This case involved a taxpayer's suit seeking a refund of Tennessee use taxes paid under protest on the licensing and sale of computer software. The Chancellor granted summary judgment for the Commissioner, upholding the tax assessment, and the taxpayer appealed. The court affirmed, holding that the Retail Sales Tax Act imposes a use tax on computer software. The core reasoning was that the 1978 legislative amendment defined "sale" to include transfers of computer software (treating it as tangible personal property) while exempting only in-house fabrication for personal use; because the Act equates use with sales and aims to tax both equally, the use tax applies to software acquired from others.
This case concerned a dispute over ownership of a barn straddling the boundary between two neighboring properties in Tennessee, where the plaintiffs claimed title through their deed but the defendants asserted rights based on long-term possession by prior owners. The lower courts found that the defendants' predecessors had exercised adverse possession since at least 1971 by treating the barn as their own, paying taxes and maintenance costs, and granting only permissive use to the plaintiffs and their predecessors, and held that such permission did not interrupt the seven-year statutory period under T.C.A. § 28-2-103. The Supreme Court affirmed, ruling that the statute barred the plaintiffs' action because the defendants' possession remained exclusive, continuous, open, and notorious despite the permission granted to others, as an owner's permissive entry does not constitute the required ouster or re-entry to reset the limitations clock. The court clarified that after the statutory period, title holders retain bare ownership but cannot sue to recover possession or use of the property.
This case concerned a bank's suit to recover the balance on a $24,900 corporate promissory note from Heatherly, who had signed an absolute and unconditional suretyship agreement along with other stockholders. After Heatherly resigned from the corporation, the remaining officers renewed the note without his signature following the forfeiture of the corporate charter; the trial court held Heatherly liable under the original suretyship contract and awarded principal, interest, and fees, but the Court of Appeals reversed on the ground that the renewal discharged the underlying obligation. The Tennessee Supreme Court reversed, reinstating the trial judgment. It applied settled precedent that a renewal note does not discharge the original debt absent agreement by all parties, and that the burden to prove novation rests on the asserting party; because no such agreement existed and the suretyship contract remained in force, Heatherly stayed primarily liable for the debt and related costs.
This Tennessee wrongful death case arose from a fatal head-on car collision in 1978, in which the plaintiff sued the defendants under the state's Wrongful Death Act seeking damages for the loss of his teenage son's life. The sole disputed issue on appeal was whether the trial court properly instructed the jury to subtract the deceased's probable living expenses from any award based on life expectancy and earning capacity. The Supreme Court of Tennessee held that the instruction was correct and affirmed the judgment, including an additur that raised the award to $75,000. The court reasoned that the Act limits recovery to pecuniary loss to the next of kin, which, consistent with interpretations of similar New York and Pennsylvania statutes, requires deducting the portion of earnings the decedent would have spent on personal maintenance rather than contributing to dependents. It further noted that the record contained sufficient evidence on the decedent's living habits to support the instruction and that jurors could draw on common experience to estimate future expenses.
In Jones v. Jones, a husband and wife each sued the other for divorce; after a trial, both suits were dismissed because each had committed grounds for divorce, but on appeal the Court of Appeals granted the husband a divorce based on the wife's felony attempt to kill him. The case was remanded for division of property under T.C.A. § 36-825, and the trial court ordered equal division of all property, which the Court of Appeals then interpreted to cover only legal interests held by the parties. The Tennessee Supreme Court granted certiorari and remanded again, holding that the statute requires consideration of both legal and equitable interests in any property standing in either party's name at the time of divorce, and directing the trial court to allow the parties to present evidence on all such interests.
The case involved two defendants charged in a two-count indictment with petit larceny and concealing stolen property after a wallet disappeared in a tavern; the jury acquitted them of larceny but convicted them of concealing stolen property. The Tennessee Supreme Court granted certiorari to address whether the verdicts were reversibly inconsistent because the acquittal negated an element of the concealment charge. The court decided that consistency between verdicts on separate counts is not required and affirmed the convictions. It reasoned that each count of an indictment is treated as a separate charge, so an acquittal on one cannot be res judicata as to another even when based on the same evidence, and that any inconsistency may stem from jury lenity or compromise without invalidating a conviction supported by the evidence.