Jon Fosheim

The case involved borrowers who sued their bank after it increased the interest rate on their FmHA-guaranteed loan without obtaining prior approval from the FmHA as required by the guarantee agreement. The borrowers claimed to be third-party beneficiaries of the agreement and also alleged negligence by the bank. The trial court dismissed both claims, and the South Dakota Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the FmHA had effectively approved the rate changes through semi-annual reports and that the cited federal regulation prohibiting rate increases did not apply to this type of loan. The court treated the motion as one for summary judgment due to consideration of external evidence and found no genuine issues of material fact.

business & regulatoryprocedure

In State v. Jones, the defendant was convicted by a jury of third-degree burglary, grand theft, aggravated assault, and committing a felony while armed after breaking into a sporting goods store, stealing a handgun, and pointing it at a police officer. Jones had undergone psychiatric evaluations revealing delusions and mental health issues, leading to a competency hearing where the jury was instructed that he bore the burden of proving his own incompetency by a preponderance of the evidence under SDCL 23A-10A-6.1; he was also tried in a bifurcated proceeding on guilt and sanity. The South Dakota Supreme Court reversed the convictions, determining sua sponte that the statute's allocation of the burden of proof on the defendant in the competency proceeding violated his due process rights and deprived him of a fair trial, treating it as plain error affecting substantial rights.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

The case involved defendant Larry Bucholz, who pleaded guilty to two DWI charges in exchange for dismissal of a habitual offender enhancement. At the initial sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed concurrent five-month jail terms with work release based on evidence that Bucholz had remained sober, but shortly afterward the judge received information that Bucholz had been intoxicated days earlier and that his ex-wife had reported it to police. After a further hearing confirming the new facts, the court vacated the original sentences and resentenced Bucholz to a five-month jail term on one count and two years in the state penitentiary on the other. The Supreme Court of South Dakota reversed and remanded, holding that the trial court possessed inherent authority to increase the sentence when it was procured through misrepresentation or fraud on the court.

criminal lawprocedure

In Hageman v. Vander Vorste, the parties engaged in multiple cattle purchase and resale transactions as partners or joint venturers between 1976 and 1978, leading to a dispute over the final accounting after an incomplete 1979 audit that omitted several transactions. The trial court awarded the plaintiff $9,333.03 but denied prejudgment interest, concluding the amount due was not ascertainable at the time of the audit because both parties failed to supply complete figures. The Supreme Court of South Dakota reversed the denial of prejudgment interest, reasoning that the exact amounts of the undisclosed transactions were capable of being made certain by calculation from reasonably available information within the defendant's control, satisfying the requirements of SDCL 21-1-11.

business & regulatory

In 1957, Rysavy sold real estate to Novotny on a contract for deed that reserved one-half of all mineral rights and one-half of all oil rights. Novotny later extracted and sold a common rock-like material (described as weathered shale or shaly siltstone) from shallow pits on the land for use in surfacing dirt roads, prompting Rysavy to sue for damages on the theory that the material qualified as a reserved mineral. The trial court granted summary judgment to Rysavy, but the South Dakota Supreme Court reversed, ruling that a general mineral reservation does not encompass substances whose removal destroys the surface estate absent additional evidence of the parties' intent, and that genuine issues of material fact remained. The court noted that the material was prevalent in the area, had no other commercial value, and that interpreting the reservation broadly would undermine the grantee's ownership.

property

In Buhl v. Bak, a partnership (BAM) sought a declaratory judgment and injunction to establish ownership of minerals, sand, and gravel on a twenty-acre tract (Outlot H-3) that was to be conveyed to defendant Bothwell in 1989 under an assignment of a contract for deed originally involving the Hunts and Jones. The trial court declared that plaintiffs owned all mineral interests and that Bothwell held only a possessory interest limited to pasturage. The South Dakota Supreme Court affirmed on appeal, concluding that the assignment language created no present ownership or mineral rights for Bothwell, who paid no consideration, was not a party to the documents, and whose interest was subject to the plaintiffs' reservation of minerals in the escrowed deed.

property

In Wooster v. Wooster, Irene Wooster filed a California judgment for $4,435 in spousal support arrearages against her ex-husband Grant Wooster in South Dakota circuit court under the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act. Grant moved for a new trial and to vacate the judgment, alleging fraud by Irene, satisfaction of the debt through payments to an insurance carrier, and internal contradictions in the California orders regarding conditions for payment. The South Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the denial of the motions, holding that foreign judgments receive the same res judicata effect as domestic ones under the Full Faith and Credit Clause and UEFJA, with only narrow grounds available to attack them collaterally, none of which Grant established here.

