Robert M. Campbell

In this case, insurance agents C. Daniel Hurlbut and A.C. Hovater sued their former employer Gulf Atlantic Life Insurance Company and related defendants for fraud, business disparagement, and tortious interference with contract rights arising from the collapse of a group health insurance trust arrangement in 1974-1975. A jury awarded the plaintiffs actual and exemplary damages, but the court of appeals reversed and rendered judgment for the defendants on the ground that all claims were barred by the two-year statute of limitations. The Texas Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, holding that the evidence raised a fact issue on when the plaintiffs should reasonably have discovered the defendants' alleged fraud, which affects the running of limitations. The court remanded the case for a new trial because the court of appeals had also concluded that the great weight of the evidence showed the fraud should have been discovered more than two years before suit was filed.

torts & liabilitybusiness & regulatoryprocedure

This case concerned ownership of an undivided one-half mineral interest in land originally mortgaged by the Scotts to Kocurek via a deed of trust in 1922. The Scotts later conveyed that half-mineral interest to Flag-Redfern's predecessors in 1931, then in 1932 deeded the full property to Kocurek in satisfaction of the debt; after further conveyances, Humble claimed the interest through Kocurek and sought a declaratory judgment. The trial court and court of appeals ruled for Humble, treating the 1932 deed as a deed in lieu of foreclosure that cut off Flag-Redfern's rights. The Texas Supreme Court reversed, holding that the deed did not extinguish Flag-Redfern's legal title because the instrument was a mortgage (not a vendor's lien), the Scotts no longer owned the full legal estate after their prior conveyance, and no merger occurred; formal foreclosure proceedings with notice would have been required to affect the intervening purchaser's interest.

property

This oil and gas case concerned whether lessee-operator Cabot Corporation breached an implied duty under its 1967 lease with lessors Martha Brown and others to reasonably market gas from the Kelln Well, where royalties were to be based on market value at the well. Cabot had entered an exchange agreement sending the gas into an interstate pipeline system subject to Federal Power Commission pricing jurisdiction, paid royalties at the lower regulated rates, and obtained a Henshaw exemption allowing some intrastate sales at higher prices without sharing those benefits with the royalty owners. Brown sued claiming the gas was not dedicated to interstate commerce or, alternatively, that Cabot should have sought FPC abandonment to market at higher prices; a jury found for Brown, and the trial court and court of appeals affirmed a damages award. The Texas Supreme Court reversed and rendered in part and remanded in part, focusing on the impact of the division orders, the applicability of FPC jurisdiction, and the scope of the implied marketing covenant in light of federal regulatory constraints.

propertybusiness & regulatoryfederal power

This case involved a claim of negligent entrustment after an employee of Esperanza Transmission Company, who had a record of speeding tickets, allowed an intoxicated companion to drive the company truck, resulting in a collision that injured Barry Schneider. Schneider sued Esperanza for negligence and gross negligence in entrusting the vehicle to the employee and sought actual and punitive damages. The trial court awarded damages based on the jury's findings, but the court of appeals reversed and rendered a take-nothing judgment. The Texas Supreme Court affirmed, holding that proximate cause was lacking because the employee was not driving at the time of the accident and there was no evidence that Esperanza knew or should have known of the employee's propensity to entrust the vehicle to an incompetent driver. The Court explained that negligent entrustment liability requires entrustment to an unlicensed, incompetent, or reckless driver who then negligently causes the accident, without imputing negligence from subsequent acts like those in joint venture cases.

torts & liability

In this mandamus proceeding, police officers J.E. Hobson and David Lott sought to overturn a trial court order compelling them to answer interrogatories in a civil lawsuit filed by Marlon Ray Davis concerning the officers' investigation into thefts of heavy equipment. The officers asserted that the requested information was privileged under the Texas Open Records Act because it related to an ongoing criminal investigation. The Texas Supreme Court recognized a privilege for law enforcement investigation records in civil cases but held that it had been waived. The court reasoned that objections to interrogatories are due within thirty days of service under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 168(6), and the officers' six-day-late response without seeking an extension or showing good cause constituted a waiver of any privilege. The court therefore denied mandamus relief.

procedurecriminal law

This case involved a homeowner who sued a contractor and its assignee bank for damages after defective rock siding was installed under a retail installment contract, alleging violations of the Deceptive Trade Practices Act. The trial court entered a joint and several judgment against both defendants for $25,000 plus attorney's fees and voided the note, which the court of appeals affirmed on the ground that the FTC holder rule preserved all claims and defenses against the assignee. The Texas Supreme Court reversed as to the assignee's liability, holding that the FTC-mandated notice provision in the contract expressly limited any affirmative recovery against the assignee to the amounts the buyer had already paid ($1,256.90). The court reasoned that the FTC rule reallocates seller misconduct costs to the creditor-assignee but caps affirmative recovery at payments made, while preserving any greater rights available under state law only if separately pleaded and proved.

