The case involved three defendants who pleaded guilty to exhibiting obscene films and were sentenced to prison terms, after which they sought post-conviction relief to withdraw the pleas on grounds that the pleas were not voluntary or knowing, that they were prosecuted under repealed statutes, and that counsel was ineffective. The trial court granted relief and allowed the defendants another opportunity to plead, but the South Carolina Supreme Court reversed, reinstating the sentences. The majority held that the pleas were voluntary and knowing because the record from the plea hearing and post-conviction hearing showed the defendants understood the charges, admitted guilt, and chose the timing of the pleas as a calculated strategy to appear before a particular judge. Claims about the statutes were rejected because the indictments used current language and no excessive-sentence allegations were made, while the ineffective-counsel claim was deemed waived by stipulation.

criminal lawprocedure

This case concerned whether Circuit Court Rule 95, which directs a solicitor to take action on a warrant within ninety days of receipt, is jurisdictional so that noncompliance would strip the court of authority to proceed. The trial court refused to quash the indictment, ruling the provision administrative rather than jurisdictional, and the appellate court affirmed. The opinion explained that the rule is silent on jurisdiction, was adopted to promote orderly and prompt case handling, and does not itself set the standard for constitutional speedy-trial guarantees; noncompliance therefore does not invalidate a warrant or bar later prosecution, though it could expose the solicitor to contempt proceedings.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerns whether an insurance agent has a private right to sue under South Carolina Code Section 38-37-940(2) for the termination of his agency agreement by Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company. The Supreme Court of South Carolina held that the plaintiff does have such a private cause of action for agreements executed after the relevant precedent. The court's reasoning relies on its prior decision in G-H Insurance Agency v. Travelers Insurance Company, which established the private enforcement provision, with retroactive application limited by later cases to avoid constitutional issues under the contract clause.

business & regulatory

This case concerned the constitutionality of a South Carolina statute that imposed a 20% license tax on admissions to movies rated "X" by the Motion Picture Association of America or unrated films. The plaintiff sought to have the law declared unconstitutional and enjoined from enforcement. The trial court ruled the statute invalid on grounds including improper delegation of legislative power, and the state supreme court affirmed solely on that basis. The court reasoned that the law unconstitutionally delegated legislative authority to the private MPAA by allowing it, without statutory guidelines, to determine which films would be subject to the tax, citing prior precedent against such reliance on private discretion.

taxesbusiness & regulatory

This case involves a wrongful death action against the South Carolina Department of Mental Health and four staff physicians, alleging negligence in the treatment, discharge, and failure to warn the public about a mental patient who killed someone two months after release from a state facility. The defendants demurred based on a specific immunity statute (Section 44-17-900) protecting those who participate in releasing mental patients, while the plaintiff relied on a later general statute (Section 44-7-50) that modifies sovereign immunity for state medical facilities up to $100,000 in damages. The court determined that the specific immunity provision for patient releases was not repealed by the general statute and bars claims based on discharge decisions, but the complaint also alleged independent grounds like improper treatment and failure to warn that fall outside that immunity, so the demurrer was properly overruled. The order was affirmed as modified, with the case remanded for trial on the non-immune claims.

torts & liabilityhealthcare

In Thompson v. Aiken, the petitioner, convicted of murder during an armed robbery and sentenced to death, sought post-conviction relief after his conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal. The South Carolina Supreme Court focused on the solicitor's closing argument in the sentencing phase, which expressed personal opinions about seeking the death penalty and other improper statements, similar to arguments deemed prejudicial in prior cases. The court concluded that these arguments introduced an arbitrary factor into the jury's deliberations, reversing the denial of relief and granting a new sentencing trial. Other claims, including alleged withheld evidence and racial discrimination in prosecutorial decisions, were not resolved as they would be moot or inappropriate in this context upon retrial.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved an appeal by the State Consumer Advocate challenging a rate increase granted to Duke Power Company by the South Carolina Public Service Commission. The court held that operating reserves derived from ratepayers should not be included in the company's rate base, as they were not provided by investors. Additionally, the approval of an increased nuclear depreciation rate from 3.57% to 4% was reversed due to insufficient factual evidence supporting the new rate. The matter was remanded to the Commission for further consideration.

