James A. Baker

In Anadarko Petroleum Corp. v. Thompson, the dispute centered on whether a 1936 gas mining lease terminated after actual production ceased for 61 days in 1981 and 91 days in 1985 due to pipeline repairs. The Supreme Court of Texas held that the lease did not terminate and reversed the court of appeals' judgment affirming partial summary judgment for the lessors. The court reasoned that the habendum clause extending the lease "as long thereafter as gas is or can be produced" is satisfied by a well capable of production, and the cessation-of-production clause requiring resumption of drilling operations within sixty days does not impose a requirement of continuous actual production to avoid termination. The case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

property

In this wrongful death lawsuit arising from a surgical complication during a polypectomy, the nonsettling defendant sought settlement credits under Chapter 33 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code based on a $200,000 settlement between one plaintiff and another defendant. The Supreme Court of Texas held that the record triggered a presumption entitling the nonsettling defendant to credits against the jury's awards because the remaining plaintiffs benefited from the settling plaintiff's proceeds. The court further ruled that the trial court must give the nonsettling plaintiffs an opportunity to demonstrate they did not benefit from the settlement. The court reversed the court of appeals' judgment and remanded the case for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved a contract dispute between Jones Brothers Dirt & Paving Contractors and the Texas Department of Transportation over Jones's attempt to terminate a Disadvantaged Business Enterprise subcontractor on a federally funded road project. Jones was required under the contract to obtain approval from TxDOT's Business Opportunity Program Office before removal, but the BOP denied the request after finding insufficient evidence that the subcontractor was unwilling or unable to perform. Jones pursued administrative remedies under Texas Transportation Code section 201.112 to recover costs and liquidated damages, then filed suit raising both administrative review claims and original common-law breach of contract and declaratory judgment claims. The Supreme Court of Texas held that the Administrative Law Judge correctly applied a partiality, fraud, misconduct, or gross error standard to review the BOP decision and that section 201.112 provided the exclusive remedy, barring the common-law claims due to sovereign immunity. Accordingly, the court reversed the court of appeals on the common-law claims, dismissed them for lack of jurisdiction, and remanded the administrative claim for further proceedings.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involved a wrongful death lawsuit against the Texas Department of Transportation after a fatal car accident at an intersection where vandals had removed stop signs. The plaintiffs claimed the state's negligence in failing to address the repeated vandalism waived its immunity under the Texas Tort Claims Act. The trial court and court of appeals ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, but the Supreme Court of Texas reversed, holding that section 101.060(a)(3) of the Act applies to claims involving third-party removal of signs and requires actual notice to the state, which was not proven here. The court determined that a sign's vulnerability to vandalism does not constitute a "condition" under section 101.060(a)(2) that would waive immunity.

torts & liability

This case involved prospective buyers of a Texas car dealership who sued Ford Motor Company for tortious interference with their purchase contracts after Ford sought to exercise a contractual right of first refusal and assign it to another dealer; the buyers also sought declaratory relief and a temporary injunction, alleging that Ford's right violated provisions of the Texas Motor Vehicle Commission Code prohibiting manufacturers from blocking qualified transfers. The Texas Supreme Court held that the Texas Motor Vehicle Board has exclusive jurisdiction only over claims and issues directly governed by the Code, so the buyers were not required to exhaust administrative remedies before filing their tortious interference and declaratory judgment claims in court. However, the trial court was directed to abate those claims to permit the Board to exercise primary jurisdiction over the Code construction issue due to its expertise. The Court further concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the temporary injunction because the buyers showed a probable right to recovery and lacked an adequate legal remedy. The judgment of the court of appeals was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings.

business & regulatoryproceduretorts & liability

This case involved a wrongful-death lawsuit arising from a fatal car accident at an intersection where vandals had removed the stop signs, leading to claims that the Texas Department of Transportation was negligent in maintaining them. The plaintiffs sued under the Texas Tort Claims Act, alleging that repeated vandalism created a "condition" that waived the state's sovereign immunity. The trial court entered judgment for the plaintiffs after a jury verdict, and the court of appeals affirmed, but the Texas Supreme Court reversed and rendered judgment that the plaintiffs take nothing. The Court held that the Act's specific provision on third-party removal or destruction of signs applies and requires actual notice of the signs' absence before the accident, which was lacking, and that susceptibility to repeated vandalism is not a "condition" under the other cited subsection.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case concerned a Belgian citizen's lawsuit against BMC Software Belgium (BMCB), a foreign subsidiary of a Texas-headquartered company, alleging breach of contract, fraud, and related claims arising from an employment agreement that included unfulfilled stock options. The trial court denied BMCB's special appearance challenging personal jurisdiction, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Texas Supreme Court reversed, concluding that BMCB lacked sufficient contacts with Texas to support either specific or general jurisdiction and was not the alter ego of its parent company. The Court further held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying a motion to continue the special appearance hearing for additional discovery. It therefore rendered judgment dismissing the claims against BMCB for want of jurisdiction.

