St. Clair Smith

The case involved Montana-Dakota Utilities Co. (MDU) petitioning the South Dakota Public Utilities Commission to provide electrical service to a new large-load facility of North Central Farmers Elevator located in the exclusive service territory assigned to FEM Electric Association under SDCL 49-34A-42. MDU sought approval as an outside provider pursuant to SDCL 49-34A-56, claiming it could serve the customer more efficiently, but the PUC granted summary disposition against MDU on standing grounds, a ruling upheld by the circuit court. The South Dakota Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the statute permits only customers—not competing utilities—to petition the PUC for relief from the incumbent provider's exclusive right to serve. The court's reasoning rested on statutory interpretation of SDCL 49-34A-56 in light of its text, surrounding provisions such as SDCL 49-34A-55, and legislative intent to protect customer choice rather than enable utility-initiated competition.

business & regulatory

The case involved Hallett Construction Co. seeking a refund of use taxes paid under South Dakota law on materials it purchased and used to build transmission lines under a contract with the federal Bureau of Reclamation. The Commissioner of Revenue and the circuit court denied the refund, and the South Dakota Supreme Court affirmed after reviewing the contract terms and statutory definitions. The court held that the company qualified as a taxable user because it exercised control over the materials in the state by bringing them in and incorporating them into the project, and the arrangement did not constitute a sale to the United States that would trigger an exemption. Core reasoning focused on legislative intent classifying construction contractors as users rather than sellers of materials, the absence of an exemption for such contracts in the current statute, and the fact that title transfer provisions did not override the company's interim ownership and use.

taxesbusiness & regulatoryfederal power

The case concerned whether a pre-service attachment levy on real property abated due to the defendant's death in a civil action alleging misappropriation of funds from a municipal liquor store. The trial court refused to dissolve the levy after substituting the decedent's administrator as defendant and directing service on him, and the Supreme Court affirmed. The court reasoned that statutes provide actions do not abate by death if the cause survives, that the action was commenced and pending upon delivery of the summons to the sheriff, and that provisions enacted in 1901 expressly preserve attachment liens on estate property even without a pre-death judgment, authorizing the court to continue both the action and the attachment. The court concluded these rules reflect legislative intent to suspend rather than void such proceedings upon death under the circumstances presented.

procedureproperty

The case involved homeowners whose property was damaged by flooding from a broken city water main that traveled through improperly compacted trenches of a municipal trunk sewer and the homeowners' service sewer. Plaintiffs sued the city for negligence in the construction, maintenance, and repair of the sewer system, without alleging negligence in the water main break itself; the city defended on grounds including contributory negligence by the plaintiffs in their sewer construction. The trial court denied the city's motions for directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and a jury found for the plaintiffs. On appeal, the South Dakota Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the evidence raised factual issues of concurrent negligence and contributory negligence that were properly submitted to the jury, as plaintiffs could not be deemed negligent as a matter of law for failing to anticipate the city's breach of duty in the absence of superior knowledge.

torts & liabilityproperty

The case involved a property owner suing the City of Sioux Falls for damages after surface water from a sudden thaw flooded his home due to inadequate culverts under a raised street grade. The trial court awarded the plaintiff $800, and the South Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the judgment. The court reasoned that the city had collected and redirected a significant volume of surface water onto the plaintiff's property through its street improvements and grading, which it would not have naturally reached, and failed to maintain adequate drainage despite notice of the risk. This violated the principle that municipalities cannot collect surface water and cast it upon private property without liability for resulting damages, as established in prior case law.

propertytorts & liability

The case concerned a dispute over title to property, including the Hill City Zoo, that Hal D. Wheaton and his wife Violet Wheaton had agreed to sell under a contract for deed. After Hal Wheaton was adjudged bankrupt, the plaintiffs purchased his remaining interest from the bankruptcy trustee and sued to quiet title, while Violet Wheaton counterclaimed for an undivided one-half interest based on an agreement to split the sale proceeds equally. The trial court found no competent evidence of any interest in Violet Wheaton and entered judgment quieting title in the plaintiffs. On appeal, the court reversed, holding that the undisputed facts of the contract execution, escrow arrangements, and subsequent conveyances to both spouses supported the inference that Hal Wheaton intended to create a beneficial interest in his wife, so that he held legal title in trust for her share of the proceeds.

