The court applied settled landlord-tenant law requiring reasonable maintenance of retained common portions and remanded for a new trial.

propertytorts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved buyers who entered a contract to purchase land in South Kingstown from Bay Associates, Inc., with the agreement conditioned on a zoning change from R-40 to business use; the contract stated that if the change was denied, the deposit would be returned and the agreement terminated. After the town council denied the zoning petition, the buyers sought a declaratory judgment that the contract had ended, which the Superior Court granted. The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the contract language was clear and unambiguous regarding termination upon denial by the council, that the pending appeal of the zoning decision addressed a separate issue, and that granting declaratory relief did not constitute an abuse of discretion under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act.

propertyprocedure

The case involved a former employee of the Pawtucket Housing Authority who sought a writ of mandamus and injunctive relief after being terminated for alleged insubordination following a single unexcused absence from work, with no prior notice of the termination meeting and a later denial of her request for a hearing. The Superior Court found insufficient evidence to support the insubordination charge and ordered reinstatement with back pay, which the Authority appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, ruling that mandamus lies to compel reinstatement of a public employee when the employer exceeds its limited authority under the personnel policy by failing to establish the specific alleged grounds for dismissal.

labor & employmentprocedure

This case concerned a dispute over the appointment of a guardian for Howard Everett Taylor, whom the probate court found incapable of managing his financial affairs due to lack of discretion that could lead to want or becoming chargeable on the town for support. The Superior Court discharged the guardian after concluding the probate judge had erred as a matter of law, but did so without holding the required de novo hearing on the appeal from probate. While the appeal was pending, Taylor died, which under state law ends the guardianship but leaves the guardian obligated to account for and preserve the estate. The Supreme Court reversed the Superior Court's order pro forma, allowing the guardian to fulfill duties of accounting and transferring assets to a representative of the decedent's estate rather than remanding for further proceedings.

family lawprocedure

This case involves a father's motion to modify child support payments set in a 1971 divorce decree, where he was originally ordered to pay $45 per week for the couple's child. The Family Court granted a modification with a sliding scale reducing payments to $20 or $25 per week during periods of lower take-home pay, citing the father's industrial injury causing reduced earnings over eight months and new expenses from his remarriage. Both parties appealed, with the mother arguing insufficient change in circumstances to reopen the decree and the father challenging the exclusion of evidence on the mother's financial ability to contribute. The court affirmed, holding that the injury and remarriage constituted a sufficient change in circumstances warranting modification and that any evidentiary error did not prejudice the father since he obtained a substantial reduction.

family law

In this case, a general contractor (Gilbane) sued a subcontractor (Cuddigan) for indemnification after an employee of the subcontractor was injured due to the general contractor's negligence on a construction site; the contract between the parties included a clause requiring the subcontractor to indemnify the general contractor for injuries arising from the work, even if caused by the general contractor's own negligence. The trial court directed a verdict for the subcontractor, finding the indemnity clause unconscionable and void as against public policy. On appeal, the Rhode Island Supreme Court reversed, holding that such indemnity provisions are valid and enforceable. The court reasoned that the clause explicitly shifted liability, that parties with adequate bargaining power may freely allocate the burden of insurance coverage for negligence, and that this arrangement does not violate public policy, drawing analogies to accepted insurance practices and citing supporting authorities like the Restatement of Contracts.

torts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory

This case involved a dispute over interests in a residuary estate under the will of Antonio M. Cotta, specifically whether the grandchildren of a child who predeceased the testator were entitled to a share in the property after the deaths of the life tenants. The petitioners, grandchildren through a predeceased daughter, sought a partition sale, while the respondents argued that only issue of children who survived the testator could benefit from the substitutional gift. The court affirmed summary judgment for the petitioners, holding that the will's language created a class gift with a substitutional provision that included the issue of children who predeceased the testator. The reasoning centered on the testator's explicit provision for the contingency of surviving the life tenants, which would be meaningless if it did not extend to children predeceasing him, indicating an intent to benefit such issue regardless of when the life tenants died.

propertyfamily law

In this case, Gary Hone, through his father, sued Lakeside Swimming Pool & Supply Company and others for injuries sustained when he fell into an unguarded excavation dug in his backyard during swimming pool construction, alleging negligence in failing to guard or cover the site. The jury returned a verdict for the defendants, after which the trial justice granted their motion for a directed verdict; the Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed on appeal. The court held that Hone was a licensee to whom the defendants, as independent contractors, owed the same limited duty as a landowner (to avoid active negligence, knowingly allowing entry onto a hidden peril, or willful harm), and that no breach occurred because the excavation's dangers were obvious. The court found no evidence warranting submission to the jury on the duty issue and dismissed the appeal.

torts & liabilitypropertyprocedure

This case involves an appeal from a family court's modification of a 1968 divorce decree that had awarded joint physical custody of the parties' son (then age 8) primarily to the mother, with the father having weekend custody and paying child support. After the father moved to amend the decree in 1972 when the child was 12, the trial court awarded physical custody to the father, granted the mother visitation rights and a counsel fee, and denied her motion to hold the father in contempt for alleged nonpayment of support. The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that a substantial increase in the child's age during a critical developmental period constitutes a sufficient change in circumstances to reopen the custody order, that the child's testimony about his preferences was admissible and properly weighed, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in modifying custody or denying contempt. However, it reversed the award of counsel fees because the statute authorizing such fees does not extend to custody modification proceedings. The court affirmed the custody modification and denial of contempt while sustaining the father's appeal on fees.

family law