Joe R. Greenhill

This case concerned the interpretation of a 1947 deed in which the grantors conveyed the surface estate of land in Texas to Cherokee Water Company while reserving the mineral estate and granting Cherokee a preferential right to purchase the minerals if the grantors agreed to sell them. Cherokee sued for declaratory judgment and specific performance after the mineral owners executed an oil and gas lease to a third party, claiming the lease triggered the right; the mineral owners counterclaimed for reformation of the deed. The trial court granted summary judgment to Cherokee, finding the lease constituted a sale and ordering specific performance while severing the reformation claim. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding the deed language ambiguous and the severance improper. The Texas Supreme Court reversed the appeals court and affirmed the trial court, ruling that the deed language was unambiguous, that under Texas law an oil and gas lease qualifies as a sale triggering the preferential right, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in severing the counterclaim.

propertyprocedure

In Neely v. Community Properties, Inc., homeowners sued adjacent apartment developers for flooding that began after construction of a complex and its drainage system, which channeled rainwater onto their land; the jury awarded damages including for permanent injury and exemplary damages based on the defendants' reckless disregard. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding there was no evidence of permanent or exemplary damages and directing that permanent-damage issues not be submitted on substantially similar evidence. The Texas Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded for consideration of factual-sufficiency challenges, finding some evidence that an injunction would not succeed in stopping the flooding (supporting permanent-damage findings) and that the defendants displayed conscious indifference through unfulfilled mitigation promises and ignored approved plans (supporting gross-negligence findings under the no-evidence standard).

propertytorts & liability

This case involved a suit by Bob Carroll Construction Company against C. L. Tyra to recover payment for construction services on an open account, with Tyra filing a counterclaim seeking usury penalties under a Texas statute for an allegedly usurious interest claim in Carroll's original petition. The trial court ruled for Carroll and denied the usury claim, with implied findings that no interest was charged and that any inclusion of the interest request was due to accidental and bona fide error. The Court of Appeals affirmed, and the Texas Supreme Court also affirmed on the basis that the statutory exception for bona fide error applied. The core reasoning was that evidence, including invoices, demand letters without interest, the attorney's testimony about mistakenly copying language from another petition, and the company's lack of any prior practice of charging interest, supported the finding of accidental error without any instruction to seek interest.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involved a worker's compensation claim by Ben J. Weinberg against American General Fire and Casualty Company. Weinberg's claim was denied by the Industrial Accident Board for untimely filing, and he then sued in district court to appeal that decision. The district court granted summary judgment to American General on the ground that Weinberg had not filed suit within twenty days of his initial notice of appeal to the Board. The Court of Appeals reversed on an unassigned point of error regarding the lack of a verified denial, but the Texas Supreme Court reversed that decision and affirmed the trial court. The Supreme Court held that the suit was untimely because the second notice was ineffective under Board rules requiring filing in the Austin office, and the Court of Appeals improperly reversed based on fundamental error not raised by the parties.

labor & employmentprocedure

In Nagle v. Nagle, a divorced woman sued her ex-husband for failing to convey his half-interest in their Houston residence as orally promised during settlement talks over missed child support payments and a contempt motion; she also sued her attorney in the alternative for not putting the promise in writing. The Texas Supreme Court reversed the trial and appellate judgments that had awarded her damages based on jury findings of fraud and promissory estoppel, instead rendering judgment for the ex-husband. The core reasoning was that the Statute of Frauds bars enforcement of oral agreements to sell real estate, and equitable exceptions like fraud or estoppel do not apply to override the writing requirement in this context; the court also found no evidence supporting negligence by the attorney.

family lawpropertyproceduretorts & liability

In Frankiewicz v. National Comp Associates, an insurance agent sued his former employer to recover commissions on renewal premiums that were withheld after he took a job with another insurance agency. The trial court granted summary judgment to the employer based on a non-competition clause in the agency contract that allowed forfeiture of commissions for violating the non-compete, and the appeals court affirmed. The Texas Supreme Court reversed, holding that the non-competition provision was an unenforceable restraint of trade because it lacked a reasonable territorial limitation, and therefore could not justify withholding the vested commissions.

business & regulatorylabor & employment

This case concerned a paternity action brought by a mother on behalf of her child, born in May 1978, against the alleged biological father; the suit was filed in October 1979 after the child turned one, and the trial court dismissed it under a Texas one-year statute of limitations for establishing the parent-child relationship in cases involving illegitimate children. The Court of Civil Appeals reversed, and the Texas Supreme Court affirmed that reversal. The court followed the U.S. Supreme Court's holding in Mills v. Habluetzel that the one-year limit violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by imposing a barrier on support claims for illegitimate children that did not apply to legitimate children, without a sufficient state justification, and because the short period failed to give illegitimate children a realistic opportunity to obtain support. The decision disapproved conflicting Texas intermediate appellate rulings upholding the statute and noted that a later four-year limitation was not at issue.

