Oscar H. Mauzy

In Hill v. Winn Dixie Texas, Inc., a customer sued a grocery store for negligence after slipping and falling on a cookie in an aisle where a store employee had been stocking shelves. The trial court instructed the jury on unavoidable accident, and the jury found no negligence by either party, resulting in a take-nothing judgment that the court of appeals affirmed. The Texas Supreme Court held that the instruction was improper because there was no evidence that the fall was caused by a nonhuman condition such as an act of God or environmental factor, rather than the parties' conduct. Nevertheless, the Court concluded that submission of the instruction did not constitute reversible error under the facts of the case and denied the petition for writ of error.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case involved a discovery dispute in a shareholder fraud lawsuit against Granada Corporation arising from its 1985 takeover of Immuno Modulation Laboratories Inc. The underlying claims alleged that Granada fraudulently induced shareholders to exchange their stock for royalty certificates that later lost value after asset transfers. The trial court issued a protective order shielding certain documents, but the court of appeals directed production of four inadvertently disclosed memoranda (finding waiver of privilege) and 62 additional documents under the crime-fraud exception. The Texas Supreme Court denied Granada's petition for mandamus relief, ruling that the inadvertent production waived attorney-client and work-product privileges and that the documents related to a prima facie case of fraud sufficient to overcome privilege claims.

procedurebusiness & regulatorytorts & liability

In Besing v. Smith, a legal malpractice suit arising from the defendant law firms' representation of the plaintiff in an underlying action against his former fiancée, the trial court granted summary judgment to the firms on the ground that the claims were barred by the two-year statute of limitations, and the court of appeals affirmed. While the plaintiff's motion for rehearing was pending in the court of appeals, this court decided Hughes v. Mahaney & Higgins, which held that limitations in legal malpractice actions arising from litigated claims are tolled until all appeals in the underlying suit are exhausted. The court overruled the motion for rehearing without remanding for application of the Hughes rule, and the dissenting justice reasoned that the new rule applies retroactively to pending cases as in Aduddell and Gulf Coast, that the court could take judicial notice of the underlying judgment and appeal dates, and that the defendants had failed to meet their summary judgment burden to establish when the cause of action accrued.

proceduretorts & liability

This case concerned whether a subcontractor's mechanic’s lien, filed under the Texas Property Code, extended to a portion of land that was sold after construction began but before the lien was perfected. The Texas Supreme Court held that Juan Valdez properly perfected his lien on the entire 7.9-acre tract, including the 0.8-acre portion later acquired by Diamond Shamrock, and reversed the lower courts' decisions enjoining the sale of that portion. The court reasoned that the term "lot" refers to the undivided tract as it existed in the deed records when work commenced, and the lien relates back to the date visible construction began, which predated the sale to Diamond Shamrock.

property

In MBank El Paso, N.A. v. Sanchez, the case concerned a bank's use of an independent contractor to repossess a vehicle after the borrower's default on a note, during which the repossessors continued despite the borrower's protests, towed the car at high speed with her inside, and left her locked in a fenced yard with a guard dog. The Texas Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' reversal of summary judgment for the bank, ruling that section 9.503 of the Texas Business and Commerce Code imposes a nondelegable duty on secured creditors to repossess collateral without breaching the peace. The court reasoned that this statutory duty, grounded in public safety and the avoidance of force or violence, cannot be shifted to an independent contractor under principles from Restatement (Second) of Torts section 424, which holds parties liable for a contractor's failure to provide required safeguards when the duty is imposed by law.

business & regulatorypropertytorts & liability

This case concerned whether a mother could recover attorney's fees from the Texas Department of Human Services after the agency removed her two young children based on unproven allegations of abuse. The trial court found the agency's actions frivolous, unreasonable, and without foundation, and awarded fees under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code chapter 105; the court of appeals reversed, holding that the statute applied only to the filing of a frivolous lawsuit and not to the agency's conduct during the proceedings. The Supreme Court of Texas reversed the court of appeals and reinstated the fee award, reasoning that the trial court's findings satisfied the statutory requirements and that section 105.002 permits recovery when an agency prosecutes a cause of action in a frivolous manner. The underlying facts involved the Department's failure to return the children after multiple judicial determinations that the evidence was insufficient, including an ex parte denial by a district judge and a directed verdict by a family court master.

family lawprocedurecivil rights

In this original proceeding, Justice Michol O'Connor of the First Court of Appeals petitioned for a writ of mandamus to compel her court to allow her to file a dissent from the denial of en banc review in an underlying medical malpractice appeal. The Supreme Court of Texas conditionally granted the writ, holding that under Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 90(e) and 79, any justice on the court, not just those on the deciding panel, may file such a dissent. The court reasoned that courts of appeals are unitary bodies rather than divided into separate panels, and allowing nonpanel dissents supports uniformity and correctness in decisions, consistent with federal practices.