procedurebusiness & regulatorylabor & employment

This case concerns a dispute between Subaru of America and its former dealer McDavid Nissan over Subaru's refusal to allow relocation of a dealership, which led McDavid to close operations and sue for alleged violations of the Texas Motor Vehicle Commission Code, breach of oral and written contracts, promissory estoppel, bad faith, and DTPA claims. The trial court granted summary judgment to Subaru on exhaustion and other grounds, but the court of appeals reversed in part while holding that the Code unconstitutionally abrogated common-law claims by granting exclusive jurisdiction to the Texas Motor Vehicle Board. The Texas Supreme Court held that the Code confers exclusive original jurisdiction on the Board to decide issues it governs, requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies before courts can adjudicate related damages claims, but does not eliminate common-law claims. It therefore reversed the court of appeals in part, affirmed in part, and remanded with instructions to abate the proceedings so McDavid could first obtain final Board findings on the Code-governed issues. The core reasoning is that the statutory scheme prioritizes initial Board resolution of regulated matters without displacing separate common-law causes of action.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involved a defamation lawsuit brought by employee Brenda Goodman against her employer Minyard Food Stores and co-worker Les Heflin, after Heflin made statements during an internal investigation admitting to kissing and hugging Goodman, which led to her transfer and resignation. A jury found Heflin liable for defamation and determined he acted within the course and scope of his employment, making Minyard jointly liable for actual damages, but the trial court set aside punitive damages. The Texas Supreme Court reversed the judgment against Minyard, holding there was no evidence that Heflin's defamatory statements were made in the course and scope of employment. The court reasoned that while employees are required to participate in misconduct investigations, Heflin's statements were made to the employer rather than for the employer's benefit or to accomplish a job purpose, distinguishing this from cases where statements furthered the employer's interests.

labor & employmenttorts & liability

In this FELA case, former Union Pacific employee Seymour Williams sued the railroad after being injured by a metal rain cap that flew off a signal mast during cleanup at a train derailment site. The jury found for Williams, and the trial court rendered judgment on the verdict after refusing Union Pacific’s proposed jury instruction on foreseeability as it relates to the railroad’s duty of care. The court of appeals affirmed, but the Texas Supreme Court reversed, holding that disputed evidence existed on whether Union Pacific knew or should have known the site posed a danger that could cause Williams’s injury, so the trial court should have submitted a foreseeability instruction tied to duty rather than conflating it with causation. The Court further concluded that Union Pacific preserved error by requesting a substantially correct instruction and that the omission was reversible because it probably led to an improper judgment.

labor & employmenttorts & liabilityprocedure

In Texas Department of Transportation v. Needham, a longtime TxDOT employee sued the agency under the Texas Whistleblower Act, alleging retaliation for reporting a coworker's alleged drunk driving incident to several supervisors. The trial court entered judgment on a jury verdict for the employee, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Texas Supreme Court reversed, holding that TxDOT was not an appropriate law enforcement authority under the Act because the statutory definition requires the ability to regulate under, enforce, investigate, or prosecute the reported law violation, which internal employer discipline does not satisfy. The court further concluded there was no evidence supporting the employee's claimed good-faith belief that TxDOT qualified, as his reports and the agency's internal processes fell outside that definition.

labor & employment

The case involved a dispute between IT-Davy, a contractor hired by the Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission (TNRCC) to clean up a hazardous waste site, and the TNRCC over whether the agency owed additional payments beyond the contract price due to unexpected site conditions. IT-Davy sued for breach of contract and other claims after the TNRCC refused further payments and declined arbitration, without first obtaining legislative consent. The trial court and court of appeals denied the TNRCC's plea to the jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity, but the Texas Supreme Court reversed, holding that sovereign immunity barred the suit. The Court reasoned that neither the TNRCC's conduct in contracting and requesting work, the contract's terms, the Water Code, nor the Declaratory Judgments Act waived the agency's immunity from suit.

procedurebusiness & regulatoryenvironment

This case concerned whether Texas Labor Code provisions requiring self-insured political subdivisions, including the Texas Municipal League Intergovernmental Risk Pool formed by over 1,600 cities, to pay unclaimed workers' compensation death benefits into the Subsequent Injury Fund violated the Texas Constitution's bans on gratuitous public payments (art. III, §52(a)) or statewide ad valorem taxes (art. VIII, §1-e). The trial court found the statutes and implementing rules unconstitutional, but the court of appeals reversed, upholding them under a custodial-escheat rationale. The Texas Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' judgment that the provisions are constitutional, reasoning that the required transfers do not amount to lending credit or granting public money without a public purpose and do not constitute a prohibited recapture of local taxes, though it rejected the lower court's escheat analysis.

