Julius B. Ness

The case involved a worker injured by allegedly defective textile machinery who sued the manufacturer solely under a strict liability theory and obtained a jury verdict that included both actual and punitive damages. The South Carolina Supreme Court, answering a certified question from federal district court, held that punitive damages are not recoverable in an action based solely on strict liability. The court reasoned that the state's 1974 strict liability statute, which incorporated Restatement (Second) of Torts §402A almost verbatim, creates liability only "for physical harm caused" and therefore authorizes only actual compensatory damages; punitive damages, being a separate remedy for punishment and deterrence rather than compensation, were not provided for by the legislature. Because the cause of action was statutorily created, the court concluded that it lacked authority to expand the available remedies beyond the plain terms of the statute.

torts & liability

This case involves an action on a guaranty agreement where the bank sought to recover a deficiency after a default. The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision as modified, holding that the trial court improperly limited the guarantors' liability but that the appellate court could not determine the exact deficiency amount based solely on proffered testimony without a hearing on remand. The court also ruled that the bankruptcy filings by two petitioners did not automatically stay the proceedings, as the action was not against the debtors in its current posture and the outcome would not diminish their estates.

business & regulatoryprocedure

In this mortgage foreclosure action, Sunrise Savings & Loan Association sought to foreclose on mortgages securing a $2.8 million note from Mariner’s Cay Development Corporation and to hold Knight liable for any deficiency as guarantor under an Unconditional Continuing Guarantee. The court affirmed the judgment against Knight, ruling that the guarantee was not a negotiable instrument under the UCC and thus Knight could not raise a defense of unjustifiable impairment of collateral. The court reversed the $125,000 attorney’s fees award on the first cause of action, however, because the record contained no evidence supporting the reasonableness of the fees or allocating them among the five causes of action, and it remanded for a redetermination based on proper evidence.

propertybusiness & regulatory

This case involves a dispute over ownership of two tracts of land between sisters claiming title through a chain of inheritance from Lemon Mack and the Fobbs family claiming title through adverse possession based on decades of farming, tax payments, and improvements. The master-in-equity ruled that the sisters held title to both tracts and that the Fobbs had not established adverse possession. The court affirmed the title determination for the Lemon Mack tract, finding sufficient evidence to support the sisters' chain of title. It reversed on adverse possession, however, because the master applied an erroneous legal standard for hostility in a non-boundary dispute and improperly admitted hearsay and testimony barred by the Dead Man's Statute, and remanded for redetermination of that issue.

propertyprocedure

This case concerned a divorced wife's efforts to enforce support payments by having a family court attach and garnish her ex-husband's state retirement account after he quit his job and stopped paying. The family court ordered the state retirement system to disburse funds for arrearages, costs, and ongoing monthly support, but the South Carolina Supreme Court reversed. The court held that while a later statute permitted garnishment of retirement income in support cases, it applied only when actual payments were being made to the retiree, not when funds remained untouched in the system. The state system was found to have standing to appeal the order requiring it to make payments.

family law

This case involved an employee seeking severance benefits, including a year-end bonus, notice pay, and payments under a non-competition clause, after being terminated for cause by his employer. The court affirmed the denial of these benefits, holding that the employment contract did not clearly alter the general rule that termination for cause extinguishes rights to such benefits. However, the court modified the order to award the employee payments under the non-competition clause for the period between termination and the company's notice that it would not enforce the clause, reasoning that the employer could choose to abandon the non-compete upon a for-cause termination due to the employee's breach of loyalty.

labor & employmentbusiness & regulatory

This case involves marital litigation between Martha F. Morris and Wyman L. Morris, including the wife's initial action for separate maintenance, alimony, and equitable distribution of property, followed by the husband's suit for divorce on grounds of adultery. The family court awarded temporary alimony and divided marital assets, leading to appeals by both parties on those issues, and later addressed the husband's request to terminate alimony. The Supreme Court of South Carolina affirmed the equitable distribution determinations as within the family court's discretion without abuse, but ruled that the pending appeal deprived the family court of jurisdiction to modify alimony and that the wife's adultery statutorily barred her from alimony under S.C. Code Ann. § 20-3-130. It therefore terminated alimony retroactively to the divorce decree, required an adjustment to the wife's property award for alimony already paid, and disposed of related disputes over alimony duration.

