Nathan Lincoln Hecht

The case concerned the University of Texas at Austin's refusal to disclose final results of student disciplinary hearings involving sex offenses in response to a request from the Austin American-Statesman newspaper. The University argued it could withhold the records under the Texas Public Information Act without seeking an opinion from the Office of the Attorney General because the federal Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) protects such education records. The Texas Supreme Court held that the PIA authorized the University's refusal without an OAG decision and that the trial court should have granted summary judgment to the University. The core reasoning was that FERPA conditions federal funding on protecting student disciplinary records, PIA Section 552.114 allows withholding without an OAG opinion in these circumstances, and federal guidance confirms the OAG would decline to review such records anyway.

federal powerprocedure

This case involves a legal malpractice claim brought by Henry S. Miller Commercial Company against its former lawyers, Newsom, Terry & Newsom, LLP and Steven K. Terry, stemming from an underlying real estate dispute that Miller lost. The Texas Supreme Court addressed whether Miller's claim was barred because the underlying opponent had obtained an interest in the malpractice recovery or influenced the litigation, requiring a reversal of positions about the strength of the cases. The Court held that the claim was not barred like an assignment would be, because Miller retained substantial control over the claim, though juries must be informed of any such interests or influences; it also ruled there was evidence of some negligence damages but none supporting the full jury award or gross negligence. The Court therefore affirmed remand for a new trial on the negligence claim only and rendered judgment against the gross negligence claim.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case In re J.Y.O. involved the division of marital assets following the 2019 divorce of Hakan and Lauren Oksuzler, specifically addressing a discretionary bonus paid to Hakan in February 2020 for his 2019 work at Bank of America, ownership interests in the marital home after refinancing, and the proper characterization of funds in Hakan's 401(k) account. The Supreme Court of Texas held that the bonus constituted community property because it was compensation for services performed during the marriage, reversing the court of appeals on that issue. The court affirmed that the refinancing deed gave rise to an unrebutted gift presumption, requiring each spouse to receive an undivided one-half interest in the home as tenants in common. It also affirmed the remand of the 401(k) issue for proper tracing of premarital separate contributions versus marital community contributions, as the trial court's calculation lacked sufficient evidence.

family lawproperty

The case involved the Texas Department of Public Safety's suspension of Stephen Caruana's driver's license after a breath test showed alcohol concentration above the legal limit following his arrest for driving while intoxicated. At the administrative hearing, the arresting officer's report was admitted into evidence despite not being sworn as required by statute, and the ALJ upheld the suspension based on the report and test results. The county court and court of appeals reversed, holding the unsworn report inadmissible under evidence rules and SOAH regulations. The Texas Supreme Court reversed those decisions, ruling that the report was admissible under Texas Rule of Evidence 803(8) as a public record because an officer's failure to swear does not undermine its reliability, given that false statements in governmental records are also criminal offenses.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a pay dispute between the City of Dallas and its police officers and firefighters over a 1979 ordinance, adopted by voter referendum, that provided a 15% raise and required maintaining percentage pay differentials between ranks. The officers sued for a declaratory judgment interpreting the ordinance and damages for breach of their employment contracts, claiming the City failed to maintain the differentials when giving raises to higher ranks. The City asserted governmental immunity from suit, nonsuited its own counterclaim for alleged overpayments, and the case reached the Texas Supreme Court on an interlocutory appeal after the trial court denied immunity. The Court held that the City's nonsuit of its counterclaim did not restore full immunity, that the case must be remanded to address a new legislative waiver of immunity, that the City retained immunity from the declaratory judgment claim, and that adoption of the ordinance by referendum did not waive the City's immunity because the officers were not acting in a legislative capacity.

labor & employmentprocedure

The case concerned whether two state hospital doctors, sued along with their employer on health care liability claims, could pursue an interlocutory appeal from the denial of their motions to dismiss under section 101.106(e) of the Texas Tort Claims Act, which requires immediate dismissal of employees when the governmental unit moves for it. After the plaintiff nonsuited the hospital, the trial court denied the doctors' motions, and the court of appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction under section 51.014(a), holding that a motion to dismiss is neither a motion for summary judgment nor a plea to the jurisdiction. The Texas Supreme Court reversed, holding that an interlocutory appeal lies from the denial of a motion asserting the statutory right to dismissal regardless of the procedural vehicle used, because the statute's purpose is to permit review of the immunity issue itself; it further held that the nonsuit could not defeat the doctors' pending claim for affirmative relief under the Act.

proceduretorts & liability

This case involved a patient who sued a hospital for negligence and premises liability after slipping on lubricating gel that fell to the floor during or after a nurse performed a doctor-ordered bladder scan. The patient did not file an expert report as required by the Texas Medical Liability Act, leading the hospital to seek dismissal. The trial court denied the motion and the court of appeals affirmed, but the Texas Supreme Court reversed, holding that the claims constituted health care liability claims. The Court reasoned that the underlying nature of the suit—stemming from the nurse's performance of the medical procedure and failure to properly dispose of the gel—was directly related to the provision of health care and inseparable from accepted standards of medical care and safety during the patient's treatment. As a result, the claims required an expert report, and the case was remanded for dismissal.