family lawprocedure

The case concerned whether the South Dakota Department of Revenue could impose a use tax on catalogs and flyers that LaBelle's, a Minnesota-based mail-order retailer, had printed out of state and mailed directly to South Dakota residents. The Department assessed the tax under SDCL 10-46-2, arguing that LaBelle's exercised sufficient control over the materials through its mailing lists and payment to qualify as a taxable 'use' in the state. The circuit court affirmed the assessment, relying on precedent from K-Mart Corp. v. Dept. of Revenue. The Supreme Court of South Dakota reversed, holding that LaBelle's lacked the required 'right or power incidental to ownership' once the materials entered the state because delivery and handling were controlled by the post office or recipients, unlike the in-state distribution arrangements in K-Mart. The court concluded that the statutory definition of use was not satisfied on these facts.

taxesbusiness & regulatory

This case is an appeal from the denial of habeas corpus relief to Wesley Cochrun, who was convicted in 1981 of distributing hashish and challenged his conviction on grounds including a fatal variance between the charging information and the proof at trial, conviction of a different offense than charged, and lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The South Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the denial of relief, holding that the claims had already been raised and decided in a prior post-conviction proceeding or could have been raised there, and were therefore barred by the doctrine of res judicata under state law, including SDCL 21-27-16.1. The court reasoned that res judicata applies to successive habeas applications to promote finality, with limited exceptions for grounds omitted for reasonable cause that were not shown here.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved Kyle Moeller's appeal of his conviction for distribution and possession of cocaine, specifically challenging whether his entrapment defense should have been decided by the trial judge as a matter of law rather than submitted to the jury. The South Dakota Supreme Court applied the subjective entrapment test, which examines whether the intent to commit the crime originated with the defendant or the state, and determined that conflicting evidence on this point made it a question properly reserved for the jury. The court declined to adopt the objective entrapment standard focused on police conduct and reaffirmed that sufficient evidence supported submitting the issue to the jury. It therefore affirmed the conviction on rehearing.

criminal law

The case arose from a South Dakota cattle ranch's default on multi-million dollar loans from First National Bank of Minneapolis, secured by the ranch's livestock and guaranteed by its owners, after an inventory revealed a massive shortfall in cattle numbers that the bank attributed to fraud or negligence. The bank sued the Kehn family and ranch on the notes and for fraud, while also bringing negligence and fraud claims against Touche Ross (the ranch's auditors) and Collateral Control (its field warehouse operator); the ranch and Collateral Control in turn sued Milbank Mutual Insurance for denying a theft claim under the ranch's policy. After a jury trial that included verdicts allocating fault and awarding damages, the Supreme Court of South Dakota addressed consolidated appeals challenging the dismissal of the bank's claims against Touche Ross, judgments against the Kehns, and dismissal of Collateral Control's suit against Milbank. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, resolving issues including negligence liability, insurance coverage, prejudgment interest, and related procedural questions arising from the common factual record.

business & regulatorytorts & liability

The case involved Eugene Rufener's conviction on three counts of distributing more than one pound of marijuana in violation of SDCL 22-42-7, for which he received concurrent six-year sentences. Rufener appealed, claiming error in the refusal of accomplice jury instructions regarding a buyer witness and in the admission of various bad acts evidence, including prior marijuana sales, items found in his car, and impeachment testimony. The South Dakota Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that the buyer was not an accomplice liable for the same offense and thus no corroboration instruction was required, that the other-acts evidence was relevant to show a common scheme or plan and properly balanced under the rules of evidence, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned whether the marriage between Frank A. Cisar and Louise Tyon was void because it was solemnized more than 20 days after issuance of the marriage license, in violation of SDCL 25-1-24. The children of Frank Cisar sought a declaratory judgment to invalidate the marriage after his death, which would have affected the validity of his prior will under SDCL 29-3-7. The trial court granted summary judgment declaring the marriage void, but the South Dakota Supreme Court reversed. The court held that marriage statutes must be construed in favor of validating marriages unless they expressly declare a marriage void, that the 20-day license requirement is directory rather than mandatory, and that solemnization after expiration of the license constitutes only a misdemeanor under SDCL 25-1-31 without invalidating the marriage itself.

family law

The case involved Share Clothier, who was convicted of accessory to manslaughter following her participation in events leading to a homicide and efforts to cover it up, and who was also found to be a habitual offender based in part on a prior Oklahoma conviction. The South Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the accessory conviction and the denial of two mistrial motions but reversed the habitual offender enhancement and remanded for resentencing. The court reasoned that the prior Oklahoma felony for possession of explosives with unlawful intent could not be used for enhancement under SDCL § 22-7-7 because its minimum elements were not substantially similar to those of the corresponding South Dakota offense, which requires a narrower specific intent to injure, intimidate, or destroy property, following the test set out in State v. Krana. The court further held that the psychiatrist's ambiguous statement and the defendant's emotional outburst did not create prejudicial error warranting a mistrial.

