Eugene Blackburn Gary

The case involved a challenge to a municipal ordinance in Greenwood that prohibited construction of any buildings within 200 feet of railroad crossings without city council approval, which Mrs. Henderson argued violated her due process rights by preventing use of her property. The court ruled the ordinance unconstitutional under the state constitution's due process clause and ordered the city to issue a building permit via mandamus. The reasoning centered on the ordinance's unreasonableness, as it granted absolute discretionary control over property use, effectively rendering it unproductive, exceeding the scope of police power delegated to municipalities, and the court affirmed its authority to assess the reasonableness of such ordinances as a test of constitutionality.

propertycivil rightsbusiness & regulatory

This case concerned the Southern Railway Company's lawsuit to remove a permanent building from its claimed right of way near Greenville, South Carolina, based on an unrecorded 1845 deed from prior owners. The defendant, who bought the property years after the building's construction without actual notice of the full right-of-way claim, defended on grounds of equitable estoppel due to the railroad's long acquiescence, failure to object despite visibility of the structure, and allowance of other encroachments. A jury found for the defendant, and the court affirmed, applying principles that estoppel prevents assertion of rights when one party's conduct has enabled the other's reliance and potential loss. The core reasoning centered on notice from the charter and deed, balanced against the defendant's tortious erection of a permanent structure without prior inquiry.

propertytorts & liability

The case concerned a dispute over the amounts, ranking, and priority of multiple mortgages in a proceeding involving Farmers' & Merchants' National Bank and Moore. A referee issued a report setting forth those determinations, to which no exceptions were filed. The circuit judge adopted the referee's report as the judgment of the court. In this dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Gary, joined by Justice Watts, concluded that the circuit court's order should be affirmed on the basis of the reasons stated in the referee's report and the adopting order.

propertybusiness & regulatoryprocedure

The case Cothran v. Meiklejohn came before the court as an appeal from an order issued by the circuit judge. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's order based on the reasons stated therein and dismissed the appeal. Chief Justice Gary delivered the opinion, with Justices Watts and Stabler concurring in the result.

procedure

The case concerned whether a petition for rehearing could be entertained after the South Carolina Supreme Court sitting en banc had issued its opinion, based on the claim that such a decision was not final. The court held that the petition must be dismissed, as the state constitution's provision making en banc decisions 'final and conclusive' bars rehearing requests that merely reargue the same issues. Drawing on the history of the state's dual court system and prior precedents interpreting identical language, the court reasoned that allowing such petitions would permit endless litigation by either party and undermine the constitutional mandate of finality. The opinion noted that a rule of court delaying remand for ten days did not conflict with this finality requirement, and that only new or different questions might warrant different treatment.

procedure

The case involved a defendant convicted in mayor's court on three separate counts of violating City of Union ordinances by possessing, transporting, and selling the same bottle of contraband whisky, resulting in cumulative sentences of $300 or 90 days. The circuit judge reduced the sentence to a single $100 fine or 30 days on the ground that the mayor lacked authority to impose multiple penalties for what amounted to one offense. In this dissenting opinion, the court reasoned that the acts formed parts of a single transaction involving one bottle of whisky, making the defendant subject to only one penalty, as separate prosecutions would violate principles of former jeopardy.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a negligence claim brought against the Town of Gaffney under a statute allowing suits against municipalities. The trial court had instructed the jury in a manner that did not require the plaintiff to prove freedom from contributory negligence. The South Carolina Supreme Court held that, unlike suits against private individuals, actions against municipalities require the plaintiff to allege and prove both the defendant's negligence and the plaintiff's own lack of contributory negligence, citing prior decisions such as Walker v. Chester County and McLees v. City of Anderson. The Court sustained the plaintiff's exceptions on this point, reversed the judgment, and remanded the case for a new trial.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved a defendant tried and convicted in South Carolina state court on charges of violating prohibition laws by storing and receiving whiskey, based on a search of his home that uncovered a partial bottle of whiskey in a bureau drawer along with jugs that smelled of alcohol. The defendant was at work during the search, disclaimed any knowledge of the whiskey, and his wife stated that it belonged to her due to illness; the state presented no other evidence linking him to the items. The trial court denied the defendant's motion for a directed verdict and submitted the case to the jury, which returned a guilty verdict. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to support the conviction because it failed to connect the defendant to any violation of the prohibition statutes.

criminal law

This case involved an employee who suffered a foot injury while working at the defendant's cotton oil mill and sued for damages, with the company and its receivers as defendants. The defendants raised defenses including a signed release from the plaintiff, but the plaintiff replied that the release was invalid due to lack of knowledge, illiteracy, and it being only a temporary adjustment. At trial, the court denied motions for nonsuit and directed verdict on grounds of no tender of the release consideration and contributory negligence. The jury awarded the plaintiff damages, and the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that precedent supported the tender issue, the jury charge was proper, and the evidence on the other defenses allowed multiple inferences.

torts & liabilitylabor & employmentprocedure

The case involved a loan from Citizens' Bank to Miss Heyward, arranged by her brother as agent and the bank's president, under which she paid 8% interest to the bank and an additional 2% commission personally to the president for the loan's duration. The trial court found no usury, but the Supreme Court reversed, holding the arrangement usurious because the president acted within his authority as the bank's loan-making agent, the extra 2% lacked any legitimate fee basis and continued with the loan, and the bank was responsible for the agent's actions even if they were not disclosed to or approved by the directors. The court reasoned that the substance of the transaction, rather than its form or separate payments, violated usury statutes, and the bank's benefit from the loan further supported imputing the president's conduct.

