McClung v. Delta Square Ltd. Partnership
Tennessee Supreme Court · 1996-10-28 · cited 301×
This case concerned a negligence lawsuit filed by a husband against the owners, operators, and anchor tenant of a Memphis shopping center after his wife was abducted at gunpoint from the parking lot, raped, and murdered by a third-party criminal. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants breached a duty to provide reasonable security measures in the lot, which proximately caused the death. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants under the strict limitations on business-owner liability established in Cornpropst v. Sloan, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Tennessee Supreme Court granted review to reassess that precedent, examining whether a duty of care exists based on the foreseeability of criminal acts, policy considerations, and the relative ability of landowners versus patrons to implement preventive measures.
torts & liabilitycriminal lawproperty
Vogel v. Wells Fargo Guard Services
Tennessee Supreme Court · 1996-10-07 · cited 62×
In Vogel v. Wells Fargo Guard Services, a workers' compensation dispute, the plaintiff, a 73-year-old security guard, suffered a work-related back injury leading to a finding of 100% permanent total disability. The trial court declared unconstitutional the provision in Tennessee Code Annotated Section 50-6-207(4)(A)(i) that caps benefits at 260 weeks for workers injured after age 60, citing equal protection violations, and awarded lifetime benefits instead. The Tennessee Supreme Court reversed, holding that the age-based cap is constitutional as it rationally accounts for social security benefits and age discrimination laws, but found the differential treatment of total versus partial disabilities irrational; therefore, the 260-week limit applies to permanent total disability cases for workers over 60, resulting in an award of 260 weeks of benefits reduced by old-age insurance payments.
labor & employmentcivil rights
Wimley v. Rudolph
Tennessee Supreme Court · 1996-10-07 · cited 31×
The case involved a recipient of AFDC benefits whose benefits were terminated after she reported an inheritance; she petitioned for judicial review of the agency decision under Tennessee's Uniform Administrative Procedures Act and also sought attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 based on a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The trial court denied the state's motion to dismiss the fee request, ruled for the plaintiff on the merits, and awarded fees. The Supreme Court of Tennessee affirmed, holding that the doctrine of election of remedies did not bar combining the state administrative review petition with a federal claim solely for attorney fees, as the requested relief was not inconsistent with or duplicative of any remedy available under the state act and could be awarded when the facts supported enforcement of federal rights even without an explicit § 1983 pleading.
civil rightsprocedure
Ramsey v. Beavers
Tennessee Supreme Court · 1996-10-07 · cited 47×
In Ramsey v. Beavers, the plaintiff sought damages for emotional distress after witnessing his mother's death in a car accident caused by the defendant's negligent driving, even though the plaintiff himself was not physically injured or within the immediate zone of danger. The trial court and Court of Appeals dismissed the claim under the longstanding zone-of-danger rule, which had barred recovery for psychic injuries stemming from harm to a third person. The Tennessee Supreme Court reversed, holding that a plaintiff who sensorily observes the injury or death of a close relative may recover for serious emotional distress if the incident and resulting injuries were reasonably foreseeable. The court replaced the rigid zone-of-danger limitation with ordinary negligence principles that emphasize foreseeability while still requiring expert proof of severe emotional injury and excluding claims based on minor distress.
torts & liability
Wilkes v. Resource Authority of Sumner County
Tennessee Supreme Court · 1996-09-23 · cited 18×
In this workers’ compensation case, employee Lee Wilkes suffered a facial laceration from a snapped cable while operating equipment at a garbage disposal facility, resulting in a visible chin scar that affected his confidence and interactions at work. He sought medical expenses for reconstructive surgery, temporary total disability benefits during recovery, and permanent partial disability benefits. The trial court awarded nine percent permanent partial disability to the face, coverage for the outpatient surgery as reasonably necessary medical treatment, and associated temporary total disability benefits, but denied attorney’s fees on the medical expenses. The Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed, holding that under Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-204, employers must provide medical treatment reasonably required even if the injury does not cause vocational impairment, and that precedent supported compensation for disfiguring scars; the court also upheld the denial of attorney’s fees based on the plain language of the recovery statute. The decision reversed the appeals panel’s contrary ruling on the surgery and benefits.
