This case involved a negligence claim by Dorothy Beasley against Ford Motor Company for alleged defects in the construction and inspection of a new Lincoln automobile purchased by her husband, which caught fire under the hood during a drive, causing her to exit the vehicle in fright without physical injury. The trial court entered judgment for Beasley in the amount of $7,500 after remittitur, based on evidence including admissions by Ford representatives and conflicting expert testimony. The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding that the verdict was excessive because the evidence of injury was minimal and did not rationally support the award, while finding sufficient evidence of negligence to submit the liability issue to the jury.
This case involved a workers' compensation claim by the dependents of John D. Sweeney, who died in a truck accident while cutting and delivering pulpwood in South Carolina for Cape Fear Wood Corp., a North Carolina corporation exempt from the state's mandatory compensation law as a logging operation with few in-state employees. The Industrial Commission denied the claim on grounds including the company's exemptions and lack of an employer-employee relationship, and the lower court affirmed based on the exemptions. On appeal, the claimants conceded the exemptions but argued the company had waived them by electing coverage under Code Section 72-109 through the filing of a master insurance policy by its carrier. The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of jurisdiction, holding that the carrier's unilateral filing without the company's knowledge or any other evidence of intent did not constitute substantial compliance with the statute's requirement for written notice of election to come under the law.
This case concerns a claim under an automobile insurance policy's uninsured motorist coverage after the insured was involved in a collision with an uninsured driver. The insurer refused the claim on the grounds that the insured had sued the other driver to judgment without obtaining the insurer's written consent, in violation of a policy exclusion, and had not pursued arbitration as required. The court affirmed a judgment for the insured, reasoning that the insurer's outright denial of liability relieved the insured of the need to comply with arbitration or consent provisions, allowing an action at law to recover the damages awarded in the underlying suit.
The case involved a homeowner suing a contractor for property damage to his residence caused by vibrations and concussions from dynamite used in excavating a sewer line on nearby property. The contractor demurred, arguing the complaint failed to state a cause of action because it lacked allegations of negligence. The court overruled the demurrer, holding that negligence need not be alleged or proved in such cases. It reasoned that blasting is an ultrahazardous activity, imposing strict liability on the defendant who undertakes it, following the majority rule and the Restatement of Torts, as the defendant set the dangerous forces in motion.
This case involved a dispute over a life and disability insurance policy issued in 1947, where the beneficiary sued the insurer for fraudulent breach of contract after the company canceled the policy in 1957 without notice or waiver of premiums despite the insured's total disability and the policy terms allowing such waivers. The plaintiff alleged the cancellation was a fraudulent act intended to avoid paying the death benefit upon the insured's death in 1958, and the jury awarded $200 in actual damages and $1,300 in punitive damages. On appeal, the South Carolina Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding that while the evidence could support the fraudulent breach claim and other challenges to the complaint and proof were without merit, the trial court erred by overlooking the defendant's timely request for jury instructions on the burden of proof and the form of verdict if finding for the defendant.
The case concerned whether funeral expenses could be recovered as damages in a survival action under Section 10-209 of the 1952 Code, which preserves causes of action for personal injuries that the deceased could have brought during life. The trial court granted the defendant's motion to strike the word "funeral" from the complaint, and the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed. The court reasoned that funeral expenses are not recoverable under the survival statute because the deceased could not have sued for them while alive, distinguishing such claims from wrongful death actions where they may be allowed. It cited prior state precedents like Petrie and an annotation confirming that funeral costs are not an element of damages in survival actions.