business & regulatory

The case involved a taxpayer's petition to the South Carolina Supreme Court seeking to enjoin the City Council of Charleston from issuing $330,000 in coupon notes authorized by a 1925 state statute to replace municipal funds that had been diverted from their original purposes. The petitioner argued that the notes constituted unconstitutional bonded debt under the state constitution because they were issued without the required petition from a majority of freeholders and a special election, would exceed the eight percent debt limit, and were not for a valid corporate purpose. The court granted the injunction, holding that the issuance violated Article 2 §13, Article 8 §7, and Article 10 §5 of the 1895 South Carolina Constitution regarding bonded indebtedness, elections, and taxation powers, while rejecting challenges based on special legislation provisions.

electionstaxesbusiness & regulatory

This case involved an action by Hartford Fire Insurance Company on two promissory notes totaling $367.85 that defendants executed in connection with an application for a fire insurance policy, with the notes allegedly covering premium installments. The defendants admitted signing the notes and application but contended that delivery was conditional on the company's acceptance and issuance of a policy, that no policy was ever issued, and that there was therefore a failure of consideration. The trial court directed a verdict for the plaintiff, reasoning that the insurance contract became effective upon the company's acceptance of the application on August 23, 1921, regardless of formal policy issuance. The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding that the evidence was susceptible of more than one inference on the key factual question of whether the company had accepted the application and issued the policy as required by the terms of the notes and application.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involved a lawsuit by property owners against a railroad company for damages from a fire that burned cedar posts placed near the company's right of way, with claims under both common law negligence and a statutory cause of action for communicated fires. After two trials, a jury awarded the plaintiffs $364.20 in actual damages, and the railroad appealed the denial of a new trial on the ground that the trial judge had failed to instruct the jury on the measure of damages. The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, holding that the defendant had waived any objection by not requesting a specific charge on damages during trial. The court reasoned that under established precedent, parties must call the judge's attention to omissions in jury instructions on material points, and the evidence and general charge on actual damages were sufficient for the jury to reach a proper verdict without reversible error.

propertyproceduretorts & liability

The case involved a dispute between a sharecropper plaintiff and defendant landowner over the terms of their contract for dividing crops, with conflicting testimony resolved in part by evidence of local sharecropping customs. The magistrate denied motions for nonsuit and directed verdict, briefly entered the jury room at the foreman's request to provide a document from the record, and the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff that the magistrate declined to disturb. The circuit court affirmed the judgment, and on further appeal the state supreme court dismissed the case, holding that the primary exception was too general to consider and that the appellant had not shown an abuse of discretion in the circuit court's refusal to allow additional affidavits or testimony about the jury's deliberations.

propertyprocedurelabor & employment

This case concerns enforcement of a $500 appeal bond posted by defendants in a mortgage foreclosure action, which required payment for the property's use and occupation only if the underlying judgment was affirmed on appeal. The prior appeal had modified the circuit court's decree on counsel fees and the distribution of sale proceeds while affirming it in other respects, resulting in a judgment labeled 'Modified.' The dissenting opinion concludes that this outcome did not constitute an affirmance, so the bond's condition was not triggered and no breach occurred. It notes that appeal costs were taxed in favor of the appellants, consistent with a modification rather than affirmance.

propertyprocedure

The case of Columbia Real Estate & Trust Co. v. Royal Exchange Assurance appears to involve a dispute with an insurance company. The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the judgments of the Circuit Court. The decision was based on the authority of the earlier case Parnell v. Orient Ins. Co. and the reasoning provided by the Circuit Judge. Justices Watts and Acting Associate Justice Purdy concurred in the affirmance.

business & regulatoryproperty

This case involved a dispute over the partition of real estate from the estate of Frances J. Hembree, where defendant Pauline Bolton claimed sole inheritance under a will provision favoring a child who cared for the parents, based on an apparent alteration striking the prefix 'un' from 'unmarried' to read 'married.' The court examined the probate of the will in common form, the effect of a four-year period to seek probate in solemn form, and legal presumptions regarding post-execution alterations to wills. It held that such alterations are presumed made after execution and, absent timely challenge, become conclusive fact after four years. The appeal was dismissed, confirming the will as originally executed without the alteration.

propertyprocedure

The case Lawrence v. Hicks came before the court on appeal from a judgment entered by the County Court. The court decided to affirm the County Court's judgment in full. The core reasoning consisted solely of adopting the reasons already stated by the lower court, with no additional analysis provided in the opinion. Four justices concurred in the result.

procedure

The case involved O.B. Dozier, charged with violating the Prohibition Act by storing and possessing corn whisky found hidden in a barrel near his managed grocery store and filling station. At trial, the state presented circumstantial evidence including a newly beaten path from the station to the whisky location, discarded jar tops nearby, and the site's proximity, though the whisky was not on property under Dozier's control; the court denied motions for a directed verdict. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, reasoning that the full body of testimony, even if circumstantial, allowed a reasonable inference of guilt connecting Dozier to the whisky.

criminal law

This case involved a bank's suit on a promissory note against maker S.H. Ussery (in default) and indorser W.C. Cook for $1,250. Cook's defense alleged that the note renewed earlier obligations secured by chattel mortgages on Ussery's 1920 cotton crop and other property; that the bank had taken possession of and sold the cotton but failed to apply the proceeds to reduce the debt as represented, which would have satisfied the obligation; and that Cook would not have continued endorsing renewals without that understanding. At trial, the court excluded parol evidence of the prior notes, mortgages, and agreement on the ground that the note contained the entire contract, then directed a verdict for the bank. The Supreme Court reversed and ordered a new trial, holding that evidence of the underlying security and failure of consideration was admissible under the parol evidence rule and relevant statutes, as it did not contradict the note's terms.

business & regulatoryproperty