W. St. John Garwood

This case involved an original habeas corpus proceeding in which relator Joe Douglas Prickett sought release from custody after being held in contempt by the District Court of Cherokee County for failing to deliver Humble Oil & Refining Company stock certificates to his ex-wife as required by their divorce decree dividing community property. The court discharged the relator and released his sureties, holding that the contempt order was unauthorized. The core reasoning was that Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 308 permits enforcement of a judgment for personal property by special writ, attachment, fine, or imprisonment only where the property has “especial value” to the plaintiff beyond ordinary market value, which was not shown here since the stock was regularly traded and the decree allowed payment of its $3,200 market value as an alternative.

family lawprocedureproperty

This case arose under the Federal Employers' Liability Act when railroad employee Earl R. Deen sued Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Railway Company for negligence causing his injury and obtained a jury verdict in his favor. After the U.S. Supreme Court previously held that the evidence supported the negligence finding, the Texas Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the verdict subject to a $5,500 remittitur, but the Texas Supreme Court initially remanded for an independent state-court review of the evidence's weight. Following a mandamus from the U.S. Supreme Court directing that the negligence issue was foreclosed, the Texas Supreme Court withdrew its prior judgment and rendered a final decision awarding Deen $15,950 (after the remittitur credit to the Railroad Retirement Board), with specified allocations of costs. The court reasoned that the U.S. Supreme Court's mandate controlled the negligence question and that its own earlier ruling upholding the Court of Civil Appeals' authority to require remittitur remained undisturbed.

federal powerproceduretorts & liability

The case concerned whether the City of Corsicana could be held liable for negligence when burning grass at its airport damaged property stored there by the plaintiff under a contract. The Texas Supreme Court held that the city's operation of the airport was a governmental function, granting it immunity from tort liability and reversing the Court of Civil Appeals. The court reasoned that under Texas statutes like art. 46d-15 and common law principles distinguishing governmental and proprietary functions, airport operations by home-rule cities qualify as governmental, contrary to the majority view in other states and the lower court's decision. It rejected alternative arguments that the specific facts or the grass-burning act itself made it proprietary.

torts & liability

The case involved two Laredo police detectives, relators in an original habeas corpus proceeding, who had been held in contempt by a district judge for refusing to testify at a court of enquiry convened under Article 9.02 of the Texas Election Code. The Supreme Court of Texas denied relief and upheld the restraint, rejecting the district attorney's concession that a lapsed commitment order rendered the detention unlawful and finding that the original capias combined with the Court of Criminal Appeals' remand order provided adequate authority for custody. The court further held that various challenges to the statute's constitutionality, the enquiry's validity, and the form of the contempt adjudication did not justify release, while declining to reach the self-incrimination claim because it had not been pressed.

electionscriminal lawprocedure

The case involved licensed optometrists challenging a temporary injunction prohibiting their price advertising for eyeglasses and related services, which was issued under a 1957 amendment to Texas statutes regulating the optometry profession. The appellants contended that the amendment's provision banning certain advertisements, including those mentioning price, was void because its caption failed to adequately state the subject matter as required by the Texas Constitution. The Supreme Court of Texas held that the provision was constitutional, finding the caption sufficient under the Court's liberal approach to such challenges despite some variances between the caption and the body of the act. However, the Court concluded that the injunction must be dissolved, noting procedural limits on direct appeals that restricted review to constitutional issues and precluded addressing statutory interpretation questions.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case concerned a petition for mandamus by relator Ferris to require the Dallas County Republican Party Executive Committee to place his name on the primary ballot as a candidate for judge of the 101st District Court. The committee had refused, citing Article 1.05 of the Election Code and Section 7 of Article V of the Texas Constitution, on the ground that Ferris had not been engaged in the actual practice of law for the required four years preceding the election. The Court held that the committee lacked authority to resolve disputed questions of fact regarding the extent of a licensed attorney's practice when the candidate held a valid license and had paid bar dues, and could consider only official records such as bar status or a disbarment judgment. It therefore ordered the committee to place Ferris on the ballot, subject to payment of any proper filing fee, distinguishing the case from situations involving undisputed facts or facial defects in applications.

electionsprocedure