healthcareproceduretorts & liability

The case concerned the interpretation of an insurance policy regarding coverage for vessels involved in offshore repair operations. The Supreme Court of Texas, in this concurring opinion, joined the majority in holding that the policy unambiguously covers repairs and vessels engaged in or about repairs but does not extend to vessels on standby for extended periods. The core reasoning was that the policy terms are clear on their face, and while stricken language from negotiations can provide context about the parties' intent and the specialized nature of the coverage, it does not alter the unambiguous scope of coverage provided in the insuring provisions.

business & regulatory

The case involved a products liability suit by the family of Leonel Garza against Merck, claiming that the prescription drug Vioxx caused Garza's fatal heart attack despite his extensive history of heart disease. The Texas Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs' epidemiological evidence did not satisfy the scientific reliability requirements established in Havner for proving general causation. Those requirements include at least two statistically significant studies showing more than double the risk of heart attack at the dose and duration taken by the decedent. Because the studies cited by the Garzas lacked sufficient statistical significance or applicability, the court found the evidence legally insufficient. It therefore reversed the court of appeals and rendered judgment that the plaintiffs take nothing.

torts & liabilityhealthcare

The case involved an employment dispute in which Nafta Traders terminated Vice President Margaret Quinn, who sued for sex discrimination under Texas law; the parties had agreed to binding arbitration with a clause limiting the arbitrator's authority to avoid reversible errors of law. The trial court confirmed the arbitrator's award in Quinn's favor, and the court of appeals held that the Texas Arbitration Act (TAA), like the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) as construed in Hall Street, bars parties from contracting for expanded judicial review beyond the statutory grounds. The Texas Supreme Court reversed, holding that the TAA permits contractual expansion of review for reversible legal error and that the FAA does not preempt such agreements. The core reasoning was that arbitration is a matter of contract, the TAA's text does not make its vacatur grounds exclusive in the same way the FAA was interpreted, and parties may therefore agree to limit an arbitrator's authority and obtain judicial review of whether those limits were exceeded.

labor & employmentcivil rightsprocedure

The case involved a dispute over lien priority on four tracts of land between the Kothmanns, who held vendors' liens secured by recorded deeds of trust, and Genesis Tax Loan Services, which paid the owners' ad valorem taxes and claimed superior tax liens transferred from the county tax collector under Texas Tax Code section 32.06. Genesis recorded only notarized photocopies of the transfer documents attached to affidavits of loss, as the originals had disappeared in the mail or at the courthouse, and the tax collector lacked a seal and kept no record of the transfers. The trial court ruled for Genesis after overruling the Kothmanns' objection to unpleaded evidence of lien superiority, but the court of appeals reversed on both pleading and recording grounds. The Texas Supreme Court reversed, holding that a verified photocopy satisfies the statute's recording requirement for enforceability and that a general denial was sufficient because the Kothmanns bore the burden to prove the invalidity of the tax liens given their statutory priority. The core reasoning rested on statutory text permitting copies under evidence rules, the absence of any explicit original-only mandate in section 32.06(d), and the principle that lien superiority claims based on tax priority are not matters of avoidance requiring affirmative pleading.

taxespropertyprocedure

The case Loftin v. Lee involved a personal injury lawsuit by Janice Lee against Terri Loftin after Lee fell from a horse and fractured a vertebra during a trail ride on Loftin's East Texas property, where the horse bolted after being spooked by mud and a vine touching its flank. The Texas Supreme Court interpreted the Texas Equine Activity Limitation of Liability Act, which shields participants and sponsors from liability for damages resulting from inherent risks of equine activities such as animal propensities, land conditions, and participant negligence, except in specified circumstances like faulty equipment or willful disregard for safety. The court held that inherent risks include dangers in the general character of equine activities, even if avoidable, and that the Act limits liability for failing to assess a participant's ability unless that failure caused the injury. The court reversed the court of appeals' judgment and rendered judgment for Loftin, concluding that the Act barred Lee's claims.

torts & liability

This case involved a breach of contract claim by Basic Capital Management, ART, and TCI against Dynex Commercial over Dynex's refusal to honor a commitment to provide $160 million in financing for future real estate investments through single-asset bankruptcy-remote entities (SABREs) that ART and TCI would create and own, as well as a related agreement for three specific loans. After a jury found Dynex breached the agreements and awarded damages including lost profits and increased financing costs, the trial court granted Dynex judgment notwithstanding the verdict on grounds that ART and TCI lacked standing or beneficiary status and that lost profits were not foreseeable. The Texas Supreme Court held that ART and TCI were intended third-party beneficiaries of the commitments because the agreements were expressly structured to benefit them through their wholly owned SABREs, and that consequential damages like lost profits were foreseeable given the parties' intertwined dealings and the nature of the financing arrangement; it therefore reversed the court of appeals and remanded for further proceedings. The Court also addressed procedural requirements under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 93 regarding challenges to a party's capacity to sue.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved two doctors employed by a state health science center who were sued for medical negligence by parents of a child injured during delivery at a public hospital; the doctors moved to dismiss under section 101.106(f) of the Texas Tort Claims Act so the suit could proceed only against their governmental employer. The trial court did not rule on the motion, and the court of appeals held that dismissal required the doctors to prove the Act waived the employer's immunity. The Texas Supreme Court reversed, holding that "under this chapter" in section 101.106(f) encompasses all common-law tort claims against a governmental unit, not merely those for which the Act waives immunity, consistent with its prior decision in Mission Consolidated Independent School District v. Garcia. The Court therefore remanded for further proceedings on the doctors' dismissal motions.