business & regulatory

The case involved a challenge by the Chester County Hospital Board to a proposed county council ordinance that would expand the board's size and shift appointment authority to the council, contrary to the original 1947 statute allowing vacancies to be filled by the board itself. The trial court granted a permanent injunction against enactment of the ordinance, finding it exceeded county powers under state law. On appeal, the South Carolina Supreme Court vacated the injunction and dismissed the action. The court held that injunctions generally may not restrain the passage of ordinances, only their enforcement, and that no evidence showed irreparable injury from mere adoption of the ordinance rather than its later implementation.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

The case involved an appeal from a conviction for voluntary manslaughter arising from the shooting death of Mrs. Peggy Byrd at her home during a confrontation between the appellant and her husband. The appellant challenged the admission of testimony suggesting he had an affair, which the trial court allowed after ruling that his wife's testimony about their continuous cohabitation had placed his character in issue, as well as jury instructions on the rights of homeowners and trespassers. The court held that the wife's statements were limited to establishing that the appellant did not own the rifle used in the incident and did not open the door to irrelevant character evidence about infidelity, which carried a probability of prejudice. The court further held that the trespass instructions were unsupported by any evidence that the appellant had been ordered to leave the premises, creating an improper implication for the jury. The conviction was reversed and the case remanded for a new trial.

criminal lawprocedure

In City of Myrtle Beach v. Richardson, cities and taxpayers challenged Horry County's 1979 creation of a fire protection district and associated taxing authority under 1974 Act 1167, arguing that the 1975 Home Rule Act (codified as Sections 4-9-10 et seq.) had repealed the earlier statute by implication and required different procedures involving electors. The court dismissed the cities' suit for lack of standing to contest districts outside municipal limits but addressed the taxpayers' claims on the merits. It held that the two acts were repugnant because Act 1167 vested sole authority in the county governing body while the Home Rule Act shifted power over boundaries, services, and taxation to freeholders or electors, resulting in an implied repeal. The repeal was applied only prospectively to county actions begun after the opinion's filing date, preserving the validity of the existing district due to accrued expenditures and obligations under the prior statute.

taxesprocedure

In State v. Plath, appellants Plath and Arnold were convicted of murder committed during a kidnapping and, after a prior remand for resentencing, were again sentenced to death based on jury findings of aggravating circumstances including kidnapping and, for Plath, assault with intent to ravish. The South Carolina Supreme Court reviewed multiple claims of error concerning juror disqualifications under Witherspoon standards, evidentiary rulings on criminal records and other matters, prosecutorial conduct, and submission of aggravating factors to the jury. The court held that the trial judge properly disqualified jurors who could not impose a death sentence, that evidentiary issues were correctly resolved, and that the aggravating circumstances were properly submitted. After conducting a proportionality review comparing the brutal facts of the crime to other capital cases, the court affirmed both death sentences as supported by the evidence and not the product of passion or prejudice.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved an appeal by a defendant convicted of burglary, armed robbery, and assault and battery with intent to kill, who challenged the admission of his confession and the jury instructions on implied malice. The court reviewed the record from an in camera hearing, including testimony about the defendant's hearing deficiency and mild retardation, and found that the confession was freely and voluntarily made after Miranda warnings, with no evidence of coercion despite the length of custody. However, the trial judge's instruction that malice is implied from the use of a deadly weapon was held to create an impermissible mandatory presumption, violating prior precedent, leading to reversal of only the assault conviction. The convictions and sentences for burglary and armed robbery were affirmed, with remand for a new trial on the assault charge.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Smith, the defendant appealed his conviction for the stabbing murder of his girlfriend, which resulted in a life sentence. The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed the conviction and remanded for a new trial. The court held that the trial judge properly instructed the jury on malice but erred in admitting reply testimony from a witness about an uncharged prior sexual battery incident involving the defendant. Although some reply evidence was admissible to challenge the defendant's credibility, the testimony about the uncharged offense lacked any foundation in a conviction and was deemed unduly prejudicial under established precedent requiring prior crimes evidence to rest on actual convictions.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Bailey, appellants Wayne Bailey and Bobby Joe Lawhorn were jointly tried and convicted of robbery, impersonating an officer, and aggravated assault and battery, with Bailey also convicted of failing to stop for a law enforcement vehicle. The appeal challenged the trial court's admission of reply testimony from a state witness about Bailey's father and brother attempting to procure perjured testimony regarding ownership of the victim's vehicle. The court reversed the convictions and remanded for a new trial, holding that the evidence was collateral and irrelevant because it concerned post-crime conduct by family members unconnected to the appellants and would not have been admissible as part of the state's case in chief.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved lot owners north of Ocean Boulevard on the Isle of Palms who sought to block development of accreted oceanfront lands owned in fee simple by the Beach Company, asserting rights of access and an unimpeded view based on estoppel, prescription, and prior plat rulings. The court affirmed the trial judge's order that the owners possessed a limited easement of access across designated pedestrian paths but that this did not prevent the company from developing the intervening property. The core reasoning was that South Carolina recognizes no prescriptive right to ocean view, light, or air, and that the relevant plats differed from those in Epps v. Freeman by containing no subdivision boundaries or reservations that would have granted equitable rights over the open accreted areas.