property

This case arose from a motor vehicle collision in Sioux Falls where the plaintiff, pulling out from a parking space, struck the defendant's vehicle as the defendant attempted a left turn into an alley; the plaintiff sued for property damage and prevailed at trial on a negligence theory. The defendant appealed, challenging jury instructions that stated city ordinances do not authorize left turns into alleys and thus rendered the maneuver negligent per se, as well as related evidentiary rulings on proof of the ordinances. The Supreme Court of South Dakota held that the trial court erred in giving the instruction because the ordinances were not properly established in the record, testimony indicated no ordinance prohibited or regulated such turns, and the appellate court could not take judicial notice of municipal ordinances; it therefore reversed the denial of a new trial. The core reasoning centered on the requirements for proving and preserving municipal ordinances for appellate review, the presumption of trial court regularity, and the impropriety of using informal testimony to establish the law while later disclaiming it.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved four defendants convicted of conspiracy to grossly disturb the public peace under South Dakota law, based on an altercation that began with verbal exchanges in a Mitchell tavern and escalated outside to threats, intimidation, and an assault on Robert Sinclair. The South Dakota Supreme Court reversed the convictions of the three appealing defendants. The court reasoned that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, showed only spontaneous actions arising from momentary emotions among strangers, without proof of any express or tacit prior agreement to commit the charged offense, rendering any finding of conspiracy speculative rather than supported by facts inconsistent with innocence.

criminal law

The case involved a plaintiff injured when the defendant's transport truck collided with his farm tractor on a highway, causing a protruding intervertebral disk that required surgery and led to ongoing pain and disability. The defendant admitted liability for damages proximately caused by the collision, and a jury awarded the plaintiff $39,529.29 in compensation for medical expenses, lost earnings, pain, and future limitations. The defendant sought a new trial on grounds that the verdict was excessive and influenced by passion or prejudice, but the trial court denied the motion. The appellate court affirmed, concluding that the award was not so unreasonable as to manifest jury misconduct, particularly in light of the evidence of the plaintiff's injuries and the reduced purchasing power of the dollar.

torts & liability

This case involved a dispute over a $25,000 promissory note executed by the defendant son in favor of his mother, the plaintiff, with the son claiming an oral understanding that principal repayment was not due during her lifetime and that the note only memorialized an interest obligation. The trial court directed a verdict for the plaintiff after excluding parol evidence of the parties' negotiations and refusing to allow the son to assert reformation of the note as a defense or counterclaim in the action. On appeal, the South Dakota Supreme Court reversed, holding that the parol evidence rule does not bar proof of an equitable right to reformation and that state statutes abolishing distinctions between law and equity permit a defendant to plead such a right as a defense to defeat the plaintiff's claim on the instrument. The court reasoned that the son's offers of proof regarding the circumstances and alleged agreement were relevant to establishing this equitable defense, entitling him to a trial on the issue rather than summary disposition.

procedurefamily law

The case concerned Roland Halvorsen's conviction for second-degree manslaughter after a car he was driving crashed, killing passenger Terry Jeremiason. The central issue was whether his testimony at a coroner's inquest—given after a subpoena, without counsel, and including an admission that he was driving—violated his state constitutional privilege against self-incrimination and should have been excluded from the criminal proceedings. The court reversed the conviction, ruling that the inquest testimony was improperly obtained and used at trial in violation of the privilege, as reinforced by statute, drawing on prior precedents like State v. Smith and State ex rel. Poach v. Sly that prohibit such interrogations of the accused. The decision emphasized that the stage of proceedings does not permit evasion of the constitutional protection through indirect means like a coroner's proceeding.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a defendant convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol, who appealed on the ground that evidence from a blood alcohol chemical test should have been suppressed. The court affirmed the conviction, ruling that the test was admissible even though the officer did not fully explain the implied consent statute's revocation provisions and the test occurred before a formal charge was filed. The court interpreted the statute's reference to a person being "charged" as encompassing the arresting officer's informal charge, and determined that informing the defendant of his right to refuse was sufficient under the circumstances. It further held that evidentiary presumptions from related DUI statutes applied to the offense at issue.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved defendant Kenneth Norwick, who was charged with two counts of second-degree manslaughter after a high-speed car accident on December 21, 1958, in which his vehicle sideswiped another, causing it to crash and resulting in the deaths of two passengers. The amended information alleged reckless and negligent driving, including while under the influence of alcohol, without due caution. Following a jury trial, Norwick was convicted on both counts and sentenced to three years in prison. On appeal, the court affirmed the judgment, holding that there was no reversible error regarding the sufficiency of the preliminary examination, the charges in the information, or the jury instructions on causation and aiding and abetting, and that the single sentence was authorized under the applicable statutes.