torts & liabilityprocedurehealthcare

The case concerned a health care liability claim arising from a spinal surgery performed by a doctor at a state university health center, where the plaintiffs initially sued the doctor individually after the incident but did not name the governmental employer as a defendant. After limitations had expired, the doctor moved under Texas Tort Claims Act section 101.106(f) to substitute the employer (the Center) as the defendant, which the plaintiffs did within the statutory 30-day window. The trial court dismissed the claim against the Center as untimely, finding the relation-back doctrine inapplicable due to the health care liability statute's "notwithstanding any other law" language. The Texas Supreme Court reversed, holding that the substitution related back to the original petition because the statute's purpose would be defeated if a delayed motion could bar the claim, and the limitations provision did not preclude application of the relation-back rule in this context.

proceduretorts & liabilityhealthcare

The case involved Liana Leordeanu, a pharmaceutical sales representative, who was seriously injured in a car accident on her way home after a client dinner; she planned to stop at a company-provided storage unit to unload business materials before an upcoming personal trip. American Protection Insurance Company denied her workers' compensation claim, and the Texas Department of Insurance upheld the denial on the ground that she was not in the course and scope of employment. A jury found otherwise, the trial court rendered judgment for Leordeanu, and a divided court of appeals reversed. The Texas Supreme Court reversed the appeals court, holding that under the statutory dual-purpose rule the business purpose of the planned storage-unit stop was both a necessary and sufficient cause of the travel, so the injury was compensable even though the journey also served a personal purpose.

labor & employment

The case concerned whether a Texas statute capping successor corporations' liability for asbestos-related personal injury claims could constitutionally be applied to limit damages in a lawsuit already pending when the law was enacted. Barbara Robinson sued Crown Cork & Seal, alleging it had succeeded to the liabilities of Mundet Cork Corporation for asbestos products that caused her husband's mesothelioma. The Texas Supreme Court held that the statute violated the Texas Constitution's prohibition on retroactive laws as applied to the pending action. The court's reasoning focused on the statute's impairment of the plaintiffs' vested substantive rights in their claims, which outweighed any asserted public benefits from the liability limits.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case concerns the termination of an indigent parent's rights by the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, where the parent had discharged appointed counsel and proceeded pro se at trial before new counsel was appointed for appeal. The parent failed to file a timely statement of appellate points under Texas Family Code section 263.405, leading the court of appeals to deny an appellate record and dismiss the appeal. The Supreme Court of Texas held that due process precludes using the absence of the required statement to deny the parent an appellate record in such cases. The core reasoning extends the court's prior decision in In re J.O.A., emphasizing that the statutory limits on appeals in parental termination cases cannot override constitutional due process protections when ineffective assistance or procedural barriers prevent compliance.

family lawprocedurecivil rights

This case arose from an employment dispute in which Richard Werline claimed severance pay under his contract with East Texas Salt Water Disposal Company after resigning, alleging a material breach; the parties arbitrated and the arbitrator awarded Werline damages and fees. The company petitioned the trial court to vacate the award, and the court denied confirmation, vacated the award on the ground that it was contrary to the evidence, and ordered a new arbitration with factual findings already fixed against Werline. Werline appealed, and the court of appeals reversed and confirmed the award. The Texas Supreme Court held that the Texas General Arbitration Act permits an appeal from an order denying confirmation of an arbitration award even when the order also vacates the award and directs a rehearing, because the statute expressly authorizes appeals from orders denying confirmation, and therefore affirmed the court of appeals' judgment confirming the award.

labor & employmentbusiness & regulatoryprocedure

The case was a wrongful death suit brought by the family of a driver killed when his truck collided with a train at a Texas railroad crossing marked only by crossbucks. The plaintiffs claimed the railroad was negligent in providing inadequate warnings and in failing to remove a gravel pile and vegetation that obstructed drivers' views of approaching trains. The railroad asserted that federal law preempted these state tort claims because the crossing improvements had been federally funded. The Texas Supreme Court held that federal regulations under the Federal Railroad Safety Act and related Highway Safety Act specify the required warning devices and expressly preempt challenges to their adequacy. It therefore reversed the court of appeals and rendered judgment that the plaintiffs take nothing.

torts & liabilityfederal powerbusiness & regulatory