John H. Waller

In this case, Larry Smith sought post-conviction relief after his 2004 conviction for second-degree criminal sexual conduct with a minor, arguing that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object to hearsay and bolstering testimony from a forensic interviewer who recounted the victim's statements and vouched for her credibility. The Supreme Court of South Carolina reversed the PCR court's denial of relief, finding counsel's performance deficient because he admitted having no strategy for the failure to object and that the testimony improperly exceeded the time-and-place limits for corroborative statements under Rule 801(d)(1), SCRE. The court further held that the error prejudiced Smith, as the trial evidence was conflicting and the improper testimony was emphasized in closing arguments, undermining confidence in the outcome.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved the conviction of the appellant for trafficking cocaine after a trial in absentia, where police used a confidential informant to conduct a controlled buy at the appellant's apartment and later recovered the marked buy money and other drugs there. The appellant challenged the admission of the cocaine at trial, arguing that the chain of custody was incomplete because the State did not call the informant to testify. The court affirmed the conviction, holding that the chain of custody was sufficient. It distinguished the case from State v. Sweet because the informant's identity was known to the defense, allowing cross-examination on relevant issues, and the informant was under police observation except for a brief period inside the apartment. The court found that other evidence reasonably established the handling of the cocaine, so there was no abuse of discretion in admitting it.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved an inmate at Ridgeland Correctional Institution who challenged South Carolina Department of Corrections Policy GA-01.03, which bars inmates from photocopying self-generated legal documents even if they can pay for the copies, claiming the policy unconstitutionally restricted his meaningful access to the courts. The Administrative Law Court affirmed the denial of the inmate's grievance, and the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed that ruling after certifying the appeal. The court held that under Bounds v. Smith and Lewis v. Casey, a prisoner alleging denial of court access must demonstrate actual injury from the policy rather than a speculative future harm such as potentially missing deadlines. Because the inmate provided no evidence of any actual injury, the policy did not violate his constitutional rights.

criminal lawcivil rights

This case involved a dispute within the Spartanburg County Legislative Delegation over whether to elect its chairman and vice-chairman by a simple majority vote or by a weighted vote proportional to each member's constituents. After the 2008 elections, the delegation split into factions, leading petitioner Harold Mitchell to seek resolution from the South Carolina Supreme Court. The court held that a simple majority vote is sufficient for electing these officers. The reasoning was that these positions are ceremonial and do not involve performing governmental functions, distinguishing it from the Fourth Circuit's ruling in Vander Linden v. Hodges that required weighted voting for substantive delegation actions to comply with one-person-one-vote principles.

electionscivil rights

In State v. Edwards, three brothers convicted of murder and accessory after the fact challenged their convictions, arguing that the trial court wrongly granted the State's Batson motion during jury selection and quashed the first panel. The defendants had used peremptory strikes partly on Caucasian and African American jurors, citing concerns like a potential juror's employment as a newspaper editor and another's work at the DMV interacting with law enforcement; the trial court found these explanations racially motivated, but two of the disputed jurors later served on the second jury that convicted the defendants. The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, holding that the employment-based reasons were race-neutral and that the State failed to show they were pretextual under Batson standards. The court reasoned that the erroneous Batson ruling tainted the jury since the disputed jurors were seated, requiring a new trial.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

In Turner v. State, petitioner Harold Turner sought post-conviction relief after his probation revocation, alleging that his probation counsel was ineffective for failing to advise him of his right to a direct appeal. The PCR court denied relief, finding no non-frivolous grounds for appeal and no extraordinary circumstances. On certiorari, the South Carolina Supreme Court examined whether the PCR court erred, clarifying that although a probationer lacks a Sixth Amendment right to counsel, state rules provide a right to counsel in revocation proceedings, so ineffectiveness claims are analyzed under the Strickland standard by analogy to other PCR cases. The court distinguished parole revocation precedents and held that this approach provides a uniform standard without creating new constitutional rights.

criminal lawprocedure

This case concerns a lawyer disciplinary matter in which the respondent had been suspended from the practice of law for ninety days, retroactive to May 14, 2009. The respondent filed an affidavit requesting reinstatement under Rule 32 of the Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement. The court granted the reinstatement request, allowing the respondent to resume practicing law in the state. The order was issued by Acting Chief Justice John H. Waller, Jr., with Chief Justice Toal not participating.

