Craig T. Enoch

The case involved parents suing a hospital and physicians for battery and negligence after their infant, born alive at 23 weeks gestation and weighing about 629 grams, received resuscitative treatment without the parents' consent. The parents had requested no heroic measures, expecting the infant to die, but hospital staff decided a neonatologist should evaluate the baby at birth and proceed with treatment if appropriate under emergent conditions. The court of appeals had ruled against the parents because the infant's condition was not certifiably terminal under the Natural Death Act, and the Texas Supreme Court affirmed that judgment. The court's reasoning was that any pre-birth treatment decisions could not be fully informed, and once born, the infant faced an emergency where treatment was needed immediately to possibly save its life before parental consent or court intervention could be obtained, creating an exception to the general rule requiring consent for treating a child. The negligence claim based on hospital policies also failed for the same reasons.

healthcarefamily lawtorts & liability

The case concerned whether the Texas Highway Beautification Act, which restricts outdoor advertising signs near interstate and primary highways, violated Pat Barber's free speech rights by preventing him from displaying a billboard with the message "Just say NO to Searches" on his nonresidential property. The Texas Supreme Court held that the Act is content-neutral and constitutes a valid time, place, and manner restriction under both the United States and Texas Constitutions, reversing the court of appeals' contrary ruling. The court reasoned that the Act's prohibitions and exemptions are based on the sign's location and general purpose rather than its specific message or viewpoint, and that it advances substantial government interests in highway safety and aesthetics without unduly burdening speech. The Texas Constitution provides no greater protection in this context than the federal First Amendment.

free speechproperty

The case was a parental rights termination proceeding in which a jury found that Shana Strickland had endangered her five children through conditions or conduct, constructively abandoned them, and failed to comply with court orders, and that termination served the children's best interests, leading the trial court to terminate her rights. Strickland appealed, challenging the admission of prior court orders containing fact findings and a mediation agreement as violating evidence rules and confidentiality statutes, the court of appeals' refusal to review an unpreserved factual sufficiency claim, and alleged ineffective assistance by her appointed counsel for failing to record parts of the trial, preserve the sufficiency complaint, and seek less restrictive alternatives. The Texas Supreme Court held that admitting the unredacted orders was error but harmless, the mediation agreement was properly admitted, parents in termination cases have a right to effective assistance of counsel, counsel's failure to preserve factual sufficiency could amount to ineffective assistance under some circumstances, and the case should be remanded for the court of appeals to assess harm on that issue while rejecting other ineffective assistance claims.

family lawprocedure

This case involved the termination of a father's parental rights to his two children under Texas Family Code section 161.001(1)(Q), which allows termination if a parent is incarcerated and unable to care for the child for at least two years from the filing of the petition. The father had been imprisoned since 1993 for drug offenses and an escape attempt, with a release date in 2003, and the Department of Protective and Regulatory Services sought termination in 1998. The Supreme Court of Texas held that the two-year incarceration period applies prospectively from the petition's filing date and that the statute is constitutional as applied to the father despite his incarceration beginning before the law's effective date. The court reversed the court of appeals' decision, which had found the statute unconstitutionally applied, and rendered judgment terminating the father's parental rights.

family lawcriminal lawprocedure

The case involved a dispute between N.P., Inc. and developer Jerald Turboff over entitlement to reimbursement payments from Harris County Municipal Utility District No. 36 for constructing water, sewer, and drainage facilities on a tract of land. Turboff had entered a 1984 contract with the MUD promising to build and convey the facilities in exchange for reimbursement of costs, but he lost title to the property and facilities through foreclosure before completing the conveyance; N.P., Inc. later bought the land and facilities and entered its own contract with the MUD. The trial court and court of appeals ruled for Turboff based on his claimed reservation of the reimbursement right, but the Texas Supreme Court reversed and rendered judgment for N.P., Inc., concluding that the reimbursement was a personal contract right tied to the ability to convey clear title to the facilities, which Turboff could no longer perform.

propertybusiness & regulatory

The case involved an indigent prison inmate who filed a pro se medical malpractice suit against a prison doctor after being reassigned to hard labor despite severe back problems, leading to the trial court denying appointed counsel and dismissing the case for failure to file a required expert report. The court of appeals reversed, ruling that suing a prison employee created exceptional circumstances requiring appointed counsel. The Texas Supreme Court reversed that decision, holding that an indigent inmate has no automatic right to appointed counsel in a civil case merely because the defendant is a prison employee. The Court reasoned that appointment of counsel in civil matters is discretionary under Texas Government Code section 24.016, inmate suits against prison personnel are common rather than exceptional, and medical malpractice plaintiffs can typically secure representation on contingency.