business & regulatorytorts & liability

This case involved a personal injury lawsuit arising from a motorcycle accident during road construction, where the plaintiff sought damages and, after a favorable jury verdict, attempted to amend his petition to request prejudgment interest following the Cavnar decision. The trial court denied the amendment and prejudgment interest, ordering a remittitur, and the court of appeals affirmed the denial of interest. The Texas Supreme Court reversed, holding that the plaintiff could recover prejudgment interest on stipulated accrued damages for past medical expenses, lost wages, and property damage, which were sufficiently segregated from future damages. The court reasoned that the stipulation and judgment recitals identified these specific past amounts, that prejudgment interest involves only a mechanical calculation without need for additional evidence or surprise to the defendant, and that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing the post-verdict amendment under Rule 66 since Cavnar applied to pending cases.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case involved a lawsuit by a mother on behalf of her daughter, a student with cerebral palsy, against a Texas school district and its employees for alleged negligence and gross negligence in failing to supervise students or provide timely medical care after the student was pushed into chairs and suffered a head injury that led to convulsions. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants based on governmental and statutory immunity, which the court of appeals and Texas Supreme Court affirmed. The majority held that section 21.912 of the Texas Education Code, as construed in Barr v. Bernhard, grants professional school employees immunity from personal liability for acts within the scope of employment involving judgment or discretion, except in narrow cases like excessive force during discipline, and that the legislature's subsequent expansions of similar protections confirmed this reading. The court declined to overrule Barr or find liability for general negligence resulting in bodily injury.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case involved a challenge by Project Principle, Inc., a group of teachers and administrators, to the constitutionality of Texas Education Code § 13.047, which required public school educators to pass the TECAT exam to retain their teaching certificates as part of broader education reforms. The trial court issued a temporary injunction blocking enforcement of the statute on grounds including impairment of contracts, retroactivity, due process violations, equal protection issues, and improper suspension of law by the State Board of Education. The Texas Supreme Court reversed the trial court's judgment and dissolved the injunction, holding the statute constitutional. The court reasoned that teaching certificates are licenses subject to reasonable future state restrictions rather than protected contracts, that the Board acted within its authority in implementing a basic skills test due to limited appropriations, and that no constitutional violations occurred.

business & regulatorycivil rights

This case is an election contest for the office of sheriff in Brazos County, in which the trial court found that illegal votes cast in the general election exceeded the margin of victory and therefore voided the election. The court of appeals reversed and rendered judgment for the contestee, holding that the contestant failed to prove the illegal votes were cast specifically in the sheriff's race. The Supreme Court of Texas dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, reasoning that neither a material challenge to the validity of a statute nor a qualifying conflict with prior appellate decisions was presented to invoke its review in an election contest under the Government Code.

elections

The case concerned whether Texas's Tax Increment Financing Act (art. 1066e) is constitutional when it allows a city to create reinvestment zones and commit increased ad valorem tax revenues from school districts and other political subdivisions to finance redevelopment in blighted areas. The trial court upheld the Act and the City's ordinance, but the court of appeals reversed, finding the Act unconstitutional as applied to school districts because it diverted their tax revenues to non-educational purposes without trustee consent and because school districts were not 'political subdivisions' under the enabling constitutional amendment (Tex. Const. art. VIII, § 1-g(b)). The Texas Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, holding the Act constitutional: the 1981 amendment expressly authorizes the use of school-district tax increments for redevelopment bonds and prevails over the earlier restrictions in art. VII, § 3, while the term 'political subdivisions' includes school districts. The court remanded for consideration of the school districts' remaining points of error.

taxesbusiness & regulatoryproperty

In Moore v. Lillebo, parents sued a driver for the wrongful death of their adult son in a car accident, where the jury awarded only pecuniary damages and the trial court refused to submit issues on loss of companionship, society, and mental anguish. The Texas Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, holding that mental anguish damages are recoverable under the Texas Wrongful Death Act for the death of a family member without requiring proof of physical injury or manifestation. The core reasoning drew from precedents such as Sanchez v. Schindler and Cavnar v. Quality Control Parking, which recognized that emotional injuries to the familial relationship are inherent in such deaths and worthy of compensation, creating an exception to the general physical injury rule for torts where genuineness of the claim is assured by its nature.

torts & liabilityfamily law

This case involved a lawsuit by Cox Enterprises, publisher of the Austin American-Statesman, against the Austin Independent School District Board of Trustees under the Texas Open Meetings Act. The newspaper alleged that the Board provided inadequate notice for its executive sessions by using vague agenda items like 'personnel' or 'litigation' and that it improperly convened those sessions without a quorum present at the meeting place. The Texas Supreme Court held that the Board violated the Act's notice requirements because general descriptions did not sufficiently alert the public to the subjects under discussion and that executive sessions must begin with a convened open meeting attended by a quorum. The court reversed the court of appeals in part on these points while affirming its rulings that certain Board actions did not constitute improper final decisions in closed session.