procedure

This case involves Jack Randall Bennett's post-conviction relief application after his 2001 convictions for assault and battery with intent to kill, possession of a weapon during a violent crime, and first-degree burglary stemming from a 1998 incident at Robert Garland's home. The PCR court granted relief, finding that Bennett's trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to adequately object to the admission of his wife's out-of-court statements and that appellate counsel was ineffective for not briefing related issues on appeal. The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed, holding that trial counsel's objections on hearsay and Confrontation Clause grounds were sufficient, the statements were properly admitted as excited utterances, and renewing the objection was unnecessary since the court had already ruled. The Court further found that appellate counsel's performance did not prejudice Bennett because the statements were cumulative and not essential to proving guilt.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a dispute over whether an arbitration agreement in a nursing home admission contract was enforceable after the designated arbitrator became unavailable. The plaintiff sued the nursing home for injuries leading to his wife's death, and the defendants sought to compel arbitration under the contract, which specified the American Health Lawyers Association (AHLA) as the arbitrator. The circuit court denied the motion, finding that the AHLA's unavailability voided the agreement because it was a material term. The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed, reasoning that the specific designation of the AHLA was an integral part of the arbitration agreement under contract principles, and thus Section 5 of the Federal Arbitration Act did not permit appointing a substitute arbitrator.

healthcareproceduretorts & liability

In this post-conviction relief case, Petitioner Dale Robert Bullis alleged that his probation counsel was ineffective for failing to inform him of his right to appeal the revocation of his probation after he pled guilty to grand larceny and had his probation revoked in 2005. The PCR court denied relief, finding counsel was not ineffective, and the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed after granting certiorari. The court held that probation counsel has no duty to advise a client of the right to a direct appeal from a probation revocation absent extraordinary circumstances, reasoning that such proceedings involve only a conditional liberty interest and minimal due process protections, akin to guilty plea proceedings rather than trials. The decision was based on the lack of evidence of extraordinary circumstances in this case and prior precedents distinguishing counsel's obligations across different types of proceedings.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Covert, the defendant was convicted of drug trafficking based on evidence obtained through a search warrant that had not been signed by the magistrate when served, along with other trial procedures. The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' grant of a new trial, holding that the unsigned warrant was invalid under the state's search warrant statute and common law because the magistrate's signature is required to confirm a probable cause finding and provide notice to the citizen. The court also ruled that a criminal verdict form must include an affirmative not guilty option to avoid prejudice. Although allowing the jury to have a written copy of the trafficking statute during deliberations was error, the court found it insufficient alone to require reversal. The decision modified the lower court's reasoning on the warrant and verdict form issues but reached the same result of ordering a retrial.

criminal lawprocedure

Luke Williams was convicted of murdering his wife and son and sentenced to death after the solicitor stated three times during the sentencing phase that he expected the death penalty. After direct appeal, post-conviction relief proceedings, and federal habeas review, Williams sought a state writ of habeas corpus based on the South Carolina Supreme Court's later decision in State v. Northcutt reversing a death sentence due to similar solicitor statements. The court denied relief, explaining that habeas corpus is available only for the gravest constitutional violations that shock the universal sense of justice and that Williams had already received extensive judicial review without demonstrating such a denial of fundamental fairness.

criminal law

In State v. Bixby, the South Carolina Supreme Court addressed whether the State could seek the death penalty against Rita Bixby, who was charged as an accessory before the fact to two murders arising from a property dispute with the Department of Transportation. Bixby was not present at the scene and faced charges of misprision of a felony, criminal conspiracy, and accessory before the fact to murder under S.C. Code § 16-1-40, but not murder itself. The trial court ruled her ineligible for the death penalty, and the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the plain language of the death penalty statute (§ 16-3-20) limits capital punishment to those convicted of or pleading guilty to murder. The court reasoned that while the accessory statute prescribes punishment in the manner of the principal felon, the specific death penalty provisions do not extend to accessories and the legislature showed no intent to include them. A dissent argued that the accessory statute makes one guilty of the principal offense and thus eligible for death.

criminal law

This case concerns a dispute between insurance companies over the selection of a neutral arbitrator after a business deal soured and an Illinois court ordered arbitration under the parties' agreement. The agreement called for party-selected arbitrators to choose a neutral, but when they reached an impasse, the appellants sought assistance from the AAA under its Supplementary Rules for insurance disputes, while respondents argued that the Commercial Rules should apply instead. The South Carolina trial court granted respondents a permanent injunction barring the AAA from using the Supplementary Rules and directing it to use the Commercial Rules. The Supreme Court of South Carolina reversed, holding that an injunction was improper because respondents had an adequate remedy at law through post-arbitration review under the Federal Arbitration Act and because the trial court lacked authority to enjoin the AAA's selection process.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