family lawcivil rights

Guaranty Bank appealed from default judgments entered against it in two suits brought by Thompson and O’Dowd to recover on promissory notes signed by Mansell, on which the bank had not signed, and to foreclose on bank stock. The trial court overruled the bank's motions to set aside the defaults and for new trial, and the court of civil appeals affirmed. The Texas Supreme Court reversed, holding that the motions satisfied the Craddock requirements because the bank's failure to answer was not intentional, no delay would result, and the motions set up a meritorious defense based on a tender of payment that discharged the bank from liability under the Texas Business and Commerce Code. The cases were remanded to the trial court for trial on the merits.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

This case involved a bank suing the payee of a check to recover $10,000 it had paid out after mistakenly honoring a stop-payment order placed by the drawer. The trial court and court of appeals ruled for the bank on a restitution theory, but the Texas Supreme Court reversed and remanded for retrial. The court held that a bank may pursue common-law restitution for mistaken payment over a stop order, but only if it alleges and proves that the drawer had a valid defense to the check; mere proof of the mistake is insufficient because UCC § 3.418 makes payment final in favor of a holder in due course or a person who changed position in reliance. Because the bank introduced no evidence of any defense the drawer might have had against the payee, its restitution claim failed as a matter of law.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case concerned the validity of a rule issued by the Texas Comptroller requiring companies to file a petition by June 1 to use a special method for computing franchise taxes based on an average of gross receipts, payroll, and property. Hewlett-Packard missed the deadline, was denied permission to use the method that would have reduced its tax bill by over $68,000, paid the taxes under protest, and sued for a refund. The trial court upheld the rule and denied the refund, but the court of civil appeals reversed; the Texas Supreme Court reversed that decision and affirmed the trial court. The court held the rule valid as a reasonable legislative administrative rule grounded in the need for administrative convenience to manage tax filings efficiently, consistent with the Comptroller's statutory authority and not arbitrary or in conflict with refund statutes or due process.

business & regulatorytaxes

The case concerned whether an illegitimate daughter (Kathryn) and illegitimate grandson (Craig) could inherit from Warren Davis Sr.'s estate under Texas Probate Code provisions that restricted inheritance by illegitimate children from their fathers absent legitimation through marriage, voluntary proceedings, or other statutory methods. The trial court denied their claims, but the court of civil appeals reversed, finding the statute unconstitutional. The Texas Supreme Court reversed the appeals court and affirmed the trial court, holding that the 1977 version of Section 42 was constitutional under U.S. Supreme Court precedent such as Labine v. Vincent, as the claimants had not met the requirements for legitimation and the statute's distinctions were permissible. The court noted that Warren Sr. had not married the mothers, completed voluntary legitimation, or taken other steps to establish inheritance rights, and it distinguished the case from Trimble v. Gordon while declining to apply that decision retroactively here.

family lawproperty

This case concerns the interpretation of a 1932 oil and gas lease between lessors and Sun Oil Company as lessee. The lessors sued for a declaratory judgment claiming entitlement to one-half of the proceeds from the working interest gas, in addition to the undisputed one-half of working interest oil. The trial court and court of civil appeals ruled in favor of the lessors, but the Texas Supreme Court reversed, holding that the unambiguous lease does not reserve any portion of the working interest gas to the lessors. The court reasoned that the lease expressly distinguishes between oil and gas, provides for royalties on each separately, and includes a specific provision reserving half the working interest only for oil, with the parties' intent to be determined from the four corners of the unambiguous document.

property

This case involved a dispute over royalty payments under oil and gas leases on state land, where the First National Bank claimed that Exxon underpaid royalties by basing them on the regulated interstate sales price rather than higher intrastate market values. The leases required royalties of 3/8 of the market value of produced gas, and Exxon had sold the gas under a long-term contract to an interstate pipeline after determining no intrastate buyers could handle the volume. The trial court and appeals court ruled against the Bank, and the Texas Supreme Court affirmed, holding that intrastate sales are not comparable for determining market value of gas dedicated to the interstate market. The court reasoned that, per its prior decision in Exxon Corp. v. Middleton, comparable sales must account for legal characteristics such as whether the gas is sold in a regulated or unregulated market, making the two markets conceptually and legally distinct. Other issues raised were overruled as the comparability point was dispositive.

business & regulatorypropertyfederal power

Earnest Ferguson sued the Farmers and Merchants State Bank of Krum for wrongfully dishonoring checks on his business account after the bank froze the funds without notice despite sufficient balances. Ferguson brought claims under both Texas Business and Commerce Code section 4.402 and the Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA) as it existed at the time. The court ruled that Ferguson could not recover under the DTPA because he did not prove he qualified as a consumer, given that the account was used for business purposes, but he could recover under the UCC provision for the dishonor. The jury found the bank's actions involved malice, supporting damages including for mental anguish, loss of credit, and related losses, and the court reformed the lower court's judgment to award a total of $34,854.56 plus interest before affirming it.

business & regulatorytorts & liability

This case involved a condemnation proceeding in which Harris County sought to acquire 3.314 acres of the Gordons' land for road and drainage purposes by paying the commissioners' $28,000 award into the court registry and entering the property. The trial court denied the Gordons' request for a temporary injunction, but the Court of Civil Appeals reversed and granted one on the ground that the County lacked authority to condemn a fee simple interest rather than an easement. The Texas Supreme Court reversed that decision, holding that the Court of Civil Appeals abused its discretion because Article 3268 provides the landowners an adequate remedy at law through potential damages if it is later determined that the County lacked the right to condemn a fee simple. The Court declined to decide whether counties have such authority and rejected other grounds for the injunction, finding that the County's deposit complied with the statute and that other issues could be addressed on appeal.

propertyprocedure

This case involved the construction of the wills and codicils of Mamie F. and Cesle C. Dues, which created a charitable trust administered by El Paso National Bank with directions that the trustee have sole discretion to distribute income for charitable purposes and that the property be used primarily, insofar as practicable, for crippled children’s work in Texas by the Elks and Shriners. The trial court held that the trust was created exclusively for the Shriners’ Hospital and the Elks Foundation with a 50-50 division of net income, but the Texas Supreme Court reversed. The court reasoned that an unambiguous will must be construed from its four corners without extrinsic evidence, that words such as “sole discretion” and “primarily” have clear ordinary meanings that do not support an exclusive distribution, and that no statement of facts was required because the parties agreed there were no fact issues and only questions of law were presented. The case was remanded for entry of judgment in accordance with the opinion.

property

This case was an original mandamus proceeding asking the Texas Supreme Court to order a Harris County district judge to vacate his order reinstating a civil lawsuit that had been dismissed for want of prosecution. The court conditionally granted the mandamus, holding that the reinstatement order was void because it was entered after the deadline set by Rule 165a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. Counsel for the plaintiffs received actual notice of the April 8, 1980 dismissal by May 19, 1980, so the thirty-day window for reinstatement expired on June 19, 1980; the judge's oral ruling on June 23 and signed order on July 28 therefore came too late under the rule and controlling precedents.

procedure

In Findlay v. Cave, attorney Cave sued former client Opal Findlay to recover the unpaid balance of fees from representing her in a divorce, claiming the amount due under a written contingency contract or alternatively in quantum meruit, plus statutory attorney's fees for the collection suit. The jury awarded Cave a reduced recovery in quantum meruit plus attorney's fees, and the court of civil appeals upheld the fee award. The Texas Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Cave's demand was not excessive as a matter of law so as to bar recovery of collection fees, because the claim matched the contract terms, Findlay never tendered the amount the jury found due, and the quantum meruit claim involved an unliquidated sum, unlike prior cases with clearly excessive demands on liquidated debts.

procedure

The case involved a dispute over the amount of 1974 franchise taxes owed by Ramada Texas, Inc. to the Comptroller, specifically whether ownership of property for computing the tax under the assessed value method should be determined as of January 1 of the preceding year or the last day of the corporation's fiscal year. The trial court and court of civil appeals ruled for Ramada, allowing recovery of the disputed taxes paid under protest, but the Texas Supreme Court reversed and rendered judgment that Ramada take nothing. The court held that articles 12.01(1)(b) and 12.08 must be read together, requiring the report to reflect the corporation's condition—including property ownership—on the last day of its preceding fiscal year (December 31, 1973, in this case), while property valuation uses the January 1 assessed value for county ad valorem taxes irrespective of who owned it then. This statutory scheme bases the tax on the corporation's holdings going into the relevant fiscal year.

taxesbusiness & regulatory

This case concerned a divorce action in which the trial court divided the marital estate, including awarding the wife a larger share of retirement benefits and a cash payment to equalize values, after considering both the wife's ongoing care for the couple's disabled adult son and the husband's fault in deserting the marriage and entering an invalid second marriage. The court of civil appeals reversed, holding that section 3.63 of the Texas Family Code did not permit consideration of either factor. The Texas Supreme Court reversed that decision and reinstated the trial court's judgment, reasoning that the statute's directive to give due regard to the rights of the parties and any children of the marriage encompasses support obligations toward a disabled adult child and that fault remains a relevant consideration in a fault-based divorce under longstanding Texas precedent.

family lawproperty