Sam Johnson

This case concerned whether an insurance company's petition to set aside a workers' compensation award by the Industrial Accident Board was timely filed, where the petition arrived at the courthouse mail facility on the final day of the statutory 20-day period but was not delivered to the district clerk's office until the next day. The trial court and court of civil appeals dismissed the suit for want of jurisdiction due to the late filing. The Texas Supreme Court reversed, holding that the petition should be deemed timely filed because the one-day delay resulted solely from an unauthorized instruction by a deputy district clerk to the post office to withhold the second daily mail delivery, a practice unknown to the district clerk; under Texas filing rules, an instrument is considered filed when it reaches the clerk's effective control, and parties cannot be penalized for the clerk's actions that obstruct timely filing.

procedurelabor & employment

This case was a venue appeal in a wrongful death action filed in Henderson County by Leola Carter against William Sommerville & Son, Inc. (a Dallas County resident), Lloyd Goins, and Doyle Ray Hundley after her husband was killed in a highway accident involving a tractor-trailer driven by an employee of Goins, who lacked the required operating permit under the Texas Motor Carrier Act. The trial court overruled Sommerville's plea of privilege to transfer the case to Dallas County, but the court of civil appeals reversed and ordered the transfer. The Texas Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was no evidence Sommerville knowingly procured, aided, or abetted a violation of the Act and that such a violation does not constitute negligence per se sufficient to establish venue under Subdivision 9a of Article 1995.

proceduretorts & liabilitycriminal lawbusiness & regulatory

The case Gutierrez v. Collins involved a personal injury suit brought in Texas by one Texas resident against another for an automobile accident that occurred in Mexico, with the plaintiff seeking damages under either Texas negligence law or, alternatively, Mexican law for moral reparations. The trial court dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction under the dissimilarity doctrine, and the court of civil appeals affirmed, based on the traditional conflict-of-laws rule of lex loci delicti requiring application of Mexican substantive law. The Texas Supreme Court reversed those judgments, ruling that neither the lex loci delicti rule nor the dissimilarity doctrine remained valid for common-law tort actions. The court reasoned that the relevant statute (Article 4678) was merely permissive rather than mandatory for negligence claims and did not preclude Texas courts from adjudicating the dispute. The case was remanded to the trial court for proceedings on the merits.

proceduretorts & liability

This case concerns a beneficiary's suit to recover proceeds from three $1,000 life insurance policies issued on his mother's life within months of her death from heart and related conditions. The policies contained "good health" clauses, and the insurer later obtained a release from the beneficiary in exchange for premium refunds on two of the policies. After a jury trial awarded the beneficiary the proceeds plus penalties and fees, the court of civil appeals reversed with a take-nothing judgment; the Texas Supreme Court affirmed that result as to the release on two policies but reversed and remanded for a new trial on the third policy due to evidence that agents may have waived the good health provisions by issuing coverage despite knowing the insured's illness. The core reasoning addressed whether the release was supported by consideration, whether special issues on avoidance were required, and whether factual disputes on waiver required jury resolution.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case concerned a dispute over the scope of an easement across the Storms' land in Kerr County, Texas, originally granted to Mrs. Mills in connection with the sale of a house and ten acres and later partially assigned to defendants Tuck, Smith, Walters, and Graham, who built a road on both the improved and previously unimproved portions of the easement. The Stormses sued to cancel the easement as a cloud on title and for injunctive relief, arguing that the defendants' road construction exceeded the grant. The trial court upheld the easement under both the written instrument and estoppel in pais; the court of civil appeals affirmed solely on estoppel grounds. The Texas Supreme Court reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded for entry of a proper judgment, reasoning that estoppel by silence requires more than mere observation without protest and does not automatically expand easement rights beyond the grant when the parties' contacts were limited and no fraud or fiduciary duty was shown.

property

This case involves a personal injury lawsuit brought by Bernard Dodd against Texas Farm Products Company for injuries he sustained while working on Texas Farm's premises to loosen and move compacted sulfate using dynamite. A jury found Texas Farm negligent and awarded Dodd $86,000 in damages, but the trial court granted the defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and the court of appeals affirmed on the ground that there was no evidence to support the negligence finding. The Texas Supreme Court reversed, holding that there was some evidence in the record to support the jury's findings. The court therefore rendered judgment for Dodd on the jury verdict.

torts & liability

This case concerned whether Houston Sash and Door Company violated Texas usury statutes by charging 12% interest on a corporate debtor's open account for building supplies before any interest was legally permitted and by including that interest in the claimed debt against both the corporation and its guarantor. The Texas Supreme Court held that the charges constituted interest in excess of double the amount allowed by law, triggering the severe penalties under Article 5069-1.06(2), including forfeiture of principal, interest, and other charges plus attorney fees. The core reasoning was that Article 5069-1.03 prohibits any interest accrual on open accounts during the calendar year they are created and limits subsequent interest to 6% absent an agreement, so the premature 12% charges exceeded double the statutory maximum and invoked the full penalties rather than lesser ones for lesser violations.