property

The case involved a beneficiary suing to recover death benefits under a life insurance policy after the insured died by suicide. The trial court denied recovery, ruling that the suicide fell within the policy's two-year exclusion period measured from the May 18, 1976 policy date. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that coverage began on April 26, 1976—the date of the application and conditional receipt for the first premium—placing the suicide outside the exclusion. The court reasoned that the binder and policy formed a single contract whose ambiguous effective date must be construed against the insurer.

business & regulatory

The case concerned whether Beaufort County, South Carolina, could charge an $80 tuition fee for voluntary public summer school sessions that provide credit, in light of the state constitution's requirement for free public schools and federal constitutional protections. The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed the trial court's decision enjoining the fee, holding that summer school was not part of the mandated free public school system limited to a 185-day term funded by the state. The court reasoned that the state constitution assigns responsibility to the General Assembly for the free system, which does not include optional summer programs without state aid, and that the fee had a rational basis under the Fourteenth Amendment since education is not a fundamental right and wealth classifications are not suspect.

civil rights

This case involved an insured driver who filed a claim under her automobile insurance policy after suffering a loss, only for the insurer to deny coverage by claiming it had cancelled the policy for nonpayment of a $240 surcharge imposed under South Carolina's Merit Rating Plan due to prior driving violations by her son. The insurer argued it could impose the surcharge at any time upon learning of the violations, even after the policy's renewal. The court treated the surcharge as an attempted post-formation modification to the original contract rather than a term of the initial agreement. Because the insured rejected the modification and there was no meeting of the minds or new consideration, the insurer lacked grounds to cancel the policy for nonpayment. The court therefore affirmed the judgment in favor of the insured.

business & regulatory

This case involved a dispute over the custody of two young children between their natural father and maternal grandmother following the mother's death in 1980. The trial court awarded custody to the grandmother without determining whether the father was unfit to have custody. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the decision and remanded the case for a new hearing. The court emphasized the superior rights of a fit parent to custody of their children and noted the significant time that had passed since the original hearing, requiring consideration of current circumstances.

family law

The case concerned the City of Aiken's 1979 license tax ordinance, which imposed graduated rates on various businesses and placed Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Company in a residual category that resulted in a tax rate twenty-four times higher than the average for other businesses. The South Carolina Supreme Court held that municipalities have authority under state law to enact graduated license taxes as an incident of their licensing power. However, the court ruled that the ordinance violated equal protection under the state and federal constitutions as applied to Southern Bell because the record showed no rational basis for the residual classification or the grossly disproportionate rate imposed on the company. The court therefore modified the trial court's judgment and ordered a refund of taxes paid under protest, while affirming the denial of the city's cross-appeal seeking to include intrastate calls in the tax base.

business & regulatorytaxes