procedure

This case is an original habeas corpus proceeding in which Roy A. Lee challenged his confinement under a writ of attachment and commitment for contempt. The commitment order stemmed from a July 25, 1985 order that referenced a non-existent contempt judgment and hearing, rather than the earlier May 30 contempt order. The court held that a written judgment of contempt and a written commitment order are required to imprison someone for civil constructive contempt, and that the commitment must be based on violation of an actual court order. It further found the May 30 order invalid because it punished Lee for failing to obey a subpoena that did not order him to answer interrogatories, only to produce documents. Because the commitment order relied on a non-existent judgment, Lee was ordered discharged.

procedurecriminal law

The case involved Michael Van Page suing the City of Denton for burn injuries sustained in a fire at a privately owned storage building, alleging the city's fire marshal negligently failed to discover stored gasoline or warn of the danger during investigations of prior arson attempts, thereby creating liability under section 3 of the Texas Tort Claims Act for a condition of real property. After a jury trial, the trial court entered judgment against the city jointly with the building owner, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court of Texas reversed and rendered judgment that the Pages take nothing from the city. The court held that the Act waives governmental immunity only to the extent a private person would be liable under state law, but the city owed no duty to Page because it neither owned nor controlled the property, did not agree to perform the owner's duty to keep the premises safe, and Page did not rely on the fire marshal's inspections.

torts & liabilityproperty

Amalia Ruiz sued her former employer, Miller Curtain Company, alleging wrongful discharge under Texas article 8307c after she was fired for filing a workers’ compensation claim; she also brought a federal civil-rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 that was later dismissed. The state trial court and court of appeals dismissed the article 8307c claim on the ground that it was preempted by sections 7 and 8 of the National Labor Relations Act. The Texas Supreme Court reversed, holding that filing an individual workers’-compensation claim does not constitute “concerted activity” protected by the NLRA and that the state statute addresses conduct of only peripheral concern to federal labor law while implicating deeply rooted local interests; therefore the state cause of action is not preempted. The court remanded the case for trial on the merits.

labor & employmentfederal power

This case arose from a collision on an interstate highway in which a truck owned by Steves Industries struck a stalled car, injuring driver Renee Williams and killing her two children; the Williamses sued Steves under negligent entrustment and related theories for actual and punitive damages, alleging the company was negligent and grossly negligent in allowing unlicensed employee Robert Robinson to drive the vehicle. The jury found gross negligence and awarded punitive damages, but the trial court disregarded those findings and limited recovery to actual damages. The court of appeals and Texas Supreme Court affirmed, holding there was no evidence that Steves knew or should have known Robinson was an incompetent or reckless driver or that it acted with the conscious indifference required for gross negligence under Texas law on punitive damages in negligent entrustment claims.

torts & liabilityprocedure

Myrna Dennis sued psychiatrist T.H. Allison for breach of an implied warranty after he physically beat and sexually assaulted her during a psychiatric consultation, claiming he violated ethical standards of his profession. The jury found in Dennis's favor on the implied warranty claim and proximate causation of damages, but the trial court disregarded the verdict as immaterial and entered judgment for Allison, which the court of appeals affirmed. The Texas Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the implied warranty doctrine—originally developed as a strict liability concept for defective products based on public policy—does not extend to professional medical services. The court reasoned that other remedies exist to address wrongs in such cases, making it unnecessary to impose liability without fault via implied warranty as a matter of public policy.

torts & liabilityhealthcare

In Crimmins v. Lowry, Crimmins sued Lowry to recover on a promissory note that Lowry and McNiel had signed as comakers, secured by a security interest in the partnership's office assets. After the partnership dissolved and McNiel went bankrupt, the bankruptcy court voided the security interest as a preferential transfer because Crimmins had delayed filing the financing statement; Lowry then argued he was discharged under Tex. Bus. & Comm. Code § 3.606(a)(2) because the collateral had been unjustifiably impaired. The trial court ruled for Crimmins, the court of appeals reversed, and the Texas Supreme Court reversed the appeals court and affirmed the trial court judgment. The court held that the impairment-of-collateral defense does not apply to comakers, because the statutory phrase "any party" refers only to parties secondarily liable under the predecessor Negotiable Instruments Law, and comakers are primarily liable. A concurring opinion noted that Lowry might have qualified as an accommodation party entitled to the defense but had not preserved that argument.

business & regulatory

The case involved Louis Redinger, an employee of a plumbing subcontractor on a construction site, who suffered a finger injury when a tractor operated by dirt-hauling subcontractor Bobby Baird crushed it after the general contractor Living, Inc. directed Baird to move dirt piles blocking concrete trucks. The trial court entered judgment for Redinger based on jury findings that Living and Baird were each 50 percent negligent. The court of appeals reversed due to alleged jury misconduct and remanded for a new trial, but the Texas Supreme Court reversed that decision and affirmed the trial court judgment. The court reasoned that a general contractor in control of premises owes a duty of reasonable care to a subcontractor's employee when it retains supervisory control over the manner of work, as evidenced here by the contractor's order directing the timing and location of Baird's activity, and that discussions among jurors about damages caused no probable injury because the same ten jurors agreed on all issues and the verdict.

torts & liabilityprocedure