In this case, Katie Hodge and her husband sued for partition of real estate and an accounting of rents, claiming Hodge was entitled to inherit from her father Jim Jefferson as the child of a valid common-law marriage between him and her mother Isabella Jefferson. The trial court and Court of Civil Appeals ruled that Hodge failed to prove the existence of a common-law marriage, and the Texas Supreme Court affirmed. The court reasoned that evidence of the couple's separation followed by Jefferson's ceremonial marriage to another woman while Isabella was alive supported the conclusion that no mutual agreement to marry existed, despite other evidence of cohabitation and community recognition; it distinguished contrary precedent and held that a statute legitimizing children of null marriages did not apply absent proof of any marriage at all.
The case involved the City of Dallas annexing all territory within Dallas County Water Control and Improvement District No. 3 via ordinances and abolishing the district under state statutes, with the city taking over the district's property and functions. The district and some residents sued for an injunction, arguing that the statutes (Article 1175, paragraph 2, and Article 1182C-1) were unconstitutional as improper delegations of legislative power and as violating protections for the district created under Article XVI, Section 59 of the Texas Constitution. The trial court denied the injunction and ordered the district to transfer its assets to the city. The Texas Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Home Rule Amendment directly authorizes home rule cities to fix and extend boundaries, and that water districts as state-created agencies may have their existence ended by legislative or authorized municipal action, consistent with prior precedents.
This case involved property owners suing the operator of a nearby caliche pit for damages to their home and improvements allegedly caused by blasting explosions, and seeking an injunction against further harmful blasting. The plaintiffs presented evidence of simultaneous shaking, cracks in walls and foundations, falling rocks, and other structural damage coinciding with the explosions, along with expert testimony indicating that excessive amounts of explosives were likely used. The trial court granted the defendant's motion for an instructed verdict after the plaintiffs rested, but the Court of Civil Appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed the reversal, concluding that the evidence was sufficient to raise fact issues on negligence (use of more explosives than reasonably necessary) and causation without relying on res ipsa loquitur, so the case should have gone to the jury.
This case involved taxpaying citizens suing a rural school district, its trustees, and a contractor to enjoin performance of a contract for school construction, alleging the contract was illegal because it called for wooden buildings in violation of the bond election materials specifying construction with non-wood materials under Article 2786. The trial court denied a temporary injunction, the appeals court dismissed the appeal as moot after substantial completion, and the Texas Supreme Court granted review. By the time of argument, the contract was fully performed and paid, making injunctive relief impossible. The court held that the case was moot because private citizens lack standing under Texas law to challenge or recover on an allegedly illegal public contract once performed, as only public officers may bring such suits, and accordingly reversed the lower courts and dismissed the action without adjudicating the contract's validity.
This case involves the interpretation of Texas's Second-Injury Fund Act under the Workmen's Compensation Act. The petitioner, who had previously lost sight in one eye from a non-compensable 1929 injury, suffered total loss of sight in his other eye from a 1946 work injury and sought additional compensation from the fund after receiving payment only for the second injury. The Industrial Accident Board deducted compensation amounts for both injuries, but the district court and Court of Civil Appeals reached differing conclusions on deductions, lump-sum payments, and interest. The Texas Supreme Court held that only the compensation paid for the second injury should be deducted, allowing the petitioner recovery for total and permanent disability from the fund, because the statute limits insurer liability to the effects of the second injury alone and the fund covers the combined disability when the first injury was non-compensable. The court affirmed related rulings on lump-sum payment and interest while reversing the reduction in award.
The case concerned a receivership proceeding in which James W. White was ordered by a Dallas County district court to deliver specified assets, including a car and cash, to a court-appointed receiver. After White did not comply, the court held him in contempt and imposed jail time and a fine without any sworn complaint or information having been filed charging the violation. The Texas Supreme Court granted habeas corpus relief and ordered White's release, holding that contempt proceedings for acts outside the presence of the court require a formal sworn complaint to inform the accused of the charges and confer jurisdiction. The court relied on longstanding Texas precedent requiring such a complaint to satisfy due process before punishment for constructive contempt.