This case concerned whether Henry Pustejovsky could file a second lawsuit for mesothelioma against asbestos suppliers after settling an earlier asbestosis claim in 1982. The trial court and court of appeals ruled that the single action rule and statute of limitations barred the 1994 mesothelioma suit, finding that diagnosis of asbestosis triggered limitations for all asbestos-related claims. The Texas Supreme Court reversed, holding that neither rule applied because undisputed expert evidence established asbestosis and mesothelioma as distinct diseases arising from separate pathological processes. The Court reasoned that the discovery of one condition did not necessarily alert a plaintiff to the risk of the other, consistent with approaches in multiple other jurisdictions. The case was remanded for further proceedings.
This case arose from a fatal head-on collision on a Houston HOV lane involving a wrong-way driver, leading to negligence claims against TxDOT, Metro, and the City of Houston by the victim's family and survivors. A jury found Metro negligent and in a joint enterprise with TxDOT (which it found not negligent), resulting in a trial court judgment holding TxDOT liable up to the Tort Claims Act's damages cap. The court of appeals affirmed, and the Texas Supreme Court affirmed as well, holding that a governmental unit waives sovereign immunity under the Texas Tort Claims Act when it participates in a joint enterprise with another unit that negligently causes harm. The core reasoning was that the Act's waiver provision for use of tangible personal property or premises defects extends to vicarious liability arising from such joint enterprises among governmental entities.
The case involved Financial Review Services (FRS), which had contracts to audit hospital bills for unbilled services on behalf of HCA-affiliated hospitals, suing Prudential Insurance after Prudential refused to pay certain bills submitted by FRS, conducted its own audit, denied the claims, and communicated with policyholders and the hospitals, leading to complaints and the termination of FRS's contracts. FRS alleged tortious interference with its existing and prospective contracts, as well as breach of an oral agreement. The trial court granted partial summary judgment and a directed verdict for Prudential on the grounds that its actions were justified or that no duty or contract existed. The court of appeals reversed in part, and the Texas Supreme Court affirmed that reversal, holding that Prudential had not conclusively established its justification defense in the tortious interference claims, leaving fact issues for trial.
The case concerned whether Texas procedural and evidentiary rules could constitutionally bar post-verdict juror testimony about statements made during deliberations unless the statements involved outside influences. Ronald Jackson won a products liability verdict against Golden Eagle Archery but sought a new trial, partly based on alleged juror misconduct and bias, supported by juror affidavits and testimony. The trial court denied the motion, but the court of appeals reversed, finding that Rule 327(b) violated Jackson's right to a fair trial by preventing proof of misconduct. The Texas Supreme Court reversed, holding that the rules are constitutional because they protect the integrity of jury deliberations without denying the right to an impartial jury, and remanded for consideration of Jackson's remaining issues.
The case involved whether a trial court properly certified a class action lawsuit brought by 904 plaintiffs against Southwestern Refining and related defendants for personal injuries, including respiratory issues and property damage, allegedly caused by a 1994 refinery tank explosion and toxic smoke release in Corpus Christi. The trial court certified the class under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 42(b)(4) and ordered a three-phase trial addressing general liability and gross negligence first, followed by punitive damages, and then individual causation and actual damages; the court of appeals affirmed with modifications requiring class representatives to prove actual damages before class-wide punitives. The Texas Supreme Court reversed the certification order, concluding that individual issues of causation and damages would predominate over common issues, rendering the class action unmanageable under the predominance requirement.
This case involves a dispute over whether insurance companies must indemnify their agent under an agency agreement for a judgment obtained against the agent due to misrepresentations made to an insured about policy coverage. The insured had sued the agent under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act and obtained an agreed judgment, which the agent then assigned to the insured. The trial court granted summary judgment to the insurance companies, but the court of appeals reversed, finding ambiguity in the contract. The Texas Supreme Court held that the agreement unambiguously excludes indemnification when the agent knowingly made misrepresentations that caused his own liability, and thus reversed the appeals court and rendered judgment that the insured take nothing.