criminal lawprocedure

This case concerned whether attorneys' fees incurred by one beneficiary (David Barbour) in litigation to establish that a disputed savings account belonged to the estate of Frederick R. Bamberger, rather than to the other beneficiary (James Barbour) as surviving joint tenant, could be paid from estate funds. After the executor presented facts in county court but then remained neutral, David's counsel carried the burden through appeals, resulting in a judgment that the account was estate property. The trial court allowed $8,000 in fees from the estate on the ground that the services benefited the estate, but the South Dakota Supreme Court reversed that allowance in part, holding that fees could be charged to the estate only for services rendered after the county court stage when the executor ceased effective representation.

propertyprocedure

In Hawkins v. Kennedy, plaintiffs sued on two promissory notes, alleging fraud in the contracting of the debt based on the defendant's representations about property sales and repayment, and obtained a default judgment that included findings of fraud. The defendant moved to vacate or open the judgment on grounds of mistake, and the trial court did so, determining that the fraud adjudication had been entered inadvertently without adequate proof. After a trial on the fraud issue, the court found that plaintiffs had failed to prove fraud and dismissed that claim while preserving the money judgment. On appeal, the court affirmed, holding that the trial court possessed inherent authority to correct its inadvertent judgment and that the evidence supported the finding that fraud was not established.

proceduretorts & liability

The case involved a dispute over the application of payments under a performance bond issued by Employers Mutual Casualty Company for subcontractor Kruse Electric on a school construction project. Crescent Electric Supply Company provided materials to Kruse, which defaulted, and received three joint checks from the prime contractor Broadway Construction Company totaling over $12,000, which it applied to the subcontractor's older open account debts rather than the specific job materials. The surety argued that the circumstances manifested an intent to apply the payments to the bonded obligation under South Dakota statute SDC 47.0207, while Crescent claimed it could allocate them freely absent express direction. The trial court ruled for Crescent, but the Supreme Court of South Dakota reversed, holding that the payments' source and the prime contractor's involvement compelled their application to the Brush school job materials under the statute's first subsection. The judgment was reversed in favor of the surety's defense of payment.

business & regulatory

In Davis v. Kressly, plaintiffs sought to recover unpaid rent under a lease for a business building in Perkins County, South Dakota, after the defendant vacated the premises. Following unsuccessful attempts at personal service, plaintiffs obtained an order for service by publication based on an affidavit claiming due diligence in locating the defendant, who had moved to Pennington County, leading to a default judgment. The defendant appealed the judgment, contending that the affidavit failed to demonstrate the required due diligence under state statute for authorizing publication service. The court reversed the judgment, holding that the trial court abused its discretion because the affidavit lacked competent evidence from process servers about their efforts and omitted a recent inquiry with the defendant's known counsel. This procedural deficiency meant the statutory requirements for constructive service were not met, invalidating the default judgment on direct attack.

procedureproperty

This case involved a dispute over the certified results of a South Dakota House of Representatives election in the 51st District, where recount boards recorded 1,615 votes for James W. Miller and 1,614 for Wallace Jewett. The court reviewed 32 disputed ballots under state statutes and precedents, focusing on rules for valid markings, erasures or obliterations, unauthorized marks, and voter intent. Ballots with erasures were invalidated as spoiled, while some with inadvertent or authorized marks were upheld; others with intentional marks in unauthorized places were rejected as identifying. After these determinations produced a net gain of one vote for Miller, the court declared him the elected representative.

electionsprocedure

The case concerned a constitutional challenge to Chapter 264 of South Dakota's 1959 Laws, which established an implied-consent regime for chemical testing of drivers arrested on suspicion of driving under the influence and provided for license revocation upon refusal. After the plaintiff refused testing and had his permit revoked, he sued to have it reinstated, arguing that the act's title failed to express its subject as required by Article III, Section 21 of the state constitution. The trial court agreed and ordered reinstatement. The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the title's reference to regulation of motor-vehicle use on state highways and exemption from liability for testers adequately expressed a single general subject to which all provisions of the act were germane, and that the title was not misleading under the court's precedents requiring liberal construction of the constitutional clause.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a personal injury damages action in which the plaintiff attempted substituted service of the summons and complaint before the three-year statute of limitations expired, but the service was later found invalid under South Dakota law. After the limitations period ran, the defendant made a voluntary general appearance, obtained a change of venue by stipulation, and answered by pleading the statute of limitations as a bar. The plaintiff argued that the defendant's appearance should relate back to the date of the attempted service, thereby preserving the action. The trial court rejected that theory and dismissed the case, and the South Dakota Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a general appearance is equivalent to valid service only as of the date it is made and does not retroactively cure defective service for statute-of-limitations purposes. The court found no facts justifying application of the relation-back doctrine and relied on statutes and precedents establishing that an action is commenced only by valid service or a timely general appearance.

proceduretorts & liability