The case involved members of a beneficial association petitioning for a writ of mandamus to compel their reinstatement after being suspended for refusing to pay an assessment of $14 per week to aid unemployed members. The court overruled the association's demurrer and issued the writ, finding the assessment illegal under the association's rules and bylaws. The core reasoning was that article 7 limited such payments to $10 per week and did not permit the excess amount under the category of necessary expenses, that members could rely on these limits until properly changed, and that petitioners were not required to first seek relief from the board of directors because that body only handled matters referred by districts rather than individual grievances.
In Tefft v. Lewis, taxpayers in Hopkinton, Rhode Island, sued to enjoin collection of a tax assessed under a 1903 state law that abolished school districts and transferred their property to towns, requiring an appraisal of that property followed by a town-wide tax to equalize values with remittances to former district taxpayers. The plaintiffs, from a joint school district spanning two towns, argued the appraisal omitted their district's property, making the resulting tax assessment unauthorized and invalid. The court held that the tax was illegally assessed because the statute mandated a complete appraisal of all vested property as a prerequisite, and an incomplete appraisal could not support a valid levy or remission process. It rejected defenses including estoppel, noting the assessors' actions deviated from statutory requirements in a way that unequally burdened certain taxpayers. The court permanently enjoined collection of the tax.
This case was a trespass action brought by the plaintiff to recover damages after being bitten by the defendant's dog on a public highway in Pawtucket. The District Court awarded the plaintiff $25 in damages plus costs, but the defendant moved to arrest judgment, arguing a variance between the writ (styled as trespass) and the declaration (which allegedly sounded in trespass on the case by omitting allegations of force and arms). The court overruled the motion, reasoning that any such defect was purely formal and curable under broad statutory amendment powers, that the plaintiff had the statutory option to proceed in either trespass or case for this type of claim, and that the pleadings were consistent enough in form to allow amendment rather than dismissal. The case was remanded to permit the amendment and entry of judgment on the prior decision.
This case involves a bill for instructions regarding the disposition of trust property held under the will of Harriot O. Baker after the death of her daughter, the life beneficiary. The will directed that the remainder be turned over to the Fourth Baptist Church to be held as a fund, with income used for the benefit of the church and advancing the cause of religion in the Regular Baptist Denomination. The court held that the charitable trust was valid despite questions about the existence and organization of the named church corporation at relevant times. It reasoned that equity will not allow a valid charitable trust to fail for want of a competent trustee and that the respondent corporation, Trustees of the Fourth Baptist Church in Providence, was suitable to serve in that role. The court therefore instructed the trustee to convey the property to that corporation to be held for the purposes specified in the will.
The case involved a negligence action brought by the plaintiff against the defendant for fatally injuring the plaintiff's intestate, a railroad worker, when lumber fell from a car the defendant was unloading. The defendant demurred to the declaration, arguing that it failed to allege any specific act of negligence by the defendant in the unloading process. The court sustained the demurrer, holding that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur did not apply because the risks were obvious and not hidden, and that the declaration did not sufficiently plead negligence on the part of the defendant in unloading the lumber, as the lack of ties or braces was the responsibility of the shipper, not the defendant.
The case involved a dispute between a worker and his employers over the agreed daily wage rate for stone-carving and modeling services under an employment contract, with the plaintiff claiming a higher rate than the defendants paid. The trial court allowed the defendants to withdraw a plea of tender before jury selection, the jury resolved conflicting testimony about the wage terms and awarded damages accordingly, and the plaintiff did not object at trial to the lack of a statutory affidavit of defense. The Supreme Court denied the petition for a new trial, holding that the plea withdrawal caused no prejudice to the plaintiff, the jury properly decided the factual issues, and the plaintiff had waived his rights regarding the affidavit by proceeding without objection.