procedure

The case concerned whether a defect in Bonnie Fitch's petition for placement on the Democratic primary ballot for district judge invalidated her candidacy under the Texas Election Code, after the court of appeals had ordered her name removed for omitting the party name and substituting the election date in the required statement. The Texas Supreme Court held that the defect did not bar her candidacy and directed the court of appeals to withdraw its writ of mandamus, allowing Fitch to remain the nominee. The Court examined provisions on petition validity and substantial compliance with statutory requirements for candidate applications in primary elections. It concluded that party officials had properly accepted the petition despite the error in the circulator's statement.

electionsprocedure

This case involved the State of Texas suing Malone Service Company and its officers for violating hazardous waste disposal regulations by continuing to use an unlined earthen pit after being ordered to stop. Malone defended by claiming discriminatory enforcement favoring a competitor, but the trial court excluded columns from an enforcement log showing penalties assessed against other companies. The jury rejected the discrimination claim and imposed substantial civil penalties. The court of appeals reversed due to the exclusion of evidence, but the Texas Supreme Court reversed that decision, holding that the full penalty details were not required to prove discriminatory enforcement and their admission would be unfair.

environmentbusiness & regulatorycivil rightsprocedure

In Shoemake v. Fogel, Ltd., the Texas Supreme Court addressed whether apartment complex owners and managers, held liable for a child's near-drowning death, could seek contribution from the child's mother based on her comparative negligence in supervising the child in a survival action brought on behalf of the child's estate. The court held that the doctrine of parental immunity prevents such contribution claims when the parent's alleged negligence consists solely of negligent supervision. The reasoning centered on the derivative nature of contribution claims, which depend on the estate's ability to recover from the parent, and the established principle that parental immunity shields parents from liability for ordinary negligence in the exercise of parental authority and discretion regarding the care of their children.

family lawtorts & liability

The case concerned whether the City of Houston could implement its own annual physical fitness testing procedures for firefighters, including potential suspensions for failures, under Department Order No. 4. Firefighters sued to enjoin the order, arguing it violated the Fire Fighters' and Police Officers' Civil Service Act. While the case was pending, the legislature added section 143.1115, establishing an exclusive statutory procedure for determining physical and mental fitness for officers in large cities like Houston. The Texas Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, holding that the state law preempts the city's authority to create alternative procedures that could lead to discipline based on fitness determinations outside the statutory process. The court reasoned that the Texas Constitution bars cities from acting inconsistently with general state laws on subjects the legislature has withdrawn from home-rule authority with unmistakable clarity.

labor & employment

The case concerned whether House of Lloyd, a Missouri corporation selling goods in Texas through independent contractors at sales parties, owed Texas franchise taxes for 1983-1985 despite never obtaining a certificate of authority to do business in the state. The trial court and court of appeals ruled in favor of the corporation based on decades of non-enforcement and an earlier administrative rule that tied the tax's 'doing business' standard to the narrower 'transacting business' definition in the Texas Business Corporation Act. The Texas Supreme Court reversed, holding that the corporation was liable for the tax. The court reasoned that the 1941 statutory amendment expressly extended the franchise tax to all corporations actually doing business in Texas, not merely those authorized to do so, and that prior non-collection or conflicting administrative interpretations could not override the statute's plain language and legislative intent.

taxesbusiness & regulatory

This case involved the enforcement of an Ohio divorce judgment ordering alimony payments, after Ruth Caulley obtained a Texas money judgment against Robert Caulley and sought to collect via writ of execution on his Houston County farm and a turnover order for his wages. The trial court found the farm was not the couple's homestead based on evidence they spent most of their time at their Harris County home and ordered Robert to turn over most of his wages to a receiver. The Texas Supreme Court affirmed the homestead ruling, holding that the couple's intent to move to the farm in the future did not establish homestead rights while they occupied another property, but reversed the wage turnover order. The court reasoned that a 1989 amendment to the turnover statute (Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 31.002(f)) expressly prohibits ordering turnover of exempt property like wages and applies retroactively to all judgments.