labor & employment
Cohen v. Cohen
Tennessee Supreme Court · 1996-09-16 · cited 288×
In Cohen v. Cohen, a divorce case, the Tennessee Supreme Court addressed whether an unvested retirement plan and increased equity in separate real property acquired during marriage qualify as marital property subject to division. The trial court had excluded the unvested retirement benefits but included the increased equity, while the Court of Appeals reversed both holdings. The Supreme Court held that both the value of unvested retirement plans accrued during the marriage and the increased equity in separate real property constitute marital property under Tennessee Code Annotated Section 36-4-121, because the statute includes increases in value of separate property to which spouses contributed and pension rights accrued during marriage, extending to unvested benefits as they are acquired through marital efforts.
family lawproperty
Johnson v. Hardin
Tennessee Supreme Court · 1996-07-15 · cited 42×
In Johnson v. Hardin, a medical malpractice suit, plaintiffs alleged that a physician negligently failed to diagnose and treat rectal cancer, seeking damages after an eight-day trial. The jury became deadlocked, prompting the trial judge to deliver an additional instruction urging further deliberations, after which the jury returned a defense verdict; the trial court denied a mistrial and entered judgment for defendants. Plaintiffs appealed, but the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for failure to comply with Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 24 regarding designation and filing of the transcript. The Tennessee Supreme Court reversed the dismissal, holding that the appellate rules must be applied to reach the merits rather than create technical barriers once a timely notice of appeal is filed, and further held that the trial court's instruction to the deadlocked jury violated Tennessee law, requiring remand for a new trial.
proceduretorts & liabilityhealthcare
Ray Ex Rel. Holman v. BIC Corp.
Tennessee Supreme Court · 1996-07-15 · cited 65×
The case involved a products liability claim by a minor child severely injured in a fire started by a BIC disposable cigarette lighter left accessible in an apartment; the plaintiff argued the lighter was unreasonably dangerous because it lacked child-resistant features. The Tennessee Supreme Court addressed a certified question on the scope of the state's products liability statute, specifically whether it allowed only the consumer expectation test or also a separate risk-utility analysis for determining unreasonable dangerousness. The court held that the statute's definition of unreasonably dangerous products encompasses two distinct tests: the consumer expectation test, based on dangers beyond those contemplated by an ordinary purchaser, and the prudent manufacturer test, which requires balancing the product's risks against its utility. This conclusion followed from the plain language of the two clauses in Tennessee Code Annotated Section 29-28-102(8), with the second clause focusing on whether a reasonable manufacturer aware of the danger would market the product. The decision clarified that summary judgment under only the consumer expectation test was not the end of the inquiry.
torts & liability
Lucius v. City of Memphis
Tennessee Supreme Court · 1996-07-15 · cited 44×
The case arose from a 1989 car accident involving a Memphis police officer, after which plaintiffs obtained judgments against the city under the Governmental Tort Liability Act (GTLA) for personal injury and property damage. The city paid the principal amounts but refused post-judgment interest, leading the trial court to issue a writ of mandamus requiring payment at the statutory rate of 10 percent; the Court of Appeals reversed, finding sovereign immunity barred such interest absent explicit GTLA authorization. The Tennessee Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, holding that judgments under the GTLA accrue post-judgment interest under the general statutes (Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 47-14-121 and 47-14-122) because those provisions apply to governmental entities unless they conflict with the GTLA, which they do not except for the separate installment-payment rule in § 29-20-312. The court reasoned that sovereign immunity does not immunize the city from obligations imposed by generally applicable statutes that are not inconsistent with the GTLA's purposes.
torts & liabilityprocedure
Resolution Trust Corp. v. Block
Tennessee Supreme Court · 1996-06-24 · cited 18×
The case involved Resolution Trust Corporation, as receiver for a failed savings and loan, suing the institution's former officers and directors for losses from loans they approved, with claims including breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, and breach of contract. The federal district court certified a question to the Tennessee Supreme Court asking whether, under Tennessee law, such officers and directors would face joint and several liability for their collective board actions or only proportionate liability based on comparative fault. The court held that liability is joint and several rather than proportional to fault. It reasoned that, both historically and under modern precedents, officers and directors remain jointly and severally liable to the corporation for damages from collective breaches of duty or contract, and that Tennessee's adoption of comparative fault principles in other tort contexts did not alter this established rule for corporate officer and director liability.
business & regulatorytorts & liability
State v. Lynn
Tennessee Supreme Court · 1996-06-10 · cited 85×
In State v. Lynn, the defendant was charged with first-degree murder, later amended to second-degree murder, arising from an altercation at his tavern; after the initial venire was tainted, the trial court directed the clerk to draw a new jury panel without following the statutory procedures in Tennessee Code Annotated Section 22-2-308, which require drawing names in open court under judicial supervision. The jury convicted the defendant of criminally negligent homicide, and the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed despite the procedural violations. The Tennessee Supreme Court reversed the conviction and remanded for a new trial, holding that a complete and flagrant deviation from mandatory jury selection statutes undermines the integrity of the judicial process and requires reversal without proof of actual prejudice to the defendant. The court emphasized that strict adherence to these procedures is essential to public confidence in the administration of justice.
criminal lawprocedure
State v. Wilson
Tennessee Supreme Court · 1996-06-03 · cited 26×
In State v. Wilson, a jury convicted defendant Mario Lamont Wilson of aggravated assault and other charges after he fired shots at a residence where occupants were present, though the intended targets were not home at the time. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the aggravated assault convictions, and the Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed that reversal. The court held that the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Wilson intentionally or knowingly caused the victims to reasonably fear imminent bodily injury, as required by the aggravated assault statute, even though his conduct was reckless and supported a felony reckless endangerment conviction. The decision emphasized that the proof of the victims' fear established the actus reus but did not satisfy the mens rea element of intent or knowledge under Tennessee Code Annotated Section 39-13-101 and 39-13-102.
criminal lawprocedure
Wanda Cruise v. City of Columbia - Concurring
Tennessee Supreme Court · 1996-05-06 · cited 30×
In this case, plaintiff Wanda Cruse sued the City of Columbia for damage to and loss of personal property seized by its police officers, seeking recovery under a specific confiscated property statute rather than the Governmental Tort Liability Act. The Supreme Court of Tennessee addressed whether the appeal was timely filed and which statute of limitations applied. The court held that the appeal was timely under the appellate rules, which should be construed to allow determination on the merits, and that the three-year limitations period for personal property claims under Tennessee Code Annotated Section 28-3-105 governed instead of the GTLA's twelve-month period. This was because the claim arose under an independent statute for confiscated property that removes immunity separately from the GTLA, making the two provisions not mutually exclusive.
propertyproceduretorts & liability
McClellan v. Board of Regents of the State University
Tennessee Supreme Court · 1996-04-29 · cited 91×
This case involved Dr. Powell McClellan, a faculty member at Middle Tennessee State University, who challenged an administrative finding that he violated university sexual harassment policies through comments and conduct during an EKG demonstration with a student assistant and by requiring her to perform personal errands. The administrative hearing, conducted under the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, resulted in sanctions including counseling, restrictions on teaching certain courses, and other measures. The Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' upholding of the sexual harassment violation, reversed the portion that had vacated one finding and the sanction order, and remanded for imposition of the original sanctions. The court held that substantial and material evidence supported the violation and that the hearing procedures, including the roles of the hearing officer and committee, were appropriate under the statute. It declined to alter the sanctions as they fell within the agency's discretion.
labor & employmentcivil rightsprocedure
Meighan v. U.S. Sprint Communications Co.
Tennessee Supreme Court · 1996-04-29 · cited 329×
The case concerned a Tennessee landowner who sued U.S. Sprint Communications after the company installed fiber optic cable on railroad rights-of-way crossing his property without obtaining consent or providing compensation, alleging both a taking and trespass while seeking statewide class certification and punitive damages on behalf of similarly situated owners. The Supreme Court of Tennessee reviewed multiple appeals regarding the trial court's partial class certification limited to Knox County, dismissal of the trespass claim, and allowance of punitive damages, drawing on its prior decision in Buhl v. U.S. Sprint that such installations constitute eminent domain takings entitling owners to compensation. The court analyzed the prerequisites and categories for class actions under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 23, the proper characterization of the cause of action as inverse condemnation rather than trespass, and the availability of punitive damages in such proceedings. It addressed whether common questions predominate and whether a class action is superior for resolving claims of real property injury across multiple counties.