labor & employmenttaxesbusiness & regulatory

This case involved a customer's personal injury claim against Southwestern Electric Power Company, a regulated utility, arising from voltage fluctuations in her home that allegedly caused an electrical shock after a damaged power line was repaired. The utility moved for summary judgment based on a tariff provision, approved by the Public Utility Commission, that limited its liability for personal injuries to instances of gross negligence or willful misconduct. The trial court granted the motion on the negligence claim, but the court of appeals held the limitation prima facie unconscionable under the UCC and remanded for further proceedings. The Texas Supreme Court reversed in part, concluding that the tariff provision was reasonable as a matter of law and enforceable against the claim.

business & regulatorytorts & liability

In this case, patient Ronald Moss sued Dr. Harshad Shah for medical negligence, alleging that the doctor negligently removed a scleral buckle from Moss's eye in November 1992 and failed to provide adequate follow-up monitoring, which led to a second retinal detachment and eventual blindness. The trial court granted summary judgment to Dr. Shah on the ground that the claims were barred by the two-year statute of limitations under the Texas Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act (article 4590i, section 10.01). The court of appeals reversed, but the Texas Supreme Court reinstated the judgment for Dr. Shah, holding that limitations began to run from the date of the surgery for the negligent-surgery claim and that the follow-up visits did not constitute a continuing course of treatment that would extend the limitations period. The Court reasoned that the periodic checkups were not shown to be part of an ongoing duty tied to the alleged negligence, and Moss did not file suit until 1996, more than two years after the relevant dates.

healthcaretorts & liabilityprocedure

This case concerned a condemnation action in which the State acquired part of a commercial property owner's land to widen a highway, resulting in the building being much closer to the frontage road, loss of green space and parking, shortened driveways, and related changes to access. The trial court admitted evidence of the resulting damages and awarded compensation, but the court of appeals reversed in part, finding some damages noncompensable. The court held that under the facts presented, damages from increased proximity to the roadway constitute special rather than community damages and are therefore compensable, that evidence of unsafe access to the remainder and the cost to cure was properly admitted as special damages, that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing a requested jury instruction on noncompensable access issues, and that any other evidentiary exclusions were harmless error. It accordingly reversed the court of appeals and rendered judgment for the property owner.

propertyprocedure

This case arose from disputes over redistricting Texas's congressional districts following the 2000 census, where multiple parties proposed plans to the trial court. The Texas Supreme Court addressed whether the Attorney General could compel the trial court to adopt his specific plan under separation of powers and whether the trial court's adoption of a new plan without adequate notice or hearing violated the parties' due course of law rights. The court held that the Attorney General's position improperly intruded on judicial authority, violating separation of powers, and that the trial court's process denied parties a meaningful opportunity to be heard on the final plan. Consequently, the Supreme Court vacated the trial court's October 10, 2001 judgment and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.

electionsprocedure

In this case, Holy Cross Church sued Johnny Wolf for a declaratory judgment that a foreclosure on its church property was barred by the Texas four-year statute of limitations, after the note secured by the property had been transferred through multiple holders including the FDIC. The trial court granted summary judgment to the Church, but the court of appeals reversed on the ground that affirmative steps toward foreclosure were needed to accelerate the note and start the limitations period. The Texas Supreme Court held that clear notices of intent to accelerate and of acceleration were sufficient to establish accrual of the claim, that the Texas four-year limitations period applied because the claim accrued after the FDIC transferred the note, and that limitations therefore barred Wolf's foreclosure. The court reversed the appeals court and rendered judgment for the Church. The opinion addresses the requirements for accelerating a real property note and the scope of the federal six-year limitations period under FIRREA when notes are transferred by the FDIC.

propertyprocedurebusiness & regulatoryfederal power

This case concerned whether state common-law tort claims alleging that a 1986 trailer was defectively designed or marketed for lacking sufficient conspicuity devices (additional lights or reflectors) to prevent nighttime accidents were preempted by the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act and Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 108. The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendant manufacturer on preemption grounds, but the court of appeals reversed, holding that the claims were neither expressly nor impliedly preempted. The Texas Supreme Court affirmed, reasoning that the federal standard sets only a minimum requirement, compliance with both the federal regulation and potential common-law duties is possible, and the tort claims do not obstruct the federal objectives of uniformity or the Secretary's regulatory approach. The Court distinguished contrary federal precedents and declined to overrule its prior decision in Hyundai Motor Co. v. Alvarado.

torts & liabilityfederal power

This case concerned whether U.S. telecommunications companies' contracts providing 1800 services to Mexican customers violated Mexican law on resale of services, and if so, whether that would bar their claims against Telmex for tortious interference and other claims. The Texas Supreme Court held that the contracts did not violate Mexican law, as Telmex's concession permitted resale of excess capacity. Because the contracts were legal, the court did not address whether illegality would serve as a defense. The court reversed the court of appeals' affirmance of summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings.

business & regulatorytorts & liability