business & regulatorycriminal law

This case concerns the relative priorities among mechanic's liens held by a general contractor, deed of trust liens held by a mortgage lender providing construction financing, and a vendor's lien to which the lender claimed equitable subrogation, all arising from the development of two motel properties in Texas. The trial court held that the lender's deed of trust liens were superior to the contractor's mechanic's liens. The court of civil appeals reversed in part, limiting the lender's priority to the purchase-money portion of the loans. On rehearing, the Texas Supreme Court reversed the intermediate court as to the Fort Worth property (affirming the trial court) and modified its judgment as to the Irving property (affirming as modified), based on the statutory timing of lien inception under Texas law, the date of visible commencement of construction, and the scope of equitable subrogation for purchase-money advances.

propertyprocedurebusiness & regulatory

In Collora v. Navarro, plaintiff Ollie Collora sought partition of a Texas farm, claiming an undivided half interest based on her alleged common-law marriage to Joe Collora, who had originally purchased the land; she also challenged a later conveyance of the property by Joe. The trial court granted a directed verdict in her favor on the marriage issue, but the court of civil appeals reversed. The Texas Supreme Court reversed the appeals court, holding that the uncontradicted testimony of multiple witnesses, including Ollie, conclusively established all elements of the common-law marriage as a matter of law, leaving no factual issue for the jury. The court remanded the case to the trial court for entry of a proper judgment, noting that the directed verdict was appropriate where evidence was clear, direct, positive, and unchallenged.

family lawpropertyprocedure

Doris Bowie sued Ranger Insurance Company to recover under an aircraft insurance policy after her husband Loren crashed his plane and was killed, with the cause undetermined. The policy's pilot clause required that the aircraft be operated only by pilots holding valid and effective pilot and medical certificates as required by the FAA. Loren Bowie had a history of heart trouble and had twice deliberately misrepresented this condition on his applications for an airman's medical certificate, which the parties stipulated would not have been issued without the falsehoods. The trial court ruled against Bowie, the court of civil appeals reversed in her favor, and the Texas Supreme Court reversed again to affirm the take-nothing judgment, holding that the medical certificate was not valid because it was procured by fraud and thus the policy exclusion applied.

business & regulatory

The case concerned a dispute over title to a 177-acre tract of land in Texas. Anna Stradt sued for partition and an accounting, claiming a one-fourth undivided interest inherited from her mother’s estate; the First United Methodist Church responded with a trespass-to-try-title action asserting sole ownership based on a 1949 deed from Stradt’s father and a theory of parol partition arising from a 1946 conveyance of other family land. The trial court and court of civil appeals ruled for the Church after a jury found a parol partition had occurred. The Texas Supreme Court reversed, holding there was no evidence to support the jury findings because acceptance of the 1946 deed did not establish an agreement among all interested parties to partition the remaining tract, and a voluntary partition requires consent rather than a unilateral decision by the grantor. The Court rendered judgment that the Church take nothing and remanded the case for further proceedings on Stradt’s partition and accounting claims.

property

In Davis v. Huey, homeowners Huey sued neighboring lot owners Davis to enforce subdivision restrictive covenants requiring developer approval of building plans, seeking both a permanent injunction and a temporary injunction to halt construction. The trial court denied the temporary injunction after a hearing, but the court of civil appeals reversed, holding that the covenants were valid and ordering the trial court to enjoin construction until plans were approved. The Texas Supreme Court reversed the appellate decision and affirmed the trial court's denial, ruling that appellate review of a temporary injunction denial is strictly limited to whether the trial court abused its discretion and does not extend to deciding the underlying merits of the case. The court emphasized that the court of civil appeals had improperly reached and resolved the substantive issues of covenant enforceability and developer discretion.

propertyprocedure

Signal Oil sued Universal Oil Products, Procon, and Alcorn for property damage and economic losses from an explosion and fire at its refinery, claiming the isomax reactor charge heater was defective due to improper bolts that caused tube failure. The suit alleged strict liability, negligence, and breach of implied warranty regarding the heater's design, manufacture, and installation. The trial court and court of civil appeals denied all relief based on jury findings, including contributory negligence by Signal. The Supreme Court of Texas affirmed the judgments on the strict liability claims but reversed and remanded for a new trial on the implied warranty claims against Alcorn and Procon, noting differences in how contributory negligence and warranty remedies apply under the relevant statutes.

torts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory

In Hubbard v. Lagow, the Texas Supreme Court considered whether a receiver in bankruptcy, appointed after entry of a default judgment against the debtor in a state-court suit on a promissory note and foreclosure of liens, had standing to seek review of that judgment by writ of error. The court held that the receiver possessed standing to prosecute the appeal as the legal representative of the bankrupt and was not required to obtain prior authorization from the bankruptcy court. The core reasoning was that Rule 610 of the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure expressly permits a receiver to prosecute or defend actions involving the debtor without court approval, and under 28 U.S.C. § 2075 this rule supersedes any conflicting requirement in the Bankruptcy Act; the court further determined that the receiver succeeded to the debtor's interests for purposes of appeal.