family lawpropertyprocedure

In Lee v. City of Houston, police officers sued the city over its appointment of unclassified civilians to managerial positions in the Houston Police Department that had traditionally been filled by classified officers, claiming violations of the Fire Fighters' and Police Officers' Civil Service Act (now Texas Local Government Code sections 143.001-143.134) and seeking promotions with back pay along with declaratory and injunctive relief. The trial court granted the requested relief, but the court of appeals reversed and rendered a take-nothing judgment, holding that the Act applies only to positions requiring law enforcement duties. The Texas Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and remanded for entry of judgment in accordance with its opinion, reasoning that the Act's purpose is to secure civil service protections for capable personnel in fire and police departments free from political influence, that the post-1957 definition of covered positions is circular, and that prior precedent supports a broader construction based on the overall statutory scheme rather than a narrow focus on law enforcement duties.

labor & employment

Mildred Dickson sought to establish that she was the illegitimate daughter of E.E. Simpson, who died in 1985, in order to gain standing to contest his will and assert inheritance rights. The trial court and court of appeals held her claim barred by the four-year statute of limitations and by chapter 13 of the Texas Family Code, which imposed strict time limits on paternity actions that Dickson, born in 1932, could never meet. The Texas Supreme Court reversed, holding that the statutory scheme violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by completely barring illegitimate children in Dickson's position from establishing paternal inheritance rights. The court reasoned that illegitimacy is a characteristic beyond individual control and that the total disinheritance was not substantially related to the important state interest in the orderly administration of estates, citing U.S. Supreme Court precedents such as Trimble v. Gordon and Reed v. Campbell. The case was remanded for further proceedings to allow Dickson a fair opportunity to prove her heirship.

family lawcivil rights

This case involved the interpretation of a will regarding the ownership of a remainder interest in real property after the death of a life tenant, and whether the open mine doctrine applied to oil and gas leases. The court determined that the will created a vested remainder interest in the testator's sisters or their descendants, not contingent on surviving the life tenant, though subject to divestment if the son had a child. It also held that the open mine doctrine applied, allowing the life tenant to receive proceeds from the leases without liability for waste. The decision reversed the lower courts' finding that the remainder lapsed and passed by intestacy, instead ruling that the interest passed under the sister's will.

propertyfamily law

This case concerned the receivership and liquidation of the Bank of Woodson after its closure in 1982, with the FDIC serving as receiver, and specifically addressed whether creditors could receive interest on their claims from a surplus generated by a bond recovery, as well as the appealability of intermediate orders in such proceedings. The trial court issued a January 1987 order denying interest, from which no appeal was taken, and later entered a final termination order in July 1987. The Texas Supreme Court ruled that trial court orders resolving discrete issues during a bank receivership constitute final, appealable judgments, drawing on precedents involving similar liquidation disputes. However, the court applied this holding only prospectively due to fairness considerations and therefore reversed the court of appeals while affirming the trial court's denial of interest to the creditors.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

This case is a habeas corpus proceeding in which relator William Evans Pryor challenged a contempt order from the 308th District Court arising out of his failure to execute deeds, a country club membership transfer letter, and royalty assignments as required by a final divorce decree. The trial court overruled Pryor's motion for new trial and then held him in contempt, sentencing him to 30 days in jail plus confinement until he complied. The court denied habeas relief and remanded Pryor to custody, holding that Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 329b does not impair a trial court's inherent power to enforce its orders through contempt even during the post-judgment plenary period.

family lawprocedure

This case concerned an administrative appeal challenging the Public Utility Commission's denial of Houston Lighting & Power's application to amend its certificate of convenience and necessity for constructing a high-voltage transmission line. The trial court and court of appeals held that the Commission's order failed to satisfy APTRA section 16(b) requirements for findings of underlying fact, leading to a remand. The Texas Supreme Court reversed, ruling that the Commission's order was valid and reviewable because it addressed the statutory criteria under PURA section 54(c), including the balance between need for the line and impacts on community values, environmental integrity, and other factors, without requiring hypertechnical additional findings. The court emphasized that the agency had made a decision within its authority based on the required considerations.

business & regulatoryprocedureenvironment

This case concerned the interpretation of liability limits in an aviation insurance policy after three passengers died in a plane crash. The policy provided $1,000,000 coverage per occurrence for bodily injury and property damage under Coverage D, but Endorsement No. 1 capped liability for bodily injury to any one passenger at $100,000 (with a $300,000 per-occurrence maximum for passengers). Petitioners, the decedents' relatives, sought a declaratory judgment that the full $1,000,000 limit applied to their wrongful death claims, while the insurer argued the endorsement reduced passenger claims to $300,000 total. The trial court granted summary judgment for the petitioners; the court of appeals reversed. The Texas Supreme Court reversed the appellate judgment and affirmed the trial court, holding that the endorsement's reference to "bodily injury" did not encompass "death," which the policy text treated as a distinct insurable event, so the $1,000,000 limit governed.

torts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory