Deborah Hankinson

In this mandamus proceeding, three former customers sued CI Host, a web-hosting company, as putative class representatives for breach of contract, negligence, and deceptive trade practices after a server crash allegedly caused data loss and business interruptions. The plaintiffs sought production of certain computer backup tapes, which CI Host objected to on the ground that federal Electronic Communications Privacy Act section 2702 protected all information on the tapes from disclosure. The trial court overruled the objection and ordered production, and the court of appeals denied mandamus relief. The Texas Supreme Court held that CI Host failed to meet its burden under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 193.4 by producing no evidence that every item on the tapes constituted protected contents in electronic storage, so the trial court did not abuse its discretion. The Court therefore denied the requested mandamus without prejudice, noting the parties' agreement that some non-protected information existed on the tapes and that third-party privacy interests could be addressed through protective orders.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

Dallas County sued certified court reporter Sandra Halsey to recover payment for a trial transcript she prepared, alleging fraud, breach of contract, and violations of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act after another reporter identified thousands of errors in the record. Halsey sought summary judgment on grounds of derived judicial immunity, which the trial court denied but the court of appeals granted. The Texas Supreme Court reversed, holding that court reporters are not entitled to derived judicial immunity for preparing a reporter’s record. The court reasoned that this function is ministerial rather than discretionary, as it requires accurate transcription but does not involve the exercise of judgment comparable to that of a judge. The case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

proceduretorts & liability

This case involved Exxon Pipeline Company's condemnation of a 50-foot easement across the Zwahrs' 49-acre farmland in Fort Bend County for an ethane pipeline, after which the parties litigated the fair market value of the 1.01-acre taking. The trial court admitted testimony from the Zwahrs' appraisal expert valuing the easement as a separate economic unit with a highest and best use as a pipeline corridor, leading to a jury award of $40,000; the court of appeals largely affirmed but reduced the judgment. The Texas Supreme Court held that the expert's opinion was inadmissible under Texas Rule of Evidence 702 because it impermissibly relied on value enhancement created by Exxon's own project and failed to apply the required before-and-after valuation method to the entire 49-acre tract. The Court therefore reversed the judgment and remanded for further proceedings.

propertyprocedure

The case involved a dispute between Travis County and Pelzel & Associates over payment withheld under a construction contract for an office building, with Pelzel alleging improper withholding of liquidated damages. Travis County filed a plea to the jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity, which the trial court denied and the court of appeals affirmed, finding waiver by conduct and compliance with the presentment statute under Texas Local Government Code § 89.004. The Texas Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 89.004 does not waive sovereign immunity from suit and that the county's conduct did not constitute a waiver, thus dismissing the claim for lack of jurisdiction because express consent is required to sue a governmental entity.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

Jimmy Apodaca sued his employer, Excel Corporation, a nonsubscriber to the Texas workers' compensation system, alleging negligence and gross negligence for failing to provide a safe workplace at its beefpacking plant, which he claimed caused his cumulative trauma disorders in his neck, back, and wrist. The trial court entered judgment on the jury's verdict in Apodaca's favor, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Texas Supreme Court reversed, holding that Apodaca presented no legally sufficient evidence that Excel's negligence was the cause in fact of his injuries. The court reasoned that while evidence showed his injuries were work-related and that the job involved repetitive motions, there was no proof that different workplace practices or modifications by Excel would have prevented or reduced his specific injuries.

labor & employmenttorts & liability

In Lenz v. Lenz, a divorced mother sought to modify the joint managing conservatorship established in the divorce decree to remove a Texas residency restriction so she could relocate with her two children to Germany. A jury found that the statutory requirements for modification were met and that the mother should have the exclusive right to determine the children's primary residence, but the trial court imposed a geographic restriction limiting residence to Bexar County and declined to award attorney's fees. The court of appeals affirmed, but the Texas Supreme Court reversed, holding that legally sufficient evidence supported the jury's verdict under former Family Code § 156.202 and that § 105.002 prevented the trial court from overriding the jury's determination of the primary residence issue by adding a residency restriction. The court rendered judgment granting the mother the exclusive right to establish the children's primary residence and remanded the attorney's fees issue for reconsideration.

family law

This case involved the interpretation of Texas Labor Code sections 409.021 and 409.022, which set deadlines for workers' compensation insurance carriers to either begin paying benefits or notify the claimant and commission of a refusal to pay after receiving written notice of an injury. The claimant, Mary Ann Downs, sought benefits following her husband's fatal heart attack at work, but the carrier, Continental Casualty Company, first disputed the claim 48 days later; lower administrative bodies found the dispute timely, and the district court granted summary judgment to the carrier. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the carrier waived its right to contest compensability by missing the seven-day deadline. The Texas Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that the statute's plain language requires carriers to take one of the two actions within seven days, and failure to do so prevents later contesting compensability, even though a separate 60-day period exists for contesting the claim. The decision relied on principles of statutory construction emphasizing legislative intent from the text and the statute's overall structure.

labor & employment

In Bragg v. Edwards Aquifer Authority, the Braggs sued the Authority, claiming it violated the Private Real Property Rights Preservation Act by failing to prepare takings impact assessments before adopting aquifer-wide well-permitting rules and applying them to the Braggs' applications for permits to withdraw water from the Edwards Aquifer for their pecan orchards. The trial court sided with the Braggs and voided parts of the rules and proposed permit actions, but the court of appeals reversed. The Texas Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals, holding that the Authority's adoption of the rules fell within the statutory exception for actions taken under authority to prevent waste or protect groundwater owners' rights, and that the permit decisions constituted enforcement of a governmental action exempt from the TIA requirement. The Court reasoned that the Edwards Aquifer Act's regulatory framework for managing withdrawals through permitting directly aligned with these exceptions in the Property Rights Act.

propertyenvironmentbusiness & regulatory

The case involved the family of subcontractor employee Jimmy Harrison suing general contractor Lee Lewis Construction, Inc. (LLC) after Harrison fell to his death from the tenth floor of a hospital construction site, alleging negligence and gross negligence in failing to ensure adequate fall-protection measures. The Texas Supreme Court affirmed the judgment against LLC awarding compensatory and punitive damages, concluding there was legally sufficient evidence that LLC retained the right to control safety at the site and thus owed Harrison a duty of care, that LLC's breach proximately caused the fall, and that LLC was grossly negligent. The court applied established Texas law adopting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 414, under which a general contractor's duty is commensurate with the control it retains over an independent contractor's work, and found any jury-charge error harmless.

torts & liabilitylabor & employment

This case concerned whether the Solid Waste Disposal Act and Administrative Procedure Act require a party appealing a Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission (TNRCC) permitting decision to serve citation on every party of record in the underlying administrative proceeding. TXI Operations sought a permit to burn solid waste, which the TNRCC granted after a contested hearing involving Sierra Club and others; Sierra Club then petitioned for judicial review, serving citation only on the TNRCC and mailing copies of the petition to the other participants. The trial court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction based on the alleged failure to meet statutory prerequisites, but the court of appeals reversed. The Texas Supreme Court held that the Solid Waste Disposal Act requires service of citation solely on the TNRCC while the APA requires only service of a copy of the petition on other parties of record, that Sierra Club satisfied both requirements, and therefore that dismissal was improper.

environmentprocedurebusiness & regulatory

This case arose from a lawsuit by a school district administrator against other administrators alleging conspiracy to defame and intentional infliction of emotional distress stemming from statements to the press about office renovations. The defendants sought summary judgment based on statutory immunity for professional school employees under Texas Education Code section 22.051, but the trial court denied it, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Texas Supreme Court dismissed the petition for review, concluding it lacked jurisdiction over the interlocutory appeal because the court of appeals' decision did not conflict with prior decisions from other courts of appeals as required for conflicts jurisdiction.

proceduretorts & liability

This case concerned a religious education program in a Tarrant County jail that provided instruction based on orthodox Christian principles to volunteer inmates. Former inmates and a local taxpayer sued the county and sheriff, alleging violations of the Establishment Clause and other constitutional provisions, seeking damages, injunctive relief, and declaratory relief. The Texas Supreme Court held that the taxpayer had standing to seek injunctive relief due to the expenditure of public funds, while former inmates had standing only for damages claims. The Court ruled that the program's operation constituted an unconstitutional establishment of religion as a matter of law because it advanced specific religious beliefs with significant government involvement, and it remanded for determinations on appropriate relief while dismissing equal protection claims for lack of standing.

criminal lawreligious libertycivil rightsprocedure

In this medical-malpractice case, the Palacios family sued American Transitional Care Centers after patient Teofilo Palacios fell from his hospital bed and suffered further injuries, alleging negligent failure to prevent the fall through proper restraints. The trial court dismissed the claims with prejudice under section 13.01(e) of the Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act because the plaintiffs' expert report by Dr. Catherine Bontke failed to provide a good-faith summary of the standard of care, breach, and causation. The court of appeals reversed after applying summary-judgment standards, but the Texas Supreme Court held that dismissal decisions under the statute are reviewed for abuse of discretion and that an expert report must discuss those elements with enough specificity to notify the defendant of the challenged conduct and allow the court to assess merit. Finding the report's statements conclusory and insufficient, the Court concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion and reinstated the dismissal. The decision interprets the statutory requirements for expert reports in healthcare liability actions.

healthcareproceduretorts & liability

The case involved Paula Ann Lock, a licensed Texas attorney who pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled substance, resulting in deferred adjudication and community supervision without a formal conviction. The Board of Disciplinary Appeals (BODA) applied compulsory discipline under the Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure, suspending Lock for the duration of her probation on the grounds that her offense qualified as an intentional crime. Lock appealed, contending that compulsory discipline was improper because the offense did not meet the definition of an intentional crime requiring proof of moral turpitude. The Texas Supreme Court held that compulsory discipline applies only when an attorney is convicted of or receives deferred adjudication for an intentional crime as defined by the rules, and that possession of a controlled substance does not automatically qualify without additional findings of moral turpitude. The Court reversed BODA's judgment and remanded the matter for review under the standard grievance procedures, which allow consideration of the underlying facts and mitigating circumstances in determining sanctions.

criminal lawprocedure

In Apex Towing Co. v. Tolin, the plaintiffs sued their former attorneys for legal malpractice, alleging the lawyers failed to file a timely maritime limitation-of-liability pleading while defending a personal-injury suit, which exposed the plaintiffs to an excess judgment. The trial court and court of appeals granted summary judgment for the attorneys on statute-of-limitations grounds, concluding that the tolling rule from Hughes v. Mahaney & Higgins did not apply because the plaintiffs had hired new counsel before the underlying case concluded. The Texas Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Hughes rule remains unmodified by Murphy v. Campbell and requires tolling of the two-year limitations period in legal-malpractice cases arising from litigation until the underlying claim is finally resolved by exhaustion of appeals or settlement. The Court reasoned that a bright-line tolling rule provides predictability and consistency for this category of claims without case-by-case policy reexamination. The case was remanded for further proceedings.

proceduretorts & liability

In this case, Charles Sherry filed a suit affecting the parent-child relationship seeking to establish his paternity of C.S.C. and obtain managing conservatorship after the child's mother died, despite a prior 1993 court adjudication naming another man as the biological father. The trial court dismissed the suit, ruling that it was barred by Texas Family Code § 160.007(a)(1) and that Sherry lacked standing under §§ 102.003(9) and (11) because he had not resided with or had actual care of the child for the six months immediately preceding the filing. The court of appeals reversed on constitutional grounds, but the Texas Supreme Court reversed and dismissed the claims, holding that the statutory bar on successive paternity suits applied since the prior judgment was valid and Sherry did not meet the residency or care requirements for standing.

family lawprocedure

The case concerned the Harris County Bail Bond Board's denial of a renewal application for Allegheny Mutual Casualty Company's bail-bond license with agent Edd Blackwood under the Bail Bond Act, due to missing recommendation letters and unpaid bond forfeitures from Blackwood's prior individual license. The trial court, after a de novo review, ordered the license renewed for two years starting from the date of its judgment, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Texas Supreme Court held that the Act's application requirements, including three recommendation letters, are mandatory and must be met for renewal, and that any renewal period is strictly limited to two years from the expiration of the prior license rather than the judgment date. The Court therefore reversed the judgments below and rendered judgment for the Board.

business & regulatorycriminal law

In Underkofler v. Vanasek, a client sued his former attorneys for legal malpractice, alleging common-law claims such as negligence, gross negligence, breach of contract, and breach of warranties, as well as violations of the Deceptive Trade Practices Act, stemming from their handling of an underlying lawsuit on a promissory note. The trial court granted summary judgment for the attorneys on all claims, primarily on statute-of-limitations grounds. The court of appeals reversed as to all claims except breach of implied warranty under the DTPA. The Texas Supreme Court affirmed that the Hughes tolling rule applied to the common-law claims, rendering them timely because they were filed before the underlying litigation concluded with a final judgment, and that the client's partial settlement of the underlying case did not eliminate his damages claims as a matter of law; however, it reversed as to the DTPA claims, holding that Hughes tolling does not apply to the DTPA's specific limitations statute and that those claims were time-barred.

proceduretorts & liability

This case concerned the Montgomery Independent School District Board's nonrenewal of teacher Joanne Davis's term contract under Education Code chapter 21, subchapter F, after a hearing examiner recommended renewal based on findings that the district failed to prove any grounds for nonrenewal by a preponderance of the evidence. The Board rejected the recommendation, made its own findings, and decided not to renew the contract citing failure to maintain effective working relationships and rapport; the Commissioner affirmed by operation of law, but the trial court and court of appeals reversed. The Texas Supreme Court held that a school board reviewing a hearing examiner's recommendation may not make additional findings of fact but retains authority to make the ultimate decision on contract renewal, subject to statutory limits and substantial evidence review. In this instance, the Board exceeded its authority and its decision lacked substantial evidence support, so the Court affirmed the judgment ordering reinstatement. The core reasoning centered on statutory interpretation of the distinct roles of hearing examiners and boards under sections 21.257, 21.258, and 21.259, distinguishing fact-finding from policy decisions.

labor & employmentprocedure

In Kroger Co. v. Keng, an employee sued her employer, a non-subscriber to workers' compensation insurance, for negligence after suffering work-related injuries, and the employer sought to have the jury consider the employee's alleged comparative responsibility. The Texas Supreme Court held that non-subscribing employers are not entitled to a jury question on an employee's comparative responsibility. The core reasoning was that Texas Labor Code § 406.033 bars nonsubscribers from proving contributory negligence as a defense, which is a prerequisite for applying the comparative-responsibility statute, and the workers' compensation scheme intends that an employee's fault will neither defeat nor reduce recovery in such cases.

labor & employmenttorts & liability