civil rightsproceduretorts & liability

The case arose after a jury trial when the trial court signed a July 2000 judgment awarding damages, interest, fees, and costs to Goodmark and the other defendants; Briscoe filed a notice of appeal but questioned whether the judgment disposed of all claims and parties. The court of appeals first dismissed the appeal for lack of a final judgment, then after the trial court issued an interpretive order confirming finality, dismissed Briscoe's second appeal as untimely. The Texas Supreme Court held that the law-of-the-case doctrine permitted the court of appeals to revisit its earlier finality ruling, but once it determined the original judgment was final the court should have addressed the merits of the first appeal rather than dismissing the second appeal for want of jurisdiction; the Court therefore reversed the dismissal and remanded for further proceedings. The opinion concerns only questions of appellate procedure and finality of judgments.

procedure

In this putative class action, a trust beneficiary sued banks serving as trustees, alleging self-dealing and breaches of fiduciary duty when the banks merged, transferred trust assets, and liquidated investments in each other's stock, resulting in losses to the trusts. The trial court granted summary judgment to the banks based on an exculpatory clause in the trust instrument that limited trustee liability to acts of gross negligence, bad faith, or fraud. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the clause could not shield the banks from self-dealing claims as a matter of public policy and that the trial court erred in striking amended petitions adding class representatives. The Texas Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, rendering judgment that the plaintiff take nothing, because Texas statutes and trust law permit such exculpatory provisions, the merger and liquidation were authorized by the trust terms and federal banking regulations, and no gross negligence or similar misconduct was shown.

business & regulatorypropertytorts & liability

In Miller v. Keyser, homeowners sued sales agent Barry Keyser under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA) after he misrepresented lot sizes and fencing options in a subdivision, leading to expenses when a drainage easement required fence removal. The trial court held Keyser personally liable based on jury findings, but the court of appeals reversed, concluding that an agent acting within the scope of employment for a disclosed principal cannot be liable under the DTPA. The Texas Supreme Court reversed that decision, holding that the DTPA's text allowing consumer suits against "any person" for false, misleading, or deceptive acts permits personal liability for an agent's own misrepresentations made in the course of employment, without requiring proof of intent or knowledge that the statements were false, and remanded the case.

business & regulatorytorts & liability

In City of Bellmead v. Torres, Nanette Torres sued the City of Bellmead for premises defect after she was injured when a swing broke at the city's softball complex, where she had been playing in a tournament. The City moved for summary judgment under Texas' Recreational Use Statute, which limits a property owner's liability for recreational users to the duty owed a trespasser (to avoid willful, wanton, or grossly negligent conduct). The trial court granted the motion, but the court of appeals reversed, holding that softball was not a recreational activity covered by the statute. The Texas Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and rendered judgment for the City, reasoning that the statute applied because the injury-causing condition was the swing (a structure on the premises) and the focus must be on whether the injury arose from recreational use, which the statute covers.

torts & liabilitypropertyprocedure

In Miga v. Jensen, Dennis Miga sued Ronald Jensen for breach of an oral stock option agreement that allowed Miga to purchase a percentage of Jensen's shares in a privately held company at Jensen's original cost. Jensen refused to honor the option after Miga resigned, and the company later went public with its stock appreciating substantially before trial. The trial court and court of appeals awarded Miga damages based on the stock's appreciated value at the time of trial, but the Texas Supreme Court reversed in part. The court held that the proper measure of damages for breach of a contract to deliver stock is the difference between the stock's fair market value on the date of breach and the exercise price, not any subsequent increase in value or lost profits from holding the shares after breach.

business & regulatory

The case concerned whether Wal-Mart could be held liable for false imprisonment after its employees submitted a returned company check and a preprinted complaint form to the district attorney, which led to the arrest of Martin Rodriguez based on an inaccurate driver's license number from the store's check identification system. The trial court granted summary judgment for Wal-Mart on the false imprisonment claim, but the court of appeals reversed that ruling. The Texas Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals in part and rendered judgment for Wal-Mart, holding that there was no evidence Wal-Mart knowingly provided false information with the intent that Rodriguez be arrested. The court reasoned that Wal-Mart's only connection to the detention was providing the check and complaint to prosecutors without further participation, and liability for false imprisonment requires willful detention or direction of the arrest, which was not shown here.

torts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory

The case involved Nathan Dale Campbell, who was found not guilty by reason of insanity on charges of aggravated kidnapping and assault and subsequently committed to a state mental hospital. Campbell appealed an order extending his involuntary commitment, arguing that the trial court lacked authority to hold the hearing because two medical certificates stating that he met the criteria for continued inpatient treatment were not on file as required by sections 574.009 and 574.011 of the Texas Mental Health Code. The court of appeals affirmed the commitment order, and the Texas Supreme Court affirmed that judgment. The Court held that hearings to extend commitment under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 46.03 section 4(d)(5) for persons acquitted by reason of insanity are not subject to the two-certificate prerequisite that applies to ordinary civil commitments under the Mental Health Code. The Court also declined to reach Campbell's sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenges due to inadequate briefing and failure to preserve other issues.