family lawprocedure

The case involved a negligence claim by Mayme Macmurphy and her husband's estate against the South Carolina Department of Highways and Public Transportation, alleging that the agency failed to clean up spilled diesel fuel or post warnings on an exit ramp, which caused their vehicle to stall and led to a collision injuring them and killing Mr. Macmurphy. The plaintiffs sought both actual and punitive damages. The circuit court granted the agency's motion to strike the punitive damages claim, and the Supreme Court of South Carolina affirmed, ruling that punitive damages are not recoverable against a state agency because no statute authorizes them and the prior abrogation of sovereign immunity in McCall v. Batson did not address or permit such recovery. The court further noted that public policy disfavors punitive damages against governmental entities, as they would ultimately burden taxpayers rather than punish individual wrongdoers.

torts & liability

This case involved media companies seeking disclosure of university records about a discretionary fund under South Carolina's Freedom of Information Act. The plaintiffs filed lawsuits after the university voted publicly not to disclose the information and later denied their requests. The court vacated a discovery order, holding that the suits were untimely because they were not commenced within sixty days of the public vote as required by the FOIA statute, which created a jurisdictional condition for the action.

free speechprocedure

The case involved a property owner in Florence County seeking a writ of mandamus to require the City of Florence to provide water and sewer services to his land, which was located in a county-created municipal service area but contiguous to the city. The trial court denied the petition, finding the owner was not a third-party beneficiary of the city's franchise agreement with the county and that city ordinance required annexation for service. The court reversed, holding that the owner was entitled to service under the agreement because it was physically and economically feasible, the agreement and annexation ordinance were mutually exclusive, and the agreement's language showed the parties intended MSA residents to be direct beneficiaries who could enforce its terms.

property

In State v. Parker, appellant Herbert Lee Parker was convicted of murder and armed robbery after a trial in which he confessed to the crimes. He appealed, arguing that the trial court wrongly excluded evidence suggesting that another individual, Rodney Fyall, had committed the offenses, including access to Fyall's psychiatric records and questions about his background, and that South Carolina lacked jurisdiction because the crimes occurred on federal property. The court affirmed the convictions, holding that the proffered evidence was not inconsistent with Parker's guilt under the standard from State v. Gregory and that the psychiatric records were confidential under state law with no applicable exceptions. On jurisdiction, the court found the victim's body was located on state property and that there was no evidence the United States had accepted exclusive jurisdiction over the area. The remaining issues were deemed meritless.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involves a child custody dispute between divorced parents who both remarried after their 1984 divorce, which initially provided for joint custody with specified times for the father. The trial court held the mother in contempt for alleged violations of the custody order and transferred exclusive custody to the father. The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed, ruling that the mother's noncompliance did not constitute a substantial change in circumstances affecting the child's welfare, particularly since the father was substantially behind on support payments and the violations did not impact her fitness as a parent. Custody therefore remains with the mother under the original order.

family law

The case involved an appeal by the Consumer Advocate challenging a South Carolina Public Service Commission order that granted South Carolina Electric and Gas Company a retail electric rate increase to add the V.C. Summer Nuclear Station to its rate base, including the valuation of resulting system-wide excess capacity of 400 MW. The court affirmed the Commission's order, concluding that Section 58-27-180 authorized the Commission to value the utility's property on a system-wide basis after a hearing and that the chosen valuation method was supported by substantial evidence, including testimony from the Consumer Advocate's own witness. The court further held that depreciation expenses could be recovered on the entire system because all plants remained in service and that the Commission's factual findings and rate determinations were entitled to deference absent a showing they were unsupported by evidence or arbitrary.

business & regulatory

In Stone v. State, the petitioner had been convicted of assault and battery of a high and aggravated nature and assaulting a police officer after a trial in which his counsel did not request a jury instruction on self-defense, even though evidence supported the defense including protection of a relative. The petitioner sought post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, but the PCR judge denied the claim. The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed, holding that counsel's failure to request the instruction was not an informed tactical decision because the attorney testified he simply did not think of it. The court further found prejudice from the omission, as the state's case depended mainly on testimony from the victim and officers, and remanded for entry of an order granting relief on both convictions.