procedurebusiness & regulatoryfederal power

The case concerned thirty-two Texas cities that had denied rate increase requests from Central Power and Light Company and appealed to the Public Utility Commission, which consolidated the matters and granted an approximately $23 million rate increase based on the utility's system-wide financial data rather than city-specific separated data. The cities sued in district court to enjoin enforcement of the Commission's interim and final orders, arguing that the Commission lacked authority to set temporary rates on appeal and that it was required to use separated data under the Public Utility Regulatory Act. The district court refused the injunction, and this direct appeal followed under constitutional and statutory provisions allowing Supreme Court review of injunction orders involving administrative validity. The Court interpreted the Act's provisions on municipal and Commission jurisdiction to permit the use of system-wide data in appellate rate proceedings, consistent with the statute's objective of establishing a comprehensive regulatory system.

business & regulatory

This case involved a personal injury lawsuit by bus passenger Patricia Moore against McDonald Transit after she fell and was injured when the driver stopped abruptly to avoid a collision with another vehicle. The trial court submitted a jury instruction on the sudden emergency doctrine, the jury found no negligence by the driver, and the court entered a take-nothing judgment. The court of civil appeals reversed, ruling that the instruction's wording improperly commented on the weight of the evidence under Rule 277, but the Texas Supreme Court reversed that decision and affirmed the trial court's judgment, holding that the instruction was a proper explanatory statement of the law that did not assume the existence of an emergency or convey the judge's opinion on the facts.

torts & liabilityprocedure

Feliciano Rodriguez, a seaman employed by B-R Dredging Company, sued his employer under the Jones Act and general maritime law after falling through an uncovered hatch on a tender boat and sustaining injuries to his back and legs. The trial court found both the employer negligent and the vessel unseaworthy but reduced Rodriguez's damages from $150,000 to $55,388.02 after the jury determined he was 55 percent contributorily negligent for failing to turn on deck lights. The court of civil appeals reversed the reduction, holding that a violation of the Corps of Engineers Safety Manual constituted a statutory safety violation that precluded contributory negligence offsets under incorporated FELA provisions. The Texas Supreme Court reversed the appeals court and reinstated the trial court's judgment, reasoning that the Safety Manual lacked the force of law because it was not published in the Federal Register or adopted through required administrative procedures, so it did not qualify as a statute whose violation would bar damage reduction.

labor & employmenttorts & liabilityprocedure

In Broussard v. Dunn, the Broussards obtained a default judgment against the Kings in Texas district court after the Kings failed to respond to the lawsuit; the Kings then filed a motion to set aside the judgment, and the judge signed an order granting a new trial more than 30 days after the default judgment was rendered. The Broussards sought a writ of mandamus to vacate that order, arguing the trial court had lost jurisdiction once the judgment became final. The court held that under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 329b, a default judgment becomes final 30 days after rendition, and any order setting it aside after that period is void. Because the judge did not act within the 30-day window, the October 17 order was of no effect, and the court conditionally granted mandamus directing the judge to expunge it.

procedure

In Select Insurance Co. v. Boucher, a workers' compensation case, the plaintiff sought benefits solely on a theory of total temporary incapacity after a workplace injury, while the insurer defended on grounds of partial incapacity only. The trial court submitted jury issues solely on total incapacity and refused the defendant's requested issues and instructions on partial incapacity, resulting in an award for six and three-quarters years of total incapacity. The Texas Supreme Court affirmed, holding that under Rules 277 and 279 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, partial incapacity is an inferential rebuttal issue that may not be submitted separately and that the defendant's tendered instruction was not in substantially correct form because it failed to define the term "earning capacity." The decision rested on the text of Rule 277 prohibiting inferential rebuttal issues and Rule 279's requirement for a substantially correct tender of explanatory instructions.

labor & employmentprocedure

This case concerned whether Liberty Mutual Insurance Company had a duty under its policy with U.S. Plywood to defend Homette Corporation in a wrongful death suit brought by the widow of a U.S. Plywood employee killed during unloading at Homette's plant. The trial court and court of civil appeals held that Homette qualified as a 'borrower' of the truck and thus was covered, but the Texas Supreme Court reversed, ruling that Liberty had no obligation to defend Homette. The court reasoned that the policy extended coverage for loading and unloading only to lessees or borrowers who had temporary possession and use of the vehicle, and the evidence showed Homette exercised no control over the truck or driver and therefore did not meet the definition of borrower. The decision emphasized that the policy's borrower limitation was intended to restrict coverage for non-employees beyond the named insured.

business & regulatorytorts & liability