criminal lawhealthcareprocedure

This case involved insurance policyholders suing their insurers for allegedly undervaluing totaled vehicles through a third-party service, claiming fraud, deceptive trade practices, bad faith, and related violations under Texas law. The insurers sought to enforce an appraisal clause in the policies to resolve disputes over vehicle values, but the trial court refused, treating the clause as an arbitration agreement that was unenforceable as against public policy. The Texas Supreme Court held that appraisal clauses differ from arbitration clauses because they only determine the amount of loss rather than liability or rights, and longstanding precedent supports their enforceability. The court concluded that the trial court abused its discretion by misapplying the law and issued mandamus relief to compel the appraisal process, as the parties lacked an adequate remedy by appeal.

business & regulatoryprocedure

In King v. Dallas Fire Insurance Co., an employer sought a declaratory judgment that his commercial general liability insurer had a duty to defend him in a lawsuit brought by a third party injured in an assault by the employer's worker. The underlying claims included both respondeat superior and direct negligence against the employer for allegedly failing to conduct a background check, assess the worker's violent tendencies, or provide proper training. The trial court and court of appeals held there was no duty to defend because the assault was intentional, but the Texas Supreme Court reversed. The Court concluded that whether an "occurrence" (defined as an accident) existed must be determined from the insured employer's standpoint, and the separation-of-insureds clause and expected-or-intended-injury exclusion supported viewing the employer's alleged negligence as an accident separate from the employee's intentional act.

business & regulatorytorts & liability

The case concerned whether prejudgment interest awarded under subchapter P of Texas's Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act must be included within the damages cap set by subchapter K of the same Act. After a jury awarded $3 million in damages to the family of a patient who died following surgery at Columbia Bellaire Medical Center, the trial court applied the inflation-adjusted cap to reduce the hospital's liability to about $1.3 million but then added roughly $300,000 in prejudgment interest on top of that amount. Relying on its earlier decision in Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp. v. Auld, the Texas Supreme Court held that prejudgment interest constitutes damages subject to the statutory cap. The Court reasoned that the Legislature enacted the cap to limit health-care providers' overall civil liability, that the provisions could be harmonized by applying interest only up to the cap, and that no language in subchapter P indicated an intent to exempt such interest from the cap.

healthcaretorts & liabilityprocedure

In American Cyanamid Co. v. Geye, peanut farmers sued the herbicide manufacturer after their crops were damaged by a Pursuit-Prowl mixture, alleging breach of warranties, strict liability, and deceptive trade practices based on labels and ads claiming the products could be safely tank-mixed without injuring peanuts. The Texas Supreme Court considered whether FIFRA preempts these state common-law damage claims. The court held that the claims are not preempted. It reasoned that FIFRA expressly preempts only state labeling requirements that differ from federal ones, but the EPA has elected not to impose labeling or data requirements regarding product efficacy, including target-area phytotoxicity or crop damage, leaving no federal standards to trigger preemption of the Geyes' claims.

environmentbusiness & regulatoryfederal powertorts & liability

In 1995, the Texas Legislature amended the Public Utility Regulatory Act to allow incentive regulation for telephone companies, which included rate caps for basic network services but provided an exception requiring the Public Utility Commission to permit rate group reclassifications based on access line growth. Southwestern Bell sought such reclassifications for several exchanges due to growth, but the PUC instead raised the upper boundaries of the rate groups to keep the exchanges in their original classifications. The court of appeals held that the PUC was required to reclassify the exchanges upon a showing of appropriate growth and could not avoid this by adjusting boundaries. The Texas Supreme Court agreed with the court of appeals and affirmed its judgment, interpreting the statutory exception to mandate reclassification when the statutory conditions are met.

business & regulatory

The case involved the Guadalupe-Blanco River Authority's condemnation of a permanent easement across Marvin Kraft's 272-acre grazing land for a water pipeline, with a dispute centering on the fair market value of the easement and related damages. Kraft's expert appraiser used a comparable sales approach but reconfigured the narrow easement strip into a hypothetical rectangular tract relocated to front a highway with utilities access, then compared it to other local sales and made adjustments to arrive at a $64,400 valuation. The Authority's expert instead valued the entire property and applied a pro rata deduction, yielding a much lower figure of $7,630. The Texas Supreme Court held that the expert testimony was unreliable under Gammill v. Jack Williams Chevrolet because the compared sales were not actually comparable to the condemned land, so the trial court abused its discretion by admitting it; the court reversed the court of appeals and remanded the case.

propertyprocedure

This case concerned whether a return of service filed in Texas administrative condemnation proceedings constitutes evidence that proper notice of the special commissioners' hearing was given to the property owner. The State sought to condemn land from Bristol Hotel Asset Company for a road project and filed an executed, sworn return of service showing notice was delivered more than eleven days before the hearing. Bristol challenged jurisdiction in the trial court, arguing improper service, and the trial court excluded the return as hearsay while also barring testimony from the server due to discovery agreements; the court of appeals affirmed dismissal of the suit. The Supreme Court of Texas held that a return of service meeting statutory requirements is prima facie evidence of the facts it recites, analogous to returns in judicial proceedings and supported by longstanding precedent, and therefore reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

propertyprocedure