propertyprocedure
State v. Kissinger
Tennessee Supreme Court · 1996-04-29 · cited 212×
The case consolidated appeals from two defendants convicted of aggravated sexual battery (and one also of aggravated rape) against children under age 13, where trial courts had enhanced sentences using multiple factors under Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-114. The Court of Criminal Appeals panels reached conflicting conclusions on whether enhancement factor (7)—that the offense was committed to gratify the defendant's desire for pleasure or excitement—constituted an element of aggravated sexual battery and thus could not be used to increase the sentence. The Tennessee Supreme Court granted review to resolve the inconsistency and to determine the proper applicability of various enhancement factors, including (1), (4), (7), (10), (15), and (16), to offenses involving child victims, considering whether each factor was an element of the crime, supported by the evidence, or otherwise permissible.
criminal law
State v. Trusty
Tennessee Supreme Court · 1996-03-25 · cited 235×
In State v. Trusty, the defendant was indicted solely for attempted first-degree murder after shooting at a neighbor during a dispute but was convicted of aggravated assault based on jury instructions that treated it as a lesser included offense. The Tennessee Supreme Court reversed the conviction, holding that aggravated assault under state law is neither a lesser grade nor a lesser included offense of attempted first-degree murder. The core reasoning was that Tennessee law prohibits convictions for unindicted offenses that do not qualify as lesser degrees or lesser included offenses of the charged crime, as this violates the requirement of adequate notice in the indictment. The court dismissed the case, emphasizing that such a conviction cannot stand even if supported by the evidence.
criminal lawprocedure
Woodson v. Porter Brown Limestone Co.
Tennessee Supreme Court · 1996-02-14 · cited 109×
This case arose from a wrongful death lawsuit filed after a gravel truck struck and killed two people in a car; the plaintiffs alleged negligence by the driver and negligent entrustment by his employer, while the defendants claimed the car pulled into the truck's path. During jury selection in the civil trial, the defendants used a peremptory challenge to exclude the only Black member of the venire, prompting an objection under Batson v. Kentucky and related precedents that prohibit race-based exclusions. The trial court informed the excluded juror of his right to serve, but the juror declined, leading to an all-white jury that found for the defendants; the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Tennessee Supreme Court reversed, holding that the race-based challenge violated the equal protection rights of the litigant and the judicial system's interest in nondiscriminatory jury selection, even when the juror opted not to serve, and remanded for a new trial.
civil rightsproceduretorts & liability
State v. Ricci
Tennessee Supreme Court · 1996-01-29 · cited 23×
This case involved whether the prosecution of Joseph and Joseph Ricci for securities fraud violations occurring in 1988 was barred by the statute of limitations or violated ex post facto principles under the U.S. and Tennessee constitutions. The trial court and Court of Criminal Appeals dismissed the indictment, finding that a 1990 amendment effectively applied a shorter two-year limitations period retroactively, disadvantaging the defendants. The Tennessee Supreme Court reversed, holding that the applicable statute of limitations for these offenses remained four years throughout, as the 1989 sentencing reforms did not reduce it for these pre-1989 crimes, and thus no ex post facto violation occurred. The court reinstated the indictment for offenses that occurred after September 28, 1988, or were not reasonably discoverable before that date.
criminal lawprocedure
Richardson v. Tennessee Board of Dentistry
Tennessee Supreme Court · 1995-12-28 · cited 288×
The case involved a challenge by Harold Richardson to civil penalties sought by the Tennessee Board of Dentistry for operating a dental clinic and practicing dentistry without a license under state statutes authorizing such penalties for unlicensed health practitioners. The Supreme Court of Tennessee held that the Chancery Court had jurisdiction to address constitutional issues raised during judicial review of an administrative order, even if those issues were not resolved by the agency. Because Richardson did not appeal the Chancery Court's initial rulings on the facial constitutionality of the penalty statute and related procedural claims, those rulings became final and barred relitigation under collateral estoppel. The court further determined that the privilege against self-incrimination was unavailable in the administrative proceeding because the statute of limitations had expired on any potential related criminal charges. The judgment of the Court of Appeals was reversed and the matter remanded to the Board for further proceedings.
procedurecriminal lawhealthcarebusiness & regulatory