criminal lawprocedure

In Meyerink v. Northwestern Public Service Co., adjoining landowners sued the State of South Dakota and Northwestern Public Service Company to invalidate a utility crossing agreement that permitted construction of power lines on a 200-foot strip of land originally acquired by a railroad around 1900 and later transferred to the state after the railroad's bankruptcy; the landowners argued the state held only an easement limited to railroad purposes and that the agreement constituted an unauthorized burden or taking. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the defendants, concluding the state owned the strip in fee simple, had authority to grant the use, and that the landowners suffered no compensable damages. The South Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the judgment but on different grounds, holding that the landowners had not initiated a contested case proceeding under the state's Administrative Procedures Act and therefore the courts lacked jurisdiction to review the agency's action. The opinion analyzed deed language under SDCL 43-25-15 to determine whether fee title or an easement passed but ultimately rested the decision on the procedural requirement rather than resolving the property interest issue on the merits.

propertyprocedure

In State v. Witchey, the defendant faced rape charges stemming from an incident in 1979, and he moved to suppress testimony from his former wife about conversations between them that occurred while she allegedly assisted him in the crime by waiting in a getaway car. The trial court granted the motion based on the confidential marital communication privilege under South Dakota law, but the state supreme court reversed that ruling on intermediate appeal. The court held that the privilege does not protect communications made during joint criminal activity, adopting a joint-participant exception recognized by other jurisdictions. It reasoned that such statements arise from the commission of a crime rather than the privacy of the marital relationship, that privileges must be narrowly construed to serve the search for truth, and that the wife's active participation rendered the communications non-confidential under the statute's definition.

criminal lawprocedure

In Hepper v. Triple U Enterprises, Inc., the Heppers purchased hundreds of buffalo from Triple U for breeding and later discovered brucellosis in the herds, resulting in increased abortions and claimed financial losses; they sued Triple U for breach of warranty and fraudulent misrepresentation. A jury awarded the Heppers substantial damages on the warranty claim, but the South Dakota Supreme Court reversed the verdict and remanded for a new trial. The court held that evidence was insufficient to establish the Heppers gave timely notice to Triple U of the breach and their intent to claim damages as required by SDCL § 57A-2-607(3) and the jury instructions, and that evidence of calf crop losses was overly speculative.

business & regulatory

In Thomerson v. Thomerson, the ex-wife appealed from a trial court's refusal to hold her ex-husband in contempt for nonpayment of alimony and child support arrears and from its modification of those awards years after their 1979 divorce. The South Dakota Supreme Court reversed and remanded, ruling that the civil contempt proceeding was procedurally defective because it lacked a proper charging affidavit, notice, and specific findings on each required element, and that the trial court erred in concluding the child support obligations had been satisfied by a trust fund and in modifying the awards without adequate evidence of changed circumstances. The court emphasized the need for constitutional safeguards in civil contempt cases that can result in incarceration and directed entry of proper findings on remand.

family lawprocedure

In State v. Likness, the defendant was convicted of driving while under the influence under SDCL 32-23-1(2) after two citizens reported observations of his vehicle and a patrolman found him asleep in the driver's seat with the ignition on and a blood-alcohol level of 0.13%. Likness appealed, arguing that the charging information was defective because it alleged both driving and being in actual physical control of a vehicle in a single count, in violation of rules against charging multiple offenses together. The South Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that SDCL 32-23-1(2) describes a single offense that may be proven by showing either act, as the statutory language is synonymous with operating a vehicle and the two acts are not separate crimes. The court reasoned that precedent allows charging disjunctive statutory acts conjunctively in one count when they constitute one violation, and evidence of driving was not required for conviction.

criminal law

The case involved a plaintiff who was injured when he stepped into an abandoned well on the defendant's property while attending a public auction of personal property. The plaintiff sued under theories including nuisance and hidden danger, despite conceding the defendant had no knowledge of the well. The Supreme Court of South Dakota affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the defendant, holding that property owners are not strictly liable to invitees and owe only a duty of ordinary care, which requires knowledge or notice of the hazard to impose liability for failure to abate it. The court reasoned that statutes on abandoned wells and nuisances do not create liability without knowledge, and the owner is not an insurer of the premises' safety.

torts & liabilityproperty