The case concerned a challenge by the City of Charleston and others to the 2002 incorporation of the Town of James Island, specifically contesting the use of a statutory provision to establish the required contiguity for incorporation. The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's ruling that S.C. Code Ann. § 5-1-30(A)(4) was unconstitutional as special legislation. The court reasoned that the subsection arbitrarily allowed only certain geographic areas, such as those involving tidal marshes or publicly owned waterways, to incorporate by using territory within another municipality's borders, creating an impermissible diversity in municipal incorporation laws that must be uniform under the state constitution. It found no rational basis for distinguishing these areas from others like freshwater marshes or highways in this context.

business & regulatory

In Randall v. State, the petitioner had been convicted of trafficking in crack cocaine and possession with intent to distribute near a school, receiving concurrent sentences of 25 and 15 years. He obtained post-conviction relief on grounds that his trial counsel was ineffective for not advising him he would have to serve 85% of his sentence before parole eligibility and for not objecting to the solicitor's closing argument that compared him and his co-defendant to cockroaches. The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed the grant of relief. It held that parole eligibility is a collateral consequence of sentencing, so the failure to advise on it did not constitute ineffective assistance, and that the isolated cockroach analogy, while strong, did not deprive the petitioner of a fair trial under due process standards. The court noted the evidence against Randall was strong and the comments were limited in scope compared to other cases where reversal was warranted.

criminal law

In Hardee v. Hardee, a divorcing couple disputed the enforceability of their prenuptial agreement after the wife sought alimony, attorney fees, and equitable division of property acquired during the marriage despite waivers in the agreement. The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals as modified, holding that the agreement's unambiguous language in paragraph 9 permitted equitable distribution of post-agreement property but that the waivers of alimony and support were valid and not contrary to public policy. The court reasoned that clear contract terms must be enforced as written and overruled its prior Towles decision, finding its assumptions about spousal support obligations reflected outdated gender stereotypes inconsistent with equal protection principles. The ruling also noted the wife's changed health circumstances but did not alter the outcome based on the agreement's terms.

family lawproperty

In State v. Lindsey, the defendant was convicted of first-degree criminal sexual conduct against his step-daughter and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole under South Carolina's Two-Strikes Law based on a 1976 rape conviction. The Supreme Court of South Carolina affirmed the conviction after finding sufficient evidence of aggravated force to support the jury's verdict on first-degree CSC. However, the court reversed the life sentence and remanded for resentencing, holding that the 1976 rape conviction could not be treated as a "most serious" prior offense under S.C. Code Ann. § 17-25-45(C)(1) because rape is not expressly listed among the qualifying offenses and the record contained no evidence that the prior conviction involved aggravated force or coercion equivalent to first- or second-degree CSC. The court reasoned that the recidivist statute must be applied according to its plain terms, which do not encompass the 1976 offense as defined at the time.

criminal law

The case involved Randall Scott Foster, who was convicted of voluntary manslaughter and a weapons charge after fatally shooting his wife during a domestic dispute, with evidence including conflicting eyewitness accounts from the victim's children and forensic analysis of gunshot residue suggesting a possible struggle. The trial court admitted a prior consistent statement by the 14-year-old eyewitness Michelle over defense objection, which the Court of Appeals found erroneous and reversed the conviction. The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the reversal, holding that the limited cross-examination of Michelle regarding prior inconsistent statements did not constitute an express or implied charge of recent fabrication or improper influence under Rule 801(d)(1)(B), SCRE, making the prior statement inadmissible bolstering evidence. The court rejected the State's preservation and opening-the-door arguments, emphasizing that the rule requires a specific challenge to the witness's credibility on those grounds.

criminal lawprocedure

This is a divorce case in which the father sought sole custody of the couple's young daughter based on the mother's adultery, while the mother sought modifications to visitation and opposed sole custody with the father. The family court awarded joint physical custody alternating every four weeks, finding both parents fit but each prone to placing their own emotional needs above the child's interest in maintaining a relationship with the other parent. On cross-appeal, the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the joint custody award, concluding it was necessary to ensure regular contact with both parents, and also affirmed the denial of attorney's fees, but reversed a restraining order limiting overnight guests during visitation periods.

family law