criminal lawprocedure

In Doe v. State, parents Jane and John Doe sued the Department of Social Services after their child was removed from custody following a report of abuse, alleging that S.C. Code Ann. § 20-7-610 was unconstitutional and that DSS violated their due process and privacy rights as well as common law and statutory duties. The family court had previously held probable cause and merits hearings (with some delays), found the removal proper under a compromise order to which the mother consented, and returned custody with counseling requirements; no appeals were taken from those orders. The trial court granted summary judgment to the Does, but the South Carolina Supreme Court reversed, holding that collateral estoppel barred relitigation of the removal issues because they had been decided against the Does in family court and the consent order precluded claims of prejudice or due process violations. The court ordered summary judgment for DSS while noting that family courts must strictly follow statutory hearing timelines.

family lawcivil rightsprocedure

This case is an attorney disciplinary proceeding in which respondent Larry Laverne Hanna was charged with misconduct while representing client Wilbert Grissett in a personal injury matter involving an automobile accident. The court found that Hanna improperly collected and retained a 40% contingency fee on undisputed PIP benefits, failed to promptly pay the remaining client funds, later converted the fee to an unsupported hourly rate without notice, and conditioned settlement of the fee dispute on the client's withdrawal of the grievance complaint, thereby attempting to limit his liability. The Supreme Court of South Carolina agreed with the Hearing Panel and Executive Committee that these actions violated DR 2-106 (excessive fee), DR 9-102(B)(4) (failure to deliver client funds), and DR 6-102 (attempt to limit malpractice liability), and it ordered a public reprimand conditioned on repayment of $3,502.42 to the client. The court reasoned that no fee was justified for collecting the voluntarily paid PIP benefits and that Hanna's actions constituted flagrant misconduct exacerbated by the improper release condition.

proceduretorts & liability

The case involved Hilton Head Center, which had entered agreements with a utility to pay aid-to-construction fees for water and sewer service and later faced default judgments on related promissory notes after failing to respond to lawsuits. In 1984, Center filed a complaint with the Public Service Commission seeking a refund of the fees, alleging the utility had fraudulently claimed authority to charge them. Both the PSC and the circuit court dismissed the complaint as barred by res judicata based on the prior judgments, and the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed. The court reasoned that res judicata applies due to identity of parties and subject matter, barring not only issues actually decided but also those that could have been raised, and that the alleged fraud was intrinsic rather than extrinsic since Center could have raised it in the earlier suits. The court also rejected Center's argument that only the PSC could address the fees' validity, as the claim centered on fraud in the agreement rather than rate reasonableness.

business & regulatoryprocedure

W. R. Livingston sued Noland Corporation and Copeland Corporation after a fire damaged his catfish and eel farming operation, alleging that defective remanufactured refrigerator compressors caused the fire and seeking recovery under theories including strict liability, negligent manufacture, breach of warranty, and failure to warn. The trial court granted nonsuits on most claims, a jury awarded $922 in damages against Copeland on an implied warranty claim, and both sides appealed various rulings. The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed the denial of Copeland’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the implied warranty claim and affirmed the remaining rulings. The court held that Livingston failed to present sufficient evidence that any compressor was defective or that a defect proximately caused the fire, as the evidence showed failures resulted from improper servicing and maintenance rather than manufacturing issues; it also found no evidence that the defendants had reason to believe a warning was necessary.

torts & liability

In State v. Rogers, the appellant was convicted of committing a lewd act on his ten-year-old daughter and sentenced to ten years in prison. The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed the conviction, ruling that the trial court erred by admitting expert psychiatric testimony that bolstered the victim's account without any showing of inconsistent behavior by the child. The court also held that testimony regarding the appellant's prior sexual acts was improperly admitted because the incidents were not sufficiently similar to establish a common scheme or plan, and that allowing the victim's videotaped testimony without specific findings of necessity, combined with her testifying while seated in her foster mother's lap, violated the defendant's confrontation rights.

criminal lawfamily lawprocedure

The case involved the conviction of appellant for murder and armed robbery, resulting in a death sentence and a term of imprisonment. The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed the conviction and remanded for a new trial because the defendant was denied the statutory right under S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-28 to make the last closing argument in the guilt phase of a capital case, with no evidence of a knowing and intelligent waiver. The court also addressed issues likely to arise on retrial, including the disqualification of courthouse employees from jury service, the admissibility of relevant mitigating evidence during the penalty phase under the Eighth Amendment, and restrictions on improper prosecutorial arguments that appeal to jurors' passions or personal biases